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Abstract 
 
When Tony Blair took Britain to war in Iraq in 2003, he overruled vociferous opposition 
from both the wider public and members of his own governing party. Public opinion was 
exercised by the issue on a vast scale. Over one million marched in London against the war. 
Opinion polls uniformly showed majority opposition to the use of force. Newspapers, the 
engine of media debate in this country, mostly attacked the government line, and encouraged 
their readers to protest or even, in one case, to rebel. The story of Iraq, however, is not simply 
one of an ideological or misguided premier dragging the entire nation to battle against its will. 
It is not simply one of ‘spin’, dossiers, Alastair Campbell, and Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
Much of the debate, and much of the hostility it generated, focused on areas that foreign 
policy analysts would consider peripheral; the domestic political consequences of war, the role 
of ‘spin doctors’ in the assessment of intelligence, and the question of whether the Prime 
Minister’s (successful) efforts to build a strong alliance with the world’s last superpower had 
transformed him into the President’s ‘poodle’.  
Interactions between ministers and the media were conditioned on both sides by an 
intimidating array of structural pressures. Diplomatic and journalistic calculations often 
clashed, trapping the government in the middle of an immensely complex ‘multi-level game’. 
News management influenced substantive foreign policy just as policy influenced news 
management, and the media arguably affected both, albeit often indirectly. The substance and 
the communication of the decision to go to war proved to be inseparable, both in the course 
of decision-making, and in their later retrospective assessment. Public Opinion, broadly 
defined, had a significant impact on British foreign policy at this time. Crucially, however, this 
impact operated through political communication mechanisms usually ignored by FPA. 
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Chapter 1 – In search of the Loch Ness Monster... 
 
Research question and research design 
 
Every student of foreign affairs experiences the tension between a historian’s 
compulsion to explain specific past events, and that of a political scientist to understand 
general phenomena. Although the two approaches are distinct, they are also ultimately 
complimentary (cf. Lawson 2012). In this study I seek to strike a balance between the 
investigation of events and the illumination of phenomena. My subject is the interaction 
between the government led by Tony Blair and British public opinion during the period 
between 11 September 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. I ask specifically what 
was the impact of that interaction; on the public, on the government, on the decision to 
launch an aggressive war against Saddam Hussein, and what were the conflict’s longer-term 
domestic political consequences. It is a question of some personal interest, but for social 
scientists, as King, Keohane and Verba remind us, “personal reasons are neither necessary nor 
sufficient justifications for the choice of a topic” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 15). I begin, 
therefore, by outlining a conceptual rationale for this project.  
In terms of a theoretical contribution, this study involves the detailed analysis of a case 
in which, according to the literature, public opinion should have exerted considerable influence 
over government policy, but didn’t. The British people were exercised by the issue of Iraq in a 
manner never seen before or since. Over one million marched against war in London alone. It 
appears evident that the government took some notice, so great were the range and volume 
of official efforts to ‘sell’ the confrontation. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that those who 
protested, who wrote critical editorials in the national press, and who spoke and voted against 
the Prime Minister in Parliament, were unsuccessful. They failed to ‘stop the war’.  
Not only, then, is this case worth considering because of what should have happened, 
but also because of what did not happen. This case should have offered good grounds for the 
illustration of existing theoretical expectations, and yet in practice its outcomes deviated 
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markedly from what earlier studies might have predicted (Schuster and Maier 2006). Deviant 
cases offer fertile ground for hypothesis generation, one of the fundamental building blocks of 
all scientific research (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). As a result, their utility goes beyond simple 
historical description, although political scientists remain sceptical of their overall 
effectiveness; Arend Lijphart, for example, warned that “a single case can constitute neither 
the basis for a valid generalisation, nor the ground for disproving an established 
generalisation” (Lijphart 1971, 691). Lijphart was right, but only because he focused on the 
production of general conclusions which meet the strict standards of scientific proof. He spoke 
solely of confirmatory explanation, explanation which produces absolute answers. No social 
scientist would claim that any more than a tiny minority of the research we produce meets 
such standards, whether based on single case studies or large-n multivariate comparisons. 
Confirmation must remain the absolute goal of scientific inquiry. But confirmation 
presupposes the existence of propositions to be confirmed. Hypotheses about social, 
economic, and political phenomena can only be described as proven once they have been 
shown to work in general. They cannot be shown to work at all, however, until they have 
themselves been generated. Most quantitative analyses test hypotheses either invented by 
their originators or suggested by earlier research. When King, Keohane and Verba quipped that 
“no-one cares what we think – the scholarly community only cares what we can demonstrate” 
(King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 15), they were being disingenuous. Of course the community 
cares what we think; most inquiries examine phenomena conjured out of the ether by the 
imagination of their authors. The better ones base their hypotheses on some sort of earlier 
analysis. They have empirical roots to support their theoretical branches. They derive from the 
exploratory, or even speculative, explanation of real-world examples. Deviant cases offer 
particular opportunities for hypothesis-generation precisely because they deviate from 
expectations. If existing theories fail to explain the outcome in a given set of circumstances, 
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they must require refinement. Exploring the reasons why a case is deviant, then, helps to 
explain weaknesses in our theoretical toolkit. 
In addressing a deviant case, this study follows Gerring in asserting that “the utility of a 
single-unit study rests partly on its double functions”. It seeks “to know both what is 
particular” to the Iraq war, “and what is general about it” (Gerring 2004, 345, emphasis in 
original). The very aspects of a case that make it interesting in particular are what make it 
significant in general. Why does it not conform to existing expectations? What does this tell us 
about those expectations? Should the hypotheses upon which they rest be revised, or 
extended? Must they be abandoned entirely, or does detailed analysis reveal a more complex 
picture than the initial diagnosis of deviance might suggest? Noting the validity of these sort of 
objectives as components of the broader scientific process, Robert Yin has proposed that “case 
studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations 
or universes” (Yin 3rd ed. 2003, 10). In other words, what is general about a single case study is 
the impact it can have on the process of theory-building by proposing new hypotheses and 
refining old ones. Single case studies cannot produce general conclusions on the basis of their 
observations about how phenomena actually play out across a wider universe. They remain 
nonetheless vital tools for the broader advancement of knowledge as a result of their 
contribution to theoretical refinement.  
This study seeks therefore to explain why it was that the Blair government was able to 
take Britain into the Iraq war in the face of stiff public opposition, with a view both to 
providing a detailed account of an important historical moment, and to developing further the 
general hypotheses underpinning the study of public opinion as an influence over democratic 
foreign policy. It focuses on the causal mechanisms underpinning the public-policy 
relationship, rather than any specific set of causal effects. Causal effects, “the difference 
between the systematic component of observations made when the explanatory variable 
takes one value and the systematic component of comparable observations when the 
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explanatory variable takes on another value” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 82), are best 
observed through large-n cross-case comparisons. Causal mechanisms, “the ultimately 
unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal 
capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, 
or matter to other entities” (George and Bennett 2005, 137), are often left unexplained by 
such analyses, which tend to assume that the mechanisms through which an effect operates 
are irrelevant provided the effect itself can be observed. Studies such as this one thus have a 
role in shedding further light on relationships suggested by large-n comparisons through the 
exploration of the mechanisms by which they might operate. In particular, this study identifies 
the ways in which public opinion sought to influence the Blair government’s stated policy 
positions, and the government’s responses. In addition, just as large-n studies seeking causal 
effects and general confirmatory explanations focus on the “effects of causes”, i.e. the impact 
of changes in the values of given explanatory variables on unknown outcomes, this single case 
study looks at the “causes of effects”, working backwards from a known outcome (Britain 
going to war despite public opposition) to understand how it came about (Mahoney and 
Goertz 2006). It might be said, then, that from a social scientific perspective, this is not so 
much a study of public opinion, and how it might impact upon war in general, but of a war, 
how it was influenced by public opinion, and of the implications of that influence for future 
analyses.  
This case is of interest from a historical perspective because of its centrality to the 
personal narrative of one of Britain’s most successful politicians, Prime Minister Tony Blair. 
Iraq cost Blair dearly. Tim Dunne observed that “at the end of [his] decade in office, the 
obvious question is ‘where did it all go wrong?’. The one-word answer favoured by the media 
and large sections of public opinion is ‘Iraq’” (Dunne 2008, 340). Christopher Hill agreed; 
“apart from losses in the 2005 general election, Tony Blair’s personal position has been 
seriously undermined in his party and the country at large” (Hill 2007, 276). Even Blair himself 
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admitted that his resignation in 2007 was partly driven by the fact that, in the British media, 
“Iraq still caused too much bitterness and obstructed sensible analysis of the broader picture” 
(Blair 2010b, 657). A key empirical contention of this study is that much of the bitterness, 
much of the lasting negative impact on Blair and his government more generally triggered by 
Iraq, stemmed from the effect of efforts to ‘sell’ the conflict, rather than necessarily from the 
conflict itself. This is not a straightforward position, but its basis is elucidated in the following 
chapters, and examined explicitly in Chapter 7. It informs and supports the theoretical claim 
outlined in Chapter 8 that the conceptual division between the substance and the 
communication of foreign policy is untenable in light of the embedding of modern news 
management practices within the policymaking process itself. Considered together, these 
observations contribute to this study’s overall contention, that public opinion is not an actor 
within the foreign policymaking process in Britain, but part of the structure of the system 
within which that process takes place.  
 
Definitions 
 
It is far from straightforward to define ‘public opinion’. Hill once expressed regret that 
most studies ignore “elementary distinctions between opinion as overall mood, opinion as the 
aggregate of many different and competing attitudes, and opinions as transmitted by the 
press, parliamentary representatives or pressure-groups” (Hill 1981, 53). This study agrees 
with Hill that it is important to be clear about what exactly one describes when one describes 
public opinion. Vague comments about “the mysterious and intangible nature of public 
opinion” are of little use, as Paul Lazarfeld complained (Lazarfeld 1957, 41). At the same time, 
however, it is recognised that public opinion is often extremely difficult to describe objectively; 
“public opinion, like beauty, is often in the eye of the beholder” (Everts and Isernia 2001, 267). 
Often it “may simply be taken to mean those opinions held by private individuals which 
governments find it prudent to heed” (Key 1961, 14), an entirely subjective definition. Slavko 
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Splichal has warned that “public opinion seems to be more a poetical than a scientific term 
because only in poetry may the incompatible become united” (Splichal 1999, 50); any attempt 
to render it scientifically is thus, he argued, inevitably fraught. 
An initial dilemma emerges from the realisation that, as Roger Hilsman put it, “there is 
not one public, but many” (Hilsman 1987, 243). There is no single independent entity called 
‘the public’ existing ‘out there’ and thinking up its own opinions on a variety of matters, 
awaiting our analysis. After all, as Walter Lippmann observed, “thought is the function of an 
organism, and a mass is not an organism” (Lippmann 1922, 243). Faced with this problem, Key 
proposed a fudge. It was “unnecessary to assume that ‘the public’ exists in any particular sort 
of loosely structured association or other ghostly sociological entity” (Key 1961, 15); public 
actors certainly existed, and they could be studied collectively and individually, without the 
need to assume any overarching structural links between them. Key’s position informs the 
approach taken in this study. The ‘public’ is defined as a collective term for the non-state or 
non-governmental actors (individual and corporate) operating within a political system. A 
public actor is, in this formulation, an entity outside of the government. It might potentially 
take a range of forms, from the individual citizen through to the opposition political party or 
major national newspaper. This definition further establishes geographical and structural 
boundaries between distinct publics (plural) whose spheres of activity are defined by the 
administrative ambit of the governments they seek to affect.  
Clearly, however, such an open and effectively negative definition requires further 
specification to be of use; the suggestion that the public is not the government is hardly a 
profound discovery. As Key observed, the ‘public’ in this formulation contains a large number 
of varied actors. Faced by this complexity, he wrote, “students of public opinion often attempt 
broad classifications of the citizenry” (Key 1961, 543). The classification of the public has 
indeed been a favourite scholarly occupation. The most common and consistently-used 
approach has been to construct a hierarchy of actors according to their perceived level of 
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attentiveness to, awareness of, and influence over, policy. Typically this has involved the 
identification of ‘mass’, ‘attentive’, and ‘elite’ strata (Almond 1950, 138, Rosenau 1961, 33-34, 
Hilsman 1987, 284, Risse-Kappen 1991, 482, Sobel 2001, 12). Hierarchical approaches prove 
useful in differentiating between public actors on the grounds of the levels of sophistication 
they show, but remain problematic nonetheless. Distinguishing members of the elite and 
attentive sets from the broader mass is fiendishly difficult. Although elected representatives, 
interest group heads, and ‘experts’ from the media, academy and think-tank worlds are easy 
to observe conceptually (Powlick and Katz 1998, 34), they are too few to be reliably identified 
using the polling methods which typically dominate studies in this area (on which more later) 
(Key 1961, 536, Mueller 1973, 164). It is furthermore unclear whether these ‘elites’ hold 
significantly different views from the ‘mass’ (Verba, et al. 1967, 331-332). Even if they do, 
there is little evidence that policymakers actually try to seek out ‘elite’ views (Powlick 1995, 
433). One of the main rationales, furthermore, for the use of a hierarchical classification 
system has been that inattentive actors lack the knowledge to hold stable and rational 
opinions. In other words, their views are inherently unsuitable source material for 
policymaking. For much of the 20th century, studies of public opinion were conditioned by the 
“Almond-Lippmann consensus”, under which public inattentiveness and ignorance was held to 
breed irrationality and impotence (Holsti 1992). Most ordinary citizens do pay little attention 
to foreign policy, being interested only in those functions of government which impact upon 
their daily lives. As Lippmann himself put it, only once wars commence do most people pay 
much attention to their state’s relationship with the international arena; “in the ante-bellum 
period, nobody has to fight and nobody has to pay” (Lippmann 1922, 241). For this reason, it 
was assumed that “the characteristic [public] response to questions of foreign policy is 
indifference” (Almond 1950, 53). More recent studies have noted not only the existence of 
public inattentiveness, but also that oblivion is economically rational for many ordinary people 
in light of the limited direct impact of most foreign affairs on domestic life (Page and Shapiro 
15 
 
1992, 14, Nincic 1992, 31). Inattentiveness is important in turn for reasons beyond the obvious 
argument that governments are less likely to listen to public actors who show little or no 
interest in what they do (Schuster and Maier 2006, 228, Knecht and Weatherford 2006, 705). It 
constitutes in a very real sense a surrender of the right to influence policymaking. This 
surrender is significant. Where the majority lacks interest in foreign affairs, dedicated 
minorities gain traction over the public debate, regardless of whether their preferred position 
stands to benefit society as a whole (Key 1961, 17-18, 92, Risse-Kappen 1991, 510, Everts 
2000, 187). Of particular significance for multicultural western societies such as the UK has 
been the question of the extent to which ethnic, national, or religious minorities are gaining 
increasing power over policies affecting states, peoples, or regions in which they have a 
particular, interest (Hill 2007). By failing to assert themselves as a public, non-governmental 
actors give up their right to be considered part of the public.  
One reason why the inattentive are thought so impotent is the assumption, again 
derived originally from Lippmann and Almond, that a lack of interest in foreign affairs likely 
translates into a lack of knowledge (Lippmann 1922, 401, Almond 1950, 80). Even Ole Holsti, 
optimistic in other ways about public influence on policymaking, has warned that ordinary 
people “are poorly informed about most aspects of international affairs” (Holsti 1996, 215). 
Ignorance may be rational given the limited time citizens have to spend on different tasks, and 
the relatively high costs compared to the likely benefits of acquiring detailed information 
about foreign policy. It remains clearly sub-optimal in terms of developing public opinions in 
tune with actual public interests (Page and Shapiro 1992, 173). Fortunately for the public the 
recognition that much of the citizenry knows little about foreign policy has not undermined 
entirely the notion of public engagement in international affairs. The perceived existence of an 
“attentive” element within the public, whose interest (which may well be purely intellectual, 
and thus irrational in the economic sense) leads them to learn about foreign policy, has been 
introduced already (Risse-Kappen 1994, 238). Ignorance, it is noted furthermore, does not 
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prevent the development of opinion (Berelson 1952, 318, Sobel 2001, 21). Indeed, as Holsti 
himself points out, lack of direct knowledge is no bar to the use “even in the absence of much 
factual knowledge...[of] some simple – perhaps even simplistic – heuristics in order to make 
some sense of an increasingly complex world” (Holsti 1992, 450). Simplistic they may be, but 
the heuristics used by public actors in developing opinions on foreign affairs are often 
sufficiently appropriate as to generate reasonably rational outcomes, even on the basis of very 
little information (Jacobsen 2008, 351). Earlier images of the public as a ‘mob’, and public 
opinion as “impulsive, unstable, unreasoning, unpredictable, capable of suddenly shifting 
direction or of going in several contradictory directions at the same time” (Rosenau 1961, 36), 
have come under challenge in more recent studies for precisely this reason (Isernia, Juhasz and 
Rattinger 2002, Klarevas 2002). Indeed, the classical question, “should the polis adhere to 
beliefs informed by doxa, common opinion, or should its policies be shaped only by those who 
have refined, specialised knowledge, secured by episteme?” (Goodnight 1992, 243) has been 
reformulated in light of evidence that the distinction between the two is generally overstated. 
Collected (as opposed to individual) public opinions have been shown to demonstrate 
remarkable substantive rationality and consistency (Page and Shapiro 1992, Nincic 1992, 42, 
45), although the point has been made that the two characteristics can conflict, where 
opinions are not updated in light of new information (Everts and Isernia 2001). Casualty levels, 
the perceived success of a policy, the benefits it promises, or the costs it seeks to avoid, have 
all been proposed as effective heuristics by which citizens gauge the significance of foreign 
policy to their daily lives, and on the basis of which they make decisions about which issues to 
learn more about (Mueller 1973, Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005, Eichenberg 2005, 163, 
Klarevas 2006, 193, Gelpi, Reifler and Feaver 2007, 158).   
Seeking to break away from the limitations of an approach to classifying the public 
based on their knowledge of foreign affairs, Mueller proposed a three-part typology of non-
governmental actor derived from their actual behaviour in responding to particular official 
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positions. His “followers” always supported the government, while “partisans” stuck by their 
preferred political party line, and “believers” were guided by their own ideological views 
(Mueller 1973, 71, 116, 140). Splichal meanwhile has spoken of “a ‘voting public’ (i.e. the body 
of actual voters), an ‘attentive public’ (characterised by the interest in politics and at least 
occasional participation in debates on political issues), an ‘active public’ (representing the elite 
of the attentive public), and ‘sectoral’ or ‘special publics’” (Splichal 1999, 16). Research efforts 
which take this sort of functional approach, distinguishing between public actors according to 
their behaviour, have proven more successful, at least in terms of identifying their subjects, 
than those which consider the supposed sophistication of individual opinions. It has been 
noted, for example, that “regular viewers of television news and readers of broadsheet papers 
have higher-than-average levels of political information, interest, and engagement” (Norris 
2000, 45). Press consumption indices have in turn yielded workable estimates of the size of 
different opinion strata, if not necessarily of their views (Sobel 2001, 13). Press consumption 
figures cannot distinguish between readers who ignore, who read and forget, and who avidly 
devour political news items. They are unable, therefore, to offer a sufficient guide to the 
makeup of a particular public. Alternative suggestions, such as the specification of a “minimum 
amount of outlay (money, and time in terms of money) necessary to warrant inclusion within 
the public” (Lasswell 1931, 315), have proven equally unsatisfactory in terms of their analytical 
coherence and practical applicability. 
These varied contradictions can be reconciled by integrating the functional and the 
hierarchical classification systems. Acknowledging both that some public actors are more 
sophisticated than others, and that different actors respond to political issues in different 
ways, we can divide the broader public into active and passive elements. Active public actors 
seek directly to influence policy; they speak in Parliament, write in the press, or march in the 
streets. In the years after the period covered by this study, they increasingly found a voice 
through social networks and in the ‘blogosphere’ (cf. Hopkins and King 2007). Passive actors, 
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by contrast, may very well hold opinions on a subject, but these remain unexpressed, at least 
unless specifically prompted by pollsters. Active public actors distinguish themselves from the 
mass; there is no need to seek them out. They do so out of a particular interest in foreign 
affairs, and a desire to influence policymaking. They not only hold opinions, but establish 
public opinions, opinions expressed in public. As Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann has put it, in this 
formulation, “‘public’, in the context of public opinion, does not designate a certain category of 
topics on which opinions are held. It refers to the sphere in which public opinion processes 
operate” (Noelle-Neumann 1979, 152, Splichal 1999, 30). The collected expressions of the 
active public correspond neatly to what Lippmann called “Public Opinion with capital letters” 
(Lippmann 1922, 29), and it is the capitalised term which this study uses throughout whenever 
it discusses the impact of the active stratum.  
Although “the tendency to confuse a part with the whole...to see the will of the 
majority in a stormy parliamentary debate or a persistent pressure-group lobby” has been 
labelled “one of the most common errors or sleights of hand perpetrated in discussions of 
public opinion” (Hill 1981, 57), a focus on the active public has in fact considerable historical 
pedigree. Before the advent of opinion polling, “‘public opinion was usually equated with riots, 
strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts’ and more generally with the opinions of those 
individuals who choose to enter the public sphere to express themselves” (Hopkins and King 
2007, 1). Why should it not be? As Charles Tilly has noted, “if we push back into the strange 
terrain of western Europe and North America before the middle of the nineteenth century, we 
soon discover another world. In that world, most people did not vote, petition, or take 
positions on national affairs in anything like the contemporary meanings of those terms. Yet 
they did act together on their interests, broadcasting their demands, complaints, and 
aspirations in no uncertain terms” (Tilly 1983, 462). Public opinion therefore existed, in the 
form of Public Opinion, long before opinion polls were first conceived. What, furthermore, do 
the opinions of the public matter to politicians if those opinions are so lightly held that no 
19 
 
action is taken to broadcast them in this manner, or to impose them upon governments? 
Unsolicited public opinions tend to emerge from precisely those attentive and interested 
individuals whose views have proven so difficult to identify in general surveys (Verba, et al. 
1967, 328). They frequently follow challenging trajectories when considering the most 
contentious policies (Mueller 1973, 157), meaning policymakers have an incentive to pay them 
attention (Powlick and Katz 1998, 45, Sobel 2001, 10, Hill 2003, 265). There is thus a very good 
argument that Public Opinion, as defined here, is a more significant subject for the 
consideration of public influence over foreign policy than the indicators of passive beliefs 
created by opinion polling. This is the case even before specific difficulties with the practice of 
polling itself are taken into account.  
 
Public opinion does not exist 
 
Since George Gallup first demonstrated the power of opinion polls for gauging the 
voting intentions of the passive public, most studies of public opinion, including those looking 
specifically at foreign policy, have used survey methods of the sort he pioneered. Already by 
the 1950s the notion was well established that polls represented “a well analysed distribution 
of attitudes” that actually existed in the passive public, this despite the fact that “very little” 
was yet known “about how such complete attitude distributions come into being” (Lazarfeld 
1957, 43). When a poll is conducted, a representative sample of the population of interest 
(likely voters in a coming election, controlling for socio-economic status, age, and gender, for 
example) is asked to respond to a question or a series of questions. The tools of statistical 
inference are then deployed to determine whether the results obtained represent a 
reasonable estimate of the responses that would arise were the same question asked of the 
entire population. Further specification can be gained by the conduct of repeated polls over a 
period of time. There are limits to what can be done with polling. But, generally speaking, the 
reliability of statistical inference and the range of more sophisticated analytical tools 
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statisticians have developed over the second half of the 20th century have seen opinion polling 
retain a prominent role in the study of public opinion. 
This prominence is undue, at least when focusing on foreign policy. There is nothing 
wrong with the fundamental statistical principles that underpin poll activity, but their use to 
study public opinion remains flawed for reasons beyond the reliability of individual polls. 
Opinion polling is an invalid method for the study of public opinion on foreign policy matters as 
it is presently conceived because, as Pierre Bourdieu concluded in considering the matter, 
“public opinion does not exist”. Bourdieu offered three “implied postulates” stemming from 
the practice of polling that undermined the notion of an actually existing public opinion:  
“[1] every opinion poll supposes that everyone can have an opinion; or, stated 
otherwise, that the production of an opinion is within everyone's range of possibility. 
At the risk of offending a naively democratic sentiment, I contest this...[2] it is taken 
for granted that all opinions have the same value. I believe that it can be proven that 
this is far from the truth, and that by gathering a plurality of opinions which do not 
have the same real importance, the results are very severely distorted...[3] the simple 
fact of asking everyone the same question implies…an agreement about which 
questions are worth asking” (Bourdieu 1979, 124). 
 
 Bourdieu’s argument was that, since ‘the public’ does not actually exist ‘out there’, 
and since therefore ‘public opinion’ equally does not actually exist, opinion polls cannot be 
said to measure  public opinion. In his formulation, polls served simply “to impose the illusion 
that a public opinion exists” (Bourdieu 1979, 125). The practice of polling, similarly, filled a 
sociological position held in earlier ages by appeals to divine right. Writing to the Emperor 
Charlemagne in around the year 800, Alcuin of York warned “nec audiendi qui solent dicere, 
vox populi, vox Dei, quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit”; “do not listen to 
those who say ‘the voice of the people, is the voice of God’, for so uproarious is the mass as to 
be nearly mad” (Alcuin of York c800). The sentiment would have appealed to many 20th 
century scholars of public opinion. The specific phrase, “vox populi, vox dei”, which must 
clearly predate even Charlemagne, has a particular resonance in the face of Bourdieu’s 
criticism; as he put it, “the politician who yesterday said 'God is on our side' today says 'Public 
21 
 
Opinion is on our side” (Bourdieu 1979, 125). The modern significance of vox populi, vox dei 
goes beyond the simple legitimisation function of an appeal to public support (Splichal 1999, 
28). Not only is public opinion appealed to as a source of legitimacy in a similar way to God in 
earlier ages, it is also equally difficult to observe objectively, and indeed equally problematic 
from a scientific perspective. Opinion polls “are not designed to determine whether opinions 
exist, but to measure the variation in existing opinions” (Peer 1992, 231), just as theological 
studies do not question the existence of God, but proceed directly to analysing His works and 
intentions. Supporters of opinion polling argue that “there can be little doubt that public 
opinion, today, is a reality – in at least some senses of the term. It exists. If it did not, the 
activity of all those who claim to explore, measure and interpret it would be a little odd” 
(Osborne and Rose 1999). Their argument is that public opinion must exist, because of the size 
of the polling industry, and the level of interest in its outputs. But this argument merely 
reflects Splichal’s observation that “public opinion is often simply equated with what opinion 
polls measure, and the public with the population from which a (representative) sample of 
respondents is drawn” (Splichal 1999, 90). The claim that public opinion must exist because we 
can measure it with polls is tautological. One might equally argue that God must exist, because 
so many people pray to Him. In common with all research methods, polls are only scientifically 
valid if they are studying something which exists independently of the practice of polling. The 
use of polls to study public opinion on foreign policy matters does not meet this standard, and 
thus the entire practice is invalid. We cannot be sure that a response given to a pollster 
reflects an actual view, developed before the poll, or simply an off-the-cuff response relating 
to an issue to which the respondent had given no prior consideration. Opinion polls therefore 
do not reveal what the public is thinking about an issue, they reveal how it would respond to a 
question on that issue, if such a question was asked across the population as a whole. Where 
the question will indeed be asked, for example in the case of efforts to predict the outcome of 
elections or referenda, polls do not so much identify public opinion as predict public 
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behaviour; since the behaviour will itself exist come voting day, these polls do measure 
something that exists ‘out there’ (Splichal 1999, 242). They are consequently methodologically 
valid. Where, however, there is no intention to ask the general population to express its views 
on a subject, there is little point in estimating how it is likely to respond. This is the case with 
most foreign policy issues. As Cohen noted, the problem with polling is that it reveals “most 
about the foreign policy opinions of the people who, overall, are least likely to participate in 
foreign policy discussions and activities” (Cohen 1973, 4); those people being the passive 
public. Instead of focusing much energy and attention on artificially representing non-existent 
public views, foreign policy analysts should instead consider primarily the artefacts of Public 
Opinion, the existence of which is not in doubt. 
 This stance is not entirely novel, though it does require a more absolute dismissal of 
opinion polls as a guide to public opinion than most previous work. Leaving aside the 
established recognition that polling is often too simplistic to capture the complexity of foreign 
policy in any useful manner (Verba, et al. 1967, 318, Gaubatz 1995, 540), several scholars have 
already identified the faults highlighted here, even without recognising their significance. 
Mueller recognised that “many people simply do not have opinions on a number of questions” 
while going on to concede, as this study does, the validity of polling for the specific task of 
predicting voting behaviour, and to highlight “the ability of the poll question writer to 
manipulate in order to generate interesting newspaper copy” (Mueller 1973, 2, 121). Bourdieu 
identified the potential danger of relying upon the practice of polling to construct a definition 
of public opinion in raising the question of “who can afford to pay for an opinion poll” 
(Bourdieu 1979, 124). Economic interests determine, at a systemic level, both the sort of 
questions asked by pollsters, and the answers they seek to get. Most polls are paid for either 
by politicians (those in government or those seeking to be in government) with a view to 
winning elections, or by journalists seeking to generate source material to fill column inches 
(Beniger 1992, 216). Only those commissioned by journalists are regularly made available 
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beyond a small circle of party leaders and advisors. These media-created and media-reported 
analyses suffer from dual weaknesses. They are, firstly, commissioned with a view to providing 
source material for coverage of an issue of existing media interest, meaning they “rarely set 
agendas by themselves” (Herbst 1992, 223). The media does not pay for a poll without having 
first decided the topic upon which it wishes to hear the public’s views. Secondly, they “are 
necessarily superficial” (Beniger 1992, 216) because “if one tried to create a survey which took 
into account Bourdieu’s concerns [above], the poll would lose its news value because it would 
take so long to design and administer” (Herbst 1992, 228).  
The notion that polls impose elite-determined categories onto passive individuals who 
may very well have no opinion on a subject prior to being polled is an important one, and, 
again, one that has not escaped notice in earlier studies in this area (Gamson and Modigliani 
1989, Page and Shapiro 1992, 4-5, Cohen 1995, 53-54, Powlick and Katz 1998, 33). It does not 
require that the polls themselves be dishonest, but does imply that the act of their production 
is conditioned by elite views. This is particularly significant in light of the suggestion that 
“reporting trends in political opinion polls might similarly exert an influence on people” (Marsh 
1984, 73, Splichal 1999, 240). If media coverage of poll results leads public opinion, rather than 
simply describing it, then there is considerable scope for journalists to determine, perhaps 
even unconsciously, the agenda of public debate. The role of the media as both a source and 
conduit of Public Opinion will be returned to in Chapter 8, underlining the role of polling as just 
one facet of a broader Public Opinion system with its own routines and broader implications 
for government.   
 Most scholars have sought to devise more elaborate polling or data analysis methods 
in order to get around the fundamental validity problem outlined here. Mueller himself 
advised comparing between similar polls, even while acknowledging that none involved the 
observation of something that actually existed. The most logical approach, however, is to 
accept that there is no objective value in opinion polling on foreign policy matters, other than 
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where voting behaviour of some sort is being predicted. Analysts would do better to look at 
the subjective ways in which policymakers and journalists interpret polls, and at the role of the 
action of polling in setting the tone for the public debate, rather than treating the results as 
intrinsically useful. As one recent study has put it, “once we accept that opinion polls are a 
form of representation, it raises the important question of how that representation works 
ideologically: what kinds of public opinion are produced, and what aspects of public discourse 
are excluded?” (Brookes, Lewis and Wahl-Jorgensen 2004, 63). Polls are not a good guide to 
what the public is thinking on a foreign policy matter. But such is their prominence in political 
life that their creation and deployment as rhetorical legitimising devices (Solomon 2009, 269), 
as mechanisms for the production of supporting evidence for particular elite-led arguments, 
remains a highly significant consideration. They are part of the system, an important part, even 
if they do not necessarily reveal any particular agency on the part of the passive public. It is in 
this capacity that they remain worthy of consideration.  
 Policymakers are rarely trained social scientists. They regard opinion polling as an 
expert activity and profess little understanding of the basis of its claims to validity and 
reliability. Demonstrating their failure to address these fundamental questions, they regard it 
as just one tool among many for the interrogation of the public mind. If polling is a valid and 
reliable method for studying public opinion, it should be used solely; if it is not, then not at all. 
No direct analysis has yet been carried out of the UK foreign policy establishment in this regard 
(though some anecdotal evidence gleaned from participant accounts is woven through the 
course of this thesis), but studies in the US have shown many of those most closely involved in 
the development and implementation of foreign policy adopt an intuitive rather than a 
scientific approach to gauging public views (Cohen 1973, 65, Powlick 1995, 431, Nacos, Shapiro 
and Isernia 2000, 5). Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann has argued that politicians understand the 
“climate of opinion” intuitively, without needing evidence (Noelle-Neumann 1979, 147-148, 
154). Indeed, as shall be seen, this was the view of many in Tony Blair’s Downing Street. That 
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intuition is not based solely on abstract reasoning, however. It is informed by a range of 
trusted sources, including the media – both ‘objective’ news and ‘subjective’ editorial 
elements, with the boundaries between the two often blurred (Blair 2012a, 2) – elected 
members of the legislature, and prominent individual citizens including academics, business 
leaders, and public intellectuals (Cohen 1973, 78, 107, 125, Herbst 1992, 228, Powlick 1995, 
433-435, Entman 2004, 21, Knecht and Weatherford 2006). Some leaders are simply 
overwhelmed by the volume of polls and “pseudoindicators of public opinion (letters, 
demonstrations, editorial opinions) [available to them] through the media, contacts with 
members of the opinion and policy elite, or observations of political events” (Graham 1994, 
198-199). The result is an approach that can, at best, be described as impressionistic. 
Policymakers assume either that active Public Opinion represents the view of the population 
as a whole (Kull and Ramsay 2000, 104), or that the absence of significant public activity means 
their citizens are indifferent on an issue (Powlick and Katz 1998, 44). Few are likely to adopt a 
more sophisticated approach than developing an instinctive view of what they regard as 
‘public opinion’ on a given question, based on whichever sources appear most prominent and 
most significant to them at the time. It is possible to re-construct the operation of these 
instinctive judgements, provided enough evidence is elucidated about individuals’ mindsets 
during the period of interest. Often this evidence reveals prejudices that policymakers, not 
being social scientists, would not have recognised themselves as holding. It also offers support 
for the model of Public Opinion as a systemic factor in the policymaking process, rather than a 
source of agency.  
 
Influence and intervening variables 
 
 Christopher Hill has written that “politicians often argue that their hands are tied by 
public opinion, or at least that they have to work within the limits set by it…[while] political 
scientists tend to be sceptical and to side more with those radical critics who claim that public 
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opinion is paid lip service but in practice ignored” (Hill 2003, 262). No single study has yet 
demonstrated a direct causal link between ‘public opinion’ as an independent variable and 
foreign policy as a dependent variable; as Holsti put it, “the evidence describing public opinion 
still far outstrips, both in quantity and quality, that on the causal links between public opinion 
and foreign policy, [although] research in recent years has begun to cast doubt on the earlier 
consensus about public impotence” (Holsti 1992, 452). The Vietnam War has often been cited 
by US policymakers (particularly those of a conservative bent) as an example of the negative 
impact of Public Opinion on the ability of a democratic state to fight effectively. Daniel Hallin’s 
analysis, however, concluded only that further escalation of the conflict had been resisted by 
the Johnson administration “not so much because it felt political opposition gave it no choice, 
but because it was unwilling to sacrifice other political priorities to an all-out war effort”. The 
suggestion that a government might have other political priorities during a time of war would 
appear ridiculous to leaders of the ‘total war’ generation, but since the end of WWII most 
western states have experienced conflict only in limited terms. Hallin concluded that “maybe 
the lesson of Vietnam is not that it is difficult for an open society to fight a limited war, but 
that it is difficult to fight a limited war against an enemy for whom it is not a limited war” 
(Hallin 1986, 212, 214). The question of whether Public Opinion prevents democracies from 
waging war only makes sense, then, in the context of the sort of limited, ‘discretionary’ war 
discussed in this study. Its findings will not, then, necessarily be indicative of a more general 
phenomenon. 
There is some evidence of shifts in passive public preferences being followed by 
corresponding shifts in policy (Page and Shapiro 1992, 2, Shapiro and Jacobs 2000, 225, Everts 
and Isernia 2001, 17, Aldrich, et al. 2006, 478). Doubts remain, even amongst those producing 
these studies, over whether their evidence accounts for a sufficiently wide range of alternative 
explanations (Jacobs and Page 2005, 119). Most analysts have restricted themselves to 
ascribing an agenda setting role to the passive public, with its preferences (as expressed in 
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polls, protest, or the press) helping to “move an issue to a spot near the top of the national 
agenda for government action”, rather than determining policy per se (Hilsman 1987, 233). 
Some have also qualified the notion of public influence, arguing that non-governmental actors 
have an indirect rather than a direct role in the policymaking process (Risse-Kappen 1991, 510, 
Graham 1994, 190).  
 So challenging is the task undertaken by this study that Hill once concluded “a search 
for public opinion and its influence over British foreign policy is of the same order as the search 
for the Loch Ness Monster – intriguing, but fanciful” (Hill 1981, 60). It is true that the influence 
of Public Opinion, where it exists at all, exists in the minds of policymakers, and “academics 
cannot peer inside the minds of policy makers and see influence at work” (Robinson 2008, 
141). Public Opinion is, after all, simply a cognitive construction in the “psychological” 
environment of foreign-policy decision-making, informed but not dictated by observations of 
varying objectivity of phenomena in the “operational” environment (Sprout and Sprout 1956). 
It is created by policymakers, and other interested observers (Lippmann 1922, 15-17, Kull and 
Ramsay 2000, 109, Hill 2003, 267-268). Nevertheless, even the sceptics working in the 1960s 
identified models by which public influence might be identified. Rosenau for example 
proposed that the flow of opinion around a political system might better be traced than direct 
influence (Rosenau 1961, 11-12). His model failed to identify the causal mechanisms at work, 
but does provide a useful starting point. Later analyses have highlighted the occasional 
admission by governments that an act was driven by the public as a useful indicator (Kern, 
Levering and Levering 1984, 7). Here too there are problems, however. Policymakers’ 
perceptions of Public Opinion need not necessarily chime with what an ‘objective’ third-party 
might observe (Jervis 1976, Hill 1981, 59). Political rewards meanwhile await leaders who show 
deference to their electors, whether or not they act deferentially. In recognising, however, the 
potential for policymakers to say one thing and to do another in the conduct of foreign policy, 
we begin to identify the core causal mechanism suggested by this study. The classical, sceptical 
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view of public (non-)influence was that public opinion set the outer limits within which policy 
must be set in order to be seen as legitimate, but that there remained a sizeable “sphere of 
legitimate controversy” (Hallin 1984, 21) within which politicians remained free to act as they 
saw fit (Almond 1950, 5, Rosenau 1961, 36, Key 1961, 552). The public, in other words, exerted 
a weak influence over foreign policy, establishing distant ‘red lines’ beyond which 
policymakers must not pass, but having no real, direct impact. This image has survived 
challenges to the wider ‘Almond-Lippmann consensus’ (Nincic 1992, 97, Sobel 2001, 5, 25). It 
fails, however, adequately to explain the interaction of public and policymaking, for at least 
two reasons. To begin with, it does nothing to address the significance of what legitimate 
controversy there may be within the apparent ‘outer limits’, to define between whom it takes 
place, and on the basis of what information. In addition, it fails to account for the importance 
of the activities conducted by governments in bringing about public influence. Public Opinion 
rarely actively dictates a change of policy course. What it does do, however, is create structural 
conditions in which policymakers chose to change course, partially at least of their own 
volition. In seeking to account for the significance of the public debate that took place in 
Britain over the invasion of Iraq, it is necessary to explain what aspects of that debate 
influenced policymaking, and to understand what the ultimate impact of that influence was. 
This study consequently focuses on what interactions took place within the ‘sphere of 
legitimate controversy’ represented by public debate, rather than on how its outer limits were 
established (although it does discuss those limits, and the constraining effect they had on 
policymaking).  
 Even having identified the structural nature of Public Opinion, and established its 
generation and operation through public debate as the proper primary focus for analysts 
interested in the domestic sources of democratic foreign policy, a greater degree of 
specification is necessary in order to construct a working model of public-policymaker 
interaction. Much of the work needed in this area has already been done; a range of 
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‘intervening variables’ have been identified which affect the extent to which public opposition 
to a given foreign policy position comes to influence government behaviour. These variables 
await only the construction of a coherent overarching theoretical framework into which they 
can each fit, and their integration with the notion of active Public Opinion. The most self-
explanatory is the idea that the absolute level of public support for, or opposition to, a policy 
will impact upon the extent to which the public is listened to. As Key put it, “a government 
sensitive to public attitudes confronts a different problem when 90 percent of the people are 
for and 10 percent against a proposition than when the division is 50:50”, or indeed where “15 
percent are pro, 10 percent are anti, and 75 percent are unaware of the question” (Key 1961, 
21). The idea that 75% of the public might be unaware of any given foreign policy question is 
both intuitive and consisent with the criticisms of opinion polling advanced above. More 
recently, Thomas Graham has established an entire hierarchy of influence, arguing “majority” 
opinion against a policy (50-59%) could be ignored by policymakers, albeit with risks, while 
public “consensus” (60-69%) would override otherwise significant official opposition, 
“preponderant” opinion (70-79%) would drive the public’s preferred policy into 
implementation, and “unanimous” public attitudes  (80%+) would totally dominate a political 
system (Graham 1994, 195-196). Graham’s model failed to account for a number of additional 
intervening variables, including the structure of a state, and the balance between political 
parties operating within it. It also relied too heavily on polls, an approach regarded by this 
study as detrimental to methodological validity. Nevertheless, the notion that a more 
concerned public will have greater influence is a useful one. This study builds on Cohen (1995, 
62-63), who talked about the scale of public protest as an influence on decision-making. The 
size of the active public, in other words the proportion of the populace which chooses to 
contribute to the public debate over a policy, serves either to heighten or to lessen 
policymakers’ attention to the substance of non-governmental views being thus expressed, 
creating conditions in which they are more likely to choose to respond directly. Public 
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activation can be seen, as Cohen suggests, in street protests. It appears, also, in the frequency 
and duration of parliamentary debates on a topic, and on the volume of media commentary 
dedicated to its discussion. Each of these elements aid this study’s efforts to observe public 
activation in practice. 
Secondly, public influence is conditioned by the beliefs of individual policymakers 
about the importance of attentiveness to public opinion, and about the need for non-
governmental input into the foreign policy-making process. More recent work in this area has 
moved the field beyond 1960s debates over whether consulting the public on an issue was 
principled or cynical (Rosenau 1961, 24, Key 1961, 538). Douglas Foyle (1997) created a two-
dimensional framework (and thus four different types of policymaker) to assess how far 
normative beliefs about the desirability of a public input to foreign policy, and practical 
considerations about its necessity, impact upon decision-making. In Foyle’s formulation, 
policymakers labelled “delegates” think public support for their actions both necessary and 
desirable, “executors” think it desirable but not necessary, “pragmatists” necessary but not 
desirable, and “guardians” neither necessary nor desirable (Foyle 1997, 145). Efforts have 
since been made to integrate approaches which gauge the impact of policymaker attitudes 
with a more general consideration of how ministers view the national interest (Shannon and 
Keller 2007, 82), and with the polyheuristic model of foreign policy decision-making (Keller and 
Yang 2008, 687). This study will draw upon these insights in seeking to explain how and why 
particular expressions of Public Opinion achieved some measure of influence over 
policymaking.  
A third intervening variable proposed in the literature is the structure of a state, 
including the locus of foreign policy decision-making power, the exposure of decision-makers 
to electoral vicissitudes, and the access routes through which Public Opinion can reach those 
with the power to act upon it (Cohen 1973, 43). Risse-Kappen  has argued persuasively that the 
way governing coalitions are assembled in a state (whether within or between political parties, 
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for example) affects the significance of public opinion to policymakers (Risse-Kappen 1991, 
479-480, 1994, 238). Linked to this, Chan and Safran have described the significance of the 
accessibility of foreign policymakers to the electorate, determined by their position within a 
democratic state structure (Chan and Safran 2006, 137). Domestic structures are held to be of 
further significance for the way they permit or prevent public opinions being expressed in 
meaningful forums such as a national parliament or the press (Cohen 1995, 53), and their 
interrelation with the notion of signalling in diplomatic bargaining, with more publicly 
accountable governments being better able to demonstrate seriousness to rivals than those 
less exposed to their publics (Fearon 1994, 587, Partell 1997, 504). Two main aspects of the 
structure of a state are relevant for this study; the division (or otherwise) of ministerial 
responsibility for foreign policy decision-making (and thus the flows of information between 
relevant actors), and the impact of the system of government on the direct accountability of 
decision-makers for their actions. It has, for example, been argued that the British executive 
has considerable freedom to ignore public views on foreign policy, owing to the combined 
effect of the government’s control over the international use of force, and the implications of a 
political system under which the party in government by definition commands the support of a 
majority of MPs in the House of Commons (Hill 2007, 276). This study shows that Public 
Opinion is not really separable from these more established ‘political’ structures. They do not 
so much ‘filter’ Public Opinion as interact with it; the rules of parliamentary arithmetic must be 
considered in tandem with the operating procedures of the media and the dynamics of 
protests in the streets.  
Fourthly, and following on from the structure of the system of government under 
consideration, public influence is affected by the distribution of views across the party-political 
landscape, and the distribution of power between competing political parties (Putnam 1988, 
458, Shapiro and Jacobs 2000, 228, Schuster and Maier 2006, 223). As Key noted, “the ultimate 
weapon of public opinion is the minority party” (Key 1961, 556), because it is only by voting for 
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the minority party that the public can actually remove the government from power, other than 
by force, a highly unusual and unlikely eventuality in the sort of mature democracy under 
consideration here. It matters therefore whether, and to what extent, credible alternative 
policymakers support the policy proposed by those in office; and it has been claimed that a 
rational power-seeking opposition party will seek to capitalise on any measure of public 
dissatisfaction (Ramsay 2004, 460). Such is the significance of political opposition that its 
absence can completely undermine public influence (Sobel 2001, 23-24, Kreps 2010, 199). 
Opposition politicians’ behaviour during the period of this study is thus of great importance.  
The notion of international action being mirrored by domestic political competition 
represented by these four ‘intervening variables’ underpins the dominant “two-level game” 
model of foreign policy decision-making. According to the model, policymakers attempt to 
balance competing and often conflicting interests and opinions both within their own political 
system and in the wider realm of international politics (Putnam 1988, Bennett 1994, 17, Hill 
and Stavridis 1996, 5, Trumbore 1998, 561). That actions taken on one level might impact upon 
the other appears logical and well-supported by empirical evidence. Indeed, further work has 
suggested that policymakers perceive (and are right to perceive) a direct link between the 
retention of domestic power and the successful pursuit of foreign policy. Leaders who are 
unsuccessful overseas, it is said, often struggle to maintain domestic political support, though 
it is not necessarily the case that foreign policy failures lead directly to electoral punishment 
(Verba, et al. 1967, 317, Hagan 1990, 4, Nincic 1992, 91-92, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 
1995, 853, Partell 1997, 508-509). The study of the credibility of threats as a diplomatic tool 
has helped to integrate Public Opinion into the two-level game model. On the one hand, an 
adversary that does not believe a government will be able to maintain domestic support for a 
threatened action may regard any threat it issues as chimerical (Eichenberg 2005, 148). On the 
other, it is now recognised that any policymaker who issues a public threat risks “domestic 
audience costs” should they fail to achieve their desired outcome or to carry the threat 
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through (Baum 2003, 285, Baum 2004a, 609, Heffernan 2006, 593, Tomz 2007, 821). The very 
act of issuing public statements on foreign policy thus establishes structural constraints on the 
freedom of policymakers to pursue their favoured course. This observation forms part of the 
basis for the core theoretical conclusions of this study, set out in Chapter 8. 
 
Methods of observation 
 
The level of domestic political punishment or reward accruing to a government for a 
particular foreign policy is determined by the balance between public expectations of its costs 
and benefits, and its actual consequences (Mueller 1973, 168, Gaubatz 1995, 541). It is in turn 
linked to the conclusion of many scholars that the “government responds to, as well as leads, 
public opinion” (Shapiro and Jacobs 2000, 230). A “highly iterative” process of interaction links 
domestic and international arenas (Powlick 1995, 430). The direction in which influence flows, 
and the significance of that influence, varies with circumstance (Putnam 1988, 427, Bennett 
1994, 34, Everts and Isernia 2001, 17, 265). Public Opinion cannot, therefore, be described as 
having a simple causal relationship to foreign policy, though nor can foreign policy-makers be 
seen to hold a monopoly of initiative or absolute power to direct Public Opinion, despite their 
evident ability to influence the flow of information to the passive public. The degree of 
influence attained by both Public Opinion and policymakers is determined by the specific 
circumstances in which they interact. The public’s impact in any given situation can best be 
understood, therefore, only though in-depth empirical analysis of the events in question. 
There is no simple theoretical shortcut if we are to observe the way Public Opinion operates as 
a systemic force. For this reason there are no dependent and independent variables in this 
study, but rather a “thick description” (Geertz 1973), a detailed analytical account of 
exchanges within the British “public sphere” (Habermas 1962, 1992) during the eighteen 
months between 11 September 2001 and the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, and a comparison 
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of this account with the actions and statements of key policymakers, Tony Blair especially, in a 
search for the causal mechanisms discussed above.  
Three main types of source material will be used to ‘triangulate’ what is essentially an 
interpretive account of policymaking against the background context established by Public 
Opinion. Firstly, there are the ‘artefacts’ of the public debate itself; government statements, 
parliamentary speeches, and media commentary. Frozen at the point of delivery, these offer 
evidence of the positions taken by competing actors during the pre-war period. Unlike 
interviews, contemporary statements cannot be revised with the benefit of hindsight (Laver 
and Garry 2000, Laver, Benoit and Garry 2003); a particularly important consideration in 
looking at the Iraq conflict given how inaccurate much of the official case for war was 
subsequently proven to have been. In addition, anything not made public at the time of the 
debate leading up to the war cannot possibly have influenced it directly. Public Opinion as 
expressed in the media will be gauged using editorial and commentary articles published in the 
leading British newspapers (by circulation) at the time. Unlike their television counterparts, 
newspaper commentators are under less pressure to provide instant reactions to new 
developments, and, compared to broadcasters, print journalists are forced by the nature of 
their medium to rely more heavily on analysis than on imagery (Gamson, Croteau, et al. 1992, 
Norris 2000, 25, Robinson 2008, 141). They are also able to develop their views in light of 
television coverage, and so they can react to major expressions of Public Opinion in televised 
forums. As a result, the full range of views expressed in the public sphere during this period 
should be reflected in newspaper commentary; it is unlikely any major contribution to the 
public debate was not at some point analysed by newspaper columnists and editorial-writers. 
Even where an argument did not originate in print, therefore, it should still be captured by a 
study that uses newspapers as a proxy for the media more generally; indeed, this is one of the 
characteristics of Public Opinion as a structure that this study observes (Blair 2012a, 2). This 
approach to assembling source materials is considered therefore to have achieved 
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“saturation” in terms of the range of views represented, a key criterion set out in methodology 
texts for the construction of a qualitative research corpus (Bauer and Aarts 2000, 34). 
Ultimately 2,114 separate opinion pieces relating to Iraq are considered, alongside an 
additional 273 discussing the earlier attack on Afghanistan, all obtained using keyword 
searches of the Lexis Nexis database. For the Afghan phase, between September and 
December 2001, the keywords used were ‘Afghanistan’ and ‘Blair’; for the period between 
January 2002 and March 2003 ‘Afghanistan’ was replaced with ‘Iraq’. ‘Blair’ was used in an 
attempt to keep the resulting corpus focussed on British political matters; there is a risk, 
however, that the data obtained on sources has been skewed somewhat as a result. 
Ultimately, the risk of source bias was thought low because the Prime Minister’s central role in 
policymaking rendered it unlikely much news coverage of the policy itself would have avoided 
mentioning him.  
Such is the volume of newspaper commentary considered that it proves possible to 
generate quantitative data through a simple content analysis approach. Each article reviewed 
was categorised as “pro-war”, “neutral”, or “anti-war” depending on whether the writer 
explicitly expressed a view on the rectitude of military action (against either Afghanistan or 
Iraq, depending on the date), and on the substance of that view. To reflect better the actual 
shape of public debate, the resultant figures were then scaled according to the monthly 
average circulation figures achieved by the relevant publication, producing overall results 
which indicate not the distribution of pro-war, neutral, and anti-war views between the 
commentary articles written, but between those in circulation. Where, for example, low-
circulating publications produced a large number of articles expressing a particular view, their 
impact on the general picture of public debate is qualified here with reference to the number 
of copies of each article actually distributed. Because the corpus is considered to be 
comprehensive, i.e. it is not a ‘sample’ of opinion pieces about Iraq, but contains the entire 
‘population’, only this very basic level of control is necessary in producing descriptive statistics. 
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More sophisticated inferential methods would only have been necessary if it had not proven 
possible to classify the corpus in its entirety.  
The second main type of source document, contemporary government documents not 
released to the public, will be used to assess the extent to which public statements genuinely 
reflected official thinking. So much material has been declassified early as a result of the 
various public inquiries into the invasion of Iraq that obtaining documentary evidence of this 
sort is far less challenging than would typically be the case with such a recent topic. Obviously 
internal papers do not change the nature of contemporary public statements. They do 
however shed light on how closely external messages matched the internal debates then 
taking place within government. In addition, they reveal a great deal about the processes by 
which the Blair government engaged with Public Opinion, and help to identify occasions on 
which it was constrained by its structural effects even while seeking to break away from 
individual public activities.  
The final source of evidence will be retrospective accounts by a number of participants 
in elements of the decision-making process, including some based on contemporaneous 
diaries, ‘first cut’ historical surveys based on interviews and direct observations of events, and 
evidence presented to the Hutton, Butler, Chilcot, and Leveson Inquiries. Although such 
accounts are likely to be coloured by hindsight, a sufficient range of different viewpoints is 
available, from a number of actors whose interests in terms of how the Iraq war is 
remembered differ, that collectively they represent an additional and highly useful resource. 
By comparing the way different actors saw the impact of Public Opinion, we can gain some 
insight into how far its capacity to influence policymaking at a systemic level played out in 
practice in this particular case.   
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Overview 
 
 The empirical core of this study opens in Chapter 2 with an account of the public 
debate in Britain following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, and 
during the NATO response against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Among the issues raised are the 
centralisation of foreign policy decision-making in Downing Street during Tony Blair’s 
premiership, and the concomitant sidelining of the Foreign Office; the general support in 
Parliament and polls for military action against the Taliban; and the difficulties faced by those 
opposed to war as they sought to develop a coherent and consistent alternative proposition, 
stemming not least from their own indecision. In Chapter 3, the focus shifts to Iraq, as ‘hawks’ 
in the Bush administration began agitating for ‘phase two’ of the ‘war on terror’ to involve the 
removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Baghdad. At the presidential ranch in Crawford, 
Texas, Bush and Blair met in April 2002 and agreed that something must be done about Iraq, 
though at this point forced ‘regime change’ was only the most probable of a range of possible 
solutions. Through the middle of 2002, as Chapter 4 recounts, the Blair government avoided 
talking about Iraq as far as possible, but in doing so it ceded control over the agenda of public 
debate. By September Blair was forced by the volume of media speculation (fuelled in part by 
the penetration of the British public sphere by discussions developing across the Atlantic) to 
bring forward the planned release of a ‘dossier’ outlining Iraq’s violations of UN Security 
Council Resolutions governing the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the now 
notorious ‘WMD’. The document’s accelerated release, however, caused more problems than 
it solved. Chapter 5 looks at the period of UN consultation, beginning with President Bush’s 12 
September speech to the General Assembly, and ending with Hans Blix’s second report to the 
Security Council on 14 February 2003. Britain and the US went to the UN to seek approval for 
military action against Iraq. They were not genuinely seeking an alternative to war, because by 
this point leaders of both countries were convinced that there was no genuine alternative. The 
other UN member states saw things differently, and again the resulting row did more harm 
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than good to the British government’s case in the eyes of Public Opinion. By the time of the 
events described in Chapter 6, the mass street protests orchestrated by the Stop the War 
Coalition on 15 February, and the climactic parliamentary debates of 26 February and 18 
March, the die had been firmly cast. Forced to choose between Saddam and Blair, a majority 
of the British public (and, crucially, British MPs) backed Blair, albeit grudgingly. The start of 
hostilities did not, as Chapter 7 recounts, mark the end of the debate over the invasion; far 
from it. Between 2003 and the withdrawal of British forces from Basra Province in 2009, three 
main factors combined in critically damaging the lasting legitimacy of the war in the British 
public mind. Firstly, there were no WMD, and a popular narrative developed to explain their 
absence based on mistrust of the government and the Prime Minister in particular. Secondly, 
Iraq descended into chaos and sectarian violence, and the costs in blood and gold of what had 
been sold as a short and inexpensive campaign rapidly spiralled. Finally, amidst a wider wave 
of ‘home grown’ jihadist terrorism, Britain experienced its first suicide bombings, explicitly 
linked by their perpetrators to the presence of British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Tony 
Blair won the 2005 general election for the same reason that he was able to get the invasion 
approved by Parliament; although many voters, like many Labour MPs, disagreed with him on 
this specific issue, they were not willing to sacrifice him over it. He was, however, willing to 
sacrifice himself. Chapter 8 concludes this study by outlining its core theoretical contributions 
to the discipline of Foreign Policy Analysis, in the form of a set of implications for the future 
consideration of domestic influences over British foreign policy. The substance and the 
communication of foreign policy inevitably interact. Public Opinion thus gains traction over 
decision-making by virtue of the competition between government and public actors to set 
agenda of public debate. To a significant degree, the difficulties faced by the government in 
trying to win support for its Iraq policy were caused by how that policy was ‘sold’ in the 
context of the prevailing Public Opinion system. Certainly the conflict’s lasting contentiousness 
derives from dissatisfaction with the communication as much as with the substance of the 
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decision to go to war in early 2003. Even with a more successful official narrative, however, the 
very nature of the Public Opinion system of media, politicians, and passive public into which 
policymakers’ messages are transmitted militates against successful elite management. This 
study thus concludes by noting the remarkable and intractable challenge that the constraining 
effect of Public Opinion over foreign policy poses for the successful conduct of democratic 
government.  
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Chapter 2 – Tough on terrorism, or tough on the causes 
of terrorism?: September – December 2001 
 
It was not inevitable that the terrorist attacks that took place in the United States on 
11 September 2001 would lead Britain to war with Iraq. The public debate that took place in 
Britain over the initial response to those attacks, the campaign to remove the Taliban regime 
from power in Afghanistan, nevertheless prefigured in many ways the discord that would 
follow over Iraq. Before 11 September there had been little mainstream consideration of the 
idea that military action might be taken against Saddam Hussein; UN weapons inspectors, 
installed after the Gulf War in 1991, had been withdrawn in 1998 and not replaced. A limited 
course of air strikes had expressed the dissatisfaction of western states at the breakdown in 
the monitoring programme, and tough economic sanctions remained in effect, but the Iraqi 
Ba’athist regime still survived. There were concerns, in London as well as Washington, that the 
situation could not be allowed to continue indefinitely, but there was no plan to act. 11 
September changed that, but not immediately. In the weeks and months following the attacks, 
both policymakers and the public focused on Afghanistan. This chapter considers in detail the 
nature of the debate over the campaign that had by mid-December driven the Taliban from 
power and established a tame interim administration in Kabul. It asks how far later 
disagreements had their origins in unresolved contradictions from these early months, and it 
sets up an implicit comparison between the invasion of Afghanistan and that of Iraq.  
Three key elements within the debate together both characterised these early months 
and established the context within which later controversies developed. To begin with, there 
remained in December 2001 an unresolved question raised repeatedly after 11 September. To 
what extent did the ‘war on terror’ represent an irreconcilable and potentially open-ended 
“clash of civilisations” (Huntington 1996), as opposed to a more limited reaction to a specific 
incident, best kept narrowly focused on al-Qaeda and the Taliban? Secondly, there was 
uncertainty about the limits of Britain’s commitment to its alliance with the United States. 
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Tony Blair had offered US policymakers, and the American people, British support in facing up 
to terrorism (Blair 2001a). British involvement in the removal of the Taliban was broadly 
welcomed domestically, and gratefully received in Washington (cf. Bush 2001). How far that 
support might continue should the US seek to extend the limits of the campaign remained 
unclear. Finally, deliberate ambiguity on the part of ministers about Britain’s wider goals for 
the ‘war on terror’, ambiguity which remained unresolved in a predominantly quiescent Public 
Opinion climate, facilitated the widespread projection of views about action against Iraq onto 
the blank canvas of government policy. Considerable scope existed for both supporters and 
opponents of the further use of force to be disappointed. For all the apparent unity evident in 
British public debate during the initial invasion of Afghanistan, these three core characteristics 
of the initial post-11 September debate set the scene for later disagreements over Iraq.  
 
Waging war on an abstract noun 
 
 That the 11 September attacks warranted some sort of armed response by the US and 
its allies (under the broad label of ‘the international community’) was never in much doubt in 
Britain. As soon as efforts began, however, to define the appropriate limits of that response, 
questions arose as to the nature of the threat faced which immediately posed problems. 
Ministers struggled not only to manage Public Opinion in this regard, but to answer the 
questions for themselves. Tony Blair had taken the initiative in reacting to the attacks; that he 
was personally responsible for setting the tone for Britain’s response appears never to have 
been seriously questioned, either in Whitehall or by the wider public (Daddow 2011, 225). He 
listened to senior colleagues, especially Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and Defence Secretary 
Geoff Hoon, but he relied above all on his “inner circle” of Downing Street officials for advice; 
Director of Strategy and Communications Alastair Campbell, Foreign Policy Adviser Sir David 
Manning, and Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell (Kampfner 2003, 121). Only Manning was a career 
civil servant; both Campbell and Powell were political appointees. They had, unusually, been 
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given the authority to direct civil servants, something the bureaucracy was never happy about 
(Hollis 2010, 2-3, 58-59, 61). Neither fulfilled what Campbell called a “traditional” role; instead 
“what we did was largely driven by what [Blair] wanted us to do and what our personalities 
best allowed us to do” (Campbell and Stott 2007, 615). The result was an informal and often 
ad hoc approach which fit uneasily with civil service norms, causing occasional bureaucratic 
incidents as a result. In one early example, on 20 September 2001, Ambassador to Washington 
Sir Christopher Meyer threw “an absolute tantrum” when told by Powell that, in a break from 
protocol, he was to be excluded from a crucial meeting between Blair and Bush. Blair wanted 
instead to take “the three people he would be working most closely with” back in London, 
namely Campbell, Powell, and Manning (Campbell and Stott 2007, 573). Meyer himself 
describes his response as “furious and expletive-laden” (C. Meyer 2005, 202). He was 
eventually admitted, but journalists noted that it was still the Downing Street aides who 
accompanied Blair to dinner with Bush (Murphy 2001). Not without reason were they 
occasionally described as “the Prime Minister’s real war cabinet” (C. Anderson 2001).  
 If Public Opinion had gained the impression that the Prime Minister was relying more 
heavily on his personal staff than on his ministers and civil service officials in determining 
British policy after 11 September, the view would only have been compounded by the relative 
inactivity of the Cabinet during the initial weeks after the attacks (McAskill and White 2001, 
Dillon 2001a). Only a handful of formal meetings of the most senior British ministers took place 
during this time, and with Parliament not in session it was largely through Downing Street 
press briefings that the government’s position was advanced. In part this reflected the fact 
that Cabinet usually does not meet at all during the parliamentary recess, and although MPs 
were recalled three times during September and October, normal parliamentary business did 
not resume following the summer break until the fighting was well under way in Afghanistan. 
Tony Blair’s relative insulation from outside views in these early weeks did not necessarily 
represent, therefore, a deliberate effort to minimise the input of Public Opinion into 
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policymaking. The effect was nevertheless that most of the government’s early thinking during 
the first month of the ‘war on terror’ took place at some remove from the key spheres of 
public debate. Certainly parliamentary influence was constrained, along with whatever 
broader public influence might exist by virtue of Britain’s relatively open political system. Of 
far greater import was the Prime Minister’s own opinion and, to the degree that they 
influenced him, the opinions of those closest to him. 
Although expert advice was taken from within Whitehall, especially from the 
intelligence services (Campbell and Stott 2007, 568), the isolation of core decision-makers 
even from much of the system of government remained stark. It was exacerbated further by 
an apparently well-established sense of distrust within Downing Street of the supposedly pro-
Arab Middle East analysts based in the Foreign Office, who, formally at least, were the British 
government’s most knowledgeable experts on the region (Hollis 2010, 63). Alastair Campbell 
epitomised the No. 10 view in recording his disgust at a 12 September diplomatic briefing 
which he felt “came very close to saying the attack was justified” by focusing too heavily on US 
mistakes in the region (Campbell and Stott 2007, 563). Certain professional judgements, 
however informed by experience and diplomatically delivered, were unacceptable in Blair’s 
Downing Street. Far from exerting the sort of dominance described by Allison’s models (Allison 
and Zelikow 2nd Edn. 1999), the British bureaucracy was thus largely excluded from core 
policymaking in the immediate aftermath of 11 September. Instead of listening to civil service 
briefings, Jonathan Powell (an ex-diplomat himself) visited the Trafalgar Square branch of 
Waterstone’s bookshop and bought Taliban by Ahmed Rashid (2000), which he read in an 
afternoon spent sat alone in his office. Both Campbell and Blair wanted to borrow the text 
once he was finished (Powell 2010b, 271), and it was later spotted on the Prime Minister’s 
plane as he flew to the US (Wintour 2001). Shortly afterwards, a BBC World Service reporter 
named Najiba Kasraee, who had fled violence in Afghanistan as a child, was said to have left 
the Prime Minister “deeply moved” after offering an account of the suffering of ordinary 
44 
 
civilians in her home country during a chance encounter (Harris 2001). Blair himself had spent 
part of the summer reading the Koran. At one point he observed that “Mohammed had lost 
battles but there was a belief that if you died in the cause that you believed in then you went 
straight to heaven”. As Campbell put it, “that was a very, very powerful thing to work against” 
(Campbell and Stott 2007, 562). It was apparently on the basis largely of these personal 
interactions and reflections that the Prime Minister concluded there was “no compromise 
possible with such people, no meeting of minds, no point of understanding with such terror. 
Just a choice: defeat it or be defeated by it” (Blair 2001b). Such was the strength of this 
conviction that he, unusually, wrote his Labour Party Conference speech, which dealt in detail 
with the need for a robust response, “virtually straight out” with “none of the usual agonising” 
or repeated redrafting (Blair 2010b, 367). Public Opinion in general had almost no chance of 
influencing his position; even his own officials had largely been cut out of the loop. At this 
stage the Prime Minister’s show of leadership was welcomed; he was praised for showing 
“moral conviction [and] decisiveness” (D. MacIntyre 2001b), and hailed as “a man at the helm 
who knows instinctively what to do” (The Sun 2001a). That he had been rewarded for 
effectively ignoring the advice of those around him, and of the wider British public sphere, 
appears ominous with hindsight. 
When President Bush responded to the 11 September attacks by declaring a ‘war on 
terror’, he introduced an entirely new conceptual framework into the global foreign policy 
discourse. To an extent, the detailed construct developed by his administration in the weeks 
that followed represented a novel and unique response to a particular set of circumstances 
(Wolfe 2008, 45). At the same time, it was undeniably “a direct metaphorical descendant of 
Lyndon Johnson’s ‘War on Poverty’ and the various ‘Wars on Drugs’” (B. MacIntyre 2001b). It 
might even be regarded as having earlier antecedents. During the Middle Ages, Christian 
warriors and theologians had between them developed the concept of a ‘crusade’. Soldiers on 
crusade were not merely participants in an armed conflict between secular authorities; they 
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served a higher divine power. Even pledging to travel to the Holy Land in the hoped of 
undertaking some feat of arms represented an act of service to God. The act of crusading, like 
that of pilgrimage, is an end in itself; the achievement of stated objectives becoming a 
secondary goal. So it was with the ‘wars’ on poverty, drugs, and terror. None of these 
‘enemies’ would ever be defeated; but there was virtue in the struggle, and political capital to 
be made in their use as metaphors for the glory of a government and the virtue of loyalty. In a 
manner which uncomfortably echoed the notion of the ‘crusade’, the ‘war on terror’ proved a 
powerful “propagandistic and rhetorical device” in the US (Hoijer, Nohrstedt and Ottosen 
2004, 7), where it comprised “the most important rhetorical construction of the entire [post-
11 September public] discourse” (Jackson 2005, 31). It was also a serious policy programme, 
with significant “intellectual coherence and internal logic”, based on the belief that future 
security for the US homeland would require a more pro-active approach to potential threats 
than that hitherto adopted (Burke 2011, 46). Its impact in the UK was limited. A handful of 
British journalists complained as so-called “soldier-speak” gradually penetrated the vocabulary 
of public debate during the course of the Afghan campaign, leaving the discursive landscape 
“radically and rapidly altered” (Roberts 2001, Fisk 2001c, B. MacIntyre 2001d). The overarching 
theme of a global ‘war’, however, did not resonate in Britain, at least outside Islamist circles. 
This was perhaps unsurprising; all successful discourses require a sponsor (Milliken 1999), and 
the most likely sponsor for this particular construction was the government, which spoke 
equivocally. In Parliament, Blair framed the attacks as “an act of wickedness” rather than as an 
‘act of war’ (Blair, Hansard 2001a, c604). Although the distinction was subtle, it was roundly 
endorsed by MPs and commentators in the press (Richards 2001a, Miles 2001). It left open the 
possibility of a challenge to al-Qaeda’s notion of intractable global politico-religious conflict, 
and so militated against the creation of an “escalating cycle of violence” (Hall 2001). It allowed 
those domestic actors who harboured doubts about the ‘war’ label the freedom to endorse 
military action in Afghanistan without confronting the contradictions latent in their approach 
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(cf. Kennedy, Hansard 2001b, c680, Keetch, Hansard 2001b, c750, Hansard 2001e, c1034). The 
extent to which Blair genuinely rejected the notion that ‘the West’ was ‘at war’ has been 
brought into question subsequently by his own memoirs. By 2010, the attacks on the United 
States had become, in his mind, very definitely “a declaration of war” (Blair 2010b, 342). This 
apparent revelation, then, serves to undermine the contemporary view that the Prime 
Minister did not regard 11 September as the start of a broad global conflict. Once this 
understanding is brought into consideration, the wider series of positions adopted by the 
government immediately appear more bellicose. Blair had, after all, referred at an early stage 
to the prospect of an all-out battle “between the free and democratic world and terrorism” 
(Blair 2001a). He had warned MPs, more than once, that the very values of Western society 
were at stake (Blair, Hansard 2001a, c604, 2010b, 345-346), and he had won Conservative 
Party support for the line (cf. Jenkin, Hansard 2001a, c661). When President Bush warned that 
the West’s enemies “hate our freedoms - our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our 
freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other” (Bush 2001), he largely reflected 
positions the British Prime Minister had already begun to lay out for himself. Crucially, 
however, Blair had done all of these things while ostensibly denying that Britain was actually at 
war. No evidence has emerged to suggest that the government engaged deliberately in 
doublespeak, but nevertheless the scope for confusion was considerable. The question of 
whether the Afghan campaign marked the first action in a general war, or the last action in 
response to 11 September, lay at the heart of the debate that  developed over whether to 
move on to Iraq. 
During October 2001 there was general consensus in British public debate that “when 
bin Laden’s suicide pilots crashed into the Pentagon and the World Trade Center he attacked 
all our values and liberties” (Porter 2001). A few voices tried to highlight the political origins of 
Islamist terrorism with particular reference to Iraq and Palestine (Galloway, Hansard 2001a, 
c639, Benn 2001, Fisk 2001a, 2001e), but without gaining significant traction over Public 
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Opinion. The government explicitly rejected the suggestion that al-Qaeda might have political 
goals; terrorists with specific real-world demands might yet be open to negotiation, and 
negotiation was emphatically not a serious policy option, as Blair had already set out. Instead, 
the official line was that the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks sought only to 
“obliterate Israel, kill all Jews, kill all Americans who support Israel, indeed all Americans” 
(Blair, Hansard 2001f, c870). Al-Qaeda could neither be placated nor appeased; it had only to 
be defeated. Such assertions are problematic from an academic perspective. Although clearly 
volatile and violent, and often acting with scant regard for observable reality, al-Qaeda is not 
without political goals, even if it is not entirely clear within itself on how they might best be 
achieved (cf. Gerges 2011). The organisation’s ‘founding statement’, issued from Jalalabad in 
February 1998, condemns the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia (a personal bugbear of bin 
Laden’s since the Saudi royal family’s decision to prefer American protection to his offer of 
mujahedeen to repel advancing Iraqi troops during the Gulf War), and criticises US support for 
Israel in light of its treatment of the Palestinians. The killing of Americans and Jews is indeed 
described as a religious duty, but the exhortation is dependent upon the failure of the United 
States to withdraw from the Middle East (Halliday 2002, 219). In practical terms this distinction 
is irrelevant; the US is not going to accede to al-Qaeda’s demands, therefore the call to 
violence stands. But the fact that al-Qaeda makes any political demands means that its 
campaign cannot objectively be dismissed as a mindless outbreak of violence. That such a 
dismissal was official British government policy would prove significant, not least because it 
contradicted views shared by many Muslims, in Europe as well as the Middle East (Burke 2011, 
28-31).   
A pervasive belief in the ethereal nature of the al-Qaeda threat partly lay behind 
widespread public scepticism about the practicality of a military campaign targeting the 
network. Although Osama bin Laden was known to be in Afghanistan, and his organisation 
certainly had a physical presence there, it was not seen as being tied to any particular 
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geographical location (The Observer 2001a). There is, in fact, some evidence that al-Qaeda 
leaders were themselves divided over whether they should seek actively to control territory. 
One line of thought, espoused by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, held that the organisation’s primary 
goal should be to establish Islamist ‘safe havens’ to serve not only as bases for attacks on the 
“far enemy” (Gerges 2005), but also as the initial proving grounds for a new Caliphate. An 
alternative argument, advanced by Abu Musab al-Suri, focused on the creation of a genuinely 
decentralised global jihad movement. Al-Qaeda would form an ideological, rather than 
physical, ‘base’ (the literal translation of ‘al-Qaeda’) on which independent cells would build in 
launching their own self-organised attacks (Burke 2011, 152). The invasion of Afghanistan, by 
denying the organisation a secure territory, effectively forced it towards al-Suri’s model, 
although al-Zarqawi would later perish seeking to implement his own ideas in Iraq. Al-Suri’s 
apparent victory was reflected in the British public’s reaction to the idea of a ‘war on terror’. It 
was noted that “one cannot make war on an abstract noun” (Marshall-Andrews, Hansard 
2001d, c1121, cf. Porter 2001), nor was it possible to “declare war on a tactic”. As The 
Independent put it, the declaration of ‘war on terror’ was as ridiculous “as if President 
Roosevelt responded to the attack on Pearl Harbor by declaring war on bombing” (2001a).  
There was agreement, then, that “terrorists” were the enemy (Steuter and Wills 2008, 
8), but not on the manner in which they might best be fought. The government quickly 
proposed to support the US in taking military action against Afghanistan, arguing that this was 
the best, indeed the only, way to bring the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks to justice 
(Blair 2001c, Straw, Hansard 2001d, c1058, Hoon, Hansard 2001e, c1017). Although the 
proposed policy was simple, and legitimised by supportive poll results, commentators raised a 
number of objections. It was suggested that a police action would be preferable to a military 
one (Fisk 2001a), although advocates of this approach never explained how the Taliban refusal 
to hand over Osama bin Laden might have been circumvented without the use of force. Others 
argued that diplomacy, secret intelligence work, and ‘soft power’ inducements such as the 
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despatch of humanitarian aid would be more likely to win the cooperation both of the Taliban 
and of the Afghan people than outright confrontation, leading in turn to their surrendering the 
al-Qaeda leadership (The Independent 2001c, D. Anderson, Hansard 2001b, c789, Tonge, 
Hansard 2001c, c864). Indeed, it was argued both that the battle against terror could only 
really be fought and won in the hearts and minds of ordinary Afghans, and that they would 
inevitably suffer far more than benefit from a military campaign. There was no sense, several 
commentators argued, in trying to put pressure on the Taliban by “killing people who have had 
little say in who rules them” (The Sunday Times 2001, cf. The Daily Mail 2001). Such action was 
rather more likely to strengthen al-Qaeda’s hold over the country and its ability to mount 
attacks against Western targets (J. Khan 2001, Oborne 2001, The Independent 2001d, Ruthven 
2001, Milne 2001, The Times 2001c, The Independent 2001i, McKay 2001). Warning against 
the unintended consequences of war, one MP concluded that only three leaders believed “the 
bombing of Afghanistan...is in the interests of their cause”; President Bush, Tony Blair, and 
Osama bin Laden (Marshall-Andrews, Hansard 2001d, c1121). The implication, of course, was 
that they could not all be right. 
Within days of the first bombs being dropped on Taliban targets, questions began to 
be asked about the nature of the campaign. Supporters of the use of force praised the 
“restrained, small and targeted operations” (Mercer, Hansard 2001d, c1123) that were 
degrading hostile defences without harming civilian populations. Sceptics complained about 
indiscriminate “carpet bombing” (The Independent 2001j). Neither side, of course, had much 
real information about what was going on. Without western troops on the ground, it was 
impossible even for journalists to gain the relatively limited first-hand knowledge they would 
later have as ‘embedded’ correspondents with allied forces in Iraq. Concerns for the welfare of 
the Afghan people were driven, however, firstly by warnings from aid agencies, even before 
they were themselves forced to withdraw from the country in the face of looming hostilities, 
that the disruption caused by war would trigger a humanitarian crisis, and secondly by 
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awareness of the weakness of Afghan military defences under the Taliban. It was argued that 
civilians must be coming under attack, because Afghanistan lacked enough legitimate military 
targets to warrant a sustained aerial campaign. One report observed that in most cases Taliban 
“command and control centres...largely consist of a man sitting on a rug with a radio, an 
ancient, unconnected telephone and the mother of all teapots” (Burke 2001). The belief that 
there was very little left worth bombing in a country in which brutal and arbitrary Taliban rule 
had actually brought relative stability and security after decades of civil war, underpinned the 
widely held fear that much of what was proposed would do little more than “rearrange the 
rubble” (Ashdown 2001). Less than a week after the first strikes, a number of public actors, 
several of whom had supported the initial decision to use force (cf. Salmond, Hansard 2001c, 
c852), launched a campaign for a ‘pause’ in the bombing. Their stated aim was to allow space 
for aid to be moved in, and for refugees to move out of the country (Tonge, Hansard 2001d, 
c1094, Steele 2001, The Mirror 2001a, The Independent 2001h, M. Riddell 2001b). Ministers 
were unsympathetic; civilians were not being targeted, they insisted, and any reduction in the 
intensity of the assault would only allow Taliban forces to regroup, ultimately lengthening the 
conflict. Although they went on to insist that “no one who raises doubts is an appeaser” (Blair 
2001d), in reality the spectre of Munich, a familiar device in British public debates over war, 
was raised occasionally to underline the point (cf. Straw, Hansard 2001b, c690). Certainly there 
was no ‘pause’.  
What these initial battles to frame the appropriate response to the 11 September 
attacks had shown was the sheer complexity of characterising what was a novel situation. 
Unlike in earlier major wars, the states that rallied to support the US in late 2001 had little 
clear idea of who the enemy was, or how it might best be fought. The Taliban had been a 
useful proxy for al-Qaeda; their removal represented an early success that compensated for 
the failure to capture bin Laden and allowed leaders to frame their decision to militarise what 
might have been a more ideational conflict in positive terms. The British government had 
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avoided a direct clash with elements within Public Opinion by refusing to describe the conflict 
as an actual ‘war’. Although ministers shared the Bush administration view that the 
significance of the 11 September attacks lay in the shift they engendered in western 
calculations of threat, they did little publicly to spell out the likely longer-term consequences 
of this. Instead, the Afghan campaign was presented if not as a free-standing operation, at 
least as likely the most physical confrontation of a broader-based struggle against a particular 
type of terrorist. The question of whether that struggle meant more traditional approaches to 
waging war was left unanswered.  
 
Writing a blank cheque 
 
 British ministers worked hard in the weeks after 11 September to emphasise both 
their support for the US and the willingness of the Bush administration to act in partnership 
with the broader international community. They sought both to tie the Americans into 
multilateral co-operation by demonstrating the benefits of allied support, and to secure 
domestic credit for having done so. It was a difficult balancing act. President Bush may have 
been given an easy ride over Afghanistan from American journalists, at least in the eyes of 
their British counterparts (Greenslade 2001), but Tony Blair knew he could not expect similar 
treatment. Government statements to the media in the UK recognised, as one commentator 
put it, that “the secret to a good briefing is to have both a domestic and a foreign element” 
(Rayner 2001). Ministers and officials offered their support to their counterparts across the 
Atlantic, while reassuring domestic audiences that Britain’s loyalty would be recognised with 
increased influence over US policymaking. Washington was slower to accept the importance of 
addressing audiences both at home and abroad, and tended to focus on satisfying the 
Republican ‘base’ ahead of respecting allies’ sensitivities (Buncombe 2001, Wastell and 
Murphy 2001). For example, Alastair Campbell was not able to get the Coalition Information 
Centre, the centrepiece of his public relations strategy during the Afghan campaign, authorised 
52 
 
by Washington until 24 October, and then only by securing the personal intervention of 
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (Campbell and Stott 2007, 583). To a degree the 
failure of Bush administration policymakers to take seriously the prospect of their messages, 
aimed at a domestic audience, penetrating other public spheres reflects the balance of ‘hard’ 
power between the US and its allies. American pronouncements on international affairs are 
automatically regarded as newsworthy across the globe because the US has global reach in a 
way that no other country has; their prominence in media coverage results from a structural 
tendency on the part of journalists to ‘index’ their reports to the influence of individual actors. 
That British policymakers’ views might become a central concern of US Public Opinion was 
unimaginable; that the converse would be the case was, at least, unanticipated (or thought 
irrelevant) in Washington. The impact in the UK of hard-line American rhetoric, particularly 
from administration ‘hawks’ such as Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney, was exacerbated by 
stereotypes of US public attitudes already established in British Public Opinion. President Bush 
would face immense pressure from his constituents for a dramatic and decisive response, and 
would offer either “isolationism” or “instant gratification for their anger”, MPs warned (B. 
Anderson, Hansard 2001a, c629, George, Hansard 2001a, c636). Journalists concluded that 
some sort of show of armed force would be necessary in order to quiet domestic discord; 
“Americans expect a firework display, so there will probably be one”, as one commentator put 
it (Maddox 2001a, cf. Oborne 2001, The Guardian 2001d). Americans did not care about 
people outside of America, they wanted revenge in the form of “blood in the sand” (Raven 
2001). If that meant massacring civilians, so be it (I. Khan 2001). Ignoring their already 
stratospheric status, a number of writers even suggested that the primary goal of the 
campaign in Afghanistan was “to keep up President Bush’s poll ratings” (Smith 2001c, cf. 
McCrum 2001, Cohen 2001a, Whelan 2001, Wastell and Lamb 2001). Clearly the British public 
had a low opinion of their American peers. 
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Perhaps mindful that Public Opinion was occasionally cynical in its consideration of US 
foreign policy, Blair was pro-active in seeking to head off the suggestion that the 11 September 
attacks constituted a rational response to American conduct overseas. He conceded that some 
of the grievances cited by those who conducted terror attacks against Western targets were 
valid; but utterly rejected the notion that terrorism was in any way a justifiable response (Blair, 
Hansard 2001a, c614). In any event, both supporters and opponents of military action in 
Afghanistan argued that there existed a degree of moral equivalence between US civilian 
casualties and those killed by western bombs or UN sanctions in the Muslim world. Established 
critics of US policies warned against overestimating the scale of the tragedy that had taken 
place on 11 September; they repeated that the death toll was less than the number killed each 
month by the economic restrictions in operation against Iraq, and that a failure to recognise 
this would only fuel further resentment in the region (Galloway, Hansard 2001a, c640, Ali 
2001a, Smith 2001, Hirst 2001, Fisk 2001d). Ministers, unwilling to let such statements pass 
unchallenged, but equally seeking to avoid a broader debate on western policy towards the 
Middle East, insisted that “there is no moral equivalence between us and our enemy: the 
terrorists seek to maximise civilian casualties; we seek to minimise them” (Straw, Hansard 
2001d, c1100). The distinction mattered little to those who were killed, it was pointed out, and 
in any event the moral equivalence argument still held, because “nothing justifies the killing of 
innocent people anywhere” (Pilger 2001). Taking a more aggressive stance than the 
government, right-wing supporters of military action actually accepted the left-wing ‘moral 
equivalence’ argument. They did not, however, include supposed victims of western sanctions 
in Iraq or of western support for Israel in their calculations. Instead they framed the campaign 
in Afghanistan as an opportunity, as one anti-war critic put it, to “even the score” (Steel 
2001c). Whenever concerns were raised, either in the press or in Parliament, about the death 
of civilians in western air strikes, they were countered by pro-war advocates with reference to 
the number of civilians killed in the World Trade Center (cf. Evison 2001, Hughes, Hansard 
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2001e, c1016, Mercer, c1081). A wide range of public opinions were thus expressed as to who 
might properly suffer the effects of the US response to 11 September. That disagreements 
over the threat to civilians did not lead to greater controversy was largely a consequence of 
the relatively limited duration of the fighting. The campaign was over before dissatisfaction 
had begun seriously to manifest itself. When it came to debating an attack on Iraq, however, 
opponents had over a year in which to articulate a moral case against war based on the threat 
to civilians. The longer build-up period altered the conditions in which Public Opinion 
operated, and so inevitably affected its impact on policymaking.  
The legal basis for the removal of the Taliban was similarly less contentious than that 
for the later action against Saddam Hussein. Formally, the British contribution to Operation 
Enduring Freedom was based on two legal principles. Firstly, in launching strikes on 
Afghanistan, the United States asserted its right to self-defence as enshrined by Article 51 of 
the UN Charter. Britain was committed to support its NATO ally in defending itself against 
attack by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, invoked for the first time in the organisation’s 
history on 12 September. With 11 September classed as an act of war in the US, both of these 
provisions were held to have been activated. Secondly, British ministers took pains to highlight 
the passage, in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, of UN Security Council Resolutions 
1368 and 1373 (Blair, Hansard 2001b, c674, Straw, Hansard 2001b, c689). UNSCR 1368 
authorised the use of force against terrorists and any states which harboured them; UNSCR 
1373 imposed a duty on all member states to combat terrorism within their own territories. 
The combined effect was to require the Taliban to hand over the al-Qaeda leadership, and to 
authorise the use of force against them in the event of a refusal. Once that refusal had been 
received, the US took the view, supported by the UK and not seriously opposed by any other 
Security Council member, that it had the necessary authority to use force. During the earliest 
exchanges over the 11 September attacks, those who feared that the US would launch a 
violent counter-strike questioned the extent to which such an action could be legitimised by 
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Article 51; “retaliation is not self-defence by any legal measure”, warned Liberal Democrat 
foreign affairs spokesman Menzies Campbell (M. Campbell, Hansard 2001a, c625). With NATO 
and the UN firmly on board, however, and with very few exceptions (cf. Robertson 2001a, 
2001b, 2001c), most elements of Public Opinion, including Campbell himself, broadly accepted 
that the action taken was in fact legal (cf. Llwyd, Hansard 2001a, c641, Kennedy, Hansard 
2001b, c680, M. Campbell, Hansard 2001b, c704, 2001h, c859). Again, it would prove 
significant for the debate over Iraq that legal niceties only seem to trigger British public 
concern where there is no clear international consensus on the right way to act.  
What agreement there was on the legality of the ‘war on terror’ began rapidly to 
evaporate once speculation began that the US intended to target Iraq as part of ‘phase two’. 
Just as the question of where the proper targets for a military response to 11 September might 
lie had been left unresolved, the existence of legal grounds for a wider programme of ‘pre-
emptive self-defence’ was in some doubt. In accordance with Article 51, the US had written to 
the UN Security Council to inform it of its intention to strike against Afghanistan. In the 
process, it had reserved the right to conduct further operations “against other organisations 
and other states”. This reservation caused some concern when it was raised in Parliament 
(Salmond, Hansard 2001c, c851). In effect, the US had asserted the right to act unilaterally, 
pre-emptively, and without further UN approval against any entity it considered a threat 
anywhere in the world, and had sought to justify the assertion with reference to its right to 
self-defence. Sceptical voices had conceded the legal argument over Afghanistan because of 
the evident degree of international agreement, represented by the broad coalition gathered to 
support the US. When it came to extending the campaign beyond Afghanistan, however, they 
complained that “America has neither a moral nor a legal right to take such momentous 
decisions by itself without proper recourse to the international community” (The Guardian 
2001b). Advocates of the use of force, meanwhile, took the exact opposite line. Not only did 
the US have the right to act against Iraq if it thought such action necessary for self-defence, it 
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also had existing UN Security Council approval stemming from the “unfinished business” of 
Iraqi disarmament, mandated at the end of the Gulf War but not yet concluded (The Times 
2001d). The ceasefire within Public Opinion over the question of legal backing for military 
action in Afghanistan was thus unlikely to hold for long once attention shifted to Baghdad. 
A subsidiary point worth making here is the varying degree to which different actors in 
Britain saw the maintenance of the international coalition assembled for the response to 11 
September as an end in itself, as a means to an end (and so as an expendable luxury), or even 
as a potential obstacle to the achievement of desired ends. Advocates of the first position 
argued that every effort should be made to sustain the coalition, even at the expense of 
operational efficiency. Their line was that the degree of international unity established in the 
wake of the attacks on the United States would yield far greater dividends in the long run than 
any individual military strike, and so any proposed action that threatened to create disunity 
was inherently undesirable (cf. Keetch, Hansard 2001c, c845). Those who took the second line 
were willing to accept that a degree of multilateral co-operation might increase the 
effectiveness of the campaign against al-Qaeda, but they disagreed with the claim that the 
maintenance of the coalition was of greater value than the conduct of further military strikes. 
Instead of worrying too much about allies’ views, they argued, the US should press ahead as it 
saw fit, retaining the support of whichever states had the stomach for the fight (cf. Duncan 
Smith, Hansard 2001b, c677). Advancing the third line, that the coalition represented a 
potential roadblock, constraining the ability of the US in particular to defend itself, were for 
the most part actors already agitating in late 2001 for a confrontation with Iraq (cf. Hart 2001a, 
2001b). Given that US policymakers, building on Donald Rumsfeld’s insistence that the mission 
should define the coalition and not the other way around, alternated between the second and 
third lines (Burke 2011, 48-49), a great deal of room had been left open for future clashes.  
Drawing upon the well-established trope of a US-UK ‘special relationship’, Tony Blair 
declared on 11 September that Britain would “stand shoulder to shoulder with our American 
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friends” in facing up to terrorism (Blair 2001a). It was significant that he made no attempt to 
limit the extent of that support, or indeed to define what an appropriate response to terrorism 
might look like. Blair recalls that he “chose the words [‘shoulder to shoulder’] carefully”, that 
he “was aware this was a big commitment that would come to be measured not in words but 
in actions”. He had decided to offer unconditional support, knowing that the result might 
mean being asked to join in actions that were not necessarily popular in the UK, “for reasons 
both of principle and of national interest”; indeed, he notes having “never believed the two 
are mutually exclusive” (Blair 2010b, 352). Britain would be with the US in Afghanistan, and 
beyond, both because it was in Britain’s interests to be there, and because it was ‘the right 
thing to do’; that, at least, was the proposition advanced by the government. Speaking in 
Parliament, Blair referred to the British casualties of 11 September (still the bloodiest act of 
terrorism ever committed against the UK, in terms of the number of dead) in justifying his 
support for the US. In addition, he said, echoing his 11 September statement, the British would 
“stand by their friends”; principle and interest were thus evoked together (Blair, Hansard 
2001a, c604), an approach endorsed by the Opposition (Duncan Smith, Hansard 2001a, c607). 
Blair may have thought the principle of support for the US and the British interest in being part 
of any retaliatory action after 11 September were inseparable, but he can have been under no 
illusions that this view was not universally shared in Britain. Veteran left-wing MP George 
Galloway praised “the great people of the United States” and “that great city, which I know 
and love, New York”, but at the same time attacked US foreign policy as the ultimate cause of 
the attacks, and predicted grave consequences should the US respond with further violence. In 
a phrase that gained some traction over Public Opinion, he warned the government against 
writing a “blank cheque” by being too forthright in its support for the Bush administration 
(Galloway, Hansard 2001a, cc639-640, cf. M. Campbell, Hansard 2001a, c625).  
By introducing, and then rejecting, the idea of a British ‘blank cheque’ for the US, 
Galloway and others actively challenged the government’s efforts to frame the specific 
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question of whether to support individual military campaigns in the general terms of the 
‘special relationship’. To gain wider credibility for this position, they would have had to 
establish the belief in the public mind that US-UK co-operation was contingent on the clear 
identification of mutual interests. Public Opinion was primed, however, to take a less than 
coolly rational view. The ‘special relationship’, already a central reference point in the public 
consideration of international affairs, had taken on a new life as a result of Blair’s pro-US 
positioning. So grateful had President Bush been for his ally’s outspoken support that the 
Prime Minister had been invited to a special ‘joint address to Congress and the American 
people’ on 20 September. Promising to wage war against the perpetrators of the attacks, Bush 
turned to Blair and declared to general applause that “America has no truer friend than Great 
Britain” (Bush 2001). It was a moment of personal triumph for the Prime Minister of a state 
ever-paranoid about the esteem in which it is held in Washington. He was praised at home for 
having cemented “a genuine transatlantic bond” (Jones 2001). The ‘special relationship’ itself, 
often analysed critically by journalists, was described by one as “a pillar of the world order, a 
seamless alliance”, and the product of a natural transfer of power from one global leader to its 
chosen successor (Cornwell 2001). Such sentiments may have been hyperbolic, but their gist 
was widely shared. The problem for the government, however, was that while the strategy of 
‘seamless alliance’ had considerable domestic support, the tactics needed to maintain it 
prompted complaints. Blair believed that the only way a British Prime Minister would be taken 
seriously in Washington was if he offered absolute support for US policy in public, raising any 
doubts he might have about the President’s chosen line only in private (Campbell and Stott 
2007, 563). The calculation that any state could criticise the US, but only its closest allies might 
hope to influence it, was shared by much of the active public (cf. The Independent 2001a, D. 
MacIntyre 2001a, 2001e, McAskill and White 2001, The Daily Telegraph 2001c, P. Riddell 
2001b, Rawnsley 2001, B. Anderson 2001, Keetch, Hansard 2001b, c752). Concerns 
nevertheless remained. For one thing, it was unclear to what extent the disparity existing in 
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terms of ‘hard’ power between the two allies might undermine their ability to co-operate; as 
one commentator put it, “a giant and a dwarf can never stand shoulder to shoulder” (Richards 
2001b). In addition, as events played out (and in particular as the debate over Iraq developed 
during 2002), doubts began to creep in as to the actual benefits of publicly toeing the line. 
Subsequent studies have argued that Blair’s loyalty in practice gained him very little traction 
over Bush’s private considerations (Wallace 2005, 54).  
What the question of the influence gained by Britain as a result of Blair’s public stance 
fails to address, however, is the extent to which the Prime Minister agreed with the underlying 
logic of the ‘war on terror’, and so with its latent promise of a ‘phase two’ beyond Afghanistan. 
On 11 September he warned aides that his “big fear”, in light of the attacks, “was terrorists 
capable of this getting in league with rogue states that would help them”. Despite having been 
advised by John Scarlett of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Stephen Lander of MI5 that it 
was unlikely “rogue governments” had been in involved, since “bin Laden was able to do it 
himself, and that suited his purposes better” (Campbell and Stott 2007, 560-561), Blair 
responded to the attacks by revising his analysis of the threat posed by a number of existing 
states of concern, primarily as a result of their development of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
Jack Straw summed up the new thinking in his statement to Parliament on 14 September, 
warning that “people who have the fanaticism and the capability to fly an airliner laden with 
passengers and fuel into a skyscraper will not be deterred by human decency from deploying 
chemical or biological weapons, missiles or nuclear weapons if they are available to them” 
(Straw, Hansard 2001a, c619). Although at this stage the only public voices which talked about 
a general need to deal with “rogue states” were those already advocating a forceful response 
to 11 September (cf. Kavanagh 2001a, Ancram, Hansard 2001a, c622), the tenor of official 
statements indicated a desire to prime public debate more generally to accept a broader 
conception of self-defence that might in time lead to further military campaigns.  
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When Blair himself talked about the next steps for the counter-terrorist coalition he 
positioned the Afghan campaign within a far broader framework. Speaking to the Labour Party 
Conference at the start of October, he told delegates “this is a moment to seize...the 
kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they 
do, let us re-order this world around us” (Blair 2001b). It was a speech of some considerable 
ambition, prompting critics to accuse the Prime Minister of imperialism (Morrish 2001; 
Henscher 2001). At the same time, he won praise for having delivered his “most truthful, 
heartfelt, least manufactured” address since becoming leader of the Labour Party (Young 
2001a). The speech itself was “the most statesmanlike and mature he has delivered” (The 
Independent 2001f); it was “remarkable and remarkably grandiloquent” (The Sunday Telegraph 
2001a). Where the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ was primarily about taking pre-
emptive action to eliminate future threats, and demonstrating US military superiority around 
the world, the British government appeared to be proposing a left-wing “mission to conquer 
world poverty and build international peace and a world based upon justice, equality and 
human rights” (Hain 2001). Fellow left-wingers were divided. Some embraced the “hard 
liberal” programme, under which “promoting liberal values everywhere from Burma to Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq to Chechnya is not neo-colonialism, but respect for a universal right to freedom 
from oppression” (Toynbee 2001a, cf. 2001b). Others attacked the “simplistic” reasoning and 
“selective moralising” embedded in the concept (Young 2001a, Pilger 2001). A number of right-
wingers spoke up to support the core ideas (cf. Osborne, Hansard 2001a, c654), while the 
majority of commentators simply accepted as given the Prime Minister’s conviction in the 
rectitude of his proposed course (Rawnsley 2001, Watkins 2001, Ivens 2001b, Maddox 2001e). 
That conviction would only grow over the following months.  
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The problem of projection 
 
 Regardless of whether the response to 11 September was to be total war or a limited 
police action, the first phase inevitably focused on the relatively uncontested decision to oust 
the Taliban, and on the (unsuccessful) attempt to capture Osama Bin Laden. The really 
controversial decisions were always going to come later. During the period of the initial Afghan 
campaign, both supporters and opponents of a further action against Iraq projected their own 
views onto the blank canvas of official policy. This tendency to project appears to be a 
characteristic of Public Opinion rather than something unique to the case considered here. 
Nothing specific prompted it beyond the vagueness of the official line, and no one view was 
particularly strongly represented amongst the range of projections offered. The effect was 
exacerbated, however, by the apparently strong position the British government occupied, 
both domestically and internationally, at the end of 2001. With the Taliban removed from 
power, there was real hope that Afghanistan might have a better future. Western costs had 
been low and the campaign had been short. Successful military actions tend to be popular; as 
one study has put it, “victory has many friends” (Eichenberg 2005). There was a danger that 
ministers would be blinded by “soaring poll ratings and the adulatory press at home and 
abroad” (D. MacIntyre 2001d), that they would forget the myriad unanswered questions about 
the broader campaign, and the fact that “war leaders tend to become unpopular when the 
wars do” (F. Johnson 2001). Opinion poll results do not remain positive forever, and in late 
2001 passive public support for military action remained high; the only way forward was down 
(M. Riddell 2001a). Parliamentary unity, meanwhile, was described as being “nearly always a 
bad sign” (Hoggart 2001, F. Johnson 2001). Partisan manoeuvring would in time return; 
politicians, “however aspirational their language becomes, can never wholly abandon the 
calculations of their trade” (Preston 2001). The political waters were calm, then, in late 2001, 
but the prospect of a storm hovered on the horizon, embedded in the nature of a Public 
Opinion system typically defined by conflict.  
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Blair’s colleagues have recalled his belief that informing the public was a necessary 
component of both government (Campbell and Stott 2007, 572) and politics (Cook 2003, 56). 
He was described by journalists as “a compulsive, almost pathological, persuader”, and praised 
for his “tireless...pursuit of public understanding” over Afghanistan (D’Ancona 2001; Moore 
2001; The Times 2001b; D. MacIntyre 2001c). In late 2001 there was no real need for an 
aggressive public relations exercise to promote the military operation against the Taliban; 
passive public support was high, and much of the active public was at least sufficiently 
supportive of the general goals of the action that little overt criticism emerged (Kampfner 
2003, 118). The Prime Minister nevertheless felt “the public deserved to have the facts” about 
the campaign (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 59, emphasis added), and he acted 
accordingly. Three main methods were used to advance the ‘official line’; formal speeches and 
statements by ministers, information ‘dossiers’, and efforts to manage the flow of information 
from the battlefield via the Coalition Information Centre.  
Part of the reason for the lack of rancour in the British public debate was a failure on 
the part of commentators to recognise that Blair really intended to implement his more 
ambitious rhetorical commitments. One writer, referring to the vast breadth of ambition on 
display in the Prime Minister’s Labour Party Conference address, prescribed an unflustered 
response; “I’m not saying Tony Blair doesn’t believe this stuff when he says it. The bad news is 
that he probably does. But there’s better news. He doesn’t do it, once he’s said it” (Parris 
2001a). Such scepticism can only have been fuelled by the unwillingness of No. 10 to press 
home the depth of the government’s commitment to the ‘war on terror’ project. When, for 
example, a draft of a speech Blair was to make to the Welsh Assembly was leaked, press 
complaints that a mooted appeal for greater ‘moral fibre’ in the face of uncertain progress in 
Afghanistan was “ridiculous” and showed “damn cheek” (Maddox 2001c, Woods 2001), were 
enough to get the line dropped. Although the speech was subsequently praised as “one of the 
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best anyone has given since September 11” (Maddox 2001d) by one of those who had 
criticised the particular reference, its removal had reduced the force of what was said.  
As for the information ‘dossiers’ released during late 2001, two documents were of 
primary significance. The first laid out the official line that “Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida, the 
terrorist network which he heads, planned and carried out the atrocities on 11 September 
2001” (British Government 2001). Although described (with hindsight, albeit somewhat 
appropriately) as “a portent of [bad] things to come” during the Iraq debate (Hollis 2010, 43), 
this document was generally well received. Sceptics did not yet automatically challenge the 
veracity of government statements, although they did warn that ministers were putting their 
credibility on the line by publishing information that could not independently be verified (M. 
Campbell, Hansard 2001b, cc704-705). Although there was little said or written on the subject 
at the time, some observers did note that the document contained “not ‘evidence’, so much as 
a convincing argument” (Robertson 2001b, cf. Blackhurst 2001). The distinction between the 
government’s case for its preferred course of action, based on a range of information available 
to ministers, and the public release of raw source material is important, but it was not 
emphasised either by the government or by observers at this time. A dangerous precedent had 
been set. In addition, there were specific errors made with the publication of individual 
papers. The ‘campaign objectives’ document that followed the first ‘dossier’ was initially only 
given to the media and not to MPs; a paper of such significance would ordinarily have been 
lodged in the Library of the House. Parliament was still in recess, despite its three recall 
debates in September and October, so the omission was not without reason. Although 
ministers apologised for the “error” (Straw, Hansard 2001d, c1054), however, complaints 
about MPs being sidelined bred a degree of early bad blood (Salmond, Hansard 2001d, c1098). 
It did not help that such incidents fed into an existing popular narrative about the danger 
posed by New Labour’s communication practices, and in particular the work of Alastair 
Campbell, already embedded in the operating code of British Public Opinion. By 2001, 
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Campbell’s reputation for media management was such that, as Blair later put it, “everyone”, 
even President Clinton, “believed [he] single-handedly shaped the news everywhere” (Blair 
2010b, 240, cf. C. Meyer 2005, 102-103). In some quarters the precedent for the Coalition 
Information Centre (once it was finally up and running in late October) in Campbell’s work 
during the Kosovo campaign was noted neutrally (The Times 2001f); indeed, a handful of 
actors regarded the ‘spin doctor’ as a strategic asset (cf. Deedes 2001). Many journalists 
however reacted critically to Downing Street efforts to influence their coverage of the Afghan 
campaign, accusing ministers of propagandising (Dillon and Gumbel 2001, Ali 2001b). 
Conservative MPs, happy to support the action itself, were equally ready to attack its 
presentation; the Opposition Defence Spokesman warned Geoff Hoon that “people want the 
facts of the situation. The do not want spin”, implying that ‘spin’ was what they might 
otherwise have got (Jenkin, Hansard 2001e, c1027).  
To a degree the government was unfairly maligned. Despite regularly being attacked 
for fostering a “culture of censorship” (Fisk 2001b), there is little evidence that officials sought 
actively to constrain what news came to be reported during the Afghan campaign, let alone 
that they worked to suppress critical commentary. In an indicative series of exchanges, 
ministers were simultaneously accused both of manipulative propagandising and of 
surrendering the initiative in the global public debate to al-Qaeda (Selous, Hansard 2001c, 
c878, The Guardian 2001a, Fisk 2001c, MacIntyre 2001a, Marshall 2001, Craig 2001, Jury 2001, 
Galloway, Hansard 2001d, c1111, Whelan 2001). Alastair Campbell saw this incongruity as part 
of a general culture of “media cynicism”; he regarded his role as largely a matter of combating 
journalists’ cynical efforts to twist information in order to support attacks on the government 
(Kampfner 2003, 125). He was not alone in adopting a ‘siege mentality’ in dealing with the 
media; a number of leading political figures (several of whom were not Campbell’s natural 
allies) agreed that some media outlets were behaving irresponsibly, at the least, in terms of 
how they presented coverage of the Afghan campaign (Cook 2003, 51, M. Campbell, Hansard 
65 
 
2001d, c1074, B. Anderson, Hansard 2001h, c865). Even journalists themselves remarked upon 
their peers’ impatient demands for daily evidence of concrete military advances (Judd 2001, 
Rawnsley 2001), indulgence in speculation by writing that the absence of fresh information 
meant the campaign was floundering (Littlejohn 2001a, 2001b), poor source selection 
involving the uncritical repetition of Taliban claims about civilian casualties (Rayner 2001, 
D’Ancona 2001), obsession with writing stories about divisions between coalition partners or 
within the government (The Daily Telegraph 2001d), and undue pessimism about the 
prospects for a military victory (Parris 2001c, Toynbee 2001c). Sympathy with the 
government’s predicament did not, however, translate into support for its actually doing 
anything in response. A memo from Downing Street warning reporters against relying on 
Taliban estimates when reporting civilian casualties from NATO airstrikes, an issue about which 
Campbell was apparently genuinely exercised (Campbell and Stott 2007, 586), was particularly 
poorly received. To have attempted to influence journalists’ source selection practices was 
both “misguided” and “patronising”, as one editorial put it (The Independent 2001g). The 
prospects for a more aggressive official communications campaign were thus far from ideal. 
The very effort to set the tone for public debate was likely to provoke a reaction; certainly 
ministers would struggle if they tried to exert anything that looked like control over Public 
Opinion; its component actors were primed to respond. 
Whether such an effort would in fact be made depended in large part on the level of 
opposition to the general thrust of the policy. During late 2001, ministers enjoyed support in 
the press, and largely dominated parliamentary debates. Conservative spokesmen backed the 
action in Afghanistan; their only complaint was that it did not go far enough (Duncan Smith, 
Hansard 2001c, c815, Jenkin, Hansard 2001c, c837). Liberal Democrats were more equivocal 
about how they expressed their agreement with the policy, but overall they were onside 
(Kennedy, Hansard 2001c, c817, Keetch, Hansard 2001c, c842, Tonge, Hansard 2001, cc864-
865). At this stage, the most vocal opponents of the use of force, Labour backbench MPs 
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George Galloway and Tam Dalyell, were dismissed as “the usual suspects” (cf. Dillon 2001a, P. 
Riddell 2001a). They represented the extreme end of a spectrum of views about both the 
appropriateness of military action as a tool of foreign policy, and the proper relationship of the 
UK to the United States.  
The breakdown of contributions to parliamentary debates over the Afghan campaign 
set out in figure 1, shows that a majority of the MPs who spoke expressed support for the 
action; just 13% were outright opposed. Most of those whose views fell towards the anti-war 
end of the scale were co-opted to support the government either by the ‘hard liberal’ 
argument, or the level of international agreement; as Robin Cook put it, those “who would 
normally have reservations about military action are also those who are most respectful of 
international cooperation”. Given the breadth of the coalition assembled in the aftermath of 
11 September, “they found it impossible flatly to resist military action” (Cook 2003, 45-46).  
 
Figure 1: Positions adopted by British MPs towards military action in Afghanistan, September – 
December 2001. 
 
In the media, meanwhile, right-wing commentators who might have opposed a Labour Prime 
Minister on principle (especially one expressing utopian views of world affairs) were won over 
by affection for the armed forces, a desired to support the United States, and the effect of 
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seeing the Conservatives supporting the government line (cf. The Sun 2001b, The Times 
2001b). 
Left-wing commentators were similarly guilty of ‘indexing’ (Entman 2004) their views 
in line with parliamentary debate. Clare Short’s praise for the “deep consensus” in the House 
of Commons (Short, Hansard 2001c, c893) found echo in the media among writers who, like 
Short herself, might otherwise have been expected to be sceptical of the Afghan operation (cf. 
The Guardian 2001c, Parris 2001b). The overall effect, as figure 2 summarises, was a generally 
positive attitude on the part of newspaper commentary towards the use of force (at least once 
circulation is controlled for).  
 
Figure 2: Editorial positions adopted by leading UK newspapers towards military action in 
Afghanistan, controlling for circulation, September – December 2001. 
 
This positive attitude was not evenly distributed across publications, however, as figure 3 
makes clear. Over 80% of the 26 opinion pieces touching on the subject published by The Sun 
during this period were pro-war; over 70% of The Independent on Sunday’s 21 commentary 
articles were anti-war. 
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Figure 3: Editorial positions adopted by articles in leading UK newspapers towards military 
action in Afghanistan, by publication, September – December 2001 (n-numbers in brackets). 
 
In terms of the activation of Public Opinion at this time, figure 4 shows the volume of 
commentary articles about the Afghan campaign during the months covered by this chapter. 
What we can see from figure 4 is that the interest of commentators in the Afghan campaign 
peaked in October, the month of the most intense military action, and then tailed off. This 
observation is consistent with the claim that Public Opinion shows the most interest in foreign 
policy matters during times of conflict.  
 
Figure 4: Volume of commentary articles in UK newspapers relating to Afghanistan or Iraq, 
September – December 2001. 
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Figure 5: Opinion poll data showing support for military action against Afghanistan, September 
– December 2001. Source: Ipsos Mori/ICM. 
 
Opinion poll data, meanwhile, shows the majority of respondents approving of the use of force 
against Afghanistan, as outlined in figure 5. Based on the wording of the questions, it is 
possible to confirm that this support was predicated on the assumption that Afghanistan was 
harbouring terrorists who were responsible for the 11 September attacks. Outright opposition 
hovered a fraction above 20%, representing a core pacifist tendency. The proportion of ‘don’t 
know’ responses increased when the rationale for action was less clearly spelt out in the 
question. The 16 September ICM poll that found just 59% support for military action had asked 
“Would you support or oppose the United States and NATO taking military action against 
countries that assist or harbour terrorists?”, without mentioning the 11 September attacks. 
This suggests that, in addition to the 20% who were against the use of force on principle, a 
further 10% of respondents wanted to learn more about the proposed target before 
expressing a view.  
What is most interesting about figure 5 however is the apparent absence of a ‘rally 
effect’ at the beginning of the actual Afghan campaign. Historically opinion polls show marked 
increases in supportive responses as troops go into battle. Partly this reflects the fact that 
support for action in Afghanistan was already high as the war began, since the greatest rallies 
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begin from low levels of support (Baum 2002). It may additionally show something more 
significant for the interpretation of British public views towards the Afghan and Iraq wars. 
British polling figures have shown greater rally effects in the past when a direct threat to the 
UK has been perceived, or where the action taken could be framed as defensive, compared to 
cases where the use of force is seen as an aggressive act (Lai and Reiter 2005, 268). 
Considering the circumstances in which Afghanistan was attacked, with the balance of Public 
Opinion largely satisfied that the action was an appropriate response to 11 September, a 
significant rally should have taken place, notwithstanding Baum’s point about the need to 
begin from a low base. An explanation may actually come from a hypothesis advanced by Tony 
Blair, speaking some months later in support of the proposed invasion of Iraq. He noted that 
there would have been little support for war in Afghanistan on 10 September 2001, even 
though the overall threat posed by al-Qaeda would have been the same as it was on 12 
September (Blair 2002e, 2003a). Public Opinion in late 2001 largely agreed with this 
assessment (B. MacIntyre 2001a, Glover 2001, Young 2001b). But no such polls were 
conducted prior to 11 September; the question was not on the agenda of public debate, and as 
Chapter 1 makes clear, opinion polling is primarily a reactive practice driven by media interest. 
When we say that no rally occured at the start of the Afghan campaign, therefore, our 
perception of when the campaign began is skewed by the absence of baseline data from 
before 11 September. What the absence of a rally effect after 7 October suggests is not that no 
rally took place, therefore, but that the British public regarded the action in Afghanistan as a 
continuation of a conflict that began on 11 September. The invasion of Iraq prompted a 
significant rally effect in Britain; support amongst poll respondents jumped from 38% on 16 
March 2003 to 54% a week later, according to ICM (the first air strikes having taken place on 
the night of 19/20 March). British voters approached the action in Afghanistan as the 
continuation of a conflict begun by an enemy attack against the West; self-defence, in effect. 
They saw Iraq differently, a fact underscored by an 11 October 2001 ICM poll which found just 
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36% of respondents thought the “war on terrorism” should “be extended to Iraq”, compared 
to 47% who thought it should not. It is noteworthy that ICM asked the question on behalf of 
The Guardian, which had declared itself implacably opposed to a war with Iraq the previous 
day, before commissioning a poll to use in legitimising its position. Even here, the views of 
media editors were driving the agenda for opinion polling, and not the other way around. This 
phenomenon follows from the logic of the Public Opinion system itself, rather than as a result 
of the specific issues considered here.  
Although it was apparently unambiguously the case that the passive public expressed 
firm support for the use of force against Afghanistan in late 2001, that did not stop anti-war 
commentators claiming that the action was taken in defiance of public opinion (Dalyell, 
Hansard 2001a, c632, The Mirror 2001b, Wheeler 2001, Routledge 2001). Some sought to shift 
the goalposts; it was true, for example, that the government lacked a “full consensus” 
domestically for its policy (O’Hagan 2001), but no political decision ever enjoys 100% support. 
Anti-war columnists attacked the “conservative press” (meaning The Sun) for the 
“irresponsible distortion of public opinion” through claims made, with the backing of poll data, 
that the British people supported removing the Taliban (The Independent 2001b). These 
complaints ignored the fact that this is exactly what the polls showed. Indeed, commentators 
on both sides of the argument sought to discredit poll results which did not fit their pre-
conceived views about public opinion (cf. The Times 2001e). Seeking ‘better’ estimates, they 
focused on personal contacts (Osborne, Hansard 2001c, c874, Awan 2001, The Daily Telegraph 
2001b, Branigan 2001, Gimson 2001) or response methods such as the letters written to 
editorial pages (The Daily Telegraph 2001a). 
Active public opposition to the action in Afghanistan was, meanwhile, notably weak. 
Anti-war commentators tended to devote more time to calling for others to develop 
alternative, peaceful strategies for dealing with al-Qaeda than they did to coming up with their 
own ideas (cf. Smith 2001b, Freedland 2001b). They left themselves open to the accusation 
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that they had “no other strategy to offer” (McElvoy 2001b), or indeed that they were 
paralysed by “hysteria” (The Sunday Telegraph 2001b, cf. Ivens 2001a, The Sun 2001c, The 
Guardian 2001e), “befuddlement” (McElvoy 2001a), or an inability to cope with reality (Young 
2001b). When Labour MP Paul Marsden defected to the Liberal Democrats in opposition to the 
Afghan campaign, he found himself ridiculed, even by newspapers themselves opposed to war, 
as a “cop-out”, famous for “loudly complaining he is being silenced” (The Independent 2001i). 
The worst warnings of his fellow sceptics, it was noted meanwhile, bore little relation to the 
actual campaign (The Independent 2001e, Freedland 2001a). Criticising the carpet bombing of 
innocent civilians as part of foreign policy only works if there is at least some level of public 
belief that innocent civilians are being carpet bombed. This was not the case during the early 
part of the Afghan war. By the end of December the anti-war case had been reduced in the 
public mind to “conspiracy theory – that last refuge of the desperate” (McElvoy 2001c). 
That is not to say that there were no grounds for the complaints of some critics of 
military action that they were being subjected to considerable public pressure on account of 
their views (cf. Monbiot 2001, M. Riddell 2001a). Generally however these attacks came from 
within the public sphere itself, rather than the government. The Sun, for example, launched a 
series of concerted efforts to identify and to castigate publicly those it regarded as ‘traitors’. 
Some of the claims it published bordered on the bizarre. One article suggested that delegates 
at the Labour Party conference were more interested in attacking Israel than dealing with 
terrorism (Kavanagh 2001b). Another included the solidly pro-war Conservative Defence 
Spokesman Bernard Jenkin on a list of “wobblers”, apparently because he had once expressed 
the hope that military action might be conducted in such a way as to minimise civilian 
casualties. There were a number of attacks on the “Anti-American, anti-Tony Blair press” which 
framed critics of the use of force as “traitors”, “fools”, “wobblers” and appeasers; The 
Observer, The Independent, The Mirror, and columnist John Pilger received special recognition 
(The Sun 2001e, cf. Spanton and Hartley 2001, Kay 2001). Adopting a slightly more civil tone, 
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the broadsheet Daily Telegraph largely backed The Sun’s assessment. Critics of the Afghan 
action were “inveterate anti-Americans, pacifists, alarmists who think we are all about to be 
killed by Anthrax, Muslim fundamentalists, anti-Semites, Continental European adventurers, 
and broadcasters, like the BBC, whose sense of self-worth comes chiefly from lacerating the 
society which pays their wages” (The Daily Telegraph 2001d). The Mirror, which had framed 
the fall of Kabul to the Northern Alliance in largely negative terms, warning it was “too early to 
uncork the bubbly” (The Mirror 2001c), elected to hit back, calling The Sun “an offensive, 
racist, sexist, misogynistic, tawdry, lying little rag” and “a Pravda-like government propaganda 
sheet” (The Mirror 2001d). The two top-selling British daily newspapers thus focused on 
fighting each other in their reporting of the successful removal of the Taliban from power, 
rather than on actually analysing the issues. As one commentator noted “the problem with this 
form of debate is that not only does nobody listen to his opponents, but nobody takes any real 
notice of what is happening” (Anthony 2001). An open and energetic public debate can, then, 
be more of a hindrance than a help to public influence over foreign policy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By the time the Taliban had been driven from power, early critics of military action 
were relenting (cf. Marshall-Andrews, Hansard 2001h, c871). At the same time, a sense 
remained that reaching consensus over what to do about Iraq would prove a much greater 
challenge for the government. Even before any action had been proposed, The Guardian had 
already declared itself opposed to an Iraqi campaign, and the ICM poll it commissioned 
allowed it to frame the passive public as equally reluctant (The Guardian 2001b). One editorial 
warned Blair that “a return to that theatre of war would divide his party, his country and his 
allies abroad...it would be the biggest decision that any British Prime Minister had been called 
upon to make in living memory” (The Times 2001d), and it was significant that no pro-war 
publication dared to generate its own poll data. It was noted, furthermore, that Iraq was the 
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one foreign policy matter in which the Conservatives might seek successfully to appear 
tougher than the government (D. MacIntyre 2001e).  
So the apparent consensus over the foreign policy approach that characterised the 
period between 11 September and the end of 2001 was deceptive, at least as a guide to the 
likely reception of a proposal to attack Iraq. There were reasons why the British public 
supported a campaign in Afghanistan, and clear limits to that support; limits which would be 
tested by the shift of focus to Iraq, and reasons which definitely did not extend that far. The 
‘enemy’ in the Afghan campaign, however ill-defined, had clearly struck first. There was 
multilateral agreement on the need to respond against Afghanistan, and the legal grounds for 
that action were not seriously in doubt, not least because of the legitimacy granted by 
international consensus. US officials talked aggressively of wider war, but their attention 
appeared focused on the specific task of disrupting al-Qaeda. There was little doubt that 
Britain was only the most favoured of several American allies, even if none was as powerful as 
the United States itself; indeed, the Bush administration had surprised critics both by its 
restraint and by its openness to international co-operation. Opponents of military action failed 
to articulate an adequate alternative approach; too often they were tied up in fighting pro-war 
rivals over whose interpretation of international affairs represented the greater treachery, or 
unable to advance beyond lamenting the lack of peaceful solutions. At the same time, a range 
of potential future tripwires for a debate over Iraq evidently already existed, albeit without yet 
having too much of an impact on policymaking. Official efforts to influence Public Opinion 
were received sceptically, if not yet cynically. Decisions were made by a small inner circle of 
ministers and advisers with limited external input, restricting the degree to which the public 
might seek to influence future policies with which it was less content. The legitimate extent of 
the ‘war on terror’ remained ill-defined. Both supporters and opponents of shifting attention 
to Saddam Hussein projected their own views onto the government, and the government did 
little to correct speculation on either side. There remained sufficient grounds for disagreement 
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between official policy and elements of Public Opinion that the invasion of Iraq could not with 
any certainty be planned on the assumption of public support in Britain.  
The British public debate over the invasion of Afghanistan did not therefore entirely 
prefigure the discord surrounding Iraq. Most of the implications this chapter highlights for the 
Iraq debate relate to the nature of Public Opinion as part of the context within which 
policymaking took place, rather than to the specifics of the views expressed at this time. Some 
elements of later clashes clearly did have their origins in discussions over Afghanistan; but 
many more did not. The Afghan campaign was too short in both build-up and action, too 
limited in ambition and scope, and too successful to provoke an outright confrontation. 
Instead future flashpoints remained latent at this time. The British public was not implacably 
opposed to the use of force as a legitimate tool of foreign policy in the aftermath of 11 
September; indeed, there was genuine support for the effort to remove the Taliban. Whether 
it would offer similar backing for the removal of Saddam Hussein would depend on how that 
action was presented and, ultimately, how far the presentation resonated with established 
public views.  
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Chapter 3 – Don’t mention the war!: January – April 
2002 
 
 Even before the end of 2001 the Blair government had begun to face questions over 
the extent to which it would support a US decision to shift the focus of the ‘war on terror’ to 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. During the early months of 2002, the outlines of a general public 
debate began to develop, as many contributors to Public Opinion asked whether a further 
move was desirable, necessary, or justifiable. After President Bush made his first State of the 
Union speech at the end of January, it was increasingly apparent that the US would pursue 
some sort of confrontation with the regime in Baghdad; whether this would lead to military 
action was unclear, but it was possible, even likely. Critics of alleged American ‘warmongering’ 
quickly put pressure on the Prime Minister to stand up to his ally in the White House. When he 
refused, they labelled him the President’s ‘poodle’, failing to recognise in the process that Blair 
actually shared much of the analysis underpinning Bush’s stance. To the extent that Blair 
sought to explain his agreement with the American administration, most notably during his 
visit to Bush’s Texas ranch at the start of April, the public illusion of a rampaging American 
hegemon held in check by Britain began to dissipate, though not without consternation on the 
part of opponents of the use of force. But Blair refused to enter into a public debate over the 
prospect of war with Iraq before a firm decision had been made to authorise a specific strike. 
He made it clear that, in his mind, policy debate should follow rather than precede policy 
making, with the latter the preserve of the Prime Minister, aided by a core group of trusted 
ministers and advisors. Much of Public Opinion disagreed, and increasingly dissatisfied 
journalists turned to speculation to fill column inches left empty by official reticence. This in 
turn soured relations with parliament, creating a situation in which the media and MPs fed off 
each other’s discontent in a spiral of cynicism that undermined the government’s ability to get 
its message heard. 
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 The way British policy towards Iraq was communicated in public in the early months of 
2002 determined the shape of the arguments which were to come. President Bush was 
unequivocal in condemning Saddam Hussein’s regime; Tony Blair appeared to offer at least the 
possibility of a peaceful solution to the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Yet both had 
established expectations. From the time of the ‘axis of evil’ speech in the case of Bush, and of 
the Crawford visit in the case of Blair, the two leaders had staked their credibility on a 
successful confrontation with Iraq. They had identified themselves personally with a process 
that would lead to the public disarmament of the regime, or its removal from power. These 
early months of the debate in Britain over Iraq, therefore, were characterised above all by 
rhetorical commitments made by the Prime Minister which would set the tone for the wider 
discussion that followed.  
 
The ‘axis of evil’ 
 
 President Bush was in a position of some domestic strength as he sought to shift the 
focus of the post-11 September agenda onto Iraq. Although British intelligence had rejected 
the notion of a direct link between Saddam Hussein and 11 September at an early stage, US 
agencies were less willing to rule the possibility out. The CIA put considerable stock in a (later 
discredited) report from their Czech counterparts suggesting that lead hijacker Mohammed 
Atta had met Iraqi intelligence officers in Prague shortly before the attacks (Burke 2011, 104). 
A number of leading administration officials were established advocates of the US taking a 
more robust approach in dealing with Baghdad. Writing under the aegis of the Project for a 
New American Century (PNAC), several key figures1 had signed an open letter to President 
Clinton in January 1998 which demanded the use of “a full complement of diplomatic, political 
and military efforts” to remove Saddam Hussein from power (Project for a New American 
                                                           
1
 Including Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Chairman of the Defense Policy Advisory Board Richard Perle, 
Undersecretary of State and later Ambassador to the UN John Bolton, and Trade Policy Representative 
and later Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. 
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Century 1998). The similarities later seen between the ‘Bush doctrine’ of US foreign policy, and 
PNAC’s founding call for a return to “a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity” 
(Project for a New American Century 1997) were no coincidence, but the consequence of 
considerable crossover in the memberships of PNAC and the Bush administration. In addition, 
under section 3 of the Iraq Liberation Act, signed into law by President Clinton in 1998 and 
drawn up partly under pressure from PNAC, the Bush administration was not just permitted, 
but required, “to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from 
power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that 
regime” (Ehrenberg, et al. 2010, 31). In terms of the American public, meanwhile, opinion polls 
conducted in the US at this time showed some 78% of respondents supporting the idea of an 
immediate follow-up action to overthrow Saddam Hussein as soon as the initial campaign in 
Afghanistan could be concluded (Huddy, Khatib and Capelos 2002, 425). Still reeling from the 
shock of 11 September, and buoyed by their success in driving the Taliban from power, US 
policymakers were determined to defend against perceived threats, intervening “robustly and 
ruthlessly” in other states where necessary to achieve security. They recognised “the fact that 
this might cause resentment in other countries”. It was “unfortunate”, but “of much less 
concern...than achieving results” (Cox 2004, 597). At least they were unlikely to face significant 
domestic discord if they pressed ahead. 
 British commentators began to note as early as October 2001 that for all the initial 
focus on the Taliban, Iraq was still regarded as “the quintessential terrorist state” in 
Washington (Almond 2001). The views of figures such as Rumsfeld were well known, and while 
the United States had decided to focus on Osama bin Laden in the aftermath of the 11 
September attacks, administration officials had made no secret of their desire also to confront 
Saddam Hussein. Chapter 2 noted the concern expressed within British Public Opinion about 
the US insistence that it retained the right, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, to expand its 
Afghan campaign to other states if it felt such action necessary to defend itself. With the 
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suggestion of a direct link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein repeatedly dismissed by 
British officials, there seemed at first to be no prospect of a coherent policy line developing 
that would justify that extension. By the end of November, however, observers began to 
report that “a new argument has begun to take shape among US hawks. Since the Iraqi regime 
is building weapons of mass destruction, and is known to consort with terrorists, and since 
Osama bin Laden made clear his desire to acquire such weapons, the US is entitled to take 
action against Iraq” (D. MacIntyre 2001e). Such thinking, prefigured by PNAC and later 
enshrined in the ‘Bush doctrine’, was beginning to crystallise around the model of a “new 
category” of potential rather than actual threat (Wastell and Lamb 2001) before the year was 
out. When David Manning visited Washington in early December 2001, he travelled in the 
knowledge that he would be expected to discuss Iraq. A Foreign Office briefing prepared in 
advance of Manning’s trip warned that “there are no anti-terrorist grounds for Stage 2 [of the 
‘war on terror’] military action against Iraq” since “it has no responsibility for the 11 
September attacks and no significant links to UBL/Al Qaida”. The briefing was, as Chapter 2 
discusses, consistent with the view of British Intelligence at this time. However, the note went 
on, there was “real reason for concern about Iraq’s WMD programmes”, left without adequate 
external oversight after the withdrawal of UNSCOM inspectors in 1998. A number of “options” 
for how to proceed were set out, including a toughening of sanctions and an escalation of 
military containment operations. The note concluded by noting that while “regime change may 
look an attractive alternative [to sanctions]...military intervention for this purpose would be 
illegal” (McDonald 2001). British policymakers knew, therefore, that the US was thinking about 
military action against Baghdad on the back of the removal of the Taliban, and agreed that 
there was a potential threat from Iraq’s development of WMD. Where British and US 
assessments differed in early 2002 was on the immediate nature of that threat. In a note for 
the Prime Minister written at this time, MI5 Deputy Director-General Eliza Manningham-Buller 
assessed that “Saddam is only likely to order terrorist attacks if he perceives that the survival 
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of his regime is threatened”. The US nightmare scenario, of a pre-emptive global terror 
campaign, orchestrated by Baghdad and utilising Iraqi WMD, was thought unlikely, absent at 
least a determined effort by the Western allies to drive the regime from power. Even if this 
assessment was proven inaccurate, the note continued, the “Iraqi capability to mount attacks 
in the UK is currently limited”. Iraq had no established links with al-Qaeda and very limited 
resources in either the US or UK with which it might arrange its own operations. Instead 
Saddam’s “preferred option would be to use conventional military delivery systems [for 
chemical weapons] against targets in the region, rather than terrorism” (Manningham-Buller 
2002).  
 It remains debatable whether such assessments might have influenced the White 
House had they been more firmly advocated by British policymakers. By the time of 
Manningham-Buller’s memo, President Bush had already changed the agenda for public 
debate over Iraq in both Britain and the US with his first State of the Union address. Referring 
back to 11 September, Bush declared that “history has called America and our allies to action” 
against “regimes that sponsor terror”. Bush’s focus on regimes was deliberate. While British 
officials had determined that al-Qaeda was unlikely to be reliant on state support, the 
prevailing thinking amongst right-wing politicians on both sides of the Atlantic was that the 
real danger from terrorism lay in its ability to garner support from ‘rogue’ governments. 
Warning of the particular threat posed by Iraq, Iran and North Korea, the President claimed 
that “states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten 
the peace of the world” (Bush 2002a). Terrorists were merely the “allies” of the states which 
posed the ‘real’ threat by virtue of their weapons development programmes. That states were 
easier to target militarily than individual terrorist cells was a convenient consequence of this 
interpretation, and one wholly intended by the administration. 
The speech had an immediate impact on the British public. The morning before, the 
British right-wing press had stuck to their established script, arguing that while action was 
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needed to curb Saddam Hussein’s ability to challenge Western power, direct efforts to root out 
international terrorism were a greater priority (The Times 2002a). In the aftermath of the 
“paradigm shift” in US thinking on foreign affairs marked by the unveiling of the ‘axis of evil’ 
concept (Harnden 2002b), the following day’s headlines were dominated by what was 
considered to be a significant step-change in presidential rhetoric (cf. Harnden 2002a, Watson 
and Whitworth 2002). Critics resumed an earlier refrain, complaining that “tragedy does not 
give America a free hand”, and attacking the ‘axis of evil’ concept as “nonsense” or “ludicrous 
tripe” (The Guardian 2002a, Maddox 2002a, Routledge 2002a). British commentators were in 
no doubt, however, that Bush had meant what he said, and that the consequences were likely 
to be dramatic for Britain as well as for Iraq. When Jack Straw suggested Bush might simply 
have been playing domestic politics by talking tough, he was labelled “out of touch” (The 
Sunday Telegraph 2002a). Some, more cynical, observers had suggested that the bombing 
campaign in Afghanistan was motivated primarily by a desire to bolster the administration’s 
approval ratings. At the end of January 2002 it remained abundantly clear that the President 
did not need to try any harder to appear tough on terrorism; his domestic authority in this 
regard was uncontested.  
Bush may not have been playing domestic politics, but his statements nevertheless 
had significant domestic political implications in the US. He had been unequivocal in referring 
to the three ‘axis of evil’ states as potential threats, and in reiterating his determination to 
defend the United States. British commentators noted that it would be very difficult to 
reconcile these commitments with a policy that did not involve a direct and aggressive 
confrontation (Watson 2002). As one observer put it, although the speech had been primarily 
rhetorical, “rhetoric on occasion does change reality. And the axis of evil is for real” (Cornwell 
2002). From this point onwards the agenda for public debate in Britain over how best to 
engage with the US was inevitably dominated by Iraq. 
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 Comments from Bush administration officials made headlines in Britain on two further 
occasions during this period, contributing both times to rising public anxiety over the 
development of US policy towards Iraq. The first was Vice-President Cheney’s visit to London 
on 11 March. Anticipating the arrival of a known administration ‘hawk’, journalists had 
assumed that the primary purpose of his visit was to plot military action. The anti-war press 
launched a pre-emptive strike, warning “it would be lunacy to attack Iraq at the moment, 
madness for Britain to back an American assault, and complete insanity to make any large-
scale commitment of our troops” (The Mirror 2002a). Their pro-war counterparts retaliated, 
insisting that Cheney was in London to “listen and not lecture” (The Times 2002d). This was, 
they claimed, a genuine opportunity for Anglo-American co-operation. A joint press 
conference between Vice President and Prime Minister passed off well. Both insisted that the 
proliferation of WMD posed a potential threat, while maintaining that no decisions had been 
made over what to do about Iraq’s alleged weapons development. Cheney, however, caused 
some concern by warning in addition of a “potential marriage” between al-Qaeda and Iraq 
(Blair and Cheney 2002). Pro-war commentators were comforted by the apparent recognition 
of the inseparability of the threats posed by “rogue groups” and “rogue states” (The Times 
2002e). Critics pointed out that there was no evidence of any such link (Freedland 2002a).  
The second occasion, again a joint press conference, this time between Blair and 
President Bush at the latter’s ranch in Crawford on 6 April, saw the President reiterating that 
the administration favoured “regime change” in Iraq (Blair and Bush 2002). Although there was 
nothing new about the specific assertion, its coming at the end of a much-discussed bilateral 
summit with the Prime Minister raised eyebrows back in Britain. Bush’s commitment to 
military action was reinforced, and the pressure he would face not to change course increased, 
while the conviction, held by many in Britain, that the US was planning to go to war regardless 
of British or international objections, was underlined.  
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A poodle called Tony 
 
 Most subsequent analyses agree that “the American President did not, for a variety of 
reasons, push a reluctant Blair into war” with Iraq in early 2003 (Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers 
2007, 207). It is evident from participant accounts, and from contemporary official papers 
released during the Chilcot Inquiry, that the view within Downing Street was at the least highly 
sympathetic towards the US assessment of the Iraqi threat. As Chapter 2 describes, however, 
ministers’ failure directly to address the question of where they stood on the prospect of 
extending the ‘war on terror’ to Iraq had allowed domestic audiences of various views to 
project their own opinions onto the government’s agenda. Many natural critics of US foreign 
policy assumed that the Prime Minister would take their side in opposing what they regarded 
as an ideological and unwarranted attempt to settle old scores with Saddam Hussein. They 
were wrong. In their disappointment, they accused Blair of selling out, of ditching domestic 
allies solely to ingratiate himself in Washington. He had made himself the President’s ‘poodle’, 
they claimed, obediently following his master’s orders instead of making up his own mind. 
Because Blair had never actually been opposed to the idea of confronting Iraq over its WMD, 
he was psychologically unprepared for making sense of these attacks, and so failed to respond 
effectively. Sticking to the mantra that ‘no decision has been taken’, he maintained that there 
was no need to consider directly the desirability of a fresh war in the Middle East, even while 
repeatedly underscoring the nature of the Iraqi threat. This stance was consistent with his 
belief that policy debate should follow policymaking, but it did little to calm concerns. The 
government’s refusal to ‘mention the war’ during early 2002 thus became a defining 
characteristic of the public debate over Iraq, and a cause of much of the tension that followed.  
 Tony Blair later wrote that the question of what to do about Saddam Hussein and his 
WMD had been “there in the background” from the beginning of the ‘war on terror’ campaign 
(Blair 2010b, 357). He had known all along that Washington would turn its attention to 
Baghdad at some point. In one of the early planning meetings of Cabinet Ministers and senior 
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officials, three days after 11 September, the participants agreed that it was “possible to be 
sympathetic” with an American desire to move against Iraq as part of the response. At the 
same time, they concluded, “the political consequences” of rash action were “all too obvious” 
(Campbell and Stott 2007, 567). It would be better to wait, and to try to get international 
support for any fresh campaign. British policymaking proceeded against this sympathetic 
backdrop in the early months of 2002. Tony Blair remained very much in control of decision-
making. He continued to rely upon the combination of personal instincts and the advice of 
close aides that had supported him in crafting Britain’s involvement in the initial Afghan 
campaign. Despite the relaxation of the time pressures faced in those first days, and the shift 
in focus from the relatively straightforward decision to support military action in Afghanistan 
to the much more vexing question of Iraq, the Foreign Office continued to be excluded from 
the most important discussions (Fawn and Hinnebusch 2006, 323, Daddow 2009, 556, Hollis 
2010, 59). As one observer put it, for Blair what mattered was not so much the expertise 
undoubtedly possessed by members of the Diplomatic Service, but the fact that “they were 
not his people” (Kampfner 2003, 92). The alternative approach he adopted, however, of both 
involving political appointees in key decisions regardless of their lack of relevant knowledge, 
and relying on informal, ad hoc discussions with ministers and advisers over formal Cabinet 
committee meetings, caused consternation in the Civil Service and continues to be a source of 
criticism (Hollis 2006, 44-45). No doubt the Chilcot Report will make some mention of the issue 
when it appears.  
 Blair had made up his mind to support the US in confronting Iraq before his trip to 
Crawford in April 2002, although he was not yet certain that this would mean military action. 
He shared at least part of the outlook underpinning the ‘war on terror’, having declared even 
before the end of 2001 that, in his view, “if anybody harbours a terrorist, they’re a terrorist...if 
they house terrorists, they’re terrorists...if they develop weapons of mass destruction that will 
be used to terrorise nations, they will be held accountable” (Blair, Hansard 2001g, c966). Blair’s 
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public silence over the ‘axis of evil’ speech (in contrast to his Foreign Secretary, for example, 
who, as we have seen, sought to downplay its significance) did not immediately commit him to 
support the substantive foreign policy doctrine it spawned. That he did not dispute it was, 
however, potentially significant. By March, in an exchange Robin Cook thought both “frank and 
unsettling”, Blair was warning MPs “I cannot offer the comfort that no military action will be 
taken” against Iraq (Cook 2003, 123). Behind the scenes, discussions with the Americans 
assumed that London’s analysis of the Iraqi threat broadly mirrored that emerging from 
Washington, although it was tempered by more challenging domestic political circumstances. 
Writing back from a preparatory visit in advance of Blair’s trip to Crawford, David Manning 
reported having told Bush that the Prime Minister “would not budge in [his] support for 
regime change but that [he] had to manage a press, a Parliament and a public opinion that was 
very different from anything in the States” (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 89-90). Three 
days later Blair wrote to Powell and Manning describing his position. Noting neither he nor 
Bush had “a proper worked-out strategy on how we would do it”, he argued that “from a 
centre-left perspective, the case [for regime change] should be obvious...a political philosophy 
that does care about other nations – eg Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone – and is prepared to 
change regimes on the merits, should be gung-ho on Saddam” (Blair 2002a). The claim, which 
Blair continues to advance (Blair 2010a, 21-30), that his objective was never ‘regime change’ 
per se, sits uneasily when considered alongside his contemporary comments. Importantly, 
what emerges from these exchanges is the central importance of Public Opinion to the Prime 
Minister’s overall foreign policy strategy. He and Bush agreed action would be needed against 
Iraq, but neither knew exactly how they should proceed. The main problem, as Blair saw it, 
was of how to gain public support, both at home and around the world, for the chosen course. 
In his formulation, Public Opinion is not so much an actor in policymaking, but a constraining 
factor upon it, and a background context against which it must be carried out.  
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 The Cabinet may not have been the site of the decision that Britain should support a 
confrontation with Iraq, but it was offered at least one major opportunity to have its say 
during this period. Robin Cook described the 7 March meeting as “a momentous event”; a rare 
“real discussion at Cabinet”, prompted by his and Home Secretary David Blunkett’s entreaties. 
Cook later recalled that,  
“this was the last meeting of the Cabinet at which a large number of ministers spoke 
up against the war. I have little sympathy with the criticism of Tony that he sidelined 
the Cabinet over Iraq. On the contrary, over the next six months we were to discuss 
Iraq more than any other topic, but only Clare Short and I ever expressed frank doubts 
about the trajectory in which we were being driven” (Cook 2003, 115-116).   
 
Cook’s reference to Clare Short here is deliberate; she has been the most vociferous of those 
accusing Blair of excluding Cabinet from the decision to go to war, describing ministerial 
meetings as “little chats” devoid of substance, in which decisions made elsewhere were 
reported rather than discussed (Short 2010, 3). Short was not actually at the 7 March 
discussion. She was out of the country in her official capacity as International Development 
Secretary. Although regarded as a competent minister, she was treated cautiously by Downing 
Street because of her unwillingness to stick to agreed common positions in public (Campbell 
and Stott 2007, 569, Blair 2010b, 436). It is possible that the opportunity had deliberately been 
taken for a discussion on Iraq without her present. The Department of International 
Development had been cut out of Iraq policymaking in the past, apparently as a result of 
bureaucratic jealousies left over from its separation from the Foreign Office in 1997 (cf. Austin 
2001), and there are historical precedents for foreign policy decision-makers choosing to 
exclude one of their number from a key discussion in order to maximise group cohesion. In 
one example, the dovish US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was deliberately not recalled from 
vacation to attend a crucial Carter administration meeting in the run-up to the failed attempt 
to rescue American hostages being held in Iran. Although there is no evidence that it was 
because of his views that Vance was excluded, it was known that he would have opposed the 
use of force had he been in Washington and so able to attend (Smith 1985, 19). Similarly, there 
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is no evidence in the case of Clare Short to support the suggestion that she had deliberately 
been excluded. That she was not present at the Cabinet’s first “real discussion” on Iraq was 
significant, nonetheless, because it meant a known opponent of military action was unable to 
state her case.  
 More readily apparent than the question of Short’s exclusion from Cabinet discussions 
is the fact that the 7 March meeting was less important in terms of concrete decision-making 
than a follow-up session at Chequers on 2 April to which only the Foreign and Defence 
Secretaries were invited. As was his usual approach (Daddow 2011, 224), at Cabinet Blair had 
largely listened, interjecting only to reassure ministers that “the management has not gone 
crazy” (Campbell and Stott 2007, 609). At Chequers he set out his own thinking on the link 
between the need to deal with WMD and the prospect of regime change in Baghdad. It was 
impossible, he argued, to address either issue on its own; the Iraqi regime was a problem 
because it was developing WMD, and WMD would be a problem whatever the regime 
(Campbell and Stott 2007, 612-613, Blair 2010b, 402). Lord Butler wrote that the government’s 
position on the Iraqi threat at this point “was accurately represented by a statement in one of 
the policy papers that: ‘What has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein’s WMD 
programmes but our tolerance of them post 11 September’” (Butler 2004, 70, italics in original). 
Both Straw and Hoon had sent Blair memos on Iraq in advance of the discussion. Butler’s 
quote appears to paraphrase Straw’s observation that “if 11 September had not happened, it 
is doubtful that the US would now be considering military action against Iraq...objectively, the 
threat from Iraq has not worsened...What has however changed is the tolerance of the 
international community (especially that of the US)” for the prospect of an Iraqi WMD 
capability (Straw 2002a). Hoon, similarly, wrote that “in objective terms, Iran may be the 
greater problem for the UK” than Iraq. he thought, nevertheless, that Iraq would be the next 
American target, although at that point Britain was “not privy to detailed US planning, either 
strategically across the region or on Iraq” (Hoon 2002). That both Straw and Hoon suggested 
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Blair take the opportunity to sound out Bush, to try to gain some insight into his planning, 
supports the claim made in public that Britain had not yet been explicitly committed to military 
action. Straw concluded his note with a warning that “the rewards from your visit to Crawford 
will be few. The risks are high, both for you and for the government” (Straw 2002a). To his 
mind, the domestic political price that would have to be paid to gain access to US decision-
makers was disproportionate to the value of that access. Blair evidently disagreed; he did not 
follow Straw’s advice to proceed with caution.  
 Although Straw and Hoon were nominally responsible for British foreign and defence 
policy respectively, neither went to Crawford. Journalists travelling with the Prime Minister 
observed that, “unusually”, even Manning, Powell and Campbell were excluded from the first 
evening’s talks; they were “despatched to a hotel for an early night” while Bush and Blair 
spoke alone (Murphy 2002). Much of what transpired in private over the course of the 
weekend followed a similar pattern, limiting the extent to which outsiders were able to gain an 
insight into the content and the tone of the discussions. Christopher Meyer speculated at the 
Chilcot Inquiry about a deal to go to war having been “signed in blood” at this meeting (C. 
Meyer 2009, 29), but Jonathan Powell dismissed this suggestion, recalling that “I was at 
Crawford, David Manning was at Crawford, Christopher Meyer was not at Crawford. He was at 
Waco, about thirty miles away”. Unlike the previous September, on this occasion the British 
Ambassador had not managed to argue his way into the key session, and had to hear about its 
results second-hand (Powell 2010a, 24). The Crawford meeting drew Tony Blair into an 
unusually close personal association with British policy towards Iraq. He had discussed Saddam 
Hussein alone with President Bush, and he personally, and alone, had made the commitment 
that Britain would support a US policy of confrontation. This personal association with the US 
position would, for different reasons, put as much pressure on Blair to stay the course as had 
been placed on Bush by his public condemnation of the Iraqi regime. 
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 Going into the meeting, Blair had made clear his intention to capitalise on the 
“unprecedented appreciation” he had won in Washington for his response to 11 September by 
seeking direct British participation in US decision-making. He was hamstrung, however, both 
by his physical remove from the Oval Office, which meant he could never compete with 
American ‘hawks’ for access to the President (Daddow 2011, 225-226), and the need to 
respond to British journalists who tended to greet his every expression of support for 
Washington with derisory remarks about his independence from presidential influence (Hollis 
2010, 35). Despite the general hostility shown by the British public, several commentators had 
kept faith in the Prime Minister’s ability to win influence in return for his support (cf. P. Riddell 
2002a, Young 2002, Rawnsley 2002a). It was during the build-up to the Crawford meeting that 
doubts, apparently well-founded (Cook 2003, 99), began to develop about the extent to which 
Blair was actually using what access he won to propose strategies other than military action. 
Reflecting these concerns, The Mirror led the media field in attacking the Prime Minister for 
being the President’s “poodle”. Its favoured tactic in launching such assaults was to publish a 
commentary article accusing Blair of behaving like a “poodle”, and then, in the same edition, 
to note in a news story that the Prime Minister had been accused of behaving like a poodle, 
which of course he had, by The Mirror’s own columnists (cf. Brown 2002, Blackman 2002a, The 
Mirror 2002b). This blurring of the lines between news and commentary continues to exercise 
policymakers (Blair 2012a, 2). Blair did himself no favours in terms of countering the ‘poodle’ 
image. Shortly before travelling to Crawford, he told an interviewer from US network NBC that 
he had never seen his relationship with President Bush in terms of his ability to constrain US 
adventurism;  
“I know people sometimes think it is my job to sit there restraining this or restraining 
that. It is a dialogue and it is a discussion about strategy from points of agreement, in 
exactly the same way that in Afghanistan I had absolutely no doubt whatever that we 
had to go after the al Qaida network, that we had to remove the Taliban regime. The 
discussion we had, it wasn’t a question of restraining the President, the discussion was 
what is the best way of doing it? We worked out the best way, we did it. Now in 
respect of Iraq it is exactly the same” (Blair 2002b).  
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The suggestion that the question of what to do about Iraq was “exactly the same” as that 
previously asked over Afghanistan was unlikely to calm the anxiety back in London that further 
military action was on the cards, given what had happened to the Taliban.   
 What was actually said between Prime Minister and President remains somewhat 
unclear, despite the proliferation of first and second hand accounts that have emerged since 
April 2002. No notes were taken of the actual discussion, so all are based on recollections of 
the two leaders’ own summaries. Most secondary studies describe Blair promising to support a 
confrontation with Iraq, using military force if necessary to bring Saddam Hussein to heel, but 
stipulating “three conditions” for that support; a serious effort to involve the UN, progress on 
the stalled Middle East Peace Process, and a concerted and co-ordinated public 
communication campaign designed to explain why Iraq was seen as such a threat in the post-
11 September world (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 89). Jack Straw in fact referred to 
these exact proposals as “conditions” for British support in a memo to Blair in July (Straw 
2002b). Blair, however, denies having set down specific criteria of this sort. He maintains that, 
rather than being a bargaining position, his reference to the UN, the Middle East Peace 
Process, and public communication was intended to aid Bush in driving the confrontation 
policy forward (Blair 2010a, 45). That even Straw appears to have been confused on the level 
of ‘conditionality’ attached to Blair’s pledge of British support is significant. Blair essentially 
argues that he advised Bush on communication and did not bargain with him on substance. 
The preparatory notes he had received from Straw and Hoon, and the tone of his own 
comments both in writing and at the Chequers meeting on 2 April, show that concern was 
already developing within the British government about the level of public support for military 
action. Straw thought that substantive demands had been made. Whether in doing so he was 
himself confusing the substance and the communication of foreign policy is unclear. What is 
clear is that there was considerable crossover between the two elements, and that this was 
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reflected in diplomatic exchanges at the very highest levels. The effect was exacerbated by the 
extreme personalisation of British diplomacy under Blair, reflected in the intimacy of the 
discussions at Crawford and the significance of the commitments emerging from them.  
 In public the Prime Minister expressed himself with greater caution than the President; 
at the 6 April press conference he did not follow his host into endorsing regime change 
outright. Instead, he posed the prospect as a rhetorical question, asking “would the region, the 
world, and not least the ordinary Iraqi people, be better off without the regime of Saddam 
Hussein?” (Blair and Bush 2002). He recalls having “delivered a strong message” at the press 
conference, but maintains that “behind closed doors...our talk was more nuanced”, referring 
not only to the threat from Iraq, but the need to consider it as part of a wider strategy towards 
a “region in transition” (Blair 2010b, 401). Because Blair had kept his more subtle arguments 
private, Public Opinion had only the tougher public line with which to engage. Given that 
domestic opposition to the notion of military action was beginning to grow in Britain, this may 
have been a tactical miscalculation on the Prime Minister’s part. Blair had been called upon, 
even before the end of 2001, to “use his influence with the President to stop military action 
being expanded to include Iraq” (Kennedy, Hansard 2001f, c867). Labour MPs were particularly 
restive. Jack Straw had warned “that there is at present no majority inside the PLP for any 
military action against Iraq...colleagues know that Saddam and the Iraqi regime are bad. 
Making that case is easy. But we have a long way to go to convince them” of the need for 
military action (Straw 2002a). Blair was not unaware of this. Writing to Jonathan Powell on 17 
March, he had noted that “the persuasion job on this seems very tough. My own side are 
worried. Public opinion is fragile. International opinion – as I found at the EU – is pretty 
sceptical” (Blair 2002a). Despite this recognition, however, he persisted with a hard line. 
 In making judgements on the level of domestic support he then had for taking Britain 
to war with Iraq, Blair drew on a range of sources of information and advice. His Cabinet 
colleagues, including Straw, kept him informed on the position of the Labour Party. Alastair 
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Campbell provided daily updates on his continued battle against the “poisonous media” 
(Campbell and Stott 2007, 604). The Labour Party’s chief pollster, (the late Lord) Philip Gould, 
visited Downing Street regularly, although he never had Campbell’s level of access. Gould’s 
main presentation of the latest internal party polling data and focus-group results during this 
period took place on 11 March, the same day as Dick Cheney’s visit to London (Campbell and 
Stott 2007, 610). Published figures from an ICM poll for The Guardian completed on 17 March 
show support for war with Iraq hovering around the 35% mark, with over 50% of respondents 
opposed (ICM 2002), suggesting Gould is unlikely to have had good news. Whether his 
presentation had any impact on Blair’s thinking going into the Crawford meeting is unclear. 
Although the desirability of managing the media was apparently accepted, there were doubts 
within Downing Street about the efficacy of opinion polling as a tool of government. Blair 
offered his view in his memoir; 
“Polls are an absolute nightmare. All leaders will tell you they don’t pay attention to 
them, but all leaders do. The problem is they can be an instant snapshot of public 
opinion (i.e. real, but superficial and therefore potentially transient) or they can 
indicate a trend (i.e. potentially of lasting significance). You never know which it is. But 
they matter because quite apart from anything else, your supporters and the media 
dwell on them. They help create a mood, which itself often then reinforces the polling” 
(Blair 2010b, 298). 
 
Polls were more important, then, because of what they did to Public Opinion than because of 
what they said about public opinion. Blair’s position ties neatly with the claims set out for this 
study in Chapter 1, and offers some support for the approach taken of focussing on the system 
of public debate ahead of the agency of individuals via opinion polls. Jonathan Powell is 
similarly wary, with hindsight, of the application of polls to political decision-making;  
“Polling is an essential tool of prime ministers, but polls, like secret intelligence, have 
to be handled carefully. Without them, a modern leader is driving blind. However, they 
are a snapshot of the past not a glimpse into the future, so if a leader uses them to 
govern it is like steering while peering over the stern of the boat. The numbers help 
locate your whereabouts in the ocean and tell you the state of the tides, but they do 
not tell you how to set your forward course...A wise leader should use quantitative 
polling as a tool but not as a substitute for his own political instincts” (Powell 2010b, 
136-137). 
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When, therefore, President Bush told the 6 April press conference “the thing I admire about 
this Prime Minister is that he doesn’t need a poll or a focus group to convince him of the 
difference between right and wrong” he may have unconsciously been echoing scepticism on 
the part of Blair and his team about the value of such measures as much as recognising his 
counterpart’s commitment to “the defence of freedom” (Blair and Bush 2002). 
 Public reaction to Blair’s statements at Crawford was mixed. He was praised for the 
“brave and right” decision to stand up to his own party in supporting the United States (The 
Daily Telegraph 2002b), and attacked for having “rolled over like a rather docile poodle” in 
capitulating to unreasonable American demands (The Mirror 2002c). His speech at College 
Station on 7 April was “subtle and important” (The Guardian 2002b) or “unconvincing” (The 
Independent 2002a) depending on the particular nuances that most appealed to different 
editorial writers. Most significant, wrote several observers, was the degree to which Blair 
expected to be able to win over his domestic doubters. He seemed “puzzled by the degree of 
opposition to his stance”, they observed, and thought his critics “utterly naive” (Eastham 
2002a, McSmith and Sparrow 2002, Wintour and White 2002). Although their authors could 
not have known it for certain, these statements are consistent with Blair’s 17 March note to 
Powell. He could yet be proved right, commentators concluded. Although the ‘war on terror’ 
concept had not caught on in Britain, denying the government the overarching narrative of 
threat already proving useful for the Bush administration across the Atlantic (Entman 2004, 2-
3), there remained room for common ground with war sceptics (The Guardian 2002c; The 
Independent 2002b). In proposing, whether as diplomatic conditions or as presentational 
advice, that Iraq be confronted through a UN-led process, alongside a fresh effort in the 
Middle East, and after a determined campaign to win over Public Opinion, Blair had recognised 
this room for accommodation. He had also conflated the management of domestic opinion 
with the construction of foreign policy. By April 2002, however, his refusal publicly to discuss 
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the prospect of war had already begun to undermine what political gains the Crawford 
strategy might yet have made.  
 
No decision has been taken 
 
 When parts of Public Opinion demanded to know whether Britain would join the US in 
an attack on Iraq, the standard official response was to insist that ‘no decision has been taken’. 
This was hardly a reassuring line. For one thing, as has been set out above, by April 2002 a 
decision had in fact been made, and communicated to the Americans, that Britain would 
support a confrontation with Iraq over its WMD, involving forced regime change if necessary. 
Technically it was true that no troops had been committed to a specific campaign, but to call 
for increased diplomatic pressure on Iraq while denying the need to discuss the prospect of 
military action was disingenuous at best, and the government was quickly called on this point. 
In addition, by asserting that no public debate on military action was necessary because no 
firm decision had yet been made to take military action, officials underscored Blair’s belief that 
decision-making properly preceded parliamentary and press scrutiny. Every time, then, that 
the government claimed no debate on Iraq was needed because no decision had been made to 
use force, it also stated clearly that no debate would be permitted until after a decision had 
been made in favour of military action. By that point, of course, it would be too late for the 
decision to be reversed. The strongest negative reactions to this official obfuscation came from 
journalists, but the effect of adverse media commentary soon crept into parliamentary debate 
as well; the two forums were linked, whether Blair liked it or not. As MPs began to raise their 
own concerns, the fact of rising opposition to the government, particularly on its own back-
benches, became newsworthy, increasing the volume of coverage and further fuelling 
discontent. Above all, it was the unwillingness of ministers at this time to admit that military 
action was on the cards that established the atmosphere of distrust that poisoned the public 
debate over the following year. Government statements during this time have been described 
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as “remarkable for their impenetrability” (Coates and Krieger 2004, 47). They hardly provided a 
sound basis for the fostering of public trust.   
 Tony Blair had dismissed early questions over the extension of the ‘war on terror’ to 
Baghdad; “in respect of Iraq, of course it is important that we act on the basis of evidence”, he 
insisted (Blair, Hansard 2001b, c679). He did not explain what evidence he thought might be 
found; nor did he commit himself on whether such material actually existed. His government 
meanwhile failed to address counter-suggestions from the Conservatives that “sooner or later 
the evidence may compel us to act” (Jenkin, Hansard 2001c, c839). Right-wing newspapers 
similarly speculated about the role the regime in Baghdad might play in sponsoring 
international terrorism, in part to pressure Blair into a less equivocal stance (The Sunday 
Telegraph 2001a, Hart 2001b, The Times 2001d). The various pro-war voices already emerging 
in the British public sphere were encouraged and incensed in equal measure by the ‘axis of 
evil’ speech. On the one hand, President Bush had made clear his intention not to forget about 
Saddam Hussein. On the other, the British government had failed immediately to endorse the 
President’s reasoning; ministers were “unrealistic” if they thought the new paradigm could be 
ignored, and “unfocused” if they failed to appreciate its logic (The Times 2002b). From an anti-
war perspective, whereas commentators had earlier projected their own views about Iraq onto 
policymakers when the latter failed adequately to speak for themselves, now they heard 
official silence in the face of American belligerence, and assumed the worst. Ministers had 
failed to condemn the ‘axis of evil’ speech because the Prime Minister was a “poodle” 
(Routledge 2002a). There would be war, as one 14 February account put it, before the end of 
the year (Borger 2002). Perturbed by the latter article in particular (as they themselves 
admitted), MPs asked anxious questions of the Defence Secretary. Why were MPs only finding 
out about British troops being committed to military action via the media? When would 
Parliament have its say? (H. Cohen, Hansard 2002a, c364, Mahon, Hansard 2002a, c371). Hoon 
held the line, insisting the reports were inaccurate. His political opponents were less reticent; 
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Conservatives Julian Lewis and Gerald Howarth reacted to left-wingers’ concerns by expressing 
their own strong support for an immediate attack on Baghdad (Lewis, Hansard 2002a, c389, 
Gerald Howarth, Hansard 2002a, c399). Reporting the exchanges, the right-wing press went 
further, again decrying the “traitors” on the left who refused to stand up to terrorism (The Sun 
2002a), and criticising the government for being “too slow in preparing British opinion for the 
inevitable” (The Times 2002c). Tensions were rising in British public debate, whether the 
government spoke up or not. 
 It was in this febrile atmosphere that, on 23 February, Blair’s trip to Crawford was first 
announced. Journalists were incensed. The government planned a “u-turn” from its previously 
sober stance (Sengupta and Morris 2002), they warned. The Prime Minister was going to the 
US to receive his marching orders. So hostile was the reaction of large parts of Public Opinion 
(despite the absence of any indication from the government that it intended even to consider 
military action at this point) that it was discussed at Cabinet on 28 February. Ministers 
observed that “the press and the media were as much the opposition as the Tories”, reflecting 
the confluence of Conservative support for and vociferous media criticism of the prospect of 
war. The government had become “more spinned against than spinning”, quipped Blair 
(Campbell and Stott 2007, 607).  
Two dynamics had begun to emerge in Public Opinion by this point which are 
encapsulated by these exchanges. The first was the failure of the ‘official’ Opposition to offer a 
real alternative to military action against Iraq. It was evident that the Conservatives regarded 
advocating the use of force as ‘their’ territory, and were neither willing nor able to attack the 
government for its (presumed) intention to commit the country to war. The second was the 
reaction this prompted from the media. Driven by journalistic norms to seek balance in their 
reporting, media producers had to construct their own anti-war narratives, rather than simply 
reproducing the lines put out by rival politicians. Often during this period a ‘balanced’ news 
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article discussed the pro-war positions of Labour ministers and their Conservative shadows on 
one hand, and anti-war arguments produced by journalists themselves on the other.  
 By the start of March the press had detected a “heightening of the rhetoric against 
Saddam Hussein” in British government communications (Webster 2002a). One commentator 
warned that these “first word-bombing raids” showed a clear intent on the part of the 
government to join “a campaign of limitless violence” in the Muslim world (Routledge 2002b). 
Questions began to be raised over whether the government could be trusted, given its refusal 
to set out its Iraq position. The chairman of the newly-formed Stop the War Coalition asked 
“can those continually caught fibbing over everything from public spending increases to who is 
doing what favour for whom be trusted when it comes to war and peace?” (Murray 2002). 
When it was suggested, apparently by Downing Street, that a ‘dossier’ outlining the threat 
posed by Iraq might be released to accompany the Crawford visit, journalists responded 
sceptically; “let’s hope this dossier is compelling and - in view of New Labour's declining 
reputation for probity - open and honest”, warned one (Glover 2002). This scepticism was 
shared in parliament; “when we receive the dossier, no doubt we will read that some such 
weapons are more sophisticated than those in the Pentagon” said one anti-war MP, 
sarcastically. “I expect that”, she added, “and I shall read about it with interest” (Mahon, 
Hansard 2002b, c77WH). Pro-war Conservatives, meanwhile, seized upon the opportunity to 
attack the good faith of a Labour Prime Minister, despite their agreeing with the substance of 
what he was apparently doing (Turner, Hansard 2002b, c73WH). At best it was assumed any 
document would contain “little new or surprising evidence” (Rufford 2002). Concerns over the 
way the government presented its policy were beginning, then, to bleed into public 
deliberations supposedly focused on the policy’s substance. 
 Chapter 4 deals in detail with what eventually became of these discussions, a 
document entitled Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British 
Government (British Government 2002). It was not released until late September. In mid-
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March a decision was made, apparently in Downing Street (Hutton 2004, 106), not to proceed 
with a public document, at least not immediately. Jack Straw told the Chilcot Inquiry that the 
main reason for the delay was that the first draft originally earmarked for release in March had 
discussed Iraq alongside Iran, North Korea, and Libya, reflecting the ‘axis of evil’ model. 
Ministers had decided to avoid confusing the debate by appearing to accept the notion of a 
link between those very different states (Straw 2011, 48). No reason was given publicly for the 
delay; if Straw’s assessment is accurate (and it should be recalled that he was the only member 
of the government publicly to dispute the appropriateness of the ‘axis of evil’ label), it may 
have been thought impossible to explain the true rationale without risking offending the 
Americans at a crucial time. After all, the government could hardly have told the public that it 
had decided to re-write the dossier to remove references to Iran, North Korea, and Libya 
without facing questions on why those states had been considered together in the first place. 
Privately Straw had warned Blair, in the aftermath of Bush’s speech, that “a lot of work will 
now need to be done to delink the three” members of the ‘axis of evil’ in the public debate 
(Straw 2002a). A dossier lumping them together would hardly help. A speculative frenzy was 
nevertheless triggered by this latest example of official reticence. The government had halted 
the dossier because it “feared it would increase the frenzied speculation about an immediate 
war against Iraq, leading to an overwhelming backlash”, cried commentators. In any event, 
“the evidence against Saddam produced so far is not as strong as No 10 would like” (Ahmed 
2002a). Further “speculation” suggested that the delay was the product of “mendacious spin”, 
“incompetence” or “negligence at a very high level” (D’Ancona 2002b, cf. Pilger 2002b, Oborne 
2002). Although journalists recognised that speculation itself did not constitute news, the 
existence of speculation apparently did warrant coverage, and there was no harm in specifying 
what it was that was being speculated. The government had been damaged by its own 
communication efforts even when those efforts consisted of a decision not to communicate.  
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 Robin Cook wrote on 4 March about “mounting speculation in the press that we will all 
be off to war soon”. He felt that “to a large extent this is generated by the newspapers 
themselves, who are each terrified that they will be the last to get in on the storyline”, but 
went on to observe that “it is true that, whenever he gets the opportunity, Tony fails to kill the 
mounting speculation” (Cook 2003, 113). It was true. Blair missed repeated opportunities to 
clarify his position in the months before Crawford. During the joint press conference with Dick 
Cheney on 11 March, he maintained that “no decisions of course have been taken yet” about 
the possible use of force, despite agreeing with the Vice-President on the need to do 
something about Iraq. He was challenged directly on the question of whether he had evidence 
to support the claim that Saddam Hussein posed a threat. The danger was “not in doubt at all”, 
he replied, but he offered nothing concrete to explain why not (Blair and Cheney 2002). 
Pressed, similarly, about the IAEA’s clean rating of the Iraqi nuclear programme, he maintained 
that there was “no doubt” that Saddam was “still trying to acquire nuclear capability and 
ballistic missile capability” (Blair, Hansard 2002e, c32). Clearly there was doubt, if the IAEA 
doubted it. Public Opinion encompassed a range of unimpressed voices, and Blair appeared 
not to be taking their questions seriously. Later exchanges over the dossier revealed that when 
he spoke of an absence of doubt in public statements about the Iraqi threat, Blair referred only 
to his own mind. At this stage the public reaction to his unsupported claims was sarcastic 
rather than angry (cf. Steel 2002a). Commentators were far more concerned with speculating 
over whether a decision to go to war had in fact been made (cf. The Daily Mail 2002) than in 
picking up the Prime Minister for logical inconsistencies. Lacking better sources of further 
information during Cheney’s visit, the British media resorted to interviewing American 
journalists travelling with the Vice President, inviting their views on the likelihood of war. The 
response was unanimous. Any effort to get UN weapons inspectors readmitted was “almost an 
exercise”; the US was going to invade, probably before the end of the year (Channel 4 News 
2002a). More nuanced reporters observed that the arguments made in March 2002 did “not 
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yet amount to a case against Iraq” but that “Bush, Blair and Cheney were not quite claiming 
that it was” (Maddox 2002b). The result, however, of Cheney’s visit, and its presentation in the 
British media was “deep unease...at the prospect that Her Majesty’s Government might 
support United States military action against Iraq” on the part of many MPs, neatly 
encapsulated in a parliamentary Early Day Motion put down by Labour backbencher Alice 
Mahon (EDM no.927, 2001/02 session). Ultimately 162 signatories would be found to support 
the statement, 134 of them from the Labour Party. Even the 39 whose names initially 
accompanied the Motion were sufficiently strong in number for the exercise warrant the title 
of  “backbench rebellion” in press reports (B. Roberts 2002).  
 The particular problem faced by the government in its public communications at this 
time was underscored by the 7 March Cabinet discussion, which participants regarded as 
amicable and productive. Sir Gus (now Lord) O’Donnell, who succeeded Sir Andrew (now Lord) 
Turnbull as Cabinet Secretary in 2005, told the Chilcot Inquiry that Blair “was reluctant at times 
to take as many Cabinet discussions as possible [on a range of issues, including Iraq], because 
he felt that they would become very public, very quickly” (O’Donnell 2011, 24). The 7 March 
discussion was very public, very quickly. Although accounts varied, the majority of press 
reports described a “Cabinet revolt”, and warned that the existence of “real unease” within 
the government itself on the question of Iraq heralded a potential ministerial rebellion (G. 
Jones 2002a, White and Borger 2002, Morris and Usborne 2002). Right-wing commentators 
then attacked the supposedly rebellious ministers for their disloyalty (D’Ancona 2002a), while 
disgruntled ex-ministers claimed their allegedly sycophantic successors would “swallow Mr 
Blair’s diktat without question” (Kilfoyle 2002). Sceptics noted that the Cabinet was “unused to 
collective discussion of any kind” (D. MacIntyre 2002a), and it was suggested that any account 
which featured New Labour ministers risking their jobs by standing up to the Prime Minister 
must surely be “exaggerated” (Ivens 2002). Concerns lingered into March that the entire 
debate “was more for show than for real” (Freedland 2002a). Some commentators noted 
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nonetheless that it was “unlikely that Mr Blair can back Mr Bush while members of his own 
government protest so aggressively” (Gilfeather 2002). This hostile and damaging set of public 
exchanges had been sparked entirely by the decision to allow an actual policy discussion at 
Cabinet. Blair’s reluctance under normal circumstances was apparently not without reason.  
 Speculation over Iraq continued to dominate British Public Opinion over foreign policy 
through March 2002. Blair himself admitted to understanding “totally” the “speculation about 
action on Iraq”, given the rising prominence of Baghdad in government communications on 
both sides of the Atlantic, even while continuing to insist that “no decision has been taken at 
all in respect of any action” (Blair, Hansard 2002c, c32). Commentators remained sceptical, and 
the press did little to calm fears, or to help Labour Whips, by reporting “a whiff of rebellion is 
in the air” at Westminster (Seddon 2002a), although it did point out deliberate Conservative 
efforts to steer parliamentary debate onto Iraq solely to cause the government trouble with its 
own backbenchers (Letts 2002a, F. Johnson 2002a, Letts 2002b, Finkelstein 2002, F. Johnson 
2002b). Blair “must decide”, the pro-war press warned, “at this early stage, that he is unwilling 
to compromise for the sake of party management” (The Times 2002f). He was praised for 
“commendable bravery” whenever he appeared to take a strong stance (The Times 2002g). 
Labour Party divisions over Iraq were quickly becoming both a legitimate subject of news 
reporting, and a target to be attacked from both pro-war and anti-war segments of Public 
Opinion. That reporting, and those attacks, then exacerbated the divisions. It was a perfect 
storm. 
The implications of the government’s continued insistence that a proper debate would 
follow when, and only when, “judgements are made” about what to do with Saddam Hussein 
(Blair, Hansard 2002e, c23) did elicit some comment towards the end of this period. Critics 
complained that “a great deception is being practised on the British people”, insisting “a 
decision has been taken in principle and the strategic planning is under way. The decision will 
be announced in due course and presented as a done deal, so that MPs cannot force the 
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government to think again” (Routledge 2002c). They were supported by the Prime Minister’s 
regular rivals in on the political right. The Daily Telegraph, not normally a natural ally of Mirror 
columnists, agreed with this assessment, warning that “what lends weight to this feeling of 
some Labour - and Opposition - MPs that parliament's voice should be heard at this point is 
this Prime Minister's propensity for thrusting the Commons aside when it suits him, 
particularly when he sniffs unrest on his own benches” (The Daily Telegraph 2002a). Before 
Crawford, Blair continued simply to concede that “it is hardly surprising frankly if people are 
concerned about military action in Iraq at this present time” while maintaining that “we are 
not suggesting it at this present time” (Blair 2002b). He apparently did not accept that refusing 
to discuss a potential foreign policy decision in public was a bad way of calming speculation 
that the decision was secretly being made in private. 
 In both the joint press conference with President Bush on 6 April, and his own speech 
at College Station on the 7th, Blair gave what was described as his “clearest signal yet” of 
British support for American war plans (Elliott and Murphy 2002, Ahmed 2002b, Blackman 
2002a). The repeated claim that ‘no decisions have been taken’ began to wear thin as the 
Prime Minister insisted Western nations must “learn from our experience” on 11 September; 
exactly Bush’s point in the State of the Union. If the British and American peoples wanted 
security, “we must be prepared to act where terrorism or Weapons of Mass Destruction 
threaten us”. The two dangers were conflated through rhetorical juxtaposition, and no 
attempt made to discuss the evidence for any actual link. Again echoing President Bush, Blair 
warned that “leaving Iraq to develop WMD, in flagrant breach of no less than nine separate 
UNSCRs, refusing still to allow weapons inspectors back to do their work properly, is not an 
option”. Little doubt of the seriousness of his statement remained with the assertion that “if 
necessary the action should be military and again, if necessary and justified, it should involve 
regime change”. Although Blair still maintained that “the moment for decision on how to act is 
not yet with us” (Blair 2002c), those actors who earlier had scoffed at the Prime Minister’s 
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willingness to see through rhetorical foreign policy commitments could not so easily dismiss 
the significance of what had been said. Christopher Meyer may have been criticised for his 
views about what was agreed at Crawford, but he has correctly highlighted that “this was the 
first time that Tony Blair had said in public ‘regime change’” (C. Meyer 2009, 29). Blair later 
recalled having, by this point, “resolved in my own mind that removing Saddam would do the 
world, and most particularly the Iraqi people, a service. Though I knew regime change could 
not be our policy, I viewed a change with enthusiasm, not dismay”. Even here he splits verbal 
hairs; in the space of one page noting his “enthusiasm” for regime change, and dismissing as a 
“myth” the suggestion that he agreed to support it at Crawford (Blair 2010b, 400). Blair’s 
public position had an immediate practical impact. Civil servants regarded the assurances 
contained within the Prime Minister’s two public statements in Texas as establishing a degree 
of British commitment to eventual military action, and began to plan accordingly (Webb 
2002a). Some media commentators concluded “it is now the agreed policy of the one 
superpower and its closest ally that Saddam Hussein be overthrown” (The Daily Telegraph 
2002c), while others described Blair as having “parroted Mr Bush’s views on Iraqi ‘regime 
change’” (The Guardian 2002c). Although, therefore, he remained equivocal in the face of 
Conservative demands that he confirm “that getting rid of Saddam Hussein may now be an 
objective of the government?” (Duncan Smith, Hansard 2002e, c12), Blair had clearly 
established certain expectations. That he repeatedly reminded MPs “I have been involved in 
three regime changes—Milosevic, the Taliban and the gangster group that took over Sierra 
Leone” was unlikely to add reassurance, especially when he maintained “I can honestly say 
that we should not regret any of them” (Blair, Hansard 2002e, c37).  
 For all his protestations to the contrary, therefore, the Prime Minister had only himself 
to blame for the general belief expressed in Public Opinion at this time that he “has completed 
his own thinking about Iraq, and intends to back military action when, and not merely if, the 
time is right” (B. MacIntyre 2002a). Distrust of the government was already growing as a result 
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of frustration with the ‘official line’, and it had been heightened further by confusion over the 
missing ‘dossier’. Such was the apparent disconnect between Blair’s continued claim that no 
decision had been taken to use force, and his insistence that “doing nothing is not an option”, 
that distrust was exacerbated all the more. The Prime Minister was “lying to parliament”, 
wrote one regular critic, “he [was] also lying to his own MPs”. He had “privately assured 
President George Bush that he will support an American assault on Saddam Hussein”, and in 
failing to admit this publicly he had, it was argued, been caught out in the lie (Routledge 
2002d). Opponents of military action were in a weak position at this time, however. Given the 
distribution of authority in the British system of government, “once Blair had set his Iraq policy 
in train, it was very hard, indeed close to impossible, for anyone to stop him” (Coates and 
Krieger 2009, 251). He retained Cabinet support, and sufficient backing amongst Labour MPs 
not to be unduly concerned about reining in rebels. As Prime Minister, he had the right to 
exclude or include officials and ministers from key decisions as he saw fit. Oddly, his assumed 
pro-war stance won him plaudits from his more natural foes in the Conservative Party and the 
right-wing press, while the ambiguity deliberately cultivated across the government prevented 
anti-war actors from having too much to oppose. Those who spoke out, as during the Afghan 
campaign, were relatively easily dismissed as extremists, John Pilger’s continued insistence 
that the ‘war on terror’ had nothing to do with terrorism being one example (Pilger 2002a). 
George Galloway, the most consistently outspoken anti-war MP at this stage, spent the later 
months of 2001 and early part of 2002 busily prophesying the fabrication of evidence by British 
“spooks” to provide a “pretext” for a campaign against Iraq (Galloway 2001, 2002a). His 
credibility was undermined, however, by the resurfacing of a video clip from 1994 (whether by 
chance or design is unclear), showing his meeting with Saddam Hussein during a fact-finding 
trip to Iraq. “Sir”, he had addressed the Iraqi dictator, “I salute your courage, your strength, 
your indefatigability”. Galloway later told a Senate hearing in Washington that he had “met 
Saddam Hussein exactly the same number of times as Donald Rumsfeld met him...The 
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difference”, he maintained, was that “Donald Rumsfeld met him to sell him guns and to give 
him maps the better to target those guns. I met him to try to bring about an end to sanctions, 
suffering and war” (Galloway 2005, 88, 94). The damage had been done, however, and media 
reports of Galloway’s contributions to the debate were regularly accompanied by discussion of 
his “reputation as a propagandist for unacceptable regimes” (Bowditch 2002, McSmith 2002a, 
Walters 2002). Most significantly, the 6 March Westminster Hall debate pulled together by 
Tam Dalyell to criticise “George Bush’s war – the war of his daddy’s ego” (Dalyell, Hansard 
2002b, c72WH) was terminated as a result of Galloway’s record, and his temper. Responding 
to the debate on behalf of the government, junior minister Ben Bradshaw labelled the 
Glaswegian MP “not just an apologist, but a mouthpiece, for the Iraqi regime” (Bradshaw, 
Hansard 2002b, c88WH). Galloway’s incensed response (he repeatedly shouted ‘liar’ as the 
minister attempted to conclude his speech) breached parliamentary protocol, and forced the 
Deputy Speaker to terminate the session prematurely. Both Bradshaw and Galloway eventually 
apologised, but the result was that media coverage focused entirely on the row, and not at all 
on the substance of the debate itself.  
 
Quantitative indicators 
 
As figure 6 shows, there was limited support from newspapers for military action 
during this period. Anti-war commentary came both from those natural sceptics of the use of 
force lying on the left wing of the political spectrum, and from right-wingers such as the 
columnists of The Daily Mail whose instinctive dislike of a Labour Prime Minister led them 
automatically to challenge his judgement (see figure 7). Opinion polls similarly indicated low 
levels of approval amongst the passive public for further military action; though at this time 
the handful of polls conducted were generally commissioned by anti-war newspapers with a 
view to providing copy for anti-war news stories. Figure 8 summarises available poll data from 
this period. 
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Figure 6: Average editorial positions adopted by leading UK newspapers towards military 
action in Iraq (1 = pro-war, 0 = neutral, -1 = anti-war), controlling for circulation, January – April 
2002 (n = 270). 
 
 
Figure 7: Editorial positions adopted by leading UK newspapers towards military action in Iraq, 
broken down by publication, 1 January – 10 April 2002 (n-numbers in brackets). 
 
It was unclear, then, in the aftermath of the Crawford meeting, whether or not the 
British government was in a strong position with regard to Public Opinion when it came to the 
discussion of its policies towards Iraq. Most of its vocal support came from its natural rivals, 
who busied themselves stirring up trouble amongst sceptical Labour MPs even as they publicly 
demanded a harder line against Baghdad. The most vociferous opponents of military action 
lacked credibility, although clearly not a modest support base in both Parliament and press.  
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Figure 8: Opinion poll data showing support for military action against Iraq, October 2001 – 
March 2002. 
 
 
Figure 9: Volume of commentary articles in UK newspapers relating to Iraq, January – April 
2002. 
 
Figure 9 shows that the initial level of interest in Iraq evident in Public Opinion during 
March tailed off after the Crawford meeting in April. The repeated insistence that ‘no decision 
ha[d] been taken’ about military action, however, apparently did more harm than good; it 
frustrated MPs and journalists alike, and opened the government up to accusations of 
dishonesty that would make its later communication efforts all the more challenging. 
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 Considered alongside the fairly apparent fact 
taken, the ‘no decision’ line was disingenuous if not dishonest. It was also counterproductive.
Figure 10: Basic two-dimensional factor analysis of British active public actors’ positions 
towards war with Iraq between January and April 2002. 
 
Finally, figure 10 presents a basic factor analysis showing the relative positions adopted by 
leading contributors to the public debate at this time. For the most part, these actors 
expressed anti-war views, though a healthy contingent remained neutral, and the government 
could take some comfort from the handful already adopting a pro
 
Conclusion 
 
 During the early months of 2002, Public Opinion in the UK began to focus on the 
prospect of a confrontation between the US, with British support, and Iraq. President Bush had 
been unequivocal in declaring his intention to take tough action
although no specific military threat had been issued, the implication 
speech was clear. Most commentators accepted that the US was
to overthrow Saddam Hussein, even if 
established conditions within which he would suffer politically should he subsequently fail to 
act. Britain’s Tony Blair, for all that he was criticised at home for failing to 
aggression, in fact shared much of the 
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Terrorists were known to be seeking such weapons. 11 
September had shown that, if their search was successful, they would have no compunction 
about using them on Western civilian populations. The risk of failing to deal robustly with Iraq 
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was too great. His views were, if not necessarily shared, at least accepted by most ministers; 
the few dissenters were sidelined or ignored.  
Before meeting Bush at Crawford in April 2002, Blair avoided giving too strong a public 
commitment to any particular course of action. The combined effect of statements emerging 
from the US, and Blair’s own unwillingness to rule out the use of force, was however that the 
British public began to suspect the government was being dishonest in claiming that no 
decision had been taken. In fact, participant testimonies and declassified government papers 
show that behind the scenes British ministers were willing, by April, to countenance ‘regime 
change’ in Baghdad in order to see the threat of Iraqi WMD eliminated. This was not quite the 
same as a decision having been taken definitely to deploy troops. But the difference was not 
so great that the government can escape entirely the charge that it engaged in wilful 
misdirection, and nor was it sufficient to protect it against criticism at the time. In turn the 
resulting distrust became a central factor in the burgeoning opposition movement. By refusing 
to ‘mention the war’ in early 2002, British ministers thus did themselves no favours. Public 
Opinion was shaped by too many alternative sources, several of which went far further in 
declaring their expectations of imminent war than a full and frank disclosure of the ‘real’ 
official position (which did not yet involve the use of force without an extended effort to 
achieve disarmament peacefully) would have allowed. Ministers were afraid that any attempt 
to set out their ongoing reasoning about the Iraqi threat, and their fear that the use of force 
might yet become necessary, would prompt such negative coverage in the congenitally 
unsubtle British media that Public Opinion would reject the policy without properly 
considering its consequences. Lacking official disclosure, however, the public debate was left 
to play out in its own terms. The result was that trust in the government began to decline at 
just the time when policymakers were beginning most heavily to rely upon it.   
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Chapter 4 – Selling the threat: April – September 2002 
 
Over the course of the summer of 2002, the tone and content of British Public Opinion 
on the question of Iraq policy, already imbued with bitterness born of frustration with official 
obfuscation, rapidly spiralled out of the government’s control. Forced by pressure emanating 
from the public sphere into releasing, ahead of schedule, their dossier on Iraq’s Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (British Government 2002), ministers unwittingly gave hostages to fortune 
for which they were later punished. Relatively uncontroversial when produced, the dossier 
subsequently gained notoriety after the invasion as a result of Andrew Gilligan’s Today 
programme report of 29 May 2003, in which the journalist claimed Downing Street had 
deliberately “sexed up” the intelligence-based judgements it made to bolster the case for war 
(Gilligan 2003). Chapter 7 deals with the fallout from Gilligan’s broadcast. During the summer 
of 2002, there was a general consensus in Britain and the wider international community that 
Iraq possessed an active programme for the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
Consequently, the actual impact of the claims made in the dossier was limited. Very few 
people in Britain appear to have revised their instinctive positions on Iraq merely because the 
government published the reasons why it considered the regime of Saddam Hussein a threat. 
Later claims by critics that the government sold the country a line in order to bring about a 
widely unwanted war generally overlook this crucial fact.  
Although it had a limited impact on the substance of the public debate, the dossier 
nevertheless was significant when it was produced. It may not have changed minds, but it 
answered widespread demand for evidence of the Iraqi threat that had grown steadily over 
the summer of 2002. It clumsily conflated policy advocacy and intelligence assessment in a 
manner which ultimately discredited both. And it represented the government’s best attempt 
to regain the initiative over an increasingly fractious public debate. The dossier matters, then, 
not because of what it said, but because of what it was. It was a response, a reply to critics, a 
hand that policymakers had hoped not yet to have to play, which they were driven into 
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revealing earlier than planned by public pressure, fuelled by the press and by MPs. It was a 
consequence of the influence of Public Opinion over the communication of British foreign 
policy, and one which ultimately had major substantive implications. 
 
A summer of drift 
 
 Chapter 3 recounted the latent hostility amongst sections of British Public Opinion at 
the start of 2002 to any talk of increasing the pressure on Saddam Hussein, and the 
government’s consequent reluctance to discuss options for doing so. The Crawford meeting 
had raised tensions temporarily, particularly as the disconnect grew between Tony Blair’s 
condemnation of Iraq, and his refusal to debate the prospect of military action. During April 
and May, however, the issue of Iraq largely receded from view. In parliament, only Donald 
Anderson (Hansard 2002h, c481, Hansard 2002i, c140WH) and Tam Dalyell (Hansard 2002g, 
c192, c219) kept the issue current, while press coverage was limited, if primarily negative. Blair 
was characterised as a “moral crusader...eager for action” (Young 2002b), attacked “for his 
slavish stance towards the Americans” (Rowson 2002), described (generally still only in The 
Mirror) for the same reason as a “poodle” (Reade 2002), and denounced for planning a 
“Western crusader invasion” of Iraq (Galloway 2002b). Alastair Campbell attributes to John 
Reid a remark in early June that “we had now reached the stage where all communications 
was dismissed as spin, all funding was sleaze, all attacks were smears...There was real 
nastiness and poison about where we were at the moment” (Campbell and Stott 2007, 623). 
Reid had a point, but at least the overall level of interest remained low.  
 Although Campbell admitted he “wasn’t quite sure” how to deal with the negative 
press environment, his primary purpose as Director of Communications in Downing Street was 
to try to maintain a degree of control over the way the government and its policies were 
represented. Although it is unclear exactly to what extent Campbell was personally behind 
them, three key innovations were made in official communication practices during June and 
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July. Firstly, ministers granted an increased number of television interviews, notable among 
them Blair’s three-part session with Jeremy Paxman for BBC Two’s Newsnight in mid-May, the 
second instalment of which focused almost entirely on Iraq. It was not unusual for ministers, 
even the Prime Minister, to speak to the media (Blair 2012b, 2), but a deliberate effort was 
made at this time to increase the direct exposure of policymakers to the passive public 
through television discussions. The appearances then had the added benefit of giving 
newspaper journalists something solid to report on, reducing the volume of speculation filling 
column inches. Secondly, the daily ‘lobby’ briefings of the press by the Prime Minister’s official 
spokesman were augmented by monthly opportunities for journalists to question Blair directly, 
beginning on 20 June. At different times the press conferences came to be dominated entirely 
by Iraq, with extended discussions taking place between the Prime Minister and 
correspondents not just from the UK, but from around the world. Finally, on 16 July, Blair 
appeared before the House of Commons Liaison Committee, comprising the Chairmen of the 
various Select Committees. Both the press conference and the Liaison Committee appearance 
represented new additions to the government’s communication arsenal; one for the media, 
and the other for MPs. They generated some positive public comment, though Blair continued 
to be attacked for not having published a dossier on Iraq in March, as journalists had been led 
to believe he would (Seddon 2002b, The Guardian 2002d). It was noted, in particular, that 
Blair’s explanation of the delay “was more to do with spin than substance”; namely that it was 
a matter of political timing (P. Riddell 2002b). In addition, the government was accused of 
trying to bypass the media through the press conferences. Blair told journalists he thought it 
was “a bit unfair to say I am trying to get round you”, having “got you all here in the room” 
(Press Conference 2002a). It was an accusation he faced, nonetheless. Interestingly, since it 
was the only innovation out of the three not directly targeted at the media, the Liaison 
Committee session on 16 July garnered the greatest volume of positive commentary. 
Observers thought it “astonishing...that this was not done before”, and criticised the “inane” 
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Prime Minister’s Questions while contrasting its “partisan knockabout” with the “sensible 
public conversation” managed by the Committee (Jenkins 2002a). MPs were generally praised 
for their “polite, non-partisan” approach “designed to elicit real answers” (The Times 2002i, 
Ashley 2002a), though The Mirror’s coverage labelled them “poodles” on account of their 
polite, non-partisan approach (Hardy 2002a).  
 Overall, therefore, the government’s initial efforts to calm post-Crawford public 
speculation over the prospect of war with Iraq had some success. But problems remained even 
before Parliament began its long summer recess at the end of July. To begin with, the ‘official 
line’ on Iraq lacked substance. Doing nothing about Iraq was not an option, intoned ministers 
and spokesmen alike, but no decisions had been taken as to what would be done, and no 
military action was imminent (Bradshaw, Hansard 2002h, c544, Macshane, Hansard 2002i, 
c175WH, Hoon, Hansard 2002j, c413, Blair, Hansard 2002k, c36, Press Conference 2002b). As 
Chapter 3 notes, such statements lacked credibility in light of Blair’s tough language (and 
praise for ‘regime change’) in April. They appear positively disingenuous, even dishonest, when 
set alongside declassified government documents recording discussions which took place 
during the early summer on the “assumption that the UK would take part in any military 
action” the US might launch (Rycroft 2002a). A second problem arose from the first weakness. 
Lacking concrete statements from the government about the prospects of a fresh Gulf War, 
journalists continued to rely mostly on speculation, and then on reporting the impact of each 
others’ speculation. Finally, and most importantly, the developing debate over Iraq in the 
United States began to penetrate the British public sphere, with arguments made in 
Washington reported in lieu of official comment in London. This had the doubly destabilising 
effect of giving newspapers sources for stories about military action at a time when the British 
government had genuinely not definitely decided that it would go to war, and fuelling 
representations of the Prime Minister as an American ‘poodle’, taking his cues from 
Washington.  
114 
 
Tony Blair has complained of the difficulty balancing the fact that the government 
“had not decided we would take military action” during the summer of 2002, with the 
recognition that “you couldn't say it wasn't a possibility”. He describes particular problems 
stemming from the media’s tendency to take anything other than the outright denial of any 
military planning as conclusive proof of imminent war; he thought Public Opinion did not 
appreciate nuance (Blair 2010a, 93). In fact, the range of press speculation was more diverse 
than Blair implies. After the Newsnight interviews in May it was noted that his “language on 
Iraq appeared less bellicose than previously” (G. Jones 2002b), and the conclusion drawn that 
“military action is not imminent” (Thomson and Maddox 2002). His message had, then, gotten 
through in some quarters. The problem was that, while outright cynicism about the 
government’s intentions was largely limited to the pages of The Mirror at this time (cf. 
Routledge 2002e), the British public considered bellicosity the default state of the Bush 
administration, and even of the American people, as Chapter 2 discussed. Donald Anderson 
raised the issue in Parliament in April (Anderson, Hansard 2002h, c481, Hansard 2002i, 
c140WH), and Malcolm Savidge warned that “ideology, rather than intelligence in either sense, 
has tended to be the driving force in the US” (Savidge, Hansard 2002i, c161WH). By May British 
journalists suggested that “despite Mr Blair’s solid public support for President George 
Bush...London and Washington are pursuing diverging strategies behind the scenes” (Usborne 
& Grice 2002). There was probably a degree of wishful thinking going on here. While this latter 
article was being read around the country, behind the scenes in Whitehall civil servants had 
concluded that “while regime change may not be an objective in its own right...we see it as a 
likely – though not certain – way point in a campaign to secure the strategic objective” of Iraqi 
disarmament (Webb 2002b). As Chapter 3 sets out, this was apparently the view Blair had held 
all along, and which he had discussed with President Bush in April.  
The final high-level meeting on Iraq before the summer break took place on 23 July. 
Blair reiterated the position he had first expressed at Chequers on 2 April that “regime change 
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and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD” 
(Rycroft 2002a). To eliminate the threat posed by the weapons, it might be necessary to 
change the regime, and disarmament would in any event change the regime’s character if not 
immediately its personnel. There was, therefore, good reason for scepticism in the British 
public debate at the start of the summer of 2002 over claims that no military action was 
planned. Technically, it remained true that no formal decision had been taken, but after 
Crawford planning work was underway, and despite the continuing public denials that war was 
intended, it was regarded at the highest levels as almost inevitable. This was not the same, 
however, as the government yet being ready to make a public case for war. More work was 
thought necessary to head off opposition, and to shore up support particularly in the 
government’s pacifist-leaning Labour Party base. So no public announcement was made, and 
no public discussion permitted. 
Across the Atlantic, the Bush Administration was less reticent when it came to setting 
out its aims. In a speech at West Point on 1 June that passed largely unremarked at first in 
Britain, the President began to develop a new foreign policy doctrine. Essentially, Bush 
proposed a stance based on pre-emptive self-defence according to which the United States 
had the right to strike unilaterally at any state or sub-state group which it thought might at 
some point represent a threat. Although Iraq was never specifically named, it was clearly 
implied that Saddam Hussein would be the first target for the new project. Belatedly (by two 
weeks), The Times called the move from deterrence to pre-emption implied by Bush “the most 
far-reaching shift in American foreign policy for more than 50 years” (The Times 2002h). This 
interpretation would gain further currency in British public exchanges with the publication in 
September of a new US National Security Strategy that explicitly codified the pre-emptive 
posture. As early as the end of May, newspapers had warned that despite the apparent post-
Crawford lull, “President Bush's commitment to overthrowing Saddam Hussein and other 
rogue regimes remains as strong as ever” (The Daily Telegraph 2002d), a view carried into June 
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and July (cf. Young 2002c, D’Ancona 2002c). Such claims were based in large part on 
statements made both on and off the record by Bush administration officials, reported initially 
by US media, and then picked up in the UK. At his 20 June press conference, Blair was 
confronted over reports published in the New York Times about US military planning which the 
journalist concerned insisted were “certain to be correct”, having originated with off-the-
record Bush administration briefings (Press Conference 2002a). The same day both Bernard 
Jenkin (Hansard 2002j, c412) and Tam Dalyell (ibid., c416) challenged Geoff Hoon to explain 
warlike comments by the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Radio 4. On 5 July the first 
of a series of Pentagon information ‘leaks’ took place, with details appearing in the New York 
Times of a planned “massive military assault on Iraq” drawn from an internal Bush 
Administration paper; The Independent on Sunday’s coverage observed that “this sort of 
document never surfaces by accident” (Cornwell and Brown 2002). Already commentators had 
begun to view “the volume and density of the leaks, to say nothing of their frequency” as 
decisive evidence of a decision for war having already been made in Washington (C. Hitchens 
2002). Such speculation only increased further following the 15 July announcement that Blair 
would again visit the US in September (cf. Ahmed, Burke and Pelham 2002, The Independent 
2002c). Suddenly momentum appeared to be building towards a strike before the end of the 
year. 
It does appear that factions within the Bush administration, particularly within the 
Pentagon-based ‘hawks’ camp, made active use of strategic ‘leaks’ in order to try to create a 
public narrative that suited their goals, even where this meant applying pressure to other 
bureaucratic actors. Such tactics would be entirely consistent with the “bureaucratic politics” 
model of foreign policymaking, with its discussion of inter-agency competition as a primary 
driver of decisions (Allison and Zelikow 2nd Edn. 1999). British newspapers responded to the 
leaks by warning against the country “sleepwalking” into war, and began to suggest that 
military action would begin before the US mid-term elections on 5 November, if not earlier 
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(The Mirror 2002d, Routledge 2002e, The Daily Mail 2002a, J. Smith 2002). Press concerns on 
this point were shared within government. ‘C’ told the 23 July pre-summer Iraq policy meeting 
that there had been what he called “a perceptible shift in attitude” in Washington, and 
observed that “military action was now seen as inevitable” (Rycroft 2002a). No timescale had 
been set, but arguably part of the motivation for the Blair government’s earnest desire to 
avoid having to discuss military action publicly at this time stemmed from its inability to keep 
pace with developments in the US. Even for a loyal ally, it was difficult to get a clear signal 
about the likely direction of policy travel from within the Kremlin-esque swarm of hostile inter-
bureaucratic briefing and intrigue buzzing with growing intensity around what Straw, quoting 
Keynes, later termed the “White Hive” in Washington (Keynes 1979, 215, Straw 2010b, 40).  
It was unfortunate for the government that press speculation over Iraq peaked when it 
did. On 24 July Parliament began its long summer recess; MPs were not due to sit again until 
mid-October. Asked whether he would recall the House in the event of military action against 
Iraq beginning before that date, Blair stuck to his established line, that no military action was 
planned and that Parliament would be consulted in ‘the normal way’ should those plans 
change. He did not commit to a recall, nor indeed to a debate, in the event of that situation 
changing, since his notion of Parliament’s ‘normal’ role in foreign policymaking was that it 
could consider government decisions only once they had been made. A significant proportion 
of the press, in an example of the sort of wilful misinterpretation Blair continues to complain 
about (cf. Blair 2012a, 10), framed the statement as evidence that military action was 
definitely planned for the summer so as to avoid parliamentary scrutiny (Letts 2002, McSmith 
2002b, Hoggart 2002, Grice 2002a). Only The Sun and The Times took the Prime Minister at his 
word, with columnists noting that “there is no evidence that the US, either on its own or with 
allies, is likely to attack Iraq over the next three months” (The Sun 2002b, P. Riddell 2002c). But 
pro-war commentators were growing frustrated too with Blair’s failure effectively to make his 
case (cf. Phillips 2002, Hastings 2002), while the Prime Minister could have been forgiven for 
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growing frustrated himself. On 5 August, just over a week after Parliament had gone into 
recess, and with absolutely nothing having happened to indicate a shift in the policy position, 
Tam Dalyell requested MPs be recalled to debate Iraq. He was backed by The Daily Mail, while 
The Times criticised the move as “a publicity stunt”, which it clearly was (The Daily Mail 2002b, 
The Times 2002j). Dalyell was rebuffed, but MPs’ impatience with the length of the summer 
break and their continued fear (shared and stirred up by journalists) that military action might 
be launched without their approval would resurface in September. Only a handful of 
commentators reflected on the fact that Blair would be on holiday (rather than planning a war) 
for most of August, as usual (cf. Marr 2002), or acknowledged that, despite “for the umpteenth 
time this year, informed opinion...working itself into a panic”, there was still no actual 
evidence that military action was imminent (Dejevsky 2002).  
It was on a lack of evidence that the press began to focus during the Prime Minister’s 
seasonal absence from the political fray, with complaints mounting that “the case for war 
simply hasn't been made” (cf. The Daily Mail 2002c, The Mirror 2002f). A sense of urgency 
developed, fuelled in part by prominently-reported statements from US General Wesley Clark 
(The Mirror 2002e), former Secretary of State James Baker (The Guardian 2002e), and Vice-
President Cheney (The Daily Mail 2002c, The Daily Telegraph 2002e, The Guardian 2002f), each 
implying that some form of escalation was on the cards. Writing on 8 August to dismiss “US 
claims” about Iraq’s WMD as “outdated fabrications and recycled information”, Mudhafar 
Amin, Baghdad’s sole representative in London as head of the Iraqi interest section in the 
Jordanian Embassy, was among the first to reopen calls for the publication of a ‘dossier’ 
outlining the alleged threat (Amin 2002). The Times of 17 August agreed with Amin’s proposal, 
but disagreed with his substantive assessment, arguing that there was indeed a clear threat, 
and suggesting an official account of it would help win over doubters (The Times 2002k). By 
the end of the month, one commentator warned that “US stridency means that at next 
Tuesday's press conference, the prime minister will have to say more than ‘wait and see’” 
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(Toynbee 2002), while another thought the release of the WMD dossier was now needed to 
close “a gaping hole in the debate about a military attack on Iraq” (The Independent on 
Sunday 2002a). Alastair Campbell agreed that some action was necessary, noting “it was clear 
that public opinion had moved against us during August” in his 1 September diary entry 
(Campbell and Stott 2007, 632-633).  
On 3 September Tony Blair took action, announcing during his press conference that a 
dossier on Iraq’s WMD would be published imminently, stating that “it is clear that the debate 
has moved” from its position when he had last discussed the matter publicly, on 25 July. 
“Originally”, he went on, “I had the intention that we wouldn’t get round to publishing the 
dossier until we had actually taken the key decisions. I think probably it is a better idea to bring 
that forward...to publish that within the next few weeks”. Accepting that many of those 
voicing concerns were asking “perfectly reasonable questions” – MPs Donald Anderson and 
Gerald Kaufman were named – Blair insisted that Public Opinion would be won round once 
presented with the evidence (Press Conference 2002c). He had, by his own admission, been 
pressed into a shift in communication policy, but he remained adamant that his substantive 
position was right. There was a threat to the international community from Iraq’s WMD 
development, the US was correctly raising the need to do something about it, and once more 
people recognised these facts, the wider argument could, and would, be won.  
 
September’s anti-climax 
 
 When the dossier actually appeared in late September, it did so against a backdrop of 
anti-war commentators’ demands not just for evidence of a threat from Iraq, but for new 
evidence. Three weeks on from the widely-discussed release of an International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) report that summarised much of the publicly available information on 
Iraq’s armaments, novelty was always going to be a big ask, and the general assessment was 
that the dossier failed to deliver. It met little substantive resistance. For the most part 
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commentators (reassured by the IISS) accepted that Iraq probably did possess WMD. What 
controversy did arise stemmed primarily from the procedural complaints of MPs opposed to 
military action as they sought to express their views through a parliamentary vote. Few minds 
seem to have been changed by the long-anticipated publication, especially in the press. The 
Times of 29 August, for example, had argued before seeing the dossier that “no reasonable 
person doubts that Saddam is actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction, no neutral 
observer would contest that his motives for that quest are either to blackmail his neighbours 
or sponsor attacks on others, and no rational figure could believe that he will abandon this 
effort of his own volition” (The Times 2002l). By contrast, four separate newspapers (from 
both the left and right of the political spectrum) had carried leading articles describing Blair’s 3 
September press conference statements as providing inadequate justification for war (The 
Daily Mail 2002d, The Daily Telegraph 2002f, The Guardian 2002g, The Independent 2002d). 
They, too, remained unmoved by his efforts to respond.  
Given the amount of information already publicly available about Iraq’s WMD, some 
observers worried that Blair had risked “setting up expectations he is unlikely to fulfil” by 
promising to release a dossier proving that Iraq represented a threat. “Those who are already 
deeply alarmed will feel vindicated”, they warned, “but those who are critical or uneasy about 
an attack on Iraq are unlikely to find enough to convince them” (Maddox 2002c). Within the 
government, Alastair Campbell privately wrote of similar concerns (Campbell and Stott 2007, 
633). But although some critics claimed Downing Street was engaged in producing a “cobbled 
together” pile of potential falsehoods (cf. Waterhouse 2002; Steel 2002b; Alexander 2002), 
most of the debate prior to the dossier’s publication remained reasonable. The government 
had thus been quite successful in seeking to set the agenda for public debate by presenting the 
issue primarily in terms of Iraq’s disarmament obligations, at least at this stage. Sceptics 
generally admitted that “the case for war could be made”, given that “Saddam has acquired 
chemical and biological weapons in the past and tried to acquire nuclear weapons”, although 
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they still maintained that insufficient evidence of a new or immediate threat had yet appeared 
to justify war (The Independent 2002f). Claims that the government was engaged in 
propagandising largely fell away after the IISS report came out on 9 September; clearly an 
independent think tank, working with UN source material, was not seeking to spin the British 
government’s official line. Press coverage of the IISS report is nonetheless interesting for the 
way different publications focused on sections that supported their established editorial 
positions, rather than developing those positions on the basis of the evidence they had seen. 
The Daily Mail concluded that “nothing in the IISS report is a surprise”, insisting that the threat 
was already well known, and maintaining that no further action was required to contain it (The 
Daily Mail 2002f). The Independent thought the IISS contribution “interesting...but by no 
means...particularly decisive” in terms of the broader debate over Iraqi disarmament (The 
Independent 2002g). Donald MacIntyre, whose criticisms were mentioned specifically by 
Jonathan Powell in an email about the dossier to John Scarlett and Alastair Campbell on 19 
September (Powell 2002a), thought the IISS document would “help [Blair] somewhat”, but 
concluded (presciently) that “it won't, of course, be enough” to win the argument, “any more 
than will the official dossier” (D. MacIntyre 2002b). The Times disagreed; “certainly [the report] 
will help Mr Blair” (The Times 2002m). Most revealingly, the IISS assessment that Iraq was 
several years from nuclear capacity under sanctions, but could put together a weapon in 
months if it was able to obtain enriched uranium illicitly, received highly selective coverage. 
The Mirror reported that “Saddam Hussein is years away from developing his own nuclear 
weapons” (Blackman 2002b), The Sun that “Saddam Hussein could have nuclear weapons 
within months” (S. Hughes 2002a). Both of these articles were, ostensibly, objective news 
reports. Both were in fact heavily slanted in accordance with the editorial position taken in 
their respective publications. There was scope, therefore, for the government dossier to be 
well received, but also the latent likelihood of its conclusions being subsumed into press-
generated frames, instead of serving as the basis for the dissemination of the government’s 
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preferred line. Too much time had been allowed from March. Journalists’ first impressions had 
become entrenched. The nature of Public Opinion as a political structure meant that once 
those impressions had become reified, they were incredibly difficult for government to 
overcome.  
With accusations of official perfidy having been undermined by the independent IISS, 
government critics changed tack. Press commentators shifted from outright denial that Iraq 
had potentially dangerous WMD, to querying why more robust action against the regime was 
seen as so much more necessary in 2002 than it had been in 1991. The Mirror accepted “that 
Saddam's not a very nice guy and has some rather unpleasant weapons” but argued that 
because “we knew that when we pulled back from Baghdad in 1991 and let him carry on 
running his country”, military action to deal with those weapons could not possibly be justified 
eleven years on (The Mirror 2002g). The Guardian similarly questioned what had changed in 
Iraq to justify the abandonment of the previous decade’s strategy of containment and 
deterrence (The Guardian 2002i). Ministers avoided explaining the real reason for the shift, the 
changed tolerance of the Iraqi threat outlined above, not least because in doing so they would 
have had to concede that the threat had not actually grown worse. Refusing to engage directly 
with the question did little, however, to reassure the questioners.  
MPs meanwhile began to revisit Tam Dalyell’s demands for a recall of Parliament. 
Having failed to make headway along official channels, former Labour whip Graham Allen 
announced on 4 September that he would arrange an ‘unofficial’ sitting of the Commons 
instead. On 6 September he gained press support for the initiative (The Guardian 2002h, The 
Independent 2002e, The Daily Mail 2002e), and on 7 September former House of Commons 
Speaker Lord Weatherill agreed to chair an informal debate. Pressure on the Prime Minister 
was growing, and quickly. One commentator warned on 9 September that “Mr Blair is in 
danger of turning the return of Parliament into a damaging controversy”, and argued this 
would be a double error because of the strong position the Prime Minister would find himself 
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in once he began to make his case (P. Riddell 2002d). By the 10th, with the BBC having agreed 
to broadcast the ‘informal’ debate, and Church House in Westminster booked to host it, the 
government conceded the point and announced that there would indeed be a recall to 
coincide with the publication of the dossier. For the second time in a week, public pressure 
had forced the government to accelerate its preferred communication strategy; after all, the 
view in Downing Street remained that no debate was necessary (or worthwhile) until a clear 
policy proposal had been developed. Again, however, it was denied the opportunity to regain 
the initiative and to set its own agenda for the public debate by the flexibility of its opponents. 
Within days of the recall being announced, critics had moved from demanding a debate to 
attacking the government’s proposal to debate a technical rather than a substantive motion 
(Wintour 2002, Grice 2002b, The Independent 2002i). A few even went so far as to dismiss the 
recall altogether; it was “a grandstanding act of propaganda, designed to con the British 
people”, cautioned one (Routledge 2002f). Complaints about the procedures to be followed 
persisted right up to the day of the debate itself (cf. The Daily Mail 2002g). Even once they had 
forced the government to change its plans, critics of the use of force had kept up their attacks, 
moving the goalposts faster than Downing Street could respond. More than at any other time 
during the period under consideration here, British journalists demonstrated during the 
summer of 2002 their propensity to make decisions about the volume of critical coverage to 
produce without reference to the substance of what the government was trying to do. 
Criticism was simply endemic. It was embedded in how they operated, and each time it was 
answered, it was automatically revised and maintained still further. Ministers, seeing this 
effect, grew cynical themselves about the media, and began to focus their briefing efforts only 
on publications thought reasonable (Blair 2012a, 1), exacerbating the negativity of the debate. 
President Bush’s speech to the UN on 12 September, in which he challenged the 
Security Council to deal with Iraq, had helped Blair somewhat; as one television report put it, 
“diplomacy” was “being given one more chance” (ITV News 2002b), one of the key opposition 
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demands. By 17 September The Guardian was reporting falling public opposition to military 
action (an ICM poll showed 40% opposition compared to 50% on 28 August), describing the 
shift as “a vindication of the prime minister's belief that the gap in the polls would close once 
the public began to focus on the debate over Iraq's capability to wage nuclear and chemical 
warfare” (Travis and White 2002). Again, the success of government agenda-setting in this 
regard is worthy of note. The debate itself, however, remained divided, especially as details of 
the dossier began to be trailed to journalists. Predictions of “spin” and “propaganda” in The 
Mirror and The Observer contrasted strongly with assertions in The Times that the document 
would be “sober in tone” and would “directly reject Iraqi claims that it has no weapons of mass 
destruction” (Routledge 2002g, Lewis-Smith 2002, T. Jones 2002, Bone and Webster 2002). The 
Independent on Sunday expected an “inconclusive” summary, while the Mail on Sunday 
quoted officials claiming that the dossier would “prove ‘beyond any doubt’ that Saddam’s 
regime has weapons of mass destruction” (Sengupta and Dillon 2002, Leake 2002). Despite The 
Mirror’s insistence that any publication would “have to contain something really unexpected” 
to shift the balance of the debate in the government’s favour (The Mirror 2002h), there was 
little expectation of a ‘smoking gun’. It even appears, from its relative ubiquity in press reports, 
that the phrase ‘smoking gun’ may have been used in official briefings as part of an effort to 
lower expectations. If this was in fact the case, the effort was unsuccessful; the search for the 
‘smoking gun’ would dominate discussions during the winter months.  
This then was the pattern of the debate “in light of” which, Blair wrote in his foreword 
to the dossier, he had taken the “unprecedented” decision “to publish this kind of document”, 
namely one drawing heavily on classified intelligence (British Government 2002, 3). In 
Parliament, the Conservatives remained unquestioningly supportive of both the dossier 
exercise and the adoption of a robust approach to Saddam Hussein more generally. Iain 
Duncan Smith made claims about Iraq’s efforts to obtain enriched uranium that went beyond 
the government’s, and even warned that “Saddam has the motive to strike against Britain” 
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(Duncan Smith, Hansard 2002m, cc7-8). Overall MPs largely agreed with Blair’s statement 
about the potential danger Iraq posed. Former Conservative leader William Hague warned that 
British Intelligence likely under-estimated Iraq’s capabilities (Hague, Hansard 2002m, c13), 
while Labour backbencher Jon Owen Jones suggested “few in the House or outside would 
disagree...that Saddam Hussein's regime represents a threat” (J. Jones, Hansard 2002m, c20). 
These initial exchanges set the tone for the debate which followed, introduced by Jack Straw. 
Michael Ancram, the Conservative Shadow Foreign Secretary, stated “we [the Conservatives] 
support the Prime Minister's stance today. We share his analysis of the threat” (Ancram, 
Hansard 2002n, c35). Several MPs, including Ancram as well as Donald Anderson, chairman of 
the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, and Liberal Democrat foreign affairs spokesman Menzies 
Campbell, referred to the dossier as evidence to support their existing views that Iraq did have 
WMD and did indeed pose at least a potential threat (Ancram, Hansard 2002n, c35, D. 
Anderson, c42, M. Campbell, c43, Maude, c52, Robathan, c119). Others, themselves already 
convinced of the need to act, hoped it would win over sceptics (Key, Hansard 2002n, c83, Ross, 
c86, Gilroy, cc143-144), while several of those very sceptics suggested their concerns had been 
reduced, if not eliminated (George, Hansard 2002n, c48, Salmond, c56, C. Smith, c64, Leigh, 
c75, Tyrie, c113, Walter, cc122-123). A common refrain was that while a threat from Iraq had 
indeed been identified, military action was not yet a practical or proportionate response 
(Hogg, Hansard 2002n, cc49-50, Clifton-Brown, c111, Godsiff, c129, Keetch, cc138-142). This 
argument was undermined by the fact that the government was not claiming that it was, 
focussing instead on the UN process launched by Bush two weeks previously; a sign of some 
success for the ‘official line’. Those who remained most strongly opposed to the government 
largely based their complaints on procedural rather than substantive matters, bemoaning the 
supposed delay in the recall of Parliament, or the timing of the dossier’s release on the 
morning of the debate (Soames, Hansard 2002n, c59, Galloway, c60, G. Jackson, c95, Garnier, 
c97, Mahon, cc100-102, Heath, c106, Turner, c126, Selous, c129, Doughty, c137). George 
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Galloway led a small number of MPs in accusing the government of propagandising, but the 
charge was not widely taken up (Galloway, Hansard 2002n, c60, Simpson, c81, Kilfoyle, c108). 
Instead, many took the opportunity to criticise Bush Administration officials for their alleged 
bellicosity during August (Salmond, Hansard 2002n, c58, Soames, c59, Bruce, c66, Bell, c72, 
Strang, c78, Browning, c79, Baker, c88, Taylor, c93, F. Cook, c105, Burden, c115, Ruddock, 
c120, Lloyd, c123, L. Smith, c132). Overall the government was not challenged strongly; clearly 
MPs were not yet ready for war, but as Blair himself argued to a receptive audience, war was 
not yet proposed. Critics forced a division on the motion for the adjournment, allowing sixty-
four MPs to vote in symbolic opposition to the government. Just six Ulster Unionists voted in 
favour of the motion, with the majority of MPs and both main parties having refused to 
participate, accepting the argument that a vote was pointless without a policy having been 
proposed. It was an anti-climatic conclusion to an anti-climatic debate, one which suggested 
that opponents of military action would find it harder to win support in Parliament than they 
had in the press.  
 Journalists were disappointed by both the dossier and the parliamentary debate, with 
many focussing on the document’s failure to offer the new evidence of an imminent Iraqi 
threat they had previously accepted it would not provide (The Daily Mail 2002h, Barnett 2002, 
La Guardia 2002a, Dawkins 2002, The Independent 2002j, Aaranovitch 2002, Heyman 2002, 
Jenkins 2002b). Informed observers were equally underwhelmed; as Dan Plesch of RUSI put it, 
“there are one or two catchy points - maps of missiles that Iraq does not have, missile ranges 
that Iraq cannot achieve, the ability to launch chemical or biological weapons in 45 minutes 
and some talk of Iraq trying to obtain not particularly useful radioactive material from Africa. 
None of this amounts to a wholesale break-down in the strategy of containment” (Plesch 
2002). The Mirror published the greatest volume of outright criticism, calling Blair’s speech “as 
good a defence of the indefensible as was possible” and printing several articles expressing 
distrust of Blair and accusing the government of propagandising (The Mirror 2002i, Loach 
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2002, Ali 2002, Routledge 2002h). The Sun similarly remained unequivocally supportive, calling 
the evidence “overwhelming and – except to the most blinkered minds – irrefutable” (The Sun 
2002c). Overall, therefore, most of Public Opinion stood after the dossier exactly where it had 
stood before. It had been released in circumstances of broad agreement that Iraq posed some 
kind of threat, it had underlined some positions, but undermined few.  
 
Drafting a dossier 
 
 Limited though its initial impact may have been, the very existence of the dossier 
marked a significant deviation from normal patterns of British government behaviour. 
Although the idea of producing a public summary of ministers’ judgements on Iraq was neither 
unprecedented (British Government 2001) nor new (Campbell and Stott 2007, 618), the 
specific processes followed in this case were unique. Tony Blair appears to have made his 3 
September announcement of the accelerated timing of the dossier’s release without 
consulting any of the people who might actually be required to write it. Both John Scarlett and 
Alastair Campbell implied to the Chilcot Inquiry that the Prime Minister’s public statements on 
that occasion had marked the beginning of the active preparation process (Scarlett 2009, 56, 
Campbell 2010a, 66). Blair had requested a briefing on Iraq in advance of the press conference, 
but had not suggested announcing the release of a dossier (Blair 2002d). In fact, Matthew 
Rycroft’s reply proposed answering any specific questions on the subject with the well-
established line that “when the time is right we shall publish a dossier documenting the 
evidence against Saddam” (Rycroft 2002b). It apparently had not occurred to Rycroft that the 
Prime Minister might decide, the following day, that the time was in fact right. September was 
far from an ideal moment to conduct the drafting exercise. Jack Straw told Chilcot he thought 
“the final product might have been a bit better” if it had been drafted by the FCO, as had been 
the ‘original’ dossier drawn up but not released in March (Straw 2011). With John Scarlett 
concerned about the use of intelligence, however, and the relevant FCO staff busy at the UN 
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General Assembly in New York, Alastair Campbell ruled on behalf of Blair that the JIC should 
take ‘ownership’ of the project (Campbell and Stott 2007, 636). The fact that such a ruling was 
required underlines the ad hoc nature of the project. 
David Omand told Chilcot he “didn't see [the dossier] in any different a light really than 
an ordinary JIC assessment when it came to process; in other words, two members of the 
assessment staff were detailed to write it essentially, supervised by the Chief of the 
Assessments Staff, superintended by the Chairman of the JIC, who took a personal interest in 
the actual drafting of it”. Omand felt Scarlett’s personal involvement provided particular 
assurance that the sensitive material covered was “being handled in the right way” (Omand 
2010, 18). Downing Street’s main input into the dossier came through Campbell, who aside 
from confirming Scarlett in charge of the drafting, chaired two meetings in Downing Street on 
5 and 9 September to discuss presentational matters, and advised Scarlett on the stylistic 
composition of the text. Criticisms were subsequently made of Campbell having chaired an 
‘intelligence meeting’, but Lord Hutton dismissed these, concluding it was “wholly 
appropriate” for JIC officials to take advice on communication matters from Downing Street, 
and indeed that “there was no discussion of intelligence issues, intelligence matters, 
intelligence at all, at that meeting or at those meetings” (Hutton 2004, 108). Omand has 
similarly strongly rejected the suggestion that communications staff were involved in 
intelligence discussions – “they certainly don’t get into the JIC” – while arguing “their views 
were sought perfectly properly” on the presentation side (Omand 2010, 19, 20).  
The distinction between the assessment and presentation of what were anyway 
subjective judgements based on limited evidence is fine. A line can probably be drawn, on the 
basis of the Hutton conclusions in particular, between the JIC view that the claims made in the 
dossier were supported by intelligence, which was not influenced by Downing Street, and the 
decision to use the document to make the strongest case possible for confronting Iraq, which 
rested with the Prime Minister. Although the exercise was unusual, therefore, there does not 
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appear to have been procedural impropriety, at least in the form of political manipulation of 
intelligence; misuse is a different matter. Hutton concluded that “10 Downing Street...was 
concerned that the intelligence...should be presented in a way which made as strong a case 
against Saddam Hussein as the intelligence properly permitted”, but that while Campbell did 
make requests for changes to ‘firm up’ the argument, “Mr Scarlett did not accept drafting 
suggestions emanating from 10 Downing Street unless they were in keeping with the 
intelligence available to the JIC and he rejected any suggestions which he considered were not 
supported by such intelligence” (Hutton 2004, 132, 141). Omand reinforces this point; “I think 
by then I knew John Scarlett well enough, and he knew me well enough, that, if he had felt 
under pressure [from No. 10], he would have put his head round my office door and said, ‘Can 
you help me fend these people off?’ But he didn't” (Omand 2010, 23). Again, therefore, it 
appears that the dossier as produced had not been subject to undue influence by Downing 
Street. Rather it represented (albeit in the strongest manner possible) the best professional 
judgement of British Intelligence as to the threat posed by Iraq’s development of WMD.  
 
Intelligence on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
 The problem, of course, with this last point, is that the best professional judgement of 
British Intelligence as to Iraq’s WMD capacity was proven to have been spectacularly 
misguided once the invasion had taken place. Iraq did not have any nuclear, chemical, or 
biological weapons, nor a viable programme for their development. Saddam Hussein may still 
have harboured an intention to develop WMD, and apparently believed allowing Iran (or his 
own truculent, oppressed, subjects) to discover he no longer had the ability to launch chemical 
attacks was a greater threat to his regime than defying the United States (Iraq Survey Group 
2004, 1). He did not, however, have any actual weapons; a crucial fact Western intelligence 
services failed to identify. This failure underpins every continuing discussion of the rights and 
wrongs of the Iraq invasion. It was the foundation of later controversies, and the reason why 
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the apparently ‘cautious and dull’ dossier subsequently attained such prominence in the public 
mind. A country was invaded and its government deposed by force, at great cost, to disarm it 
of weapons it did not have. Chapter 7 considers the impact of these issues on the long-term 
political consequences of the war. 
The problem was primarily one of “group-think” (Freedman 2004, 25). Not only were 
Western intelligence analysts incorrect in their judgements, so too were politicians, 
independent researchers, and even the passive public; “most people in countries where polls 
were held on this issue” thought Saddam Hussein a threat to world peace (Everts and Isernia 
2005, 273). Both Jack Straw and Alastair Campbell pointed out to the Chilcot Inquiry that the 
IISS report actually went further than the government in describing the Iraqi nuclear threat, 
with its worst-case assessment that Iraq could have a bomb in nine months (Campbell 2010a, 
102, Straw 2011, 57). The Defence Intelligence Staff (2002) had determined in March 2002 that 
at least a year would be required. When Anthony Seldon interviewed former Chief of the 
Defence Staff Admiral Mike Boyce, former head of the Diplomatic Service Lord Jay, and 
UNMOVIC chairman Hans Blix, each recalled having been convinced of the threat (Seldon, 
Snowdon and Collings 2007, 138). Blix confirmed to Chilcot that “I, like most people at the 
time, felt that Iraq retains [sic] weapons of mass destruction” (Blix 2010, 29-30). Blair, 
Campbell, Powell, and Straw have all stated that, in their view, few people in government, the 
public, or the wider international community, disputed the assumption that Iraq had WMD 
prior to the invasion (Blair 2010a, 78, Campbell 2010a, 94, Powell 2010a, 50, Straw 2011, 54). 
This is an image well-supported by the relative absence of controversy over the dossier at the 
time of its release. It simply did not warrant detailed public discussion, and did not, at the 
time, prompt a rancorous public debate.  
 That very agreement, however, posed problems for the government as it sought to 
justify a change of policy from containment towards a more aggressive confrontation with 
Saddam Hussein. Merely describing what was already known about Iraqi arms would not be 
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enough. As Chapter 3 notes, however, not even the strongest advocates of military action in 
Britain believed that the threat from Baghdad had actually, objectively, increased. British 
intelligence assessments thought an Iraqi attack on the UK highly unlikely (Joint Intelligence 
Committee 2002b). There was, however, a “changed calculus of threat” after 11 September, 
with the subjective view becoming prevalent amongst both ministers and officials that the 
demonstrable desire of terrorist groups to cause mass casualties, and the availability to such 
groups of personnel unafraid of death, meant possible threats previously disregarded as too 
outlandish to be credible had to be reconsidered. An existing concern that terrorist groups 
might seek WMD was consequently re-evaluated in a context in which key officials believed 
such weapons were now genuinely likely to be used (Butler 2004, 34). The common ground 
between this thinking and arguments emerging from the US was considerable. Reflecting on 
his own calculations at this time, Blair has written “would someone like Saddam want al-Qaeda 
to be powerful inside Iraq? Absolutely not. Would he be prepared to use them outside Iraq? 
Very possibly. Was there a real risk of proliferation, not only from Iraq but elsewhere, leaching 
into terrorist groups which would not be averse to using WMD? I certainly thought so. 
Actually, I still think so” (Blair, 2010b, p.386). By September he was beginning to make this 
argument in public, asking the TUC to ponder a hypothetical scenario: 
“Suppose I had come last year on the same day as this year - 10 September. Suppose I 
had said to you: there is a terrorist network called Al Qaida. It operates out of 
Afghanistan. It has carried out several attacks and we believe it is planning more. It has 
been condemned by the UN in the strongest terms. Unless it is stopped, the threat will 
grow. And so I want to take action to prevent that. Your response and probably that of 
most people would have been very similar to the response of some of you yesterday 
on Iraq. There would have been few takers for dealing with it and probably none for 
taking military action of any description” (Blair 2002e). 
 
Praised in The Guardian (Freedland 2002b) and dismissed as “an intellectual conjuring trick” by 
The Independent (2002h), this argument was otherwise little remarked upon, though one 
writer observed that it sounded “very similar to what Monty Python characterised as ‘the 
Welsh Art of Self-Defence’: attacking your opponent before he's even thought of attacking 
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you” (Harris 2002). Only The Times’ Bronwen Maddox linked the TUC line to the IISS report, 
noting the absence of a clear sign of a growing Iraqi threat, and concluding “if there is new 
urgency” in Western efforts to confront the regime, “it is in [Saddam’s] intentions, not his 
present capabilities” (Maddox 2002d). No evidence was ever presented of a shift in intent on 
the part of Iraq, however. The government thought it implicitly obvious that Baghdad would 
strike the West if it could, and 11 September had shown the relative ease with which even a 
low-tech operation could wreak devastation. Ministers failed to acknowledge their own 
assumptions on this point, and in doing so failed to recognise that they were not universally 
shared. They also apparently gave little consideration to the point raised in Eliza Manningham-
Buller’s memo, discussed in Chapter 3, that Iraq would probably only become a threat to 
Britain if Britain began directly to threaten Iraq (Manningham-Buller 2002).  
 It is notable that prior to September 2002 ministers do not appear to have treated Iraq 
as a particular concern when compared to other potential proliferators. During the 23 July 
meeting, for example, Jack Straw revisited his 25 March line in noting that “the case [for 
military action] was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability 
was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran” (Rycroft 2002a). Following up on this 
discussion, the Attorney-General wrote to Blair to outline the possible legal basis for military 
action on the grounds of self-defence. Confirming that, in deciding whether a pre-emptive 
strike could be justified, “the key issue...is whether an attack [by Iraq] is imminent”, Goldsmith 
added that “the development of WMD is not in itself sufficient to indicate such imminence”, 
and that “on the basis of the material which I have been shown...there would not be any 
grounds for regarding an Iraqi use of WMD as imminent” (Goldsmith 2002a).  
This was the position, then, at the start of the summer break. But on 29 August MI6 
received a new report from an “established and reliable line of reporting...quoting a senior 
Iraqi military officer in a position to know” (Hutton 2004, 112-116). The details of this report 
led the JIC to assess on 9 September that Iraq’s “chemical and biological munitions could be 
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with military units and ready for firing within 20-45 minutes” (Joint Intelligence Committee 
2002b). This assessment then formed the basis for the statement in the dossier that 
“intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical and biological 
weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so” (British Government 2002, 19). It was one of 
a number of reports received in quick succession at the end of August which, in John Scarlett’s 
words, “led to a firming up of what were already quite firm judgments” that Iraq had WMD 
which it was prepared to use (Scarlett 2009, 59). Alastair Campbell has even suggested that it 
was this “firming up”, rather than the need to respond to press speculation, that led to the 
dossier’s publication in September (Campbell 2010a, 64), though in light of what Blair said at 
his press conference this interpretation does appear somewhat far fetched. The intelligence 
picture remained imperfect, despite the new material. The indefinite terms used in these 
statements, such as “intelligence indicates” and “quite firm judgements” (emphasis added), 
reflect the uncertainty that characterised the position. Hans Blix, who “thought [the dossier] 
was a good paper” overall, noted the slightly speculative language it contained, and concluded 
“this was not evidence”, but inference (Blix 2004, 83). The JIC had warned repeatedly during 
2002 that intelligence was “limited” while “Saddam’s own  unpredictability” complicated 
matters, meaning much of what it produced was “necessarily based on judgement and 
assessment” rather than hard evidence (Joint Intelligence Committee 2002b). Taken together, 
and in the context of what one official later called a perceived “creeping tide” of WMD 
proliferation (Butler 2004, 63), the various strands of intelligence were, by September 2002, 
nevertheless regarded as adding up to a highly suggestive, if incomplete, picture of ongoing 
Iraqi weapons development. As Jack Straw has put it, “all the little bits of information, however 
patchy and sporadic, all pointed in one direction” (Straw 2010, 67). Iraq was developing WMD.  
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Drafting deficiencies 
 
 So the Blair government, in September 2002, had come to the conclusion, on the basis 
of intelligence assessments, that Iraq possessed an ongoing WMD development programme, 
and probably some active weapons. It was furthermore genuinely concerned that, should 
those weapons be passed on to terrorist organisations, they would be used in mass casualty 
attacks against Western targets, although it recognised that this was worryingly possible rather 
than particularly probable. The dossier produced on 24 September reflected those conclusions, 
and the intelligence assessments underpinning them, and was itself authored by the 
professionals of the Joint Intelligence Committee, with only limited input coming from 
Downing Street in the form of Alastair Campbell’s advice on presentation – which was not 
decisive in terms of the substantive content. Nevertheless, even setting aside its ultimate 
inaccuracy, the dossier contained crucial flaws that helped undermine its credibility. Firstly, by 
its very nature it conflated the government’s advocacy of its policy of adopting a more 
assertive line towards Iraq, with neutral intelligence assessment, and failed adequately to 
distinguish between the two. Secondly, a particular (and admittedly fairly minor, at the time) 
presentational error was made with regard to the ‘45 minute claim’, namely that by referring 
to “chemical and biological weapons” (emphasis added) the document, and Blair’s statement 
to Parliament, failed to distinguish between strategic missiles and battlefield munitions. 
Several press stories spoke of Iraqi missiles capable of reaching Israel, Turkey, or even British 
bases on Cyprus, but the intelligence assessment in fact referred specifically to munitions; 
artillery shells. In other words, it suggested Iraq had in 2002 very similar WMD capabilities to 
those it had possessed since the early 1980s at least. Tim Dunne concludes that “this initial 
omission – and subsequent failure to clarify – generated a misleading impression”. Certainly, 
without it, the later furore caused by Andrew Gilligan could not have been so intense.  
 Dunne also concludes that the dossier episode “illustrates the difficulty of staying on 
the right side of the line between persuasion and propaganda” in political communications, 
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particularly regarding matters of intelligence material and war (Dunne 2008, 352). Dunne has a 
point. Even before the dossier’s release, concerns had been expressed in the press about the 
centrality of rhetoric and assertion to the government’s case, particularly in light of the lack of 
definite evidence of an Iraqi threat (B. MacIntyre 2002b). Warnings about statements catching 
“unwanted implications” (Mullan 2002) or intelligence becoming “overtly politicised” 
(Beaumont and Vulliamy 2002) were particularly prescient. With the dossier, the main problem 
was that it represented the government, and specifically the Prime Minister, setting out why it 
(he) thought Baghdad needed to be confronted, which was because it (he) had decided, having 
seen intelligence assessments which consciously avoided policy recommendations, that Iraq’s 
apparent development of WMD posed an intolerable threat to British interests. Blair’s 
foreword featured statements such as “what I believe the assessed intelligence has established 
beyond doubt...” (British Government 2002, 3, emphasis added). The crucial point being that 
his claim was not that the intelligence picture itself objectively proved ‘beyond doubt’ that 
there was a threat from Iraq, but that he, personally, subjectively, believed it did. As Blair told 
Chilcot, “I did believe it, frankly, beyond doubt” (Blair 2010a, 80). It is a subtle distinction, and 
it was one quickly lost in the debate. Jack Straw built upon Blair’s expression of his beliefs, 
describing what the dossier “shows”, “reveals”, or “sets out” about the threat, and even 
referring back to what “the Prime Minister spelt out” in his own expression of beliefs, as if 
Blair’s assertions themselves constituted evidence. Straw did not refer to belief, judgement, or 
assessment (Straw, Hansard 2002l, cc27-30). It was this elision of advocacy and assessment 
which gave the impression (albeit without changing many minds) that the evidence available 
to the government was stronger than it was. This impression was then further cemented by 
Blair’s conflation of warnings about the limitation of intelligence with expressions of faith in 
the conclusions drawn, and hints that there might be still more material left unpublished 
(Butler 2004, 82).  
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 Had these issues been confined to the Prime Minister’s foreword and to the 
parliamentary debate, questions about the veracity of the underlying intelligence assessment 
might have been avoided. But they were not. For the text not only implied an impolitic 
conflation of advocacy and assessment by virtue of its existence, it took a form unusual for JIC 
documents, leaving aside many of the usual caveats about the limitations of particular areas of 
intelligence. Lawrence Freedman has suggested that “the JIC were aware that they had to 
produce a document that was stronger than normal”, and that this change in format was the 
result (Freedman 2004, 27). Lord Hutton concluded that “the possibility cannot be completely 
ruled out that the desire of the Prime Minister to have a dossier which...was as strong as 
possible in relation to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s WMD, may have subconsciously 
influenced Mr Scarlett and the other members of the JIC to make the wording of the dossier 
somewhat stronger than it would have been if it had been contained in a normal JIC 
assessment” (Hutton 2004, 152-153). It has even been suggested (albeit by a Defence 
Intelligence Staff official who did not attend the JIC at the time) that JIC drafters were under 
“direction and pressure” to “make [the text] as strong as possible”, and that although “Alastair 
Campbell said to the [Chilcot] Inquiry that the purpose of the Dossier was not ‘to make a case 
for war’”, many of those involved in its production “had no doubt at the time that this was 
exactly its purpose and these very words were used” (Laurie 2010). Robin Cook certainly 
thought there were problems with the format adopted, noting his concern that the 
intelligence agencies might be blamed for the “violence” it did to their “craft” (Cook 2003, 
220). Lord Butler agreed that “the dossier did not follow the format of JIC assessments 
exactly”, but concluded “nor should it have done so. It was written for a different purpose and 
a different audience” (Butler 2004, 79-80), namely the public via the media, which had little 
patience for subtlety. Butler was not uncritical on this point (ibid., 82), and most studies now 
conclude that while the government “did not falsify evidence”, it “did make the most of the 
unreliable information that was available” in seeking to ‘sell’ its case (Bromund 2009, 267). In a 
137 
 
telling example, intelligence which the JIC labelled “sporadic and patchy” and “limited” (Joint 
Intelligence Committee 2002a, 2002b) was described in Parliament by the Prime Minister as 
“extensive, detailed and authoritative” (Blair, Hansard 2002m, c3). Seldon quotes Butler 
describing “the three words – extensive, detailed, authoritative” as “the closest Blair came to 
the ‘lie direct’” (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 140). Compared to the caution contained 
within JIC assessments, Blair’s certainty on this point does appear to have been a rhetorical 
flourish unsupported by evidence. David Omand defended the dossier to Chilcot, warning that 
“we mustn’t be too precious about ministers' wish to, as it were, make their case”, in a hostile 
communications environment. His concession, at the same time, that the confusion between 
intelligence analysis and policy advocacy represented by the dossier discredited both the JIC 
and the government is nevertheless indicative of the damage done by this particular exercise 
(Omand 2010, 11). 
On 24 September, the Evening Standard ran a front-page story about the dossier 
under the headline “45 minutes from attack” featuring an image of rows of bombs described 
as “chemical weapons containing nerve gas” (figure 11).   
 
 
 
 
<Image removed for copyright reasons> 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Front Page of the Evening Standard, 24 September 2002. 
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The picture caption adds “Tony Blair’s dossier claims Saddam has missiles ready and 
capable of hitting British bases in Cyprus”. With the debate in Parliament still ongoing, this 
coverage fed back into MPs’ statements to the House (F. Cook, Hansard 2002l, c105).  Alastair 
Campbell has argued that just “one or two” British newspapers appeared to interpret the ‘45 
minute claim’ as a reference to missiles (Campbell 2010a, 112). At least nine separate articles 
across the following day’s Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, Guardian, Independent, Mirror, Sun, and 
Times repeated either the dossier’s ambiguous reference to “weapons” or the Standard’s 
more specific description of Iraqi missiles (Seamark and Hickley 2002, G. Jones 2002c, Rogers 
2002, Penketh 2002, Hardy 2002c, S. Hughes 2002b, Pascoe-Watson 2002, Kavanagh 2002, 
Maddox 2002e). No less an expert than former head of UNSCOM Charles Duelfer commented 
that the inclusion of the ‘45 minute claim’ in the dossier suggested “that concrete intelligence 
has now been obtained” of something UNSCOM had “strongly suspected”, namely “that the 
regime had the ability to launch a chemical or biological attack” (Duelfer 2002). Only The 
Guardian’s expert commentators, Wyn Bowen of King’s College London and Trevor Findlay of 
the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, noted the claim was “a bit vague” 
as to whether it referred to missiles or artillery, and concluded that if it meant the latter then it 
seemed credible if unsurprising. Iraq had long been able to launch artillery shells carrying 
chemical agents – this was how it had gained its reputation for not only developing but using 
WMD in the first place (Pallister and Watt 2002). 
 Clearly, then, the dossier had left room for uncertainty, and in an area which would 
later provoke great controversy. The question thus arises as to what extent the government in 
general and the Downing Street communications team under Alastair Campbell in particular 
were responsible for the misunderstanding. In an apparently incriminating exchange, Jonathan 
Powell had asked Campbell on 19 September “what will the Standard headline be [on the day 
of the dossier’s release]? What do we want it to be?” (Powell 2002a). But Powell told Chilcot 
that this “relates back to an in-joke from opposition time [relating to Campbell’s poor record of 
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predicting Standard headlines]...so it was a bit of a sort of a dig, I am afraid, rather than a 
serious point” (Powell 2010a, 63). Lawrence Freedman noted that “historians might find that 
detail very helpful” (ibid.). Campbell insisted that no deliberate manipulation had taken place, 
and referred to the Butler Report as evidence (Campbell 2010a, 111). Butler noted that his 
committee; 
“wrote to some 60 Editors of national and regional print and broadcast media to ask 
them if they had been briefed by representatives of the Government about the 
dossier...all of those who replied said that they had not been guided to particular parts 
of the dossier prior to its publication. There was [contra Campbell] some evidence 
from the replies that some journalists had had their attention drawn after its 
publication to passages in the Prime Minister’s Foreword. Some Editors noted that the 
‘45 minute’ story attracted attention because it was of itself an eyecatching item in a 
document containing much that was either not new or rather technical in nature” 
(Butler 2004, 127, emphasis in original). 
 
It would appear therefore that the confusion in the British press about the nature of the 
weapons Saddam Hussein was allegedly capable of launching in 45 minutes, and the 
prominence given to such reports, was not primarily a result of government news 
management efforts. A further charge remains, however, against Campbell et al., namely that 
more could have been done at the time to correct the misperception once it had arisen. It is a 
charge that Campbell himself rejects, arguing that “if we corrected it, every single story in 
every newspaper that we knew to be wrong, we’d be 24/7” (Campbell 2010b, 4). As a general 
argument, this is a good point, but it fails to account for the sensitivity of this specific claim. 
Geoff Hoon requested a special briefing when he read the 45-minute claim, which he noted 
was “the only thing in the draft that I had not seen before in terms of my familiarity with the 
intelligence”. He, however, has admitted not having paid attention to the media reaction to it, 
and to not having seen the Standard front page until “shortly before Lord Hutton reported” in 
2004 (Hoon 2010, 120). David Omand concluded that “with hindsight, one can see that adding 
a bit of local colour like that is asking for trouble. But we didn't really spot that at the time” 
(Omand 2010, 25). So a lack of capacity to monitor and respond to media coverage, and a lack 
of foresight about the way one particular claim in the dossier would be reported, appear to 
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have underpinned the confusion in the press, rather than any deliberate effort to mislead. Not 
that this distinction has mattered much; the damage to the government’s credibility had 
already been done. It would not be the last time incompetence undermined the effect of an 
exercise intended to win public support. 
 
Quantitative indicators 
 
In terms of the distribution of passive opinion at this time, there was a degree of 
variation in opinion poll estimates of the likely response of the British public to a question on 
whether Britain should take part in military action against Iraq. Much of this variation, 
however, can be ascribed to different questions being asked rather than to actual shifts in 
public reactions. Excluding the effects of inconsistent questions, the trends are fairly consistent 
across the period (and indeed consistent with polls taken in March 2002 and October 2001), 
with a margin of around 10% of respondents on average preferring anti-war to pro-war 
statements (see figure 12). 
 
Figure 12: Opinion poll data showing support for military action against Iraq, October 2001 – 
September 2002. 
 
It was not, therefore, the passive public which had turned against the government 
during the summer of 2002 (though they remained lukewarm at best on the prospect of a 
further war), but active Public Opinion (in particular in the press) which sought to use poll 
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numbers to support its own views. The Mirror’s approach to polling was most clearly tailored 
to support its editorial position. In early August, it committed the ‘Readers’ Digest fallacy’ by 
presenting the results of a phone-in vote by its readers as a representative guide to the views 
of the populace more generally (Cummins 2002). Coverage suggested, for example, that the 
size of the sample – over 20,000 Mirror readers had phoned in – rendered its conclusions of 
particular import (Hardy 2002b). There was no scientific basis for this assertion. On 2 
September The Mirror published the results of a (scientific) poll by ICM, which it argued 
showed “how swiftly the public is turning against involvement” (Seymour and Blackman 2002). 
In fact, The Mirror’s poll had asked for views on British participation in a war on Iraq that was 
not supported by the United Nations, finding just 22% of respondents willing to accept such a 
plan, with 71% against. By mentioning the UN, something earlier exercises had not done, this 
poll in fact reveals the extent to which that institution was used by passive actors as a heuristic 
for judging the propriety of the use of force; about 20% of respondents switched from pro-war 
or neutral positions to anti-war when asked specifically about military action without UN 
support. This effect would be significant in the months that followed, as Chapter 5 describes. 
More revealing still was the result of the previous question on the same poll, ‘based on what 
you know, do you think an attack on Iraq aimed at removing Saddam Hussein is justified or 
unjustified?’. 41% of respondents thought an attack justified with UN approval, and another 
12% that it was justified whether the UN agreed or not; in other words, 53% of respondents 
thought that regime change in Iraq was justified in September 2002, provided it was 
sanctioned by the UN. The Mirror’s coverage of the poll did not mention this second question 
at all. The Daily Mail did report it, but excluded the 12% who favoured regime change under 
any circumstances to report that “even if an attack were to be sanctioned by the UN, only 41% 
would back it”; a clear distortion of the results, albeit one which could charitably be ascribed 
to error. In addition, The Daily Mail mentioned that 38% of respondents had agreed that Blair 
was “a poodle who follows along with almost anything George Bush decides”, but did not 
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report that 11% of respondents thought Blair considered only British interests, and 45% that 
he assessed Bush’s proposals before offering his support; in other words, that a majority did 
not think he was a ‘poodle’ (Clarke and Eastham 2002).  
 
Figure 13: Average editorial positions adopted by UK newspapers towards military action in 
Iraq (1 = pro-war, 0 = neutral, -1 = anti-war), controlling for circulation, 1 April – 30 September 
2002 (n = 615). 
 
 
Figure 14: Proportional distribution of commentary articles in UK newspapers between pro-
war, anti-war, and neutral positions, 10 April – 30 September 2002 (n = 556). 
 
Newspaper commentary during this period, as figure 13 shows, largely opposed 
military action, even accounting for the fact that ‘pro-war’ papers, identified by figure 14 as 
the Times, Telegraph, and Sun as well as their Sunday counterparts, tended to achieve higher 
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circulation figures than their anti-war counterparts. In terms of the overall activation of Public 
Opinion at during this period, figure 15 shows the initial decline in commentators’ interest 
after Crawford continuing during the summer of 2002. 
 
Figure 15: Volume of commentary articles in UK newspapers relating to Iraq, April – September 
2002. 
 
 
Figure 16: Distribution of speeches by British MPs in debates on Iraq policy during Summer 
2002 between pro-war, anti-war, and neutral positions (n = 77).  
 
By August, however, public interest has clearly been rekindled, while debates over the recall of 
Parliament and then the release of the dossier in September pushed the volume of newspaper 
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 commentary to a level higher than that seen with respect to the inva
October 2001. 
The distribution of parliamentary speeches made in debates on Iraq between April and 
September in figure 16 shows MPs were slightly more neutral than journalists, but that a 
plurality of speeches opposed the prospect of
more finely balanced than that taking place in the 
government statements (which necessarily supported the government line) are excluded from 
these figures, meaning overall 
Figure 17: Basic two-dimensional factor analysis of British active public actors’ positions 
towards war with Iraq between April and September 2002. 
 
Finally, figure 17 illustrates the range of positions
contributors to Public Opinion 
majority of the most prominent 
poll data in figure 12, however, the
that recorded during the early months of 2002. The government was clearly yet to win the 
argument, but its position had not grown appreciably worse during the apparent drift of the 
summer of 2002. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Tony Blair maintains that, far from epitomising the ‘spin’ of which his government was 
often accused, the dossier instead represented a genuine effort to inform and educate the 
public (Blair 2010b, 463). But ‘spin’ has dual definitions. The first, the more negative, sees it as 
simple manipulation, as deliberate falsification and propagandising. The second, however, sees 
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‘spin’ as a process of putting the government’s case in the strongest manner possible without 
resorting to dishonesty, and frames it in turn as a necessary tool of statesmen given their need 
to operate in light of Public Opinion. Lord Hutton concluded that the dossier was not 
dishonest, but had been designed to state a particular position; in other words, that it had 
been ‘spun’ in the latter sense, but not the former (Hutton 2004, 144). The dossier contained 
claims about the threat posed by Iraqi WMD, derived from and supported by the analysis of 
secret intelligence, published to support the ‘sale’ of the policy of confrontation with Saddam 
Hussein, as a component of a wider strategic communications approach driven from Downing 
Street. It was not deliberately dishonest. Both Hutton and Butler concluded that key 
government ministers and officials genuinely believed during 2002 and 2003 that Iraq held and 
continued to develop WMD, that this belief was consistent with the (limited) intelligence 
evidence available, and that the text of the dossier reflected this evidence accurately. Its 
conclusions were evidently inaccurate, but this was not known at the time, and it is unclear to 
what extent it realistically could have been, given the lack of up-to-date information on Iraqi 
practices then available, and the (independently-verified) track record of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime of developing, and concealing the development of, WMD.  
When the dossier finally came out, it was widely “regarded as cautious, and even dull” 
(Butler 2004, 76), and few predicted that it might achieve its later notoriety. Claims by 
policymakers that later criticisms amount to little more than “ex post facto wisdom” (Blair 
2010b, 406) do not entirely hold up, however. For the dossier remains important in a number 
of ways. Having been produced with the official imprimatur upon it, it remains the key 
document outlining the British government’s reasons for confronting Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
during 2002 and early 2003. Because of the gaps between its assertions and evidence found 
after Saddam’s overthrow, it serves both as a base line against which the shortcomings of 
Western intelligence-gathering can be assessed, and as  a central example of what critics claim 
was an overstated case for war. Chapter 7 will consider the longer-term systemic impact of 
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these failings on the government’s credibility, and on the popular memory of the Iraq invasion 
in Britain; for now it will suffice to note that there was such an impact, and that it arose at 
least in part because of actual errors of judgement made by policymakers. Finally, the dossier 
matters because the government was pressed into producing it at a time not of its choosing by 
public pressure, initially in the press and then from MPs. Along with the early recall of 
Parliament, the new monthly press conferences held by Tony Blair, and his appearance at the 
Liaison Committee, it formed part of a wider communications campaign that was essentially 
reactive in nature, being driven by a desire to reclaim authority over a public debate divided by 
speculation and increasingly bellicose statements from the American right-wing which 
penetrated the British public sphere. The entire episode stands as a prime example of the 
influence that Public Opinion can exert over the communication, and through communication 
the substance, of British foreign policy.   
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Chapter 5 - Going the UN route: September 2002 – 
February 2003 
 
 Emphasising his commitment to pre-emptive self defence, reiterating his conviction 
that Iraq was developing WMD, and responding to British advice, President Bush used his 
speech at the General Assembly on 12 September 2002 to challenge the UN to confront 
Saddam Hussein. By November a tough new UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) had given 
Iraq a final chance to comply with outstanding disarmament obligations dating back to the Gulf 
War. UNMOVIC, the revamped weapons inspection organisation led by Hans Blix, deployed 
shortly thereafter, and began seeking to verify the continued insistence of the regime in 
Baghdad that it neither retained banned weapons, nor had the capacity or the intention to 
develop them in future. Britain had advocated a UN-led approach since at least the time of the 
Crawford meeting between Prime Minister Blair and President Bush. Blair thought UN backing 
vital both to the success of any confrontation with Iraq, and to the maintenance of his own 
domestic support base. In seeking both benefits, however, he faced a range of competing 
legal, diplomatic, and political pressures. Although the British government had some success in 
setting the agenda for public debate during late 2002 and early 2003, public actors repeatedly 
and effectively contested official efforts to frame crucial components of the discussion. The 
nature and purpose of the UN, the concept of ‘international community’, and the principles of 
international law, were all up for debate. Ministers knew the scale of the challenge they faced 
in the autumn of 2002. They were committed, rhetorically and diplomatically, to a 
confrontation with Iraq. They were convinced that its supposed development of WMD posed a 
threat to Britain. They were well aware that, barring a dramatic change of heart on the part of 
Saddam Hussein, the US planned to take military action to remove him from power, probably 
early in 2003. And they knew that British participation in any such action was both essential for 
the maintenance of the ‘special relationship’ with Washington, and impossible without the 
conferral of additional legal backing, and legitimacy in the eyes of the public, by the UN (Blair 
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2011, 67). By the time the actual invasion began, however, the debate over the ‘UN route’ had 
so played out in Britain that the use of force was regarded, even by senior officials, as “legal, 
but of questionable legitimacy” (Greenstock 2009b, 38). Many public actors, and indeed some 
Whitehall insiders, challenged the substance of the legal judgement, as well as the claim that 
the US and UK were acting only on behalf of the international community as represented 
through the UN (Ralph 2011, 124). In late 2002 and early 2003 the British government tried, 
and failed, to sell the prospect of war with Iraq as a necessary consequence of international 
law and the will of the international community. This chapter investigates how that failure 
came about.  
 
Playing a multi-level game 
 
 Ministers faced a number of potentially insurmountable obstacles in seeking both to 
legalise and to legitimise war with Iraq by asking the UN Security Council for support. The first, 
and most substantial, was the complexity of the diplomatic balancing act upon which any 
consensus about the legitimacy of military action, whether at the UN or back in Britain, would 
depend. As Chapter 1 discusses, Robert Putnam has described foreign policymaking as a “two-
level game”, in which governments must address domestic and international pressures 
simultaneously, handicapped by their inability to take actions at one level without their having 
an effect at the other (Putnam 1988). Britain’s experience during the period of consultation at 
the UN over Iraq highlights the descriptive power of Putnam’s model, while also 
demonstrating its need for further extension. Rather than simply facing two levels of 
calculation, British ministers played a multi-level game (figure 18) as they sought to balance 
legal, political, and diplomatic imperatives across at least four different political arenas, some 
of which themselves had multiple layers. In the UK, there was a broad consensus across 
Cabinet, Parliament, and Public Opinion that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and that it 
should be pressed into giving them up. But beyond this basic level of agreement lay 
149 
 
considerable discord. British Public Opinion encompassed few pacifists, but a good number of 
actors concerned about the practicality, legality, legitimacy, or morality of military action in 
late 2002. They could all have been satisfied through a successful UN process, at least in 
theory, were it not for tensions within, and between the other arenas of debate.  
 
Figure 18: The ‘multi-level game’ played by the UK government by ‘going the UN route’, with 
selected actors’ interests identified. 
 
The Bush administration was divided along bureaucratic lines, and within those lines between 
‘hawks’ who demanded immediate action to force regime change in Baghdad and had little 
patience with allies or international institutions, and ‘doves’ who saw value in a multilateral 
approach that preserved at least the semblance of international law. Unlike in the UK, where 
the UN proved a central totem around which public debate could focus, the range of 
legitimate public debate in the US – and, thanks to bureaucratic rivalries, much of the debate 
over US policy was public (Straw 2010b, 41) – encompassed outright rejection of the UN as a 
source of legitimacy and of influence over national security policy. No British leader could 
credibly sustain the claim that UN approval did nothing to increase the legitimacy of British 
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foreign policy; in the US, the situation was essentially the opposite. Also unlike in the UK, it 
was clear that the immediate benefits of a multilateral approach to US foreign policy-making 
were limited. Allied forces added little to the firepower of the US military, and no potential 
rival had the capacity effectively to resist American might. Realisation and fear of this simple 
fact drove developments in the third arena, among the members of the UN Security Council, 
especially the veto-wielding P5. Britain, Russia, and France each recognised the devaluation 
that their own permanent positions would undergo should the US act without UN 
authorisation, and in doing so effectively withdraw from the UN framework. At the same time, 
they did not doubt that Iraq was flouting the obligations that the Security Council had imposed 
upon it. This was, after all, why so many previous resolutions had been passed, and why it was 
possible to get a consensus for UNSCR 1441. Where divisions developed among members of 
the Council was over the best way to keep the US tied to a UN process. France and Russia 
refused to approve regime change as a primary policy goal. They would not rule out approving 
military action leading to regime change as a response to an Iraqi failure to co-operate with 
UNMOVIC, but they calculated that their own position would be weakened to a greater extent 
by approving an attack without the clear exhaustion of peaceful alternatives, than by 
withholding their support, whether that stopped the war or not. Blair calculated that the US 
was going to invade Iraq regardless of what the UN said, and that a rubber-stamp from the 
Security Council was the best that could be hoped for. At least the sceptics within the Bush 
administration who argued against any consultation with the UN would not gain further 
ammunition to use against bureaucratic rivals, such as Colin Powell, who still saw some value 
in international institutions. There was in essence a conceptual disagreement over whether 
the authority of the Security Council was undermined to a greater extent by the demonstration 
of its irrelevance or of its impotence. Finally, of course, there was the Iraqi regime itself, 
determined to avoid public disarmament for fear of encouraging domestic dissent and Iranian 
aggression, and equally determined to avoid regime change (Iraq Survey Group 2004). Iraq had 
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form in dealing with the UN. In 1998, Operation Desert Fox had been launched in response to 
years of well-documented Iraqi resistance to Security Council demands that it declare and 
destroy its WMD following the Gulf War. The regime had watched sanctions erode through the 
1990s as the patience and determination of the international community waned, and appears 
never to have accepted fully that it genuinely faced the threat of force. At the same time, of 
course, were it to be convinced that war was inevitable, it would have no incentive to co-
operate with peaceful disarmament efforts.  
 Britain therefore needed to follow a UN process that offered a strong prospect of war, 
to engage US hawks and to intimidate Iraq into compliance, but similarly preserved the 
possibility of peace, to ensure domestic legitimacy, to assure France and Russia that the US 
was taking them seriously, and to convince Baghdad that it had something to gain from co-
operation with UNMOVIC. Blair might reasonably have thought himself well placed to strike 
this immensely complicated balance (Hollis 2006, 41). During negotiations leading to the Good 
Friday Peace Agreement in Northern Ireland, he had alternately cajoled, misled, 
misrepresented, and outright lied to delegates until sufficient common ground had been 
fabricated for a genuine compromise to be reached (Blair 2010b, 152-199). Serious and deep-
rooted disagreements had been overcome, in part by the Prime Minister’s ability to say 
contradictory things, but always with conviction, to different audiences. Such political flim-
flammery would not bridge the gaps that existed between the ‘four arenas’ over Iraq. In part, 
this was because much of the debate played out in public; it was, as Putnam suggested, nearly 
impossible to target messages effectively when every audience heard every pronouncement. 
In part it was because of conflicting policy priorities between London and Washington. And in 
part it was because of structural pressures established by British Public Opinion.  
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Legality and legitimacy 
 
 That concerns about legality and legitimacy were intricately linked was well 
understood in Whitehall throughout the period covered by this chapter (Wood 2002b, Wood 
2002c, Adams 2002). As Chapter 4 notes, the Attorney General had written an unprompted 
and, he thought, not “terribly welcome” memo (Goldsmith 2010, 23) to the Prime Minister 
following the 23 July Iraq planning meeting, outlining problems with the legal grounds for war. 
Goldsmith accepted the general validity of the “revival argument”, under which a failure by 
Iraq to comply with the terms of UNSCR 687 revived the suspended authority to use force 
under UNSCR 678, initially passed in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This 
argument had been, after all, the basis of law officers’ advice that Operation Desert Fox was 
legal in 1998. He warned nevertheless that, absent a fresh Security Council finding of Iraqi non-
compliance with UNSCR 687, it would be hard to establish the argument’s applicability in the 
summer of 2002 (Goldsmith 2002a). In 1998, UNSCOM had just been forced to withdraw from 
Iraq. No such immediate crisis existed in 2002 that might trigger revival in the same way, 
unless the Security Council were specifically to rule otherwise. Given the real prospect that an 
invasion lacking clear legal grounds might prompt both official resignations (Greenstock 2009a, 
8) and Cabinet divisions (Straw 2010a, 7, 24), it was obvious from at least mid-2002 that some 
sort of UN process would be a necessary prerequisite of UK participation in a war, not just a 
sensible PR exercise.  
 Legitimacy is a more complicated concept than legality. Something either is, or is not, 
legal. While there is considerable scope for debate over what actually constitutes international 
law, there is no doubt on this ultimate point. Legitimacy is far more subjective. Tony Blair 
seems to have believed that a military campaign would be seen as legitimate by the British 
public and the international community provided it had legal backing, express multinational 
support, and at least the semblance of being a last resort (Kampfner 2003, 257). Certainly the 
invocation of the “international community” by policymakers has “an important political 
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function in generating legitimacy” for their actions (Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2005, 31). 
Blair, in addition, genuinely believed  in the capacity of the “international community” to act 
decisively and collectively in addressing common concerns (Dyson 2011, 64). It was a position 
notably not shared by President Bush (Hollis 2010, 55). Referring to the will of the 
international community over Iraq caused some difficulties, however. No matter how often 
British ministers claimed that it had been the UN itself which had chosen to confront Saddam 
Hussein over his WMD (cf Press Conference 2003a), this remained demonstrably untrue. Both 
contemporary commentators (Cornwell 2003a) and subsequent studies have observed that 
“the idea of invading Iraq would not have even been an issue before the international 
community were it not for the determination of the United States that the Baghdad regime be 
overthrown” (Zunes 2006, 21). The United States, with Britain as its auxiliary, had challenged 
the UN to confront Iraq; the UN had not raised the matter of its own accord.  
 Generally speaking, the internationalisation of an interstate dispute through the UN 
enhances the legitimacy of any subsequent military action not just in the eyes of policymakers, 
but in the consideration of the public, even where the state in question has little practical to 
gain and much to lose from multilateralism. In the US, for example, “when given the choice 
of...multilateral action versus ‘going it alone’, survey respondents almost always choose the 
former” and “are also likely to endorse the opinion that the United States should seek the 
approval of international institutions” (Eichenberg 2005, 5). Public opinion in militarily weaker 
states such as the UK, “tends to insist even more strongly on UN authorisation” before it will 
accept the use of force as legitimate (Voeten 2005, 532, Everts and Isernia 2005, 275). This 
heightened British concern is perhaps unsurprising. The US is at least capable of conducting 
unilateral military operations in far-flung parts of the globe without incurring crippling costs. 
States lacking American resources are far less able to act effectively on their own.  
British Public Opinion expressed three main interpretations of the legitimacy-granting 
powers of the United Nations Security Council. The comparison of these highlights the extreme 
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difficulty the government would face in seeking public consensus on the level of assurance any 
one UN process brought to a policy. Firstly, the Security Council was regarded by some public 
actors as a source of foreign policy legitimacy through its role as an arbiter of international law 
(Scott and Ambler 2007, 83). Proponents of this interpretation generally rejected outright the 
suggestion that any organisation affording considerable clout to human rights violators such as 
Russia and China might reasonably hold any great moral authority, but they nonetheless 
thought that its legal role was significant (Sillars 2002, The Observer 2003a, Finkelstein 2003a). 
For a second group, the UN was thought to represent a kind of global moral authority. Jacques 
Chirac was praised for his principled stand in insisting upon a UN-led process (Lichfield 2002, 
Amalric 2002, D. Macintyre 2002c), while the US and UK were attacked for “corrupting the 
security council” by treating it as a mere forum for political deal-making (Norton-Taylor 2003a, 
Fisk 2003a). Finally, the UN was described by a third group of commentators as a forum for 
political deal-making, an arena in which different states with interests of varying compatibility 
could meet to forge agreements. Believers in this interpretation of the legitimacy granted by a 
UN consultation praised the achievement of consensus as an intrinsic good (The Independent 
2002l), acknowledged the basis of inter-state relations in realpolitik (The Sunday Telegraph 
2003a), and explicitly denied that the Security Council could offer anything more substantial in 
legal or moral terms than public inter-state agreement in support of a particular action (Hogg, 
Hansard 2003c, c39). Russia was regarded as the most proficient player of the Security Council 
‘game’, with Vladimir Putin’s initial scepticism over Iraq widely and dispassionately reported as 
being rooted in Iraqi oil contracts (Wilson 2002, The Guardian 2002k, Baldwin 2002, J. Simpson 
2002a, The News of the World 2002). Claims that Putin had in fact questioned the real level of 
the threat from Iraq were not published until much later (Campbell and Stott 2007, 644). In 
theory, adherents of each of these viewpoints could have been satisfied had the Security 
Council approved military action; each could project their own explanations onto an 
unambiguous Council decision. Certainly the wide range of views about the UN’s nature and 
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purpose meant its invocation in the early Autumn of 2002 quickly silenced even harsh 
government critics, especially those within the Labour Party itself (Freedland 2002c), as they 
waited to see how the UN process would play out. It was for this reason, as Blair openly stated, 
that a UN route had been pursued at all (Blair 2002f). At the same time, considerable scope 
remained for debate. Many critics had been quietened by the decision to work through the 
UN, but at a cost. From the moment the consultation process began, the British government 
had ceded its freedom to lead domestic public debate over its policy. It had placed itself at the 
mercy of developments in Washington and New York, and had given its rivals in Paris and 
Moscow an avenue directly to impact British domestic affairs.  
 
Problems on the Potomac 
 
 For the UK, then, the UN route offered the prospect of conferring vital legality and 
legitimacy upon its policy of supporting the US in confronting Iraq. For the US, which did not 
share Britain’s legal concerns (Goldsmith 2010, 87), and had alternative avenues to legitimacy, 
the UN represented a potential roadblock on the way to a solution, rather than a vital part of 
the solution itself. For one thing, Britain and the US had conflicting ideas of what they were 
trying to achieve, and contrasting views of the impact of international law upon their plans. 
Although Britain was willing to countenance “regime change” as a means to the end of Iraqi 
disarmament, for the US the position was “almost the opposite” (Manning 2009, 24). British 
government lawyers had warned that while “it could be that another lawful basis for force 
might lead to regime change...wanting regime change was not of itself a lawful basis for the 
use of force” (Goldsmith 2010, Grainger 2002). British Cabinet ministers thought “a foreign 
policy objective of regime change”, the very objective being pursued by their American 
counterparts, was “improper and self-evidently unlawful” (Straw 2010b, 17, Straw 2010c, 2). 
US policymakers had the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 to rely on in obtaining domestic legal 
backing. They were committed, furthermore, to the ‘Bush doctrine’, which regarded pre-
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emptive action as a necessary tool of self-defence even if the threats thus confronted were 
merely potential, rather than imminent (Bush 2002b, US Government 2002). Despite 
suggestions from Geoff Hoon that “pre-emptive action is no more than modern jargon to deal 
with the ancient right of self-defence” (Hoon, Hansard 2003c, c39), legal advice circulated 
within the Foreign Office confirmed that the principles of the Bush doctrine were not 
consistent with Britain’s view of international law as it then stood (Wood 2002a). These 
contradictions, subsumed as they were by the agreement that the US and UK would together 
follow a UN process, meant that, as Christopher Meyer warned London (and as Robin Cook 
was highlighting within the Cabinet), “what the Americans understand by exhausting the UN 
process and what we understand by exhausting the UN process may prove not to be the same” 
(C. Meyer 2009, 54, Cook 2003, 204-205).   
 Despite this difference in understanding, the US did agree, at least partly at Britain’s 
behest, to seek a UN Resolution in the Autumn of 2002 rather than immediately launching 
military action against Iraq. The Bush administration needed the appearance of multilateral 
backing before it could proceed to war sure of the support of the American people. It would 
settle for only token practical assistance (since it hardly needed any actual help to defeat the 
Iraqi military), but stood to benefit politically from the semblance of wider international 
agreement. What was envisaged, then, was “multilateralism in form, unilateralism in 
substance”, as one study put it (Coates and Krieger 2004, 34). British involvement was crucial 
to this approach. In addition to its position as ‘first ally’, and a contributor of forces that were 
relatively easily integrated into the overall military chain of command, Britain is generally 
better placed to lead international negotiations, as it “often raises fewer hackles” than the US 
(Greenstock 2009a, 6-7). It was believed in Downing Street that, such was the importance of 
British involvement as a source of legitimacy, “it was unlikely that the US would proceed” 
against Iraq without UK support (Powell 2002b). But Britain was constrained by legal and 
political concerns from supporting an invasion without a UN mandate. David Manning had 
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warned Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice in the Summer of 2002 that “it was impossible for 
the United Kingdom to take part in action against Iraq unless it were through the United 
Nations” (Manning 2009, 19). Powell and Rice convinced the President, and a meeting 
between Tony Blair and Vice-President Cheney at Camp David in early September is said to 
have clinched an agreement across the administration that a UN approach would be tried 
(Greenstock 2009b, 9, Campbell 2010b, 44). Sure enough, on 12 September Bush appeared at 
the General Assembly. Asking “will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will 
it be irrelevant?”, he announced the US “will work with the UN security council for the 
necessary resolutions” in order to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iraq (Bush 2002c). The 
plural, “resolutions”, was an error; the wrong version of Bush’s speech had been placed on the 
teleprompter, and he had to ad-lib the line, misspeaking in the process (C. Meyer 2005, 253). It 
was a potentially costly error, as the question of whether the US had sought one resolution, or 
two, came to dominate the following debate. 
 
UNSCR 1441 
 
 When it was agreed on 8 November 2002, UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was 
hailed in Britain as “nothing less than a diplomatic triumph for the Bush-Blair approach” (The 
Daily Telegraph 2002g). From the beginning, however, the new resolution contained 
weaknesses that would ultimately undermine its power to legitimise decisions made over Iraq. 
As Christopher Meyer put it, a number of ambiguities, “necessary to get a consensus” had 
been deliberately tolerated in the text, ambiguities which in time left the whole agreement 
“fatally undermined” (C. Meyer 2009, 68). Of greatest significance was the lack of clarity over 
whether a ‘second’ resolution was required to authorise the use of force in the event of Iraqi 
non-compliance with UNSCR 1441. France and Russia had originally argued for a ‘two-stage’ 
approach, under which one resolution would re-establish UN weapon inspections, while a 
second would then be required, in the event that inspections failed, to give the green light for 
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military action. The US, however, was said to be “dead against” constraining its freedom of 
action by agreeing in advance to seek a second UN mandate before proceeding (Adams 2002). 
From a British perspective, Jeremy Greenstock’s instructions stipulated it was “important that 
the [first] draft should provide legal cover for military action without further Council action” 
(MacDonald 2002), a point ministers continue to highlight in discussing the UN exercise (Straw 
2010b, 70, Blair 2011, 56). France and Russia were primarily concerned that they should not be 
seen to be approving immediate military action, and were adamant that they would not agree 
a resolution without some sort of mechanism to prevent it being used by the US as cover to 
move directly against Iraq (Goldsmith 2010, 41-42). They suspected that any resolution 
containing an explicit threat of force and lacking safeguards would be used to circumvent the 
inspection process, which they required as a plausible alternative to war, and one more in 
keeping with the notion of the UN as an organ of collective security. For weeks there was an 
impasse as both sides struggled to find a compromise position with which each was 
comfortable (Straw 2010d, 43). A solution was found through a concession offering some 
“procedural comfort” to compensate for the American refusal to yield on substance (Straw 
2003b). In the event that UNMOVIC reported Iraqi non-compliance, the Security Council would 
have to meet “to consider the situation” before any military action could take place (United 
Nations Security Council 2002, OP12). No reference was made to a further UNSCR, satisfying 
the American wish not to be constrained to seek consensus for action they thought already 
provided for under existing resolutions, but also the French and Russian desire to create some 
sort of space for UN inspections actually to work.  
 Originally negotiated in private between Britain and France, without the involvement 
of the rest of the P5, let alone the wider Security Council (Adams 2003), this section of UNSCR 
1441 would form the focus of the legal debate that played out in Britain during the latter 
months of 2002 and early 2003. Participants argued over whether the Council had retained the 
right to decide upon, as well as to discuss, the nature of any response to Iraqi non-compliance. 
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In November 2002 the question was largely thought unproblematic. Although some elements 
of British Public Opinion did not accept that military action could be launched without the 
Security Council confirming that UNSCR 1441 had been violated (cf. Salmond 2002, Usborne 
2002, Kennedy, Hansard 2002s, c39, Simpson, Dalyell, c43, Moore, c73), the majority view was 
that the UN had given Iraq one final chance to comply with the disarmament provisions of 
resolution 687, or military action would ensue (Flynn 2002, Cecil 2002, La Guardia 2002b, 
Keane 2002, Ellis 2002, The Times 2002n). Public acquiescence on this point underscored the 
extent to which the British government had boosted the legitimacy of its policy by working 
through the UN. It did not rule out, however, the possibility of that legitimacy being 
undermined by future developments; no ‘blank cheque’ had been obtained.  
British ministers assumed that Iraq would either refuse entirely to admit UNMOVIC 
inspectors, with the resolution thus “provoking an indisputable example of Iraqi intransigence” 
(Greenstock 2002), or that the inspectors, once admitted, would quickly find enough banned 
material to demonstrate a further breach of UNSCR 687. As a result, little thought was given to 
how the inspection process should be presented to the public on an ongoing basis, a “tactical 
error” from a communications perspective, as commentators put it in early 2003 (Gedye, 
Harnden and Helm 2003, cf. Grice 2003a). UNMOVIC’s role was primarily to validate Iraq’s 
statements about its weapons programme, rather than to ferret out evidence of specific 
violations. As Hans Blix later put it, “self-declaration is as basic to arms control as it is to 
income tax systems. The weapons inspector or tax man should not need to go and find what 
you have” (Blix 2004, 99). Considering Downing Street apparently thought UNMOVIC “didn’t 
have a cat’s chance in hell of finding anything” (Kampfner 2003, 257), however, it is surprising 
to note that the British government failed conspicuously to convince Public Opinion that Iraq 
could be found in violation of UNSCR 1441 even if inspectors did not locate any hidden 
weapons. Tony Blair argued, on the one hand, that the process “is not a game of hide and 
seek” (Press Conference 2002e), but on the other that “it is for the inspectors to examine 
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whether there is evidence of weapons of mass destruction” (Blair, Hansard 2003b, cc164-168, 
emphasis added). This second ambiguity in the presentation of UNSCR 1441 allowed anti-war 
actors to argue that the burden of proof lay on the US and UK rather than on Iraq (Tapsell, 
Hansard 2002s, Rufford and Allen-Mills 2002, D. Blair 2002, Norton-Taylor 2002). Only those 
elements of Public Opinion already convinced of the need for war ever accepted that the 
“resolution...does not require the UN weapons inspectors to provide proof of Saddam's 
weapons of mass destruction. The onus is explicitly upon Iraq” (D'Ancona 2003a, cf. Stewart 
2003a, Coman 2003, Daley 2003a). Commentators who remained unconvinced or undecided 
expected to see additional concrete evidence before they would be won over, despite the 
relatively high level of agreement in September 2002, discussed in Chapter 4, that Iraq did 
retain banned materials. This meant that, when weaknesses were quickly identified in the 
declaration submitted by Iraq on 8 December, the government was unable to capitalise in 
order to boost the legitimacy of military action. Blix recalls being “hopeful” that Iraq would use 
the declaration as an opportunity to come clean on its activities, perhaps blaming a rogue 
general for having exceeded his remit, and “disappointed” when this did not happen (Blix 
2010, 38). Blair, meanwhile, “told his staff that Saddam’s declaration was ‘the defining 
moment. This was his big opportunity. He’s blown it’” (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 
143). By 14 December, a number of British newspapers, apparently each harvesting Bush 
administration quotes given off-the-record to the New York Times (cf. J. Simpson 2002b), were 
reporting that the declaration contained holes “big enough to drive a tank through” (Paveley 
and Lowther 2002, cf. The Sun 2002f, Evans 2002). The Joint Intelligence Committee informed 
the Prime Minister on 18 December that the documents submitted by Iraq were indeed 
deficient in a number of ways and that, crucially, no attempt had been made to deal even with 
the outstanding issues left unresolved at the time of UNSCOM’s withdrawal, let alone with 
new questions raised by subsequent Western intelligence-gathering (Joint Intelligence 
Committee 2002c). Despite all this, ambiguity over whether UNMOVIC was tasked with 
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verification or detection remained, and undermined government efforts (and particularly 
attempts by elements within the Bush administration) to convince Public Opinion that the 8 
December declaration marked a decisive moment.  
Divisions on the role of the inspectors were exacerbated by a third ambiguity, present 
at least in the reaction of the British public to UNSCR 1441, over to what degree the US was 
actually willing to be constrained from launching a military assault by diplomacy. Diplomats in 
Washington reported that the early August “frenzy about imminent action” had been 
dampened down by “the President’s emphasis on caution and deliberation” (Brenton 2002), 
but expectations had been generated, and a lasting impression created in Britain that proved 
difficult to shake off. Several actors questioned the extent to which UNSCR 1441 had been 
obtained as a good faith effort to avert war, or whether the plan was “to contrive an assault on 
Iraq whatever Saddam does” (Cook 2003, 209, cf. The Guardian 2002j, The Independent 2002k, 
Ellis and Blackman 2002, Channel 4 News 2002c, Ritter 2002, Tisdall 2002, G. Jackson, Hansard 
2002q). Blair’s insistence that “the UN route...has got to be the way of dealing with this issue, 
not the way of avoiding dealing with it” did little to clarify matters (Press Conference 2002d, 
Hansard 2002o, c309, Hansard 2002p, c268, Hansard 2002t, cc836-837). He was, after all, 
arguing that Britain and the US would work through the UN to disarm Iraq only so long as the 
UN facilitated the escalation of the confrontation. As a result, although some MPs were won 
over to the government’s position by its involvement of the UN and efforts to obtain a fresh 
UNSCR (cf. Hood, Hansard 2002s, c73, Kaufman, c92), other public actors attacked UNSCR 
1441 as “a war resolution...mined with trip wires to trigger a war” (Mahon, Hansard 2002r, 
c439, The Guardian 2002l, Anne Campbell, Hansard 2002s, c48).  
 
Train timetables 
 
 As problematic as the ambiguities contained within UNSCR 1441 were in their own 
right, their significance paled beside the fact that the US had, by September 2002, a reasonably 
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well-established timetable for the commencement of military action in early 2003, and little 
interest in seeing this delayed by diplomacy (Greenstock 2009b, 76, C. Meyer 2009, 55). 
Britain, which had offered the US a division-sized land force for planning purposes even before 
UNSCR 1441 was agreed (Wechsberg 2002, P. Watkins 2002a, 2002b), was not completely 
committed, but was equally hardly free to withdraw at will. By January 2003 Blair “was pretty 
clear...that we couldn’t peel off from the US without very good reason”, and indeed without 
very substantial costs (Campbell and Stott 2007, 657-658). On the 15th he was briefed, for the 
first time, on a concrete invasion plan, asking only “will it work?” (Blair 2003a). Ministerial 
statements that “no decision has been taken”, which had been received sceptically as early as 
March 2002, rang increasingly hollow in early 2003 as troop deployments were announced 
(Hoon, Hansard 2003a, c25). Concerns began to be raised that the mobilisation might develop 
a momentum of its own (Kilfoyle, Hansard 2002t, c854, The Independent on Sunday 2002b, M. 
Campbell, Channel 4 News 2002d).  
This latter notion was well founded. Three former senior British officials each told the 
Chilcot Inquiry that the “American political timetable” dictated the “window for invasion”, and 
that the deployment of forces as a ‘contingency’ had indeed developed “huge momentum of 
[its] own” by early 2003 (Omand 2010, 57, Greenstock 2009b, 76). Military imperatives were 
undermining diplomatic efforts, an effect that would inevitably have political consequences in 
turn, in Britain at least. Most immediately, the military pressure meant “you had to short-
circuit the inspection process by finding the notorious smoking gun” (C. Meyer 2009, 52). 
Operation Desert Fox had followed the determination by UNSCOM that the failure of Iraq to 
comply pro-actively with weapons inspections had rendered the entire inspection process 
pointless. UNMOVIC would not be allowed the time to reach the same conclusion for itself.  
 Initially, this fundamental tension was revealed through briefings by Bush 
administration officials opposed to the UN process that painted a negative picture of the work 
being done by weapons inspectors on the ground. Anti-war columnist Robert Fisk had warned 
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in December that the first sign of imminent hostilities would be the rise of media commentary 
criticising the inspectors (Fisk 2002), while British journalists had shown a willingness to spin 
events involving UNMOVIC according to their opinions on the necessity of war (Blackman 
2002c, The Sun 2002d). Noting his refusal to dismiss the Iraqi declaration, some British 
newspapers called Hans Blix “complacently bureaucratic” (The Sunday Telegraph 2002b) and 
accused him of “bumbling” (The Sun 2002e); this despite his not having had the chance 
actually to read the document at that point. Blix was also coming under pressure from hostile 
media briefings in the United States. He describes a meeting with Condoleezza Rice in February 
2003 which was immediately reported, on the basis of anonymous official sources, as having 
involved Rice lecturing Blix to toughen up his inspections. Blix himself recalls Rice doing 
nothing of the sort, and suggests “information might have been passed to the media on what 
some policy hub wanted or expected her to say – without caring to check what she actually did 
say”. In a wry observation, he remarks that by acting in this way such ‘hubs’ “were creating 
their own virtual reality!” (Blix 2004, 195). Similar reports appeared in the UK, apparently 
based on second-hand accounts circulating in the US (cf. Watson and Bone 2003). Their effect 
was to fuel concerns that the inspectors were little more than “chess pieces on someone else’s 
board” (Gilligan 2002), hardly the independent arbiters Public Opinion had been promised. 
 On 27 January 2003, Blix delivered his first report to the Security Council. Although 
later he thought the phrase “perhaps was a bit too harsh” (Blix 2010, 81), at the time he stated 
that “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance – not even today – of the 
disarmament, which was demanded of it” (Blix 2003). It was a moment of huge significance, 
especially for Tony Blair, with his faith that UNMOVIC would prove the need for military action, 
and thus grant it legitimacy in the eyes of the British public. Blix effectively accepted the 
American argument that Iraq had yet to make a “strategic decision” in favour of disarmament. 
As he later recalled, “it appeared from our experience that Iraq had decided in principle to 
provide cooperation on process, notably access. A similar decision on substance, I said, was 
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indispensable” (Blix 2004, 139). Although he maintained that UNMOVIC should be given more 
time to seek a peaceful solution, the disappointment Blix recalls feeling in private after the 
December declaration had, by January, become palpable in his public statements. As he told 
Channel 4 News, “there is something odd about having had eight years of inspections, then 
four years without, and then only two months, and then write it off...[but]...I cannot say in 
good conscience that I see sign [sic] of co-operation” (Channel 4 News 2003b). Had Blix’s 
reports continued in this vein, leading him to the conclusion that Iraq would never take its 
disarmament requirements seriously and that UNMOVIC was unable to complete its task, the 
legitimacy debate in Britain might well have been won, as it had been after the withdrawal of 
UNSCOM in 1998.  
 But when Blix returned to the Council on 14 February (a report added in to the 
UNMOVIC schedule by the US, excited by the prospect of further condemnation of Iraq, and 
impatient to proceed to war), his “tone was less critical of Iraqi cooperation than it had been” 
(Blix 2004, 178). Although concerns remained, he reported that Iraq had begun to 
demonstrate a degree of pro-active engagement in the inspection process. If his first report 
had given hope to the ‘hawks’, the 14 February update was “just what the anti-war lobby had 
wanted” (Kampfner 2003, 272). Robin Cook called it Blair’s “nightmare come true” (Cook 2003, 
293-294). Despite his argument that “if you are asked to report about the weather, your 
reports must be different when the weather changes” (Blix 2004, 178), Blix has been accused 
by British ministers and officials alike of having altered position to try to delay military action 
(Greenstock 2009b, 71, Blair 2010a, 120, Blair 2010b, 411, Straw 2010b, 88). Implicit in such 
claims is the suggestion that Blix had ceased to be a neutral figure, and that his conclusions 
should not necessarily be regarded as independent of political considerations. To a significant 
degree this represents ex post facto justification by individuals who otherwise might 
themselves be accused of politicising the inspection process. Blix certainly understood the 
power of his office to confer legitimacy on military action. But, as his 27 January report shows, 
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he hardly gave Iraq an easy time, and at no point did he ever suggest that the regime had 
reached a level of co-operation he regarded as acceptable. Had the US military timetable been 
less urgent, and UNMOVIC allowed to work through its inspection process, Blix might very well 
have concluded that he could not offer sufficient assurance to the Security Council that Iraq 
had in fact disarmed. Arguably France, and even Russia, would have been willing to go along 
with military action in response to such a report. 
 Because Blix was never to be given sufficient time to reach his own conclusions, 
however, those individuals within the US and UK governments who had advocated a UN-led 
course to Iraqi disarmament had to find a way of justifying the premature termination of the 
UNMOVIC inspection process. They had to do this without entirely abandoning the UN route, 
and without the clear-cut evidence of Iraqi wrongdoing that the discovery of a ‘smoking gun’ 
might have provided. Their approach was to argue that UNMOVIC was neither solely 
responsible for, not practically capable of, determining the level of Iraqi co-operation. Instead 
this was claimed as the responsibility of individual member states. Britain put out a second 
‘dossier’ describing Iraq’s Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation (British 
Government 2003). The US meanwhile sent Colin Powell to the Security Council, armed with 
his own conclusions about Iraq’s efforts to circumvent the inspection process. Although pro-
war actors (Shawcross 2002, Webster 2002b, Jenkin, Hansard 2003a, c26) had made similar 
claims at various stages, the majority of contributors to British Public Opinion were not primed 
to respond favourably to this effort to reframe the inspection process, and as with the 
September dossier exercise reactions were lukewarm at best. Weaknesses in both the new 
British document and the Powell presentation then served further to undermine official 
credibility.  
Alastair Campbell has argued that the second dossier represented a simple effort to 
inform the public debate at a time when attention had apparently shifted away from the ‘real 
issue’ of Iraqi co-operation with UNMOVIC onto the question of the US timetable for war 
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(Campbell 2010b, 26). Others have dismissed it as “an Alastair Campbell stunt” (Seldon, 
Snowdon and Collings 2007, 150), and it is routinely labelled today as the ‘dodgy’ dossier. In 
terms of its genesis, it is better compared to the earlier exercises conducted during late 2001 
to explain the need for action in Afghanistan, rather than to the more professional JIC-led 
operation of September 2002. Compiled under the aegis of the Coalition Information Centre by 
Campbell’s secretary, two junior press officers from Downing Street, and the FCO’s “head of 
story development and briefing team” (Wilson 2003a), the document drew on a range of both 
secret and open sources in describing Iraq’s efforts to hide its WMD capabilities from the UN. 
Neither set of source material was well used. Although the JIC did see and approve the 
intelligence-based claims made, there was no system of overall quality control comparable to 
that used in September. Crucially, no-one checked that open-source material included within 
the text had been properly cited. It had not. Journalists quickly identified the unacknowledged 
reproduction of an article from the Middle East Review of International Affairs by an American 
researcher named Ibrahim al-Marashi (al-Marashi 2002), and were soon focussing their 
attention solely on this issue, while largely ignoring the dossier’s substantive claims. The 
scandal of official misconduct proved far more newsworthy, in other words, than anything the 
government might say about Iraqi WMD. Campbell felt the media reaction overblown, but 
even he admitted the situation constituted “a bad own goal” for the government 
communications effort (Campbell and Stott 2007, 664-665). Campbell probably underplays the 
point. Robin Cook, never a great supporter of Campbell or his techniques, expressed 
amusement at the “almost entertaining, comic Inspector Clouseau quality” of “this bungling 
incompetence”, but nevertheless worried that “the serious consequence is to damage Tony’s 
credibility when he asks the public to trust him” (Cook 2003, 287). Cook was right to be 
concerned. Even war supporters complained that “the Number 10 culture of spin is 
undermining a perfectly good case” (The Daily Telegraph 2003b), while anti-war voices spoke 
of “a deliberate attempt to hoodwink and mislead the public [which] will undermine trust in 
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anything the government says about the Iraqi threat” (The Observer 2003b, The Independent 
on Sunday 2003b). Certainly little was done to support the claim that the British government 
was better placed to judge the success of weapons inspections than the weapons inspectors, 
and indeed much to undermine it. This was despite no substantive problems being identified 
with the text; plagiarism had been enough to discredit the entire document. 
 Colin Powell’s presentation to the Security Council was more professional but barely 
more effective. Trailed in advance as an “Adlai Stevenson moment” (The Daily Telegraph 
2003a, Borger 2003, C. Brown and Coman 2003) in reference to the decisive revelation of 
proof that the Soviet Union was misleading the UN during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it lacked 
the concrete evidence seen on that occasion, and so failed to have a major impact, either at 
the UN or on the public. Jeremy Greenstock, who thought the presentation “extremely 
impressive”, still conceded it was “not decisive” (Greenstock 2009b, 86-87). Christopher Meyer 
has been harsher, calling Powell’s statement “inadequate and incorrect” (C. Meyer 2009, 55). 
Commentators in Britain generally expressed concern about the alleged Iraqi violations set out 
by Powell, but did not accept his crucial claim, that they were sufficiently serious so as to 
warrant the acceleration or even early termination of the inspection process (The Daily Mail 
2003a, Barnett 2003a). So limited was Powell’s impact, in fact, that the direct refutation of 
several of his key hypotheses by Hans Blix on 14 February elicited little comment in Britain. As 
Blix himself concluded, for many observers it was “hard to avoid the reflection that Colin 
Powell had been charged with the thankless task of hauling out the smoking guns that in 
January were said to be irrelevant and that, after March, turned out to be nonexistent” (Blix 
2004, 156).  
 Smoking guns had become relevant in early 2003 only because of the pressure to 
conclude efforts at peaceful disarmament before the military timetable stipulated war must 
begin. British ministers knew the US was willing to go to war without UN backing, but Britain 
itself was unable to do so, and yet equally unwilling to appear a fair-weather friend by letting 
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the US fight alone. It fell, therefore, to Tony Blair, and to a lesser extent to Colin Powell, who 
had put his own reputation on the line in pushing for a UN route, to find a compromise that 
would be consistent with Public Opinion. In early February the argument advanced was that 
UNMOVIC was being successfully misled by wily Iraqi security agents, to the extent that UN 
formalities could no longer be allowed to delay the military action that such obfuscation made 
inevitable. The argument failed, partly because the public, trusting of international institutions 
and primed to await the inspectors’ findings, rejected the substance of the claims made. It 
failed, also, because of incompetent spinning by Downing Street. In effect, the government 
had, through shoddy execution and a lack of imagination, undermined its own case.  
 
The ‘second’ UNSCR and the ‘unreasonable’ veto 
 
 Every other avenue exhausted, Britain was forced to seek domestic legitimacy for 
military action through a ‘second’ Security Council Resolution. Great efforts had been made 
during the negotiations which led to UNSCR 1441 to avoid having to return to the Council a 
second time, but unable otherwise to reconcile clashing military and diplomatic timetables, 
and constrained by Public Opinion, ministers had little choice. In early January Blair was 
warned that, absent a decisive report from UNMOVIC or the discovery of an indisputable 
‘smoking gun’, he “might be unable to survive the expected House of Commons vote” on the 
use of force, without a further resolution (Blair 2010b, 412). By the end of the month 
“everyone [he] was speaking to was saying they needed a second resolution or they wouldn’t 
get support” (Campbell and Stott 2007, 658). Under the rules of the multi-level game that 
Britain faced at the UN, these domestic political concerns had to be balanced against the very 
real possibility that a second resolution might fail, which would have undermined claims to 
both legality and legitimacy (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 144), and damaged the 
Western allies’ ability to avoid appearing weak while trying to pressure Saddam Hussein to give 
up without a fight (Wood 2002d, 1). Considerable tension had developed between the US and 
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France, after Dominique de Villepin’s 20 January “ambush” of Colin Powell at the UN, in which 
the French Foreign Minister used an impromptu press conference during an unrelated 
ministerial summit to attack US posturing over Iraq (Straw 2010d, 74). The publication on 30 
January and 6 February of letters of support for the US from a range of EU member and 
candidate states2 had further underscored European divisions (Ehrenberg, et al. 2010, 124-
126). It has subsequently been argued that the US would not have allowed negotiations for a 
second UNSCR to begin had it not been thought that France might yet come round (Marfleet 
and Miller 2005, 338). But clearly there was little prospect of an easy ride, and if Blair really did 
tell Bush a second resolution would be easier to obtain than the first (Cook 2003, 276), he 
offered an assessment of the situation that was neither objective nor accurate.  
 Somewhat counter-intuitively, Britain’s best hope for achieving a second resolution lay 
in refusing to acknowledge publicly that a further Council decision was necessary to legalise 
war, thereby shifting the argument from the question of whether France and Russia would 
permit military action, to whether Britain and the US would allow France and Russia to 
‘approve’ a war that would (and legally could) take place regardless. For this reason, Blair had 
initially refused to comment on whether he would seek a second resolution in the event 
UNSCR 1441 did not produce the desired level of Iraqi co-operation, arguing “there are certain 
questions frankly...it is not very helpful to speculate on” (Press Conference 2002d); “unhelpful 
for him”, as one observer put it (P. Riddell 2002e). Privately, ministers and officials were aware 
that the situation was complicated. Jack Straw, Jeremy Greenstock, and David Manning had 
each accepted at different times (both publicly and privately) that resolution 1441 envisioned 
a further Security Council decision, and not just a discussion, before military action (Straw 
2002c, Straw 2002d, Straw, Hansard 2002r, c437, Greenstock 2002e, Manning 2002). Although 
ministers had argued that the key passage in OP12 of UNSCR 1441 “does not stipulate that 
                                                           
2
 The signatories of the ‘gang of 8 letter’ were Spain, Portugal, Italy, UK, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Denmark; this was followed by the ‘Vilnius letter’ signed by Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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there has to be a second Security Council resolution to authorise military action in the event of 
a further material breach by Iraq” (Straw, Hansard 2002s, c53), they had privately been 
warned repeatedly by Lord Goldsmith that, in his opinion, some form of Council decision was 
required; this despite the instructions given to Greenstock during the negotiation of this point 
(Goldsmith 2002b, 2002c, 2003a, 2003b). Publicly, Blair maintained his line, despite knowing it 
was not consistent with the government’s own legal advice. Seeking to justify this apparent 
dishonesty, he subsequently argued at the Chilcot Inquiry that he “was less making a legal 
declaration, as it were, because I could not do that, but a political point” (Blair 2011, 74). In 
effect, he claims that when he made public statements about Britain’s legal position which he 
knew contradicted advice given by the Attorney General, he was not making false statements, 
but was rather not making legal statements at all. He claims the coincidence of the 
diplomatically convenient claim that no second resolution was required with his own view of 
the legal position (which differed from Goldsmith’s despite the latter’s advice) is irrelevant 
(Blair 2011, 61). Most subsequent observers have rejected Blair’s assurances on this point. 
What was not irrelevant was the way the government dealt with legal advice which did 
not support ministers’ own views, or which threatened to create insurmountable obstacles to 
their policies. Advised by FCO lawyer Sir Michael Wood that there was “no doubt” a further 
resolution was required (Wood 2003b), Jack Straw responded, in a note which prompted a 
reprimand from the Attorney General (Goldsmith 2003c), that he “hope[d] (for political 
reasons) we can get a second Resolution”, but that international law was “uncertain” and so 
he did not accept the substance of the advice (Straw 2003a). It is apparently not unheard of for 
ministers to challenge legal advice. The additional admission here, that a further SCR would 
offer much-needed political, if not necessarily legal, cover, is consistent with what is known 
about the diplomatic position in early 2003. Straw’s rejection of Wood’s advice was not 
necessarily inappropriate, therefore, but it did clearly conflate political and legal priorities, at 
the risk of undermining the ability of law officers to offer impartial opinions. Prior to his visit to 
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Bush on 31 January, Blair had underlined Goldsmith’s statement that UNSCR 1441 “does not 
authorise the use of military force without a further determination by the Security Council”, 
scribbling “I just don’t understand this” in the margin of the text, despite the apparent 
simplicity of the statement (Goldsmith 2003b). Instead of accepting the Attorney-General’s 
legal advice as it was first advanced, Downing Street sought to change his mind. It was 
arranged that Goldsmith should meet Jeremy Greenstock in late January, and then that he 
would travel to Washington to see William Taft IV, State Department legal adviser, in early 
February. Jack Straw raised an additional point in a note warning that he had “some doubts 
about the negotiability” of a second resolution (Straw 2003b). Finally, on 12 February, 
Goldsmith came up with the answer ministers had been looking for, accepting there was a 
“reasonable case” that war was legal on the basis of UNSCR 1441 alone (Goldsmith 2003d).  
At the Chilcot Inquiry, Goldsmith explained the thinking behind his ultimate position by 
arguing, with reference to UK and US accounts of the negotiations leading up to UNSCR 1441, 
that “it was, frankly, quite hard to believe, given what I had been told about the one red line 
that President Bush had, that all these experienced lawyers, and negotiators in the United 
States could actually have stumbled into doing the one thing that they had been told mustn’t 
happen” (Goldsmith 2010, 127). This conclusion chimes both with what is known about the 
instructions given to negotiators, and with some of the public statements made by ministers 
and officials at the time resolution 1441 was announced. Clearly, however, Goldsmith had 
faced pressure of a sort, improper or otherwise, until his legal view changed to coincide with 
what was thought politically and diplomatically feasible. In effect, the impartiality of legal 
advice had been compromised for political communication purposes, just as had been secret 
intelligence assessments during the period covered by Chapter 4.  
 British ministers won legal approval to launch military action against Iraq without 
explicit UN authorisation at around the time it became most clear that a further Security 
Council Resolution remained essential to the generation of political legitimacy. An increasingly 
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desperate domestic situation, the ongoing complications of Britain’s diplomatic balancing act, 
and the very real risk that the newly-minted legal argument could be undermined by 
subsequent developments at the UN each impacted upon the decision to return to the Security 
Council. Blair was convinced during his 6 February BBC Newsnight grilling that “a second 
resolution would go a long way towards tempering domestic concerns about the impending 
war” (Dunne 2008, 354). As he told Jeremy Paxman, “I think if there were a second UN 
resolution then I think people would be behind me. I think if there's not then there's a lot of 
persuading to do” (Blair, BBC Newsnight 2003). The fact he was on Newsnight in the first place, 
before a studio audience deliberately selected to be hostile, was significant. He had launched a 
“masochism strategy”, an effort to win over critics by facing tough questions head on 
(Campbell 2010b, 39). As one observer pointed out, however, the main effect of such 
exchanges was the reinforcement of Blair’s repeated commitment to producing “some kind of 
‘second resolution’...to the point where it does not matter too much what the piece of paper 
says, so long as he can produce it” (Maddox 2003a). He may have won converts to the pro-war 
line, but at the cost of promising them a UN resolution he no longer needed legally and would 
probably not be politically able to deliver. 
 So concerned was the Prime Minister with the constraining effect of domestic Public 
Opinion at this stage that it formed a major element of his 31 January appeal to President Bush 
to support a return to the Security Council (Campbell and Stott 2007, 660). At the time, he 
could refer also to Goldsmith’s advice that Britain required a second resolution to cement its 
legal base, which was not revised until 12 February. There were very real concerns in both the 
US and UK about affording France and Russia a second chance to withhold UN approval from 
military action; as has been noted, such concerns motivated the public refusal to accept the 
legal necessity of a further UNSCR. While the Council debated a US-UK draft text, however, it 
could not also discuss a Franco-Russian alternative; a significant benefit given the likely levels 
of support an alternative draft would have gathered, especially had it praised UNMOVIC and 
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called for inspections to be given enough time to ‘work’ (Greenstock 2009a, 13, Straw 2010b, 
82). The passage of a counter-resolution explicitly ruling out immediate military action, even if 
it was vetoed by Britain and the US, would have exploded the legal argument upon which Lord 
Goldsmith had by then alighted, since the ‘revival argument’ held only in the absence of a 
specific expression of the Security Council’s view. Ultimately, it appears that “Bush realised 
that no second resolution might mean...no Britain” (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 147), 
and elected to compromise by allowing Blair to seek one out, despite never having accepted 
the desirability of such an exercise in its own right. He remained clearly lukewarm about the 
prospect of additional negotiations in New York, conceding in public only that “should the 
United Nations decide to pass a second resolution, it would be welcomed”, while maintaining 
that “1441 gives us the authority to move without any second resolution” (Bush 2003b). So 
stark was the difference of emphasis between Bush and Blair on this point, and so focused was 
the media on reporting it, that the Prime Minister felt compelled to travel to the press section 
of his plane during the return flight to London, in order to highlight the success he had just 
had. As Nick Robinson put it, this was “a journey he makes only when told that the media 
thinks his day went badly” (Robinson 2003a). Coming just two days after Bush had told 
Congress, in a line which “produced wild cheering” (Ashley 2003a), that “the course of this 
nation does not depend on the decisions of others” (Bush 2003a), the President’s tepid stance 
towards a second resolution appears unsurprising. He was utterly and publicly committed to 
war, regardless of events at the UN (C. Meyer 2009, 55), and vulnerable to serious domestic 
criticism should he appear to backslide. Unfortunately for Blair, it was impossible for Bush to 
talk separately to US and UK publics on the subject of the UN, and forced to decide between 
the two, it was the British he chose to antagonise. Just as Blair’s rhetoric constrained his 
substantive policy options, so too Bush had already closed off the prospect of a genuine US 
effort to gain a second resolution by making his position so unequivocally clear in the State of 
the Union.  
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 Having returned home, Blair struggled to refute suggestions that the decision to refer 
back to the Security Council reflected the US and UK having agreed all along to follow a two-
resolution route (The Guardian 2003a). In doing so he highlighted the government’s 
established position that proceeding with a second resolution was preferable to going without, 
but that it was ultimately unnecessary, especially in case of an “unreasonable” veto (Straw, 
Hansard 2002r, c435, Blair, Hansard 2002s, c39, Press Conference 2003a, Hansard 2003d, 
c292, BBC Newsnight 2003). As with the broader second resolution argument, government law 
officers had advised here, too, that the position being taken was not consistent with 
international law; a veto was a veto, whether or not British policymakers considered it 
‘reasonable’ (Goldsmith 2002d, Wood 2003a). Even Jack Straw, who publicly advanced the 
claim at this time that certain types of veto were ‘unreasonable’ and so illegitimate, accepted 
at the Chilcot Inquiry that it was invalid (Straw 2010d, 47). It seems that ministers were again 
asserting political positions, knowing they lacked legal authority, for diplomatic advantage; it is 
hardly surprising that commentators were confused.  
 Clever linguistic contortionism was no longer enough, however, to win public support. 
By February 2003 it was clear, as one newspaper put it, that many in Britain had thought the 
deployment of UNMOVIC would “postpone the prospect of a military campaign indefinitely”, 
and that the fact “that the inspectors might become irrelevant if Baghdad failed to provide a 
credible inventory of its materials has come as an unwelcome surprise” (The Times 2003a). 
Hans Blix had observed as early as September 2002 the belief amongst journalists that 
“inspection was the alternative to war” (Blix 2004, 79). Certainly debating inspection was an 
alternative to debating war; by early 2003 a number of commentators were warning about an 
undue focus on events at the UN, to the exclusion of broader considerations such as the pros 
and cons of removing Saddam Hussein from power (D. MacIntyre 2003a, The Independent on 
Sunday 2003a, Tisdall 2003a). Only a handful of those public actors who doubted the necessity, 
morality, or practicality of military action were willing to reject a UN-backed campaign outright 
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(cf. Sheridan 2003, Benn 2003). Some had assumed the negotiations in the Autumn of 2002 
that led to UNSCR 1441 would be unsuccessful (A. Watkins 2002). Others rejected possible 
violations of 1441 as mere “technicalities” (The Guardian 2003b), and constructed a 
comprehensive series of arguments which delegitimized military action under almost any 
circumstances (Tisdall 2003a). Opponents of military action sought to strike a balance between 
expressing their commitment to upholding the authority of the UN, and avoiding having to 
endorse the use of force even in defence of that authority. Clearly, then, and despite similarly 
circular claims being made on the pro-war side (Hames 2003a), the British government was in 
some considerable trouble by mid-February 2003. Pinning its hopes of legitimising an armed 
conflict that was all but inevitable on developments at the UN, it had talked itself into a 
position in which almost no course of action could have achieved that legitimacy.  
 
Quantitative indicators 
 
On 11 February The Times argued that its own evidence of public opinion suggested 
that voters were divided, that they accepted that inspections alone could not disarm Iraq, yet 
preferred to call for more time when faced with accepting the inevitability of war as the 
alternative (The Times 2003b). The implication was that, faced with a stark choice, most would 
prefer that their support for the UN should lead to war, rather than that no effort should be 
made to enforce UN resolutions, although the paper admitted that this was far from certain 
short of a clear point of decision. Journalists opposed to war alternately lamented that wider 
public “unease remains anchored to the sofa” (M. Riddell 2003) and reported having witnessed 
increasing levels of public activation (Fisk 2003b). 
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Figure 19: Volume of commentary articles in UK newspapers relating to Iraq, October 2002 – 
February 2003. 
 
Figure 19 shows that the volume of public debate over Iraq grew towards the end of 
this period. The number of Iraq-related commentary articles published in leading newspapers 
spiked upwards in January, and then boomed in February. Rising media interest meant 
pressure on the passive public to pay attention. The Mirror launched a petition on 22 January, 
calling on readers to sign and return a pro-forma printed in the paper. By the first post on 23 
January, 15,000 forms had been received (The Mirror 2003a), a figure which reached 181,500 
by 6 February (Fisher 2003). This was clearly a large number, but at the same time it equally 
clearly represented only a minority of the population, and indeed a minority of The Mirror’s 
readership of over two million. Nevertheless, the mere existence of a varied and lively public 
debate, to which ordinary citizens were willing actively to contribute, over the legitimacy of 
military action demonstrated that Public Opinion was increasingly engaged in the issue, and 
that it had some real concerns with the position put forward by the government (Michalski and 
Gow 2007, 204). 
As figure 20 shows, a clear plurality of the British passive public, when asked, 
continued to oppose the use of force against Iraq during the period covered by this chapter. 
What was new about the public debate at this time was, however, the increasingly urgent 
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question of just how far these latent levels of passive concern might be mobilised into an 
active anti-war campaign. Channel 4 News noted that “the same old faces, like Tony Benn and 
George Galloway...dominate the anti-war movement”, and wondered “can they galvanise the 
British public?” (Channel 4 News 2003a). 
 
Figure 20: Opinion poll data showing support for military action against Iraq, 1 October 2002 – 
15 February 2003. 
 
Interestingly, as figure 21 sets out, the balance of views in newspaper commentary 
articles at this time was generally more anti- than pro-war.  
 
Figure 21: Average editorial positions adopted by leading UK newspapers towards military 
action in Iraq (1 = pro-war, 0 = neutral, -1 = anti-war), controlling for circulation, October 2002 
– February 2003 (n = 851). 
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Figure 22: Average proportional distribution of newspaper commentary on the prospect of 
military action against Iraq (n = 543). 
 
It is instructive to compare figure 21 to figure 22 on this point, however. Figure 22 
demonstrates that a clear majority of the newspaper comment articles written (as opposed to 
figure 21, which focuses on articles circulated and so gives more weight to those in more 
popular newspapers) at this time took a neutral position on the question of the use of force. 
Anti-war views were strong, while pro-war commentators remained very much in the minority; 
the breakdown is more similar to that seen in Parliament. 
 
Figure 23: Proportional distribution of newspaper commentary on the prospect of military 
action against Iraq, by publication (n = 543, individual n-numbers in brackets). 
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Looking at figure 23, we can start to explain the difference between figure 21 and 
figure 22. The publications with the strongest pro- and anti- war lines were The Sun and The 
Mirror, which achieved during this period average market share of 34.95% and 20.5% 
respectively, for a total of 55.45% of commentary within the British newspaper market taking a 
strong line one way or another. The Times and The Daily Telegraph, which both carried a high 
proportion of neutral commentary on the Iraq question, achieved just 15.46% market share 
between them, and so had far less influence over the proportional distribution of commentary 
in terms of the number of copies of articles circulated, despite having made up a far higher 
proportion of the number of articles written. Again, this should not be surprising; it reflects the 
focus in the higher-circulating tabloid press on clear-cut positions and limited levels of 
extended argument, compared to the more sober and nuanced approach adopted by the 
broadsheets (measures for the News of the World and Sunday Mirror may be unreliable, due 
to a very low number of relevant articles – n = 10 and 3 respectively – but have been included 
for the sake of completeness). Chapter 8 discusses the implications of these relationships in 
more detail. 
 
Figure 24: Distribution of speeches by British MPs in debates on Iraq policy between 1 October 
2002 and 15 February 2003 (n = 63). 
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 Parliamentary support for war was hit hard by the UN process, the proportion of pro
war speeches made in this period falling to just 11%, as 
were willing at least to let the UN process play out, something which explains 
proportion of neutral contributions to debates held at this time (and also the similar pattern 
seen in the press). The significance of 
the Conservative party’s support for war, a stance which, it
effectively “neutered” (Richards 2002, Richards 2003a, M. Brown 2003)
discussed the extent to which the press had taken on the role of opposition 
Ashley 2002b). Regardless of the realit
contested between government and journalists irked many parliamentarians, and fuelled 
complaints from MPs about the government’s tendency to brief the media before the House 
on key announcements (Ancram, 
Hansard 2003c, c47). Such complaints usually went unanswered. Right
struggled, meanwhile, as the Conservatives had, trying to balance their pro
instincts with the “automatic impulse of their editors to undermine a Labour government
The result was often support on substance but criticism on process, with editors focussing on 
stories about the government’s failure properly to equip troops, or the fate of Labour’s p
policies in the face of mounting disagreements with France and Germany 
Figure 25: Basic two-dimensional factor analysis of British public actors’ positions towards war 
with Iraq between 1 October 2002 and 15 February 2003.
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active Public Opinion remained for the most part opposed to war throughout the UN 
inspection process. The government was not helped by the fact that it had succeeded in 
setting the agenda for public debate by going to the UN, but that far more pro-war than anti-
war opinion was neutralised by the move. Only the editorials of the previously anti-war 
Observer followed resolutely the logic of its own pro-UN line, agreeing with the government 
that military action should be taken to ensure that SCRs were upheld.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 During the latter part of 2002 and opening months of 2003, a series of political, legal, 
and diplomatic battles over the level of UN approval for military action against Iraq played out 
in a complex multi-level game ranging between Britain, Washington, Moscow, Paris, Baghdad, 
and New York. Seeking both legality and legitimacy according to standards set by contributors 
to Public Opinion, the Blair government balanced Bush administration unilateralism against 
European scepticism to secure the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441. UN 
weapons inspectors returned to Iraq, and after initial delays the regime slowly began to co-
operate with the demands made of it. Whether this co-operation would ever have satisfied 
UNMOVIC remains debatable; Hans Blix approached his task with a sceptical, but open, mind. 
His initial 27 January report was scathing, but he was somewhat more muted on 14 February. 
With enough time, he would have reached a definite conclusion; either Iraq’s disarmament 
could be verified, or it could not. But he was not to have enough time. US military planners had 
targeted early 2003 to launch an invasion of Iraq. Bush administration unilateralists disliked 
anyway the notion that they might be constrained from acting against a perceived threat by 
the efforts of an international institution to promote peace. The President had committed 
personally and publicly to overthrowing Saddam Hussein, to a doctrine of launching pre-
emptive strikes against perceived threats to national security, and to the unashamed use of 
military might in imposing pax Americana on the world. There thus emerged a disconnect 
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between the diplomatic and military schedules which British rhetorical efforts could never 
realistically have overcome. A fundamental clash had developed between the structural 
imperatives of the ‘special relationship’, and those of Public Opinion.  
 From the Blair government’s perspective the war, when it came, had legal approval 
from the government’s law officers, but lacked clear-cut domestic legitimacy. Ministerial 
efforts to reconcile American impatience, Franco-Russian scepticism, Iraqi intransigence, and 
UNMOVIC inspections, had largely backfired in the face of challenging conditions established 
by the nature and operation of Public Opinion. By seeking UN approval for war, but refusing to 
be constrained if that approval was withheld, or even too slow in coming to meet the (entirely 
artificial) deadlines set by the American military timetable, the Blair government demonstrated 
conclusively that it was acting without UN support (Ralph 2011, 130). For the Bush 
administration, which had alternative legal arguments and sources of legitimacy (including of 
course multilateral backing from Britain), there was little cause for concern. But a complex 
legal argument that found, on balance, that the use of force against Iraq in early 2003 would 
(probably) be legal was not enough alone to legitimise, in the eyes of the British public, a war 
with limited international support. The contrast with what had happened over Afghanistan, 
discussed in Chapter 2, is striking. Going to the UN had always been an exercise in both policy 
and politics, an effort to obtain legal backing, to be sure, but also an opportunity to achieve 
legitimacy through a well-worn route to multilateral consensus. Legal, diplomatic, and 
domestic political concerns are interwoven throughout the government’s private exchanges 
and public statements from this time, underscoring the close relationship between policy 
substance and policy communication. That so few official aims in going to the UN were 
achieved reflects in large part the very complexity that this interweaving implies, and the 
opportunities it creates for the development of irresolvable conflicts.  
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Chapter 6 – “We need to be ready to climb the mountain 
of conflict”
3
: February – March 2003 
 
On 15 February 2003 the largest political protest in British history took place in 
London. As many as one million people marched across the capital to express their opposition 
to a military attack on Iraq. Just over a month later the British government, with the support of 
Parliament, committed the country’s armed forces to Operation Iraqi Freedom, a US-led 
invasion that rapidly removed Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party from power in Baghdad. 
This chapter explores the way public debate over the appropriateness of military action played 
out in the final weeks before the war. Building on the discussion of policymaking processes, 
communication methods, and diplomatic pressures in the previous chapters, it considers how 
leadership psychology and domestic political circumstances interacted with Public Opinion in 
shaping the government’s behaviour. It asks how far Tony Blair’s beliefs about the necessity of 
military action against Iraq, and the desirability of public support for that action, influenced his 
willingness to risk his own political survival by exposing the unpopular decision to go to war to 
a constitutionally unnecessary parliamentary vote. It investigates the impact on that decision 
of Conservative Party support, Labour Party scepticism, and Liberal Democrat weakness. 
Finally, it seeks to understand how it was that the wave of vocal and organised anti-war 
protest which surged through the streets of several cities and the corridors of Westminster 
seemed to have so little impact.  
Three crucial points emerge from the analysis. Firstly, the ‘moral turn’ in the official 
case for war that took place on 15 February both won converts from instinctively anti-war left-
wing elements of Public Opinion, and underscored the Prime Minister’s deep personal faith in 
the need to take military action. Blair’s beliefs, in humanitarian intervention, in his own 
judgement, in the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and in the proper role of leaders in foreign 
policymaking together limited the scope for conditions imposed by Public Opinion to influence 
                                                           
3
 (Hollander 2009) 
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his decisions. Secondly, the government’s ability to exploit latent popular prejudices in blaming 
France for the failure of the ‘second’ UNSCR helped soften its impact. Much of what support 
had been garnered for military action prior to February 2003 had been dependent on its 
legitimisation by way of unequivocal UN backing. As Chapter 5 describes, this was why a 
‘second’ UNSCR had been sought at all. By playing on images of the ‘perfidious French’ already 
well-established in the minds of tabloid editors, however, ministers successfully directed 
attention away from the absence of explicit UN approval for the campaign that launched in 
March 2003. Finally, the domestic political circumstances were such that, in reality, the only 
way the government could have been forced to change its stance towards Iraq was if its own 
backbench MPs had brought it down. When it came to it, if Labour MPs really wanted to 
prevent an invasion, they would first have to overthrow a Labour Prime Minister. It proved a 
sacrifice few were willing to make.  
 
The ‘moral turn’: 15 February 2003 
 
When Tony Blair stood up to defend his Iraq policy at the Labour Party Spring 
Conference in Glasgow on the afternoon of 15 February, he did so knowing the scale of public 
opposition ranged against him. With a million people protesting on the streets of London, he 
cannot have mistaken the importance of the occasion, nor the unusually high salience of the 
issue to many ordinary people. Yet, rather than changing course under pressure, he sought 
instead to change the terms of the debate. Insisting that “the moral case against war has a 
moral answer” (Blair 2003e), he engaged directly with those critics who accused him of rushing 
unthinkingly to war, and began to argue seriously for the first time that removing Saddam 
Hussein from power would benefit the Iraqi people far more than it would harm them. It was a 
significant shift (Coates and Krieger 2004, 57). Blair had strongly implied that he was personally 
committed to humanitarian ‘regime change’ in Iraq during his April 2002 visit to Crawford. His 
private statements were even more explicit. In ideological terms, he observed that “from a 
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centre-left perspective, the case should be obvious...a political philosophy that does care 
about other nations – eg Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone – and is prepared to change 
regimes on the merits, should be gung-ho on Saddam” (Blair 2002). The Attorney General had, 
however, warned repeatedly that if military action was to be taken in line with international 
law, “regime change cannot be the objective” (Goldsmith 2003e). For this reason Blair had 
worked from Crawford onwards to construct a case against Iraq based primarily on the threat 
posed by its weapons of mass destruction and its violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 
dating back to the Gulf War. What was proven by the 15 February protest was that this 
approach had failed to win the public debate in Britain. Too many people did not buy it. As far 
as the British public was concerned, WMD were dangerous, and Iraq’s violation of UNSCRs a 
concern, but the case for what would inevitably be a devastating war had not been made. Blair 
therefore fell back on a familiar trope of New Labour foreign policy; liberal interventionism 
(Gaskarth 2006, 325-326, Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers 2007, 205, Hollis 2010, 2-3, Dunne 2008, 
344-345, Williams 2005). As his memo of  17 March 2002 suggests, he was finally expressing in 
public his true, private views on why Saddam Hussein simply had to be removed. 
Blair held a moralistic, even simplistic, view of the nature of international affairs which 
might have predisposed him to favour the use of force against Iraq, even without his having 
had wider experience of intervention (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 86, Dyson 2009, 
235-236, Bromund 2009, 260, Dyson 2011, 64, 71). His decision, however, to encourage and 
participate in military action against Serbia over the Milosevic regime’s treatment of ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo in 1999 had hardened his underlying instincts (Kampfner 2003, 36, 
Daddow 2009, 548). Speaking at the Chicago Economic Club in an effort to encourage Bill 
Clinton to deploy US air power to the region, Blair had elucidated a new foreign policy stance, 
the “Doctrine of International Community” (Blair 1999). Drawing together themes of global 
interdependence and individual morality, and building on work done by Professor Lawrence 
Freedman, Blair described humanitarian intervention as a tool of what he later termed 
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“enlightened national self-interest” (Blair 2010b, 228). Ostensibly ‘humanitarian’ intervention 
was, in Blair’s formulation, not so much a charitable act as a prudent investment in global 
stability. In an interdependent world, as he put it, “[national] values and [national] interests 
merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and 
an open society then that is in our national interests too. The spread of our values makes us 
safer” (Blair 1999). Clinton was won over, Serbia bombed into submission, Kosovo placed 
under UN protection, and Milosevic (eventually) driven from power and put on trial for war 
crimes. Britain’s actual role in achieving each of these outcomes is debatable. What is clear, 
however, is that he regarded Kosovo as a personal triumph. In particular, he thought the 
success of his strategy proved that he was a better judge of foreign policy matters than those 
domestic voices who had disagreed with him (Blair 2003f, Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers 2007, 
210). Roundly opposed again in 2003, his thoughts returned to Kosovo.  
 Blair could not avoid responding to the 15 February protest; that had been the 
organisers’ intention in scheduling it for the same day as his Glasgow speech. The marchers 
were too numerous, and too mainstream to be dismissed. They were the sort of people who 
did not usually go on marches (The Daily Mail 2003b, White 2003a, Parris 2003, The Mail on 
Sunday 2003), rather than the ‘usual suspects’ who could be relied upon to protest (Cook 
2003, 298, Kampfner 2003, 272-273). Reporters described the crowd as “middle-class, middle-
aged, politely-mannered and jolly angry” (Ellam 2003, cf. Moreton 2003). Many of the large 
number of eye-witness despatches that appeared in the next few days’ newspapers underlined 
the fact that the average protester was reasonably affluent, politically centrist, and often a 
Labour voter who had been won to the party for the first time in its 1997 landslide. The 
marchers, then, were Tony Blair’s most significant supporters, the people whose votes made 
him such an electoral force, who might otherwise for cultural or economic reasons have voted 
against Labour, were they not so personally impressed by him. Such was the penetration of 
anti-war feeling through the government’s core constituencies that even within Downing 
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Street, most of Blair’s closest colleagues had family members who marched against him 
(Campbell 2010b, 54). Although a handful of observers on the pro-war side of the debate 
attacked the marchers as “knee-jerk rent-a-mob agitators...a ragbag of second-rate no-hopers” 
(The News of the World 2003a, cf. Amiel 2003), such views were not mainstream. Ministers 
and officials were certainly concerned (Press Conference 2003b, Blair, Hansard 2003e, c130, 
Campbell and Stott 2007, 667, Campbell 2010b, 52-53, Blair 2010b, 424, Straw 2010b, 102-
103). What was interesting, however, was how the Prime Minister in particular chose to 
respond. Instead of altering his substantive commitment to increasingly imminent military 
action, Blair simply shifted his rhetoric (The Independent on Sunday 2003c, Gallagher & 
Knowsley 2003, Tisdall 2003b, Waugh 2003a). Suddenly war with Iraq was not just a matter of 
self-defence or UN resolutions or the ‘special relationship’. Suddenly it was ‘the right thing to 
do’. 
 By altering the focus of the official line towards the question of right and wrong, Blair 
did shore up some support. Doubters within Downing Street drew comfort from the ethical 
arguments put across (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 153). Although the effect was far 
from universal (Watkins 2003a, The Independent 2003d), backbenchers in Parliament and 
opponents in the media were generally impressed by the claims made (George, Hansard 2003f, 
c306, Carr 2003c), particularly in light of the government’s past successes in Kosovo, Sierra 
Leone and Afghanistan. The moral argument contained logical flaws, however, which limited 
its success as a tool for winning over Public Opinion. Although Blair claimed he did not 
“pretend to have a monopoly of wisdom in these issues” (Blair 2003f), he acted quite 
differently. One Downing Street aide told Seldon that “this is a man who, in terms of the 
judgement of right and wrong, would think that his own judgement was at least as good as 
that of the Archbishop of Canterbury, of the Cardinal of Westminster, and of the Pope 
combined” (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 153-154). The choice of these three 
ecclesiastical leaders was not accidental. No sooner had Blair begun to set out his moral case, 
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than Archbishop Rowan Williams, Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor, and Pope John Paul II 
were each challenging it publicly. Anti-war commentators thought the government’s new 
moral argument had been immediately undermined, and noted critically Blair’s lack of humility 
in the face of such eminent authorities (The Mirror 2003c, The Guardian 2003d, The 
Independent 2003b, Chancellor 2003). Blair did not, however, back down. It has been further 
suggested  that the willingness of ministers to admit the difficulty of reaching a clear moral 
position on Iraq (cf. Straw, Hansard 2003f, c272) somewhat weakened their claim to have done 
just that. One cannot credibly accept that a moral question is finely balanced, and 
simultaneously argue with complete conviction that one’s own solution is unequivocally 
correct (Bulley 2010, 454). That was, however, exactly what the government tried to do in 
these final weeks. Ministers could hardly ignore the strength of anti-war opinions, and Blair 
had explicitly recognised their basis in value judgements in explaining his own moral turn. This 
recognition, however, then undermined his claim to have himself reached the ‘right’ answer, 
especially as he continued to deny thinking that he possessed any particular moral authority. 
Finally, the official case continued to be constrained by the need to balance ministers’ desire 
to see Saddam Hussein displaced against the fact that an approach based on regime change 
alone remained evidently illegal. Although by this point, as Campbell observed, “whether we 
liked it or not, we were moving towards a regime change argument” (Campbell and Stott 2007, 
666), the government still needed to show respect for international law, both practically in 
terms of what actions civil servants could perform, and politically to shore up Labour Party 
support. For this reason, Blair was forced to concede that Saddam Hussein might yet be left in 
power if he co-operated fully with the UN; regime change became a welcome consequence of 
war, rather than a reason for war in its own right (Blair, Hansard 2003e, c124, Press 
Conference, 2003b, Blair 2011, 45). He could take no other position without risking a serious 
clash with his own Attorney General. But having so determinedly excoriated Saddam on 15 
February, the quick reversal left Blair looking opportunistic in his choice of arguments, if not 
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outright confused. How, critics asked, could the Prime Minister take so strong a view on the 
moral imperative to overthrow the Iraqi dictator, and in the same breath pledge to leave him 
in power should he only co-operate with UN weapons inspections (McSmith 2003, D. 
MacIntyre 2003b)? It was a question to which Blair offered no answer. 
 
The ‘Messiah complex’ 
 
“The best lack all conviction, while the worst / are full of passionate intensity” (Yeats 1928, 
1970). 
 
The significance of the ‘moral turn’ in the communication of British foreign policy at 
this time goes beyond the impact that anti-war Public Opinion had on the agenda of the 
national debate. It was noted above that, faced with rising opposition to his proposed policy, 
Blair responded by changing how he sought to ‘sell’ it, while leaving the policy itself 
substantively unchanged. In his autobiography, he admits to “a somewhat weirdly optimistic 
view of the power of reason, of the ability to persuade if an argument is persuasive”, and 
notes that Jonathan Powell used to refer to his drive to convince others as a “Messiah 
complex” (Blair 2010b, 117, 157, Powell 2010b, 56). What the Glasgow speech showed, and 
what his conduct over the following weeks underlined, was that the Prime Minister’s 
instinctive reaction to public opposition over Iraq was to try harder to get his point across. He 
never considered that he might be wrong; he thought only in terms of how best to convince 
others that he was right. Explicitly adopting the position, first discussed in Chapter 3, that it 
was the role of governments to lead rather than follow when facing difficult decisions (Blair 
2003f, Blair 2010b, 486-487), he launched himself in these final weeks into the ‘masochism 
strategy’ mentioned in Chapter 5, making his case directly and repeatedly to hostile audiences, 
of journalists, MPs, Labour Party activists, and ordinary people. Although some opponents 
accepted that he might yet win the argument (Toynbee 2003a), this period was marked more 
than anything else by the emergence of “Mark 2” Tony Blair, “a man who was once known as 
consensual, accommodating, even insecure at times”, now “possessed of certainty” in the face 
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of concerted antipathy (Stothard 2003, 13, 3). In Glasgow he had told the Labour Party that 
unpopularity was “the price of leadership and the cost of conviction” (Blair 2003e). Shortly 
afterwards he told The Guardian that, whatever contemporary Public Opinion might say, 
ultimately history would be his judge (Ashley 2003b). He knew the risks. He knew, as he told 
Campbell repeatedly, that he might lose his job, or the broad coalition of public support upon 
which his power depended (Blair 2003f, Campbell and Stott 2007, 669-672). By late February 
“there was talk of mass resignations from party activists, of meltdown in the local elections, of 
several resignations from the Cabinet – perhaps even of Blair having to stand down” 
(Kampfner 2003, 283). He was not oblivious to this, as Robin Cook later suggested he might 
have been (Cook 2003, 314). He was simply unperturbed. He had made his choice, and he 
planned to see it through. From a purely rational perspective, such a position makes little 
sense. It becomes explicable only in light of the overwhelming strength of Blair’s belief at this 
stage in the rectitude of his chosen course. As Campbell put it, “somebody who has been 
elected Prime Minister and wants to get re-elected, does not do something as difficult and 
controversial [as this] unless they really, really, really believe that they should be doing it” 
(Campbell 2010b, 54, cf. Dumbrell 2009, 278, Powell 2010a, 137). Blair had not been so 
incautious in the face of hostile Public Opinion in domestic matters (Chandler 2003, 302-303). 
But when it came to confronting Iraq, he was a ‘true believer’ (Cox 2005, 218).  
Chapter 1 introduced the idea that the beliefs held by key policymakers might affect 
the ability of public opinion to influence foreign policy. Tony Blair’s beliefs affected in at least 
three distinct ways the level of public input into the decision to take Britain to war in Iraq, by 
supporting him in choosing not to accept the structural pressures being placed upon him. As 
noted above, Blair trusted the superiority of his own judgement over that of others, regardless 
of their station or experience, when faced with a difficult moral dilemma. He believed in the 
need for regime change in Iraq as a matter both of conscience and of national interest, and 
even that those two motivators were indelibly linked. He believed that the role of political 
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leaders was to lead the public debate; to take positions ahead of the consensus and to bring 
people along with them through logical argument and sheer force of will, rather than to listen 
to alternative views and seek to strike a compromise. The first way in which this constellation 
of views affected Iraq policy was in terms of its substance. It is unsurprising that a 
policymaking process “driven from the top by an ideological-minded leader” (Fawn and 
Hinnebusch 2006, 323) should result in a policymaking outcome that reflected that leader’s 
core beliefs. Blair’s faith in the capacity of armed intervention to represent a “force for good in 
the world”, an idea first introduced into the British foreign policy lexicon by Robin Cook just 
after his appointment as Foreign Secretary (Cook 1997), clearly influenced, maybe even 
determined, the development of the government’s substantive policy towards Iraq. This effect 
was reinforced by a second interaction between belief and policymaking. Blair’s unwillingness 
to accept others’ judgements as viable alternatives to his own, and his repeated insistence on 
the proper precedence of decision-making over public debate, dramatically constrained the 
access routes by which the conditioning factors established within Public Opinion might have 
gained direct traction over British foreign policy. As a number of studies have pointed out, 
public influence in a representative democracy is inevitably indirect (Foyle 1997, 141, 148, 
Shannon and Keller 2007, 82, Keller and Yang 2008, 687). The public cannot force politicians to 
change course. Instead, Public Opinion creates conditions in which they might think it 
desirable to do so. Blair’s conviction that he was right meant he did not anticipate that 
pressures emanating from Public Opinion would change his mind. His preference for a public 
debate that followed rather than informed policymaking represented not simply a desire to 
suppress dissent, but a genuine sense that dissent was misguided, and would evaporate in the 
face of a proper elucidation of the official line. He did not see Public Opinion as a source of 
potential policy alternatives, and a source of constraints on his freedom of action, but as a 
target for persuasion that he could then ignore if he failed adequately to persuade it. He 
wanted public support, and indeed may well have thought it necessary for a policy to be a 
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success. He did not want public input. Public input was unnecessary, since he himself already 
possessed the necessary judgement to make the right decision. That was, after all, why he had 
been elected. This self-belief underpinned the third mechanism by which Blair’s beliefs 
affected the public-policymaking interaction. Because he was right, and his opponents were 
wrong, and the need to deal with Iraq was so pressing, Blair was unwilling to change course 
even if the result was severe or even terminal damage to his political position. He was willing 
to sacrifice himself, and his government if necessary, rather than concede the substantive 
point. Nearly every existing model of public influence over policymaking assumes that a 
rational office-seeking politician will weigh the anticipated future political costs of a course of 
action against his own belief in its utility. Such was the significance of Blair’s ‘messiah complex’ 
for his Iraq decisions, however, that he made no such calculation. Listening to Blair discussing 
his situation in early March, Campbell recalled having “lost count of how many times he said – 
1. We are right on this issue, 2. We have to see it through, 3. I’m philosophical about what it 
means for me and whether I survive or not” (Campbell and Stott 2007, 672).  
Blair’s certainty actually had a positive impact on Public Opinion. In the final weeks 
before the war, the suggestion that the Prime Minister was a presidential ‘poodle’, meekly 
following his master’s orders, became more and more untenable as he risked everything 
politically, and exhausted himself physically, seeking converts to the pro-war party line. Several 
observers, including some who had attacked Blair for his slipperiness in taking public stances in 
the past, were forced to conclude that on this issue “the public Blair is the true Blair” (P. 
Riddell 2003a, cf. Ahmed 2003, Sieghart 2003a, The Times 2003e, The Sunday Times 2003b, 
Jenkins 2003a, Oborne 2003, The Independent 2003h, Howard 2003). Not only was he 
beginning to gain plaudits for the sheer effort he was making to change opponents’ minds, 
Blair was also (finally) dominating the agenda of public debate. Writing after a particularly 
brutal televised Q&A session with anti-war members of the public, the then ITV political editor 
Nick Robinson explained the extraordinary journalistic appeal of the situation; “Blair believes 
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in the rightness of his cause, the logic of his case and his ability to convert people to it. And, for 
once, there is little downside for the media. The public wants to watch him try” (N. Robinson 
2003b). The result was huge media interest in every step of the ‘masochism strategy’, both in 
terms of the substantive arguments advanced, and the significance of the strategy itself, 
particularly for the increasingly shattered premier. Andrew Marr, wondering at the Prime 
Minister’s willingness to endure the punishment meted out by hugely hostile crowds, even 
asked whether “he is still convinced by his ability, whatever the odds, to win people round? Or 
is it subtler - that he will gain respect for tackling the genuine critics and not ducking 
arguments?” (Marr 2003). Blair did gain respect. One observer, who was himself agnostic 
about military action, wrote that “never again will it be possible to portray this Prime Minister 
as a politician who would not put on a tie without first consulting a focus group” (Rawnsley 
2003). Another, opposed to war, marvelled at Blair’s “pure, unadulterated conviction”, noting 
it was “mesmerising...to watch such awesome blind integrity in action” (Orr 2003b). Although 
there remained a handful of cynics, who rejected the moral argument as just another attempt 
to ‘spin’ the coming conflict (cf. P. Hitchens 2003, Watkins 2003b), most commentators agreed 
with The Observer that “even [Blair’s] critics should acknowledge the remarkable leadership he 
is exhibiting” by sticking, quite literally, to his guns, in the face of widespread and vocal 
hostility (The Observer 2003d, cf. The Daily Mail 2003e, The Guardian 2003e, Malone 2003).  
Public hostility was not, however, the only challenge to the Prime Minister’s 
conviction. Despite his evident faith in the case for war, the argument he advanced contained 
a series of substantive internal weaknesses which came increasingly into focus as the time for 
action approached. The first weakness lay with the legal grounds for war. Although Lord 
Goldsmith had confirmed that military action would be legal without a second UNSCR 
(Brummell 2003), his detailed advice was finely balanced, warning for example that he would 
not “be confident that [a] court would agree with this view”, and maintaining that “the safest 
legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution” (Goldsmith 2003e). There 
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was no room for nuance in the government’s public communications profile, and such was the 
concern with “the problem of leaks” that Goldsmith was advised to withhold his detailed 
commentary even from the Cabinet (Straw 2003e). Instead of the carefully weighed argument 
received by the Prime Minister, most of his colleagues saw only the summary letter prepared 
for Parliament, which confirmed that the legal case was sound, but did not allude to the 
difficulties behind the position (Goldsmith 2003f). The later revelation, discussed in Chapter 7, 
that there existed two versions of the Attorney General’s legal advice prompted suggestions 
that Downing Street had sought to mislead the Cabinet by pressing for amendments to the 
original (Short 2010). In fact, as the memo from Jack Straw cited here shows, Goldsmith had 
been asked to rewrite his advice to make his approval of the use of force more categorical 
between the 7 March note to the Prime Minister and the 17 March version released to MPs 
and the public. Cabinet was not the primary target audience for the rewrite, however; rather 
the concern expressed by Straw was with the way the legal case would be perceived by the 
public if it appeared to be uncertain. So equivocal had been Goldsmith’s conclusion that the 
FCO deputy legal adviser felt unable to concur with it, and resigned (Wilmshurst 2003). The 
fear expressed by Straw was that Public Opinion would interpret any uncertainty in the 
government’s case as a sign of weakness. The fact remained, however, that the legal case did 
contain an element of uncertainty. A second UNSCR would have been preferable, Goldsmith 
made clear. It simply was not deliverable.    
In addition to this legal shakiness, Blair’s belief that Iraq posed a threat to international 
peace and security, and even directly to the UK, was being challenged by early 2003. Having 
taken advantage of a personal intelligence briefing from John Scarlett, Robin Cook came to the 
conclusion “that Saddam probably does not have weapons of mass destruction in the sense of 
weapons that could be used against large-scale civilian targets”. He even thought Blair “did not 
believe it himself” by this stage (Cook 2003, 299, 312). The claims made in the September 
dossier remained the official position. They had begun to look less certain in these final weeks, 
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however. For example, two major elements of the case against the Iraqi nuclear programme 
were dismissed by the IAEA at the UN on 7 March. Updating the Security Council on the 
nuclear component of the UNMOVIC inspection process, Mohamed El-Baradei reported that 
aluminium tubes identified in the dossier as potential components in Iraqi nuclear centrifuges 
were nothing of the sort, and that documents released by the British government purporting 
to show efforts by Iraq to purchase yellowcake for refinement into enriched uranium were 
(blatant) forgeries – by whom remains unclear (Blix 2004, 211). The nuclear threat had always 
been the strongest component of the case against Iraq; nuclear weapons are by far the most 
destructive of the WMD trio. The IISS had estimated in September 2002 that Iraq could be 
nuclear-armed within nine months if left unsupervised, although it was unclear whether it 
could produce a credible delivery system in that time. In March 2003, however, the IAEA was 
preparing to announce that no Iraqi nuclear threat existed. The absence of a ‘smoking gun’ 
could be explained away (more or less effectively, depending on the audience) as a 
consequence of Iraqi deception. Had the IAEA reached a settled conclusion that no Iraqi 
nuclear programme existed, however, that would have been far harder for the British 
government to dismiss. At the same time, questions were beginning to be asked about the 
suggestion that Saddam Hussein’s rule was an inherently destabilising force in an already 
volatile region. Having listened to Blair’s 25 February statement, Cook wrote that “whatever 
else we might say about the Iraqi regime, it is not unstable. Indeed, the problem with Saddam 
is that the regime is proving only too damn stable” (Cook 2003, 303). Cook apparently did not 
keep this observation to himself; it was reported in the following day’s press, albeit with no 
specific source identified (Carr 2003b).  
Despite all this, Blair remained convinced that Iraq posed a threat. He was 
psychologically predisposed to distrust Saddam Hussein by this stage. His experience of dealing 
with dictators since coming to office, and Iraq’s evident failure to engage fully with UNMOVIC 
had convinced him that there was no alternative to military action if the threat was to be 
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alleviated. The existence of a clear predisposition on Blair’s part here helps explain his failure 
to update his position in light of new evidence established by UNMOVIC, and new ideas being 
generated within British public debate. In addition, it again supports the suggestion that the 
capacity of the public to influence British policy towards Iraq was constrained by the Prime 
Minister’s personal beliefs. Blair was both unprepared to change position, and unwilling even 
to consider the validity of others’ views. Critics from outside of the government stood little 
chance, in such circumstances, of getting a fair or effective hearing. 
 
Freedom fries 
 
It has been suggested that, forced to choose between the US and Europe, Blair showed 
his pro-US leanings in moving against Iraq (Gamble and Kearns 2007, 121). His government 
certainly put considerable effort into attacking the position taken by President Chirac during 
the final weeks of the build-up to war. Ministers’ efforts represented a last-ditch effort to win 
public support by playing on the prejudices of a British press primed to respond favourably to 
an anti-French narrative (cf. H. Evans 2003, Rees-Mogg 2003, The Sun 2003a, 2003c, The News 
of the World 2003b, The Times 2003d). There was, at the same time, genuine frustration 
within Whitehall at Chirac’s behaviour (Blair 2010b, 119). On 5 March, Russia, Germany and 
France had issued a joint declaration noting the successes of the inspection programme, and 
calling for more progress. It stated “in these circumstances, we will not let a proposed 
resolution pass that would authorise the use of force. Russia and France, as permanent 
members of the Security Council, will assume all their responsibilities on this point” 
(Ehrenberg, et al. 2010, 143). It was a strong statement, but it reflected known disagreements, 
and did not rule out the possibility of some common ground yet being reached. Blair still 
hoped to find his way to consensus, but he had all along hedged his bets in dealing with the 
UN, as Chapter 5 discusses, by introducing the concept of an ‘unreasonable’ veto. He was, 
however, caught unprepared when Chirac told French television on 9 March that, faced with a 
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UN resolution authorising the use of force against Iraq, “whatever the circumstances, France 
will vote no” (Chirac 2003). The French President had perhaps been “emboldened by the 
Security Council victory [on 14 February, an anti-war statement by Dominique de Villepin had 
drawn a spontaneous round of applause from delegates], buoyed by the support of two 
permanent members and a preponderance of nonpermanent members, and encouraged by 
the tone of European public opinion” to speak as he did (Marfleet and Miller 2005, 339). He 
may also have felt pressure to avoid inflaming tensions within France’s restive Muslim 
population (Hill 2007, 272). Whatever the reason for Chirac’s statement, it meant for Britain 
the end of the second resolution. Non-permanent members of the Security Council, desperate 
to avoid falling out with supporters and trading partners among the divided P5, were unlikely 
to risk going out on a limb to support the US if any resolution would be vetoed regardless. The 
moment Chirac spoke, the “situation” with regard to the second resolution “became terminal” 
(Straw 2010a, 19).  
French intransigence had thus scuttled the centrepiece of the British government’s 
frantic search for legitimacy. It also offered a way out, however. Ministers and spokesmen 
moved quickly to accuse France of wrecking the UN process. Clare Short has labelled this tactic 
“one of the big deceits” of the government’s case for war (Short 2010, 104), and it is true that, 
“whatever the subsequent spin...at no point was [the outcome at the Security Council] even 
close to being determined by the French vote” (Kampfner 2003, 287). Britain never secured 
the nine votes needed to pass a resolution, irrespective of a veto (Greenstock 2009b, 72). 
However, “it was now down to political survival and, in Blair’s eyes, the ends justified the 
means” (Kampfner 2003, 288). If he could not have a second resolution, he needed at least to 
find a reason that Public Opinion would accept as to why Britain should proceed without one. 
Anti-war actors took little notice of the attempt to blame France for what had occurred (The 
Guardian 2003h, 2003i, 2003j, The Independent 2003g, Cornwell 2003c, The Mirror 2003d), 
but the overall impact on the debate was huge. Respected Labour MP and Chairman of the 
198 
 
Foreign Affairs Committee Donald Anderson complained that “so long as ‘immediate’ is not 
defined as ‘immediate’, and ‘final’ not defined as ‘final’, the Security Council will lose 
credibility for its own resolutions” (D. Anderson, Hansard 2003g, c175). The Sun compared 
Chirac to “a cheap tart who puts price before principle, money before honour”, maintaining a 
steady stream of similar abuse through to the start of military action (The Sun 2003d, cf. 
Cunningham 2003, The Sun 2003e, 2003f, Kavanagh 2003a, Wooding 2003). Other 
commentators on the pro-war side of the debate were less colourful but no less critical in their 
characterisation of the French President (The Daily Telegraph 2003e, 2003f, The Times 2003g, 
2003h, 2003i, The Sunday Times 2003c). Although the main immediate impact was on the pro-
war press, by 15 March reports suggested “several MPs who intended to oppose Mr Blair have 
been won round by the government's campaign to blame France for scuppering the efforts to 
reach agreement at the UN” (Grice 2003b), while an ICM poll published on 16 March showed 
51% of respondents thought Chirac “has poisoned the diplomatic process” while 61% said 
“France has put its own interests above the rest of the world by opposing war” (The News of 
the World 2003d, cf. Smith & Speed 2003). Clearly the case against France had considerable 
popular resonance, particularly when emphasised in this way by poll results, in a rare example 
of such figures actually being helpful to the pro-war argument. 
It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that the government stuck by its line despite 
frantic efforts by French officials to qualify Chirac’s position. On 12 March Matthew Rycroft 
emailed Powell, Manning, Campbell and others in No. 10 to report a conversation with Gerard 
Errera, the French Ambassador to London, in which the latter insisted Chirac’s remarks had 
been taken out of context, and “it is not the case that he said that he would vote no against 
any resolution” (Rycroft 2003b). The following day, British Ambassador to France Sir John 
Holmes cabled London to report a “complaint from the Élysée about our beginning to criticise 
France more openly, particularly Chirac’s remarks about the veto...[and] our repeated taking 
out of context of the President’s remarks on the veto in all circumstances. We must be well 
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aware that he had been talking about the particular position that evening, with the draft then 
on the table”. Holmes records having responded that “our position can hardly surprise the 
French, nor the fact that we are using Chirac’s words against him when the stakes are so high – 
he did say them, even if he may not have meant to express quite what we have chosen to 
interpret” (Holmes 2003, emphasis added). Further evidence that British officials knew they 
were playing a game, and felt comfortable playing it, comes from a response to Holmes sent by 
Sir Peter Ricketts, FCO Political Director, describing a exchange with Errera that closely 
mirrored Holmes’s report; “he began with some remonstrating...I brandished Le Monde at him 
with the quotation prominent on the front page. The French should not be surprised if 
Ministers were contrasting this with the constant efforts we were making to build common 
ground in the Security Council” (Ricketts 2003). British diplomats and, through their reports, 
ministers, were thus aware that the French believed Chirac had been misquoted, and that it 
had not been the President’s intention to terminate the negotiation process entirely. At the 
same time, those same diplomats were well aware of the political value to the government of 
choosing to interpret Chirac’s statements in a particular way. The characterisation of a Security 
Council veto, whether threatened or actual, as ‘unreasonable’ might have no legal force, but 
its value to a government struggling to establish the legitimacy of its chosen course could 
prove immeasurable. Ministers must have known, indeed they clearly did know, that France 
remained officially open to compromise. No actual veto had been cast at the UN, and two 
French warships were en route to the Gulf region as part of Chirac’s own contingency plan for 
military action. They were desperate, however, to reconcile the US military countdown, which 
had nearly reached its end, with their own earlier promises that Britain would act only with a 
UN mandate. Blaming France for wrecking their own honest attempts to reach a consensus 
gave them a potential out. At ministerial level, Jack Straw had told De Villepin “that Chirac’s 
statement...had caused great difficulties. It was clear that France would veto. Villepin said that 
Chirac had never said that. Chirac had not meant that France would not try to find common 
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ground. He had not meant that, whatever happened, France would vote no”. In a telling 
phrase, the note of Straw’s discussion with de Villepin records that “the Foreign Secretary said 
that he read the comments differently” (Straw 2003d). Having been told by the French Foreign 
Minister that his interpretation of French foreign policy was wrong, Straw nevertheless stuck 
to it. Just as Blair was psychologically unprepared to update his views on the Iraqi threat in 
response either to public protest or new evidence, so too Straw may have been unable to 
accept the failure of the UN process, without at least the comfort of an alternative narrative in 
which that failure resulted from the unreasonableness of the French. More than any other 
member of the British government, Straw was associated with the attempt to work through 
the UN. Just as Colin Powell’s advocacy of the UN route in the US had left him vulnerable to 
attacks from within the administration (Stelzer 2003), so too Straw’s past positions were such 
that any outcome other than a second resolution, or an ‘unreasonable veto’, would have 
damaged his credibility and may even have been literally unthinkable for him. 
Chirac’s statement was not the only example of apparent French obstructionism upon 
which Straw (and Blair) could draw, and it is important in noting the impact of the apparent 
spin placed on the President’s words to acknowledge also the genuine spirit of Gallic 
intransigence in which they had been delivered. Seeking a compromise on a second resolution, 
Jeremy Greenstock had worked with Hans Blix to draw up ‘six tests’ by which Saddam’s 
willingness to comply immediately with his obligations could be measured. The idea was to 
create a crisis, forcing Iraq either to meet or to refuse to meet a set of clear, UN-mandated, 
short-term targets. Presented on the night of 13 March, the six tests were denounced by de 
Villepin before they had even been seen by Iraq. Alastair Campbell seized on de Villepin’s 
hastiness as creating an opportunity “to go to an aggressive position re French intransigence” 
(Campbell and Stott 2007, 677). On 17 March, Jack Straw ordered the withdrawal of the 
second resolution without a vote, stating “President Chirac's unequivocal announcement last 
Monday that France would veto a second resolution containing that or any ultimatum 
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‘whatever the circumstances’ inevitably created a sense of paralysis in our 
negotiations...France has thereby put a Security Council consensus beyond reach” (Straw, 
Hansard 2003h, c703). He had Conservative support both for withdrawing the draft resolution, 
and for blaming France for its failure (Ancram, Hansard 2003h, c705). Even Bill Clinton spoke 
up in Britain against Chirac (Clinton 2003). Although the claim had no legal effect (Goldsmith 
2003e), and had already been widely challenged as a possible source of legitimacy for action 
taken without explicit UN support, the government’s final position was thus that France had 
unreasonably vetoed efforts to agree a collective UN decision to use force against Iraq.  
 
The opposition 
“Thomas Jefferson once argued that ‘a little rebellion now and then is a good thing’. He did not, 
however, have to lead the British Labour party”
 
(The Times 2003c). 
 
By March 2003 the British public was increasingly attentive to the issue of Iraq, and 
indeed becoming increasingly active in its opposition to military action, as the scale of the 15 
February protest suggested. Ordinarily passive actors were expressing opinions on the 
prospect of war with growing regularity “in the pub, at the school gates or on the radio”, as 
more established commentators noted (Moore 2003, cf. Chaytor, Hansard 2003g, c228, Odone 
2003, Greenslade 2003, Woolf 2003, Routledge 2003d). Some observers maintained, in line 
with the Almond-Lippmann consensus view discussed in Chapter 1, that “most people are less 
interested in foreign wars than in their quality of life at home” (The Sunday Telegraph 2003b, 
Routledge 2003b), but the sheer scale of the 15 February marches largely undermines the 
notion that the Iraq issue failed to capture the public imagination. An attentive public is soon a 
more active public, and the more active the public becomes, the greater the volume of Public 
Opinion on a given issue. The case against war was weakened, however, by a number of 
internal shortcomings. People may have distrusted Bush, or even Blair, but no-one wanted to 
stand up for Saddam Hussein (The Daily Telegraph 2003c). This meant there was no positive 
agenda for the broad coalition of anti-war voices to advance (Hari 2003b). Polls may have 
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showed majorities opposed to military action without a specific UN mandate in March 2003, 
but they never suggested the passive public would reject the prospect of war outright. Indeed, 
the picture painted by opinion polls in the media at this time was likely distorted by journalists’ 
focus on the UN. The government bothered to blame France for the collapse of negotiations 
over the second resolution largely in order to counteract media efforts to frame the UN 
process as all-important. Getting acceptance for a line which justified the missing second 
resolution could make the difference between having a majority of voters in favour of war, and 
having a majority against. 
Meanwhile, anti-war sentiment was confused, based around dissatisfaction with 
government communication efforts and with the impact of the US military timetable on efforts 
to achieve peaceful disarmament in Iraq, outlined in Chapter 5, rather than any sense that 
Saddam Hussein deserved sympathy or support. Much of the active opposition, particularly 
that of the apolitical individuals who took to the streets in February, represented more “a howl 
of rage over lies and spin” (The Daily Mail 2003c), a protest against official communications 
rather than a considered critique of the substantive policy being advanced (cf. Kennedy, 
Hansard 2003e, c129, Ancram, Hansard 2003f, c280, Cormack, ibid., c299, Savidge, Hansard 
2003g, c200, Chaytor, ibid., c228, Keane 2003a, Parris 2003, Dobbie 2003, The Mail on Sunday 
2003, The Sunday Mirror 2003a, D’Ancona 2003b, The Daily Mail 2003c, 2003d, McKay 2003, 
Phillips 2003, Carr 2003a, Whittam Smith 2003, The Daily Telegraph 2003d, Daley 2003b, 
Iannucci 2003, Norton-Taylor 2003b, Barnett 2003b, Orr 2003a, Dejevsky 2003, Hattersley 
2003, B. Anderson 2003a, The Independent on Sunday 2003d, Galloway 2003, Honderich 2003, 
The Mirror 2003d, Williams 2005, 192-193). In addition, anti-war protesters at every level 
found their position undermined by the impression, as one commentator noted, that “many of 
them are not really opposed to wars of intervention at all” (Hume 2003, cf. The Sun 2003b, 
Humphrys 2003b, S. Shakespeare 2003). For example, in moving an amendment to the 
government’s motion during the 26 February debate, anti-war MP Chris Smith conceded that 
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he did “not take the view that military action is never, ever likely to be required. There may 
well be a time when it becomes necessary” (Smith, Hansard 2003f, c286, cf. Rogers 2003). He 
argued that such a time had not yet been reached, rather than that it never would be reached. 
Of the 199 MPs who supported Smith’s amendment, 76 failed to oppose the main motion, and 
of those 20 even voted in favour of it, having accepted the proposition that Iraq should comply 
with the will of the UN even as they rejected the argument that its failure to comply warranted 
war.  
The anti-war camp also lacked leaders. The government’s ‘official’ opposition, the 
Conservative Party, supported military action, and had in any event a weak public profile. Press 
coverage, when it considered the Conservatives worthy of comment at all (which was rarely), 
frequently dismissed them as “irrelevant” (Collins 2003, cf. Hames 2003b, Travis 2003, M. 
Brown & O’Grady 2003, The Guardian 2003c, Hattersley 2003, P. Riddell 2003b, White 2003b, 
Finkelstein 2003d, Buckland 2003). Opposition leader Iain Duncan Smith, in theory the leading 
alternative to Tony Blair as Prime Minister, was labelled “Mr Thing”, “baldilocks”, and “a 
disaster” (Carr 2003d, Routledge 2003a, Stewart 2003b). One poll found 71% of respondents 
thought “there is no real political opposition in this country” (The Sunday Times 2003a); as 
usual, it is unlikely such a question would even have been asked had journalists not already 
come up with their own answer. Certainly there was no credible alternative to Labour as the 
party of government. This was significant for the public’s ability to influence policymaking. 
Politicians need only fear their policies becoming unpopular if their rivals offer credible 
alternatives, so that a choice might be established at a future election. Absent that fear, the 
threat that even an unpopular position might be used against them is greatly mitigated. 
As it was, the greatest political challenge to Tony Blair’s position came from within his 
own party. That Labour MPs were less willing to countenance military action than their 
Conservative opponents has been discussed. The Liberal Democrats were anti-war, but they 
were too few in number seriously to affect parliamentary arithmetic. With a commanding 
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overall majority in the Commons, the government could only be prevented from carrying out 
its policy by a massive Labour revolt, a position strengthened still further by Conservative 
support. The government might alternatively have collapsed as a result of internal divisions, 
should these reach a sufficient degree of intensity. In the Cabinet, International Development 
Secretary Clare Short, and Leader of the House (and former Foreign Secretary) Robin Cook had 
each expressed doubts about the course to war. Short moved first. On 10 March she gave a 
radio interview attacking Blair as “reckless” and threatening publicly that she would resign in 
the event of war (Short 2003). In violation of both the convention of collective Cabinet 
responsibility, and the Labour Party’s own communications policies, she had given the 
interview on her own initiative, without consulting even her own department, let alone 
Alastair Campbell (Chakrabarti 2003). Crucially, too, she had failed to discuss the extent of her 
concerns in private with the Prime Minister, before expressing them on air. To Blair, Short was 
merely “being her usual self” (Blair 2010b, 428). He might have sacked her, but instead she 
became another target for his persuasion efforts. At first this lenience appeared a sign of 
weakness, of a desire to avoid making martyrs at a time of great tension in the Labour Party 
(Cook 2003, 316, Stothard 2003, 7, Glover 2003, Routledge 2003c, Jones 2003a, The Times 
2003f). Some commentators noted, however, that a more Machiavellian spin could be put on 
Blair’s behaviour, suggesting his goal was to discredit Short by convincing her to make a u-turn 
(White 2003c, Jones 2003c). Whether it was Blair’s intention or not, Short was definitely 
discredited. Her interview was described as “self-serving, personalised and incompatible with 
her position as a member of Mr Blair's Cabinet” (The Independent 2003e, cf. P. Riddell 2003c, 
Lee-Potter 2003, The News of the World 2003c). “The pointed contrast with Robin Cook” was 
noted (D. MacIntyre 2003d). When she then failed to resign, she became “a laughing stock” 
(Wilson 2003b); literally, in fact. In writing his satirical cinematic take on the Iraq war, 2009’s In 
the Loop, the comedian Armando Iannucci drew on Short’s autobiography to construct the 
central character, a hapless International Development Minister. One scene repeated Short’s 
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words almost verbatim (Iannucci 2009). Contemplating resignation in the face of war in the 
Middle East, which he opposes, the minister asks “ is it braver to do the wrong thing, and not 
resign?”. His callow special adviser equivocates; the cynical civil servant travelling with them 
answers simply, exasperated, “no!” (Hollander, Addison and McKee 2009). British Public 
Opinion took a similarly dim view of Short’s behaviour. When she finally resigned in May 2003, 
her reputation lay in tatters.  
Robin Cook was potentially more dangerous to Blair, if only because he had managed 
to use the media as a conduit for making his private concerns public without destroying his 
own credibility in the process. Cook, however, was determined to avoid damaging Blair as far 
as possible; he remained a supporter of the Prime Minister’s domestic policies and, perhaps 
more importantly, a sworn enemy of his likely successor, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon 
Brown. Cook had expressed concerns throughout the build-up to war, and at Cabinet on 13 
March he strongly hinted he would not remain in government once the fighting began 
(Stothard 2003, 38). The next day, he met Alastair Campbell to discuss “rules of engagement” 
for his leaving office, and the pair agreed the text of both Cook’s resignation letter and the 
Prime Minister’s response (Cook 2003, 322, Campbell and Stott 2007, 677). They also agreed 
the timing of the announcement, and that Cook would make his resignation statement to the 
House on 17 March, the night before the main parliamentary debate on Iraq, rather than 
during the debate itself. Although the entire exchange demonstrated unwillingness on Cook’s 
part to damage Blair, this latter agreement was particularly important. Despite maintaining “I 
have no sympathy with, and I will give no comfort to, those who want to use this crisis to 
displace [Blair]”, in explaining his decision to step down, Cook proceeded in his statement to 
challenge systematically the Prime Minister’s core arguments in favour of war. Had he spoken 
directly before the Prime Minister at the start of the following day’s debate, the effect could 
have been devastating. Applauding the “heroic efforts” made to get a second resolution, Cook 
argued “the very intensity of those attempts underlines how important it was to succeed”. 
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Recalling government efforts to portray France as wreckers of the UN process, he noted “it is 
not France alone that wants more time for inspections. Germany wants more time for 
inspections; Russia wants more time for inspections; indeed, at no time have we signed up 
even the minimum necessary to carry a second resolution”. Considering the level of the threat 
from Iraq, he observed “ironically, it is only because Iraq's military forces are so weak that we 
can even contemplate its invasion”, insisting with some incredulity that “we cannot base our 
military strategy on the assumption that Saddam is weak and at the same time justify pre-
emptive action on the claim that he is a threat”. As for WMD, “Iraq probably has no weapons 
of mass destruction in the commonly understood sense of the term”. The US had sought a UN 
process only to make “the case for war”, hence “why any evidence that inspections may be 
showing progress is greeted in Washington not with satisfaction but with consternation” 
(Cook, Hansard 2003h, cc726-728). The speech prompted a standing ovation from assembled 
MPs. Unlike most parliamentary speeches, it was not interrupted by heckling or interventions. 
Cook was left to elaborate his argument for ten minutes unfettered and without rebuttal. Blair 
was not present, but Straw sat impassive on the government bench throughout. The press 
thought Cook’s performance “electrifying” (Waugh & Woolf 2003, P. Riddell 2003d). He had 
delivered a “masterclass in foreign policy analysis” (Brogan 2003) which had “swept away the 
cobweb of lies and obfuscation” constructed by the government (Routledge 2003e), delivering 
a “dynamite blast of dissent...without self-pity” (Letts 2003a), “dignified and measured, yet all 
the more coruscating for that” (Waugh 2003b). Only The Sun refused to join the praise, 
dedicating its 18 March leading article to describing Cook (and Short) as “the enemy within” 
(The Sun 2003g).   
Cook’s statement had hit the official case for war hard, but his decision not to risk 
undermining Blair blunted its impact. Short had proven not to be credible as an anti-war 
leader. The Liberal Democrats opposed war, but struggled to be heard, and their parliamentary 
clout was constrained by their limited numbers. There were, furthermore, divisions among 
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those public figures traditionally on the political left who might have been expected to oppose 
military action. Several found themselves reviving the ‘hard liberal’ line devised by Polly 
Toynbee in October 2001 and discussed in Chapter 2. The Observer newspaper, for example, 
took a pro-war stance, calling in effect for regime change on humanitarian grounds. Labour 
left-winger Ann Clwyd MP, a respected and established parliamentary authority on Iraq, 
pushed the same position (Clwyd, Hansard 2003f, c321, cf. The Observer 2003c, Cohen 2003a, 
2003b, 2003c, Hari 2003a, Aaronovitch 2003). Although the moral case for war put by the 
government was dismissed in some quarters as “a confidence trick” (Plesch 2003), the fact that 
it was adopted independently by a number of actors who might otherwise have been expected 
to oppose military action was of great significance for the overall tenor of Public Opinion. It 
also reinforced the fact that there was no coherent anti-war alternative.  
Opponents of military action were further discouraged from speaking out by a desire 
to support British troops, either through genuine belief (Cordingley 2003, The Daily Mail 
2003f), or fear of media opprobrium, possibly mindful of The Sun’s lists of “traitors” during the 
Afghan campaign (Robinson, et al. 2009, 537). Many also appeared to accept that military 
action had, by March 2003, become inevitable. If a million marchers could only convince the 
Prime Minister to redouble his efforts at persuasion, there was a sense that nothing would 
change his substantive position. Indeed, the protesters’ choice of ‘not in my name’ as a 
primary slogan reflected this fatalism. They thought war would probably happen regardless. 
They wanted simply to register their disagreement before it began (Keane 2003b, cf. Woods 
2003, Harris 2003). As the Daily Telegraph put it on the day of the war debate: “the time has 
passed when war could be averted, so any vote against war cannot be effective or persuasive. 
Such a vote turns, then, from being an expression of principle to being an act of defeatism” 
(The Daily Telegraph 2003g). Blair had insisted all along that no debate could take place on the 
use of force against Iraq until a firm decision had been taken. By denying a role for Public 
Opinion in the decision-making process in this way, he had drawn criticism. What the manner 
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in which the 18 March vote was approached reveals, however, is the clear strategic advantage 
gained by the determined refusal to engage in public debate, at least in terms of the Prime 
Minister’s ability to implement his chosen policy. Asked to comment on hypothetical scenarios, 
such as the failure to get a second UN resolution to authorise military action, he had always 
refused, insisting that he remained confident no such scenario would arise (cf. Finkelstein 
2003c). The motion debated in Parliament on 26 February simply proposed support for the 
government’s efforts to work through the UN, making no mention of military action. It was 
thus not until 18 March that MPs were given the chance to debate and vote on the particular 
combination of circumstances which actually pertained when war began, namely the absence 
of a clear conclusion to the UN process, but also the imminence of an unstoppable US assault. 
By this point, it probably was too late for opposition to be effective. Just as small states at the 
UN saw little point in sticking their necks out to support a doomed Security Council Resolution 
once France had confirmed it would veto, so too backbench MPs, by mid-March 2003, 
recognised that the US was going to war regardless, and that the British government would 
almost certainly go along with it. Why risk standing out?  
There was a further sense that Labour MPs opposed to war, but otherwise supportive 
of the government (and the Prime Minister in particular), found themselves effectively having 
to choose between the two positions; this had been Cook’s dilemma. Once the government 
had committed to a vote authorising the use of force, the possibility arose that MPs could 
prevent at least British involvement in the Iraq campaign. They could do so, however, only at 
the cost of bringing down the government, a position underscored when the left-wing 
Campaign Group of MPs began calling for an emergency Party conference to replace Blair 
(Kampfner 2003, 294). By 12 March, a number of Labour Parliamentary Private Secretaries 
were backtracking from earlier suggestions that they might resign over Iraq, fearful of the 
negative impact on the government (Watt & Perkins 2003). Public Opinion concluded that 
Labour might disagree with Blair on Iraq, but was unwilling to sacrifice him to see that 
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disagreement through (Jones 2003b, cf. Watson & Webster 2003, Sparrow 2003, Sieghart 
2003b, C. Brown & Elliott 2003, Kavanagh 2003b). At a dramatic PLP meeting on 13 March, 
“the enormity of it dawned on the rank and file: the most successful Labour prime minister 
ever, the only one to win two huge majorities, was facing open rebellion” (Carr-Brown et al. 
2003). Diana Organ, who was sceptical about the need for war, nevertheless led a number of 
anti-war MPs in standing up for Blair. His harshest critics were shouted down; Tam Dalyell 
stormed out. On 15 March a meeting at Downing Street involving Blair, Labour Party Chairman 
John Reid, and a number of key advisers agreed to give MPs a chance to get back to their 
constituencies, where “local Labour leaders, chairmen of constituency parties, may remind 
them why they were elected in the first place, why, without Tony Blair, there would not be a 
Labour government” (Stothard 2003, 52). As Matthew D’Ancona put it, in the final week before 
the war began, most Labour MPs had remembered something he thought “blindingly 
obvious...the public did not vote for Labour in 1997 and 2001: it voted for Blair” (D’Ancona 
2003c). Ironically, then, for all his conviction, for all his persuasive efforts, Blair approached the 
18 March debate with a reasonably good chance of success both because of and in spite of the 
strength of his commitment to action against Iraq.  
 
Path dependence 
 
 Chapter 5 hints at the damage done to the government’s efforts to win public support 
by the continued public perception that the US had decided at an early stage to wage war 
come what may, and that Britain was simply struggling to justify tagging along. Ken Clarke 
summed up the thoughts of many during the 26 February parliamentary debate, expressing 
the belief “that the course to war upon which we are now embarked was decided on many 
months ago, primarily in Washington, and there has been a fairly remorseless unfolding of 
events since that time” (Clarke, Kenneth, Hansard 2003f, c294). Concerns of this sort, which 
were distinct from dissatisfaction with excessive spin, abounded during the final weeks (cf. 
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Smith, ibid., c286, Gummer, ibid., c310, Clarke, Tom, ibid., c349, Illsley, Hansard 2003g, c192, 
The Mirror 2003b, M. Campbell 2003, Sardar 2003, The Independent 2003a, 2003c, 2003h, The 
Guardian 2003e, 2003f, D. MacIntyre 2003c, Morgan 2003, Dawkins 2003, Hastings 2003a, 
2003b, The Sunday Mirror 2003b, The Independent on Sunday 2003e, Richards 2003c, La 
Guardia 2003, Howard 2003, Maddox 2003b, Jenkins 2003b, Kaletsky 2003). As well as 
worrying whether the government was telling the truth, Blair admitted, “people want to know 
that war is not inevitable” (Blair 2003f). He apparently told Bush “the public opinion problem 
stemmed from people feeling the US wanted a war” come what may, rather than from any real 
disagreement with the objective of disarming Iraq and overthrowing Saddam Hussein 
(Campbell and Stott 2007, 674). This certainly was part of the problem. Further issues resulted, 
however, from the undeniable fact that the Prime Minister believed that standing “shoulder to 
shoulder” with the US was both in the British national interest and inherently right (Blair 
2010b, 352). By February 2003 Blair’s evident belief in the Iraq policy had mitigated the 
“poodle problem” (Campbell and Stott 2007, 669) to a degree, in that commentators had 
largely accepted that, whatever his motives, he was not blindly following presidential orders. 
Nevertheless, the conflation of values and interests in Blair’s view of the ‘special relationship’ 
continued to cause confusion. The public would likely have accepted that the government was 
supporting the US out of pure realpolitik, seeking to stay close to Britain’s most powerful ally 
(Hollis 2006, 38, Stothard 2003, 107). Blair however made it clear (Blair 2003f, Blair 2010a, 62, 
129) that, rather than making a rational calculation of interest, he had been driven primarily by 
values. He believed in the US alliance; it was “an article of faith” (Blair, Hansard 2002m, c21, cf. 
Dumbrell 2009, 275, Dyson 2006, 289, Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers 2007, 207, Kramer 2003, 
Campbell 2010a, 32). The British people might have understood realpolitik. They did not, 
indeed could not, share Blair’s fervour (Tyrie, Hansard 2003g, c217, Humphrys 2003a).  
 It was faith in the special relationship which had, however, effectively “trapped” the 
Prime Minister into military action (Coates and Krieger 2009, 248-249). By early 2003, the fact 
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that he could turn back only at great cost, in terms both of domestic and international 
credibility, was widely noted (The Mail on Sunday 2003, Stott 2003, Clark 2003, Alexander 
2003, The Guardian 2003g, Cornwell 2003b, Richards 2003b). The effect was compounded by 
ministers’ continued insistence that the choice they faced was solely between war and 
capitulation (Straw 2003c, Blair, Hansard 2003e, cc124-125). Chapter 5 notes the growing 
sense that the confrontation with Iraq was developing independent momentum towards war. 
As the moment of decision drew closer, observers began to express concerns about that sense 
of unstoppable escalation. One columnist referred to the US experience in Vietnam, warning 
that states commit themselves to military action far earlier than they might intend, with small 
decisions establishing positions from which the only credible way forward is war (Finkelstein 
2003b). By arguing in April 2002 that Saddam Hussein almost certainly had to be removed 
from power, in September that he posed a direct threat to the UK, and in early 2003 that he 
was threatening to undermine the UN, Blair had systematically not just rejected but utterly 
dismissed the main arguments against British involvement in military action. Only one 
remained; the fact that the US did not need British military support. By March 2003 the Bush 
administration was going to war with Iraq regardless, even, of British participation. When 
Donald Rumsfeld announced on 11 March that Britain might not take part in the initial 
invasion because of difficulties within the Labour Party, and insisted that the US could and 
would proceed regardless, it had thus the effect of “reinforcing in the minds of opponents of 
the war that [Blair] was scampering to give the Americans help they did not really need” 
(Kampfner 2003, 291, cf. The Independent 2003f, Waterhouse 2003). Despite the potential for 
political and diplomatic embarrassment, the Prime Minister could have taken Rumsfeld’s 
comments as an opportunity to pull out. The problem was that he “believed in military action” 
(Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 161, emphasis in original).  
 Although the decision to focus the government’s communication strategy on the 
threat from Iraqi WMD, and on the need to uphold UN resolutions, was probably the best that 
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could have been made at the time, in the end the failure to make the case earlier that 
removing Saddam was simply ‘the right thing to do’ probably damaged public support (Hollis 
2010, 86, cf. B. Anderson 2003b). Chapter 7 discusses the long-term effects of public 
dissatisfaction with the communication campaign in more detail. Britain’s inability to influence 
the US timetable (Wallace 2005, 54) might have appeared less problematic had senior 
ministers’ genuine belief in the need to act against Iraq been established in the public mind at 
an earlier stage, even though the position itself would have been unpopular. The Prime 
Minister’s unwillingness to try to restrain the President would at least have been explained. US 
officials were well aware of Blair’s domestic difficulties, and keen to help if they could. They 
had accepted the September dossier and the involvement of the UN; they might yet accept a 
further delay, if Blair asked (Kampfner 2003, 273-274, Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 
152, Campbell and Stott 2007, 672). Tony Brenton, Deputy Ambassador in Washington (Meyer 
having retired by this point), cabled London to report having briefed senior officials (the names 
are redacted in the declassified paper) on the position in Parliament, observing that “the only 
event which might significantly affect [the US] timetable would be problems for the UK”, and 
that for this reason, the Americans were “pulling out all the stops in the UN” (Brenton 2003a). 
Some British observers suggested Blair could use his domestic situation to apply leverage to 
Bush (Toynbee 2003b, D. MacIntyre 2003c, White & Wintour 2003, Rawnsley 2003). As 
Chapter 5 discusses, however, Bush had domestic concerns of his own, having established 
expectations with his repeated denunciations of Saddam Hussein. The extent to which he 
would have risked retribution to help his ally was never tested to destruction, in the end.  
 
Endgame 
 
 So it was that Tony Blair stood up in Parliament on the afternoon of 18 March 2003 to 
propose that the House “supports the decision of Her Majesty’s Government that the United 
Kingdom should use all means necessary to ensure the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass 
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destruction” (Blair, Hansard 2003i, c760). He knew defeat would mean the end of his 
premiership (Stothard 2003, 55), but as Chief Whip Hilary Armstrong recalled, “in the end he 
just thought it was the right thing to do”; another example of the triumph of instinct over 
calculation in Blair’s policymaking approach (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 159). Alastair 
Campbell thought Robin Cook’s statement had marked “the high point of the rebellion” 
(Campbell and Stott 2007, 680-681), but Blair still knew he was making “the most important 
speech I had ever made” (Blair 2010b, 436). He rose to the occasion, mounting a passionate 
defence of the positions he had taken over the preceding months, and concluding that, 
“in this dilemma, no choice is perfect, no choice is ideal, but on this decision hangs the 
fate of many things...To retreat now, I believe, would put at hazard all that we hold 
dearest. To turn the United Nations back into a talking shop; to stifle the first steps of 
progress in the middle east; to leave the Iraqi people to the mercy of events over 
which we would have relinquished all power to influence for the better; to tell our 
allies that at the very moment of action, at the very moment when they need our 
determination, Britain faltered: I will not be party to such a course. This is not the time 
to falter. This is the time not just for this Government—or, indeed, for this Prime 
Minister—but for this House to give a lead: to show that we will stand up for what we 
know to be right; to show that we will confront the tyrannies and dictatorships and 
terrorists who put our way of life at risk; to show, at the moment of decision, that we 
have the courage to do the right thing” (Blair, Hansard 2003i, cc773-774). 
 
By insisting “I will not be party to such a course”, Blair spoke to the fears of many Labour MPs 
that a vote against war would mean the end of their most successful leader ever. He was 
helped, again, by the lack of strong opposition voices. Iain Duncan Smith argued that “the 
Prime Minister is acting in the national interest” (Duncan Smith, ibid., c779) in pledging his full 
support for war. Even the anti-war amendment moved by Peter Kilfoyle was soft, arguing “the 
case for war against Iraq has not yet been established” before going on to concede that, “in 
the event that hostilities do commence”, the House should support British forces (Kilfoyle, 
ibid.). A long and serious debate followed; aside from Blair’s opening statement and Straw’s 
concluding remarks, fifty five MPs spoke. Twenty three opposed war, twenty seven supported 
it, and five remained unconvinced. The final shape of parliamentary opinion encompassed a 
broad range of themes. Clare Short was mocked for failing to resign as promised (Hague, ibid., 
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c791). France was more often blamed for the failure at the UN (Bayley, ibid., c764, MacKay, 
c804, David, c844, Burnett, c849, Bradley, c856, Jack, c865, Davies, c871, Ancram, c891) than it 
was defended (Salmond, ibid., c820, Sedgemore, c836, Banks, c880). American unilateralism 
was attacked (Denham, ibid., c798, Savidge, c817, Marshall-Andrews, c852, Curry, c883, Hoyle, 
c887), but the point also made that for all the Bush administration’s diplomatic heavy-
handedness, Saddam Hussein remained the real enemy (Winnick, ibid., c795, Soley, c813). 
Government communication efforts were criticised (Johnson, ibid., c812, McDonnell, c876) 
while the Prime Minister’s own speech was praised (Mawhinney, ibid., c815). Some MPs 
reported having been convinced of the need for war (George, ibid., c801, MacKay, c804), 
others, if not won over, had at least wobbled in their anti-war convictions as a result of Blair’s 
arguments (Quin, ibid., c805, Randall, c827, Hoyle, cc884-885). One particularly confused MP 
concluded “I cannot vote against a motion that offers support to Her Majesty's armed forces 
who are now on duty in the middle east. Of course, there are matters in the Government 
motion with which I do not agree and which I cannot support...[if the amendment fails] I will 
make my position quite clear. I shall probably have to abstain” (which he did) (Burnett, ibid., 
c850, cf. Pike, c889). Deciding one will probably not vote, it was pointed out, is a poor way of 
making one’s position quite clear. Crucially, it was acknowledged that “the choice tonight is 
not whether to prevent war...we cannot prevent war. The choice is either to go in alongside 
the Americans to topple Saddam Hussein, or to let the Americans go in on their own” (Davies, 
ibid., c867, cf. Tyrie, c869). By 18 March, when the only real chance opponents had to stop the 
war arrived, it was already too late to stop the war. The same fatalism which had characterised 
the final days of public debate in the press descended over Parliament in these final hours. In 
the end, the amendment was defeated by 396 to 221 votes, and the motion authorising war 
passed by 412 to 149. Just nine MPs voted for the amendment before switching to support the 
motion. Unlike during the 26 February vote, when the motion discussed had called only for the 
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government to support the UN, there remained on 18 March no doubt that MPs were voting 
for war.  
 Press coverage attributed the government’s success above all to the quality of the 
Prime Minister’s argument, and the passion with which it had been made. Blair had been 
“furious with intent, fizzing with conviction, at times imploring, at others raging against the 
recklessness of inaction”, “roaring, alive, quivering with ferocious tension, like a sub-lieutenant 
about to lead a battalion into battle...passionate yet coherent, furious while icily controlled” 
(Letts 2003b, Hoggart 2003). The speech was “raw, simple, dignified, and bleak: a promise, a 
plea, and a warning” and “the most persuasive case yet made by the man who has emerged as 
the most formidable persuader for war” (B. MacIntyre 2003, The Independent 2003i). It was 
noted that “on the eve of unstoppable war, for some it was too late to be worth damaging the 
government” (Toynbee 2003c), but also argued that “it was not only the vote that Tony Blair 
won in the House of Commons last night. It was the argument, too” (The Daily Telegraph 
2003h, The Times 2003j). Although The Guardian maintained that war was “both unnecessary 
and avoidable” (The Guardian 2003k), while John Pilger called for open rebellion against the 
government (Pilger 2003), a general sense that the point had been lost pervaded the anti-war 
press, which began to focus instead on hopes for Iraq’s future (The Independent 2003i). 
Military action was launched on the night of 19/20 March.  
 
Quantitative indicators 
 
As figure 26 indicates, once war became imminent, initially anti-war passive public 
responses to poll questions gave way to a sound pro-war majority, in place by the morning of 
the 18 March debate, and so in advance both of the final decision by MPs to support war, and 
the start of hostilities. This shift reflects both a decline in the number of respondents reporting 
anti-war views, and also in the number of “don’t know” responses.  
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Figure 26: Opinion poll data showing support for military action against Iraq, 15 February – 30 
March 2003. 
 
 
Figure 27: Distribution of speeches by British MPs in debates on Iraq policy between 15 
February and 18 March 2003. 
 
The parliamentary debate was more evenly split. What is notable from figure 27 is the very 
small proportion of speeches, just 7%, which took a neutral line at this stage. This likely 
reflects, again, the imminence of a decision, and shows a marked shift from the position 
reported in Chapter 5, when large numbers of MPs appealed to the judgement of the UN 
rather than adopting a specific pro or anti-war position for themselves.  
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Figure 28: Average editorial positions adopted by leading UK newspapers towards military 
action in Iraq (1 = pro-war, 0 = neutral, -1 = anti-war), controlling for circulation, October 2002 
– February 2003 (n = 911). 
 
Trends in press commentary, outlined in figure 28, show a similar pattern to that visible in 
opinion polls. Anti-war sentiments declined from over 40% of commentary circulated in mid-
February, to below 20% at the start of the invasion; the average position reached its strongest 
pro-war level during the entire debate. Interestingly, it was only at the very end of the period 
that ‘pro-war’ overtook ‘neutral’ as the most popular position, suggesting that much media 
analysis retained a degree of balance even in the final weeks before war. 
Figure 29 meanwhile demonstrates the extent to which British Public Opinion was 
activated by the issue of Iraq. Over nine hundred commentary articles were published 
between 1 February and 20 March 2003; in total March saw nearly double the volume of 
commentary on Iraq as was published in relation to Afghanistan in October 2001. The 
contentious nature of the Iraq debate had made it more worthy of comment in the eyes of the 
British media than the better-supported earlier conflict.  
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Figure 29: Volume of commentary articles in UK newspapers relating to Iraq, 1 February – 20 
March 2003. 
 
 
Figure 30: Proportional distribution of newspaper commentary on the prospect of military 
action against Iraq, by publication, 15 February – 20 March 2003 (n-numbers in brackets). 
 
Figure 30 illustrates the overall position towards war taken in these final weeks by 
commentary published in each of the major newspapers considered in this study. As with 
previous chapters, the tabloid press dominates the edges of the scale, with the ‘quality’ press 
publishing a wider range of views and a greater proportion of neutral analysis. Of most note 
here is the position of The Observer, far removed toward the pro-war camp, away from its 
sister paper, the strongly anti-war Guardian. As noted above, The Observer took an editorial 
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Figure 31: Basic factor analysis of positions taken by leading public actors towards war with 
Iraq, 15 February – 20 March 2003
 
Again, the presence of Observer
towards the pro-war end of the scale is noteworthy. Their placing illustrates the very real 
divisions which had opened up on the British left by the time military action commenced. 
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Tony Blair, the driver of the policy from the beginning, certain that his chosen course best 
reflected both Britain’s interests and her values. He was never likely to be swayed by the views 
of others; the way he responded to the 15 February march, in particular, shows this. Dealt a 
blow but clearly unbowed, he redoubled his persuasion efforts and held to his substantive 
position. His conviction did not win him the argument. Opposition remained. But Blair’s 
evident certainty blunted several of his opponents’ key criticisms, not least that he had failed 
to cleave a sufficiently independent line from that pursued by the United States.  
Having introduced a ‘moral case’ for war in response to pressure from the ‘Stop the 
War’ marchers, the government struggled to make it stick. Regime change, long avoided as a 
military objective in public statements, remained evidently illegal. Far more success came from 
blaming France for the US and UK failure to secure a firm UN mandate for military action. By 
18 March, the opposition was struggling to articulate a coherent anti-war case. It lacked 
leaders, with the ‘official’ Conservative opposition in favour of war, the Liberal Democrats 
ridiculed in press and parliament, and Labour MPs either unwilling to overthrow their own 
Prime Minister, or unable to maintain a consistent argument. The opposition camp had also 
lost heart, in the face of Blair’s determination to act. By 18 March, many thought war was 
inevitable. They were probably right, though Britain could perhaps have pulled out, at some 
cost to the ‘special relationship’, and possibly still at the cost of the Prime Minister. These were 
penalties few of those in a position to influence the government were willing to bear. The Iraq 
war would not be fought in their name. But it would still be fought.   
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Chapter 7 – Consequences: March 2003 - present 
 
 Six years passed between the first deployment of British troops to Iraq and their final 
withdrawal from Basra province. Saddam Hussein’s armed forces had proven no match for the 
US-led invasion. His fractious country represented a much greater challenge, and in the years 
of chaos and insurgency that followed hundreds of British and thousands of American service 
personnel perished, along with tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians. Although some semblance 
of stability and democracy eventually emerged in Baghdad, and the dictator’s execution 
removed a potentially destabilising force from the political landscape of the Middle East, 
British Public Opinion continues to regard the war as a strategic failure. Rather than this simply 
being a consequence of events on the ground, it represents to a much greater extent 
dissatisfaction with the way the decision to take military action was ‘sold’. Having presented its 
actions as an essential corrective to Iraq’s development of banned Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, the Blair government found its credibility seriously undermined when no such 
weapons were ever found. Having upset journalists, by rejecting their anti-war arguments and 
seeking to ‘spin’ the source material upon which they based their reports, ministers found 
themselves unable to present the conflict positively to the public without being challenged 
relentlessly in the press. Facing the electorate in 2005, New Labour confronted a revitalised 
Conservative Party that sought with some success to reframe the decision to go to war as a 
matter of official perfidy rather than one of national interest. In the end the Blair government 
retained power, winning a reduced but still healthy majority of seats in parliament. Only then 
did it face the most extreme consequence of its foreign policy for domestic Public Opinion, the 
July suicide bombings on the London transport network. For those British Muslim voters who 
withdrew their support for Labour in 2005 in response to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
for the outliers who turned to terrorism, the substance of the continued fighting probably held 
more significance than its communication. For most of Public Opinion, however, it is to 
communication, to ‘spin’, that arguments repeatedly return.     
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Trust 
 
When Tony Blair decided to go to war in Iraq, he might reasonably have expected that 
by the time they next came to vote, “the public would forget it and judge the government by 
their domestic agenda” (Cook 2003, 337). Democratic publics appear not to pay much 
attention to foreign policy matters most of the time, and there is little evidence that 
international affairs affect electoral decision-making to any significant extent. Crucially for 
Blair, however, public indifference to events overseas does not mean leaders escape 
punishment should their foreign policies appear to go wrong. Few individuals will bother with 
the details of diplomacy, but most will be interested in evidence of official incompetence, 
weakness, or dishonesty, since these characteristics are likely to affect every aspect of a 
government’s performance, not just far-off conflicts (Nincic 1992, 93). The main impact of the 
Iraq war on British Public Opinion was its contribution to the growing conviction that Blair and 
his advisers were dishonest (Coates and Krieger 2004, 5, 87, Hollis 2006, 44, Kennedy-Pipe and 
Vickers 2007, 206, Hill 2007, 276, Dunne 2008, 340). There were other reasons why polls in the 
years after the invasion found 49% of respondents thought the Prime Minister personally 
untrustworthy (IPSOS MORI 2003) or showed 63% of likely voters thought his government had 
not “on balance, been honest” (YouGov 2005). There were other causes of Blair’s inability to 
challenge Gordon Brown or much of the Labour Party over the Euro or public service reform, 
both battles originally planned for his second term in office (Cook 2003, 357, Seldon, Snowdon 
and Collings 2007, 240, 385-386). Above all, however, it was the credibility crisis induced by 
arguments over Iraq that defined the latter years of New Labour, and which continues to 
shape its place in history. As the appearance of a lone protester at his Leveson Inquiry 
appearance demonstrated, Blair’s alleged ‘war crimes’ in Iraq continue to evoke passionate 
responses, and to colour views of his premiership. 
  New Labour’s alleged obsession with ‘spin’ had damaged public trust in its probity 
even before controversies arose around legal advice and WMD (Chandler 2003, 299, Heffernan 
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2006, 588). The existence of “a perceived record of distortion and manipulation on the part of 
an administration” can be enough, on its own, to fuel doubts over a conflict (Baum and 
Groeling 2010a, 475). In the Blair government’s case, this effect was exacerbated by the 
hostility of large parts of the British media towards any attempt to portray official positions in 
a positive light. Blair told the Chilcot Inquiry that, even before the actual fighting began, “we 
[in government] were fighting a constant battle against people [in the media] utterly 
misrepresenting us, our motives, what we were trying to do” (Blair 2010a, 214, cf. 2012a, 2). 
Journalists were responsible for numerous examples of ‘spin’ every bit as disingenuous as that 
put out by the government during the course of the debate preceding the invasion. Certain 
newspapers displayed a visceral hostility not only to government communications, but often 
also to each other, with all the detrimental effects for the quality of public debate such conflict 
implies. The perceived news value of scandal was such that any opportunity to accuse the 
government of wrongdoing was seized upon by media critics, often with little regard to the 
substance of the charges made. Because Britain had gone to war to disarm Iraq, and Iraq had 
turned out not to need disarming, even the least credible charges placed against official claims 
affected public perceptions to some degree.   
The most egregious example of the enthusiasm shown for publishing material 
damaging to ministers came in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. The Mirror 
received photographs purporting to show British troops abusing Iraqi prisoners of war, and 
published them prominently without waiting for comment from the Ministry of Defence. 
Shortly thereafter, officials were able to confirm that the pictures were in fact fakes; they 
showed men apparently from units not stationed in Iraq, carrying equipment not used there, 
abusing a ‘prisoner’ in a type of truck never deployed outside of Europe. Mirror editor Piers 
Morgan initially refused to retract the story, insinuating that even if the particular images were 
fake, they still represented actual conduct by British troops. The following day he was forced 
to resign by the newspaper’s publishers, apparently fearful of further antagonising both the 
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government and the wider public. The Mirror had been the most consistent and vocal of anti-
war publications prior to the invasion, but its mistakes over the prisoner abuse images 
demonstrated the damaging effects of pre-war dissatisfaction leading to post-invasion distrust, 
and so clouding journalists’ critical faculties (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 270). They 
also undermined its credibility, and damaged its confidence. Ministers hardly benefitted from 
Morgan’s disgrace and his employers’ embarrassment, however. Even with the original report 
withdrawn and an apology issued, public perceptions of the ongoing military campaign had 
been negatively affected.  
Two major post-invasion developments accelerated the collapse of public trust in the 
British government over Iraq. To begin with, the deterioration of the situation on the ground 
meant that, by the time of the 2005 election, British and US troops were engaged in a 
protracted counter-insurgency campaign with no end in sight. Iraq thus became the ‘quagmire’ 
that policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic had sought above all to avoid. During the 
Vietnam war, US leaders believed bad news from the front could be enough on its own to 
undermine public support for a military campaign (Mueller 1973). More recent studies have 
found the effect of individual setbacks is qualified where audiences still believe success is 
possible overall, although it should be noted that the press itself plays an important role in the 
establishment of such beliefs (Taylor 1992, 274, Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005, Eichenberg 
2005, 141, 163, Gelpi, Reifler and Feaver 2007, 158). Ministers might have been able to ride 
out the unpopularity associated with continued instability (and rising casualties) in Iraq had 
they successfully maintained an overall impression in the public mind that the conflict was 
going well. Two key criteria determine the ability of an administration to dominate the way the 
success of a military campaign is assessed in public debate. Firstly, the narrative that the 
government seeks to promote must be congruent with well-established and commonly-held 
criteria for success. It is difficult to re-define the goals of a military operation once it has been 
launched; they become crystallised the moment shooting starts. Whether, therefore, the Blair 
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government would be able to present the results of the invasion of Iraq in a positive light 
depended in large part on how far it had established realistic criteria for gauging success prior 
to the fighting starting. Secondly, the government must be able effectively to subsume 
contradictory developments into a broader positive narrative (Graham 1994, 194). This is more 
a matter of post-invasion than pre-invasion ‘spin’, although undoubtedly having been 
successful in earlier debates makes policymakers’ subsequent tasks easier. An inability to 
frame unexpected setbacks as undesirable but fundamentally irrelevant glitches on the road to 
success left the British government struggling to maintain the line that the decision to use 
force against Iraq had been the right one, and had produced desirable outcomes. 
Unfortunately for Blair and his ministers, it was clear to most observers, particularly those in 
the media, primed to focus their reporting on stories inimical to the government line, that by 
2004 Iraq was in crisis. With ministers privately being warned of imminent “strategic failure” in 
Iraq (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 262), they were in no position to claim that things 
were going well.  
  Public Opinion soon accepted that the Iraq campaign was unlikely to prove an 
unqualified success. What support there was for continuing the fight might have held up 
better had it still been thought legitimate. Unfortunately for the government, investigations 
after the invasion revealed that Saddam Hussein had not in fact been hiding WMD. Although, 
in the US, “15-30 percent of the public thought during the period from May 2003 to April 2004 
that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction had actually been found” (Everts and Isernia 2005, 
266), in the UK the picture was different. Helped in large part by a media primed to reach and 
then to highlight such a conclusion, the British passive public widely recognised at a much 
earlier stage “that Iraq no longer appeared to have even the chemical weapons it was known 
to possess when UN Inspectors had last been allowed access in 1998”. The effect was 
devastating for the government’s credibility; “once it was clear that this particular emperor 
had had no clothes, not even old ones, perceptions of the legitimacy of the action against Iraq, 
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already imbued with significant amounts of scepticism, became critically damaging” (Michalski 
and Gow 2007, 145). WMD had been the centrepiece of the case for war. However much Tony 
Blair had personally believed in the moral virtue of regime change for its own sake, publicly he 
had described it only as either a necessary cause or an inevitable consequence of Iraqi 
disarmament. The alleged development of illegal weapons by Iraq had underpinned the legal 
basis for the invasion, and had been used to explain why a country thousands of miles away 
posed such a direct threat to Britain as to warrant war. With varying degrees of success, the 
government had framed the action taken by the ‘coalition of the willing’ as simply the 
enforcement of outstanding UN Security Council judgements relating to Iraqi WMD. The 
realisation that Iraq did not in fact have WMD raised serious questions about both the 
presentation and the substance of the decision to invade, and critically undermined the 
legitimacy of the entire campaign.  
The impact of the missing weapons on public perceptions of the conflict was 
exacerbated by the ongoing chaos in Iraq, and by rising British casualty rates (Daddow 2011, 
230). Blair himself recalls the double blow suffered by the government, as the absence of 
WMD “seemed to disintegrate the casus belli” while the ongoing violence “served to keep the 
fact and consequence of it constantly in our thoughts” (Blair 2010b, 374). Most voters are 
willing to accept even costly military action as a necessary evil provided they regard it as the 
best mechanism to stave off even greater anticipated future losses. A counter-trend emerges, 
however, if arguments about the negative impact of inaction come to be proved unfounded 
(Wolfe 2008, 76). For the British public, the missing WMD meant not only that the 
government’s credibility was damaged, but also that the increasing cost of battling the Iraqi 
insurgency seemed less and less of a justifiable investment in future security. At the start of 
the conflict, ministers had considerable freedom to present developments favourably. Over 
time, journalists gained better access to the various small battlefields that sprang up during 
the following years, gathering first-hand accounts that contradicted the government’s 
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overarching narrative of gradual stabilisation. Official rhetoric thus fell victim to a 
phenomenon dubbed “the elasticity of reality”, under which leaders who seek to ‘spin’ foreign 
policy developments find any success they have rebounds upon them once “reality asserts 
itself” (Baum and Groeling 2010a, 474). The realisation that the British government’s case for 
war with Iraq had been based on incorrect assumptions and inaccurate statements both 
damaged public trust and prompted many observers to reconsider, retrospectively, their own 
pre-war expectations. The result was that large numbers of those who had supported, or at 
the least grudgingly accepted the necessity of military action began to view it more negatively. 
Post-invasion developments “do not change the facts about the war, but they can alter how 
the public recalls and evaluates it” (Mueller 1973, 168). Although in the build-up to the Iraq 
campaign, ministers had considerable power to present their goals, and to describe the likely 
consequences of war for public consumption, once discrepancies emerged between rhetoric 
and observable reality the result was a significant decline in that power over time. Ultimately, 
it is for this reason that Iraq is remembered with such negativity. The media’s general 
propensity to seek out scandal, and hostility to ‘spin’, helped motivate journalists’ focus on 
missing WMD after the invasion, raising their salience in Public Opinion’s efforts to define the 
conflict. Additionally, as Blair observed, “the problem with a military campaign to which a large 
part of opinion – public and most important media – is opposed is that this part continues to 
have a point to prove...they approach the conflict with a strong desire, conscious and 
subconscious, to see it fail” (Blair 2010b, 441, 454). Journalists were primed to look for 
negative stories by their own unresolved qualms about the decision to go to war in the first 
place. Ministers had been able to get the policy through Parliament while ignoring significant 
elements of Public Opinion, but in the process sacrificed their freedom to present the 
consequences of war in a positive light. New Labour may have come to office concerned about 
media hostility, but by 2003 what hostility it faced stemmed in large part from the failure of its 
own news management activities.  
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To the extent that the British government made the most of the evidence it had in 
framing Iraq as a threat to the UK, it had not significantly transgressed the bounds of ‘normal’ 
official behaviour. There is “a long tradition of overstatement” on the part of ministers seeking 
to justify involvement in overseas conflicts (Freedman 2004, 7). A particular problem arose in 
this case from the fact that not only were claims about Iraq’s WMD presented in the strongest 
possible light, they were also based on inaccurate intelligence. Although the US and UK 
governments faced “anger that they sought to hoodwink both national and international 
opinion”, arguably “the real problem was that first they hoodwinked themselves” (Freedman 
2004, 39). Discrepancies between the description of Iraq’s WMD programmes in the ‘dossier’ 
of September 2002, and the post-invasion findings of the Iraq Survey Group, stemmed from 
both ‘spin’ and genuine intelligence failures, as Chapter 4 recounts. The latter were explicable 
just as the former were predictable. Even senior Iraqi military officers (one of whom had 
unwittingly provided the information, via an intermediary who was an MI6 source, upon which 
several of the British dossier’s claims were based) were apparently unsure of the extent of 
Iraq’s WMD capacity. Saddam Hussein hinted repeatedly that he was hiding weapons that 
would only be brought out in the event of an attack. The reality, however, was that all WMD 
activities had been “essentially destroyed in 1991”, although Iraq did retain the expertise, and 
apparently the intent, to have reconstituted its full programme had it succeeded in getting 
international sanctions lifted (Iraq Survey Group 2004, 1). It might have been possible to 
explain the reasons for intelligence misjudgements, and so for the government to escape 
significant public punishment. Its good faith was already doubted by large sections of the 
public even before the invasion, however, largely as a result of its own obfuscation, 
disingenuousness, and repeated shifts in emphasis between different components of its case. 
Robin Cook thought “the public is mature enough to know that in the real world governments 
make mistakes”, and suggested that the real problems over WMD stemmed from “subsequent 
attempts to deny that anything was wrong and to cover up any evidence to the contrary” 
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(Cook 2003, 336). Blair, by contrast, considered “it was never enough, in today’s media, for 
there to have been a mistake... a mistake doesn’t hit the register high enough. So the search 
goes on for a lie, a deception, an act not of error but of malfeasance. And the problem is, if one 
can’t be found, one is contrived or even invented” (Blair 2010b, 454). Scandals were invented, 
if not by journalists themselves, then as a logical consequence of their readiness to believe 
that any evidence of improper conduct must be accurate, a readiness built up by frustration 
with the outcome of the debate that preceded the war, and exacerbated by the obvious 
problem of missing WMD. Just as the government had fallen victim to a combination of hubris 
and groupthink in mistaking the intelligence material it had received for concrete evidence of 
an Iraqi threat, and had then compounded its mistake by placing an unduly heavy amount of 
emphasis on this ‘evidence’ in its public communications stance (Kampfner 2003, 210, 
Freedman 2004, 24-25), so too journalists would fall victim to exaggerated claims based on 
inaccurate source material. The problem from the government’s perspective, however, was 
that it suffered just as much damage from incidents such as the Mirror prisoner abuse photo 
scandal as did the media, since each accusation of misconduct, even those subsequently 
disproven, contributed to a more general negative discourse steadily undermining public 
perceptions of the entire campaign. 
 Of course, The Mirror’s error had been several degrees less severe than the 
government’s, and had been mitigated to an extent by Morgan’s departure and by the paper’s 
immediate apology. Tony Blair neither resigned nor apologised for the missing WMD. Indeed, 
he remains unapologetic (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 560, Blair 2010b, 374). Given an 
opportunity at the Chilcot Inquiry, he expressed “responsibility but not a regret for removing 
Saddam” (Blair 2010a, 246). In many ways this consistency is unsurprising. Blair would never 
have led Britain to war in Iraq had he not been utterly convinced that it was the right thing to 
do. That very conviction helped drive the policy into effect in the face of determined 
opposition. At the same time, however, his obstinate defence of decisions now known to have 
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been based on inaccurate information has only served to reinforce the divide between Prime 
Minister and Public Opinion already evident in the build-up to war. As Chapter 4 concludes, 
there is good evidence, seen in the Hutton and Butler reports and in documents released by 
the Chilcot Inquiry, showing that few official or public actors doubted that Iraq represented a 
threat prior to March 2003. British ministers continued to expect a significant weapons find 
well into 2003 (Campbell and Stott 2007, 693, 731). In terms of Public Opinion, however, it did 
not matter that the government was genuinely surprised at the Iraq Survey Group’s inability to 
turn up anything to indicate WMD production (Coates and Krieger 2004, 4, Scott and Ambler 
2007, 84). The legitimacy of the invasion had already been undermined, with the result that 
even as he left office years later observers still felt it necessary to consider whether the Prime 
Minister could be trusted (Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers 2007, 212). For much of British Public 
Opinion, dissatisfaction with the communication of the decision to go to war in 2003 ensures 
that the answer remains ‘no’. 
 
David Kelly 
 
“As Dr Kelly was leaving I said to him: what will happen if Iraq is invaded? And his reply was, 
which I took at the time to be a throwaway remark – he said: I will probably be found dead in 
the woods” (Hutton 2004, 101, quoting a British diplomat named Peter Broucher). 
 
 Although the absence of WMD in Iraq was bad for the Blair government, it was not 
until the death of Dr David Kelly in an Oxfordshire wood in the early hours of 18 July 2003 that 
the issue became truly poisonous. Dr Kelly’s death came six weeks into a bitter public dispute 
between Downing Street and the BBC over a 29 May report casting doubt on the veracity of 
one of the central claims of the WMD ‘dossier’. Prompted by Today programme presenter 
John Humphrys, the journalist Andrew Gilligan reported having “been told by one of the senior 
officials in charge of drawing up that dossier...that, actually the government probably erm, 
knew that the forty five minute figure was wrong, even before it decided to put it in...Downing 
Street, our source says ordered a week before publication, ordered it to be sexed up, to be 
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made more exciting and ordered more facts to be er, to be discovered” (Gilligan 2003). A 
further report by Gilligan in The Mail on Sunday named Alastair Campbell as the author of this 
alleged government manipulation. It was an explosive claim. The government, and specifically 
Campbell, were being accused of falsifying evidence of an Iraqi threat in order to justify a 
controversial war. The relationship between No. 10 and the BBC was already tense, thanks to 
what many in Downing Street saw as the corporation’s “one-sided and negative” approach to 
the Iraq issue (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 194). New Labour was allergic to media 
criticism anyway, but in reacting to Gilligan’s claims it reached new heights of sensitivity 
(Robinson, Goddard, et al. 2009, 535). Campbell was furious. The BBC was “twisting” the facts, 
“trying to move the goalposts”, and unreasonably refusing to accept even the possibility of an 
error in the original story (Campbell and Stott 2007, 703, 711). His psychological state was 
poor by this point. He had admitted to Blair in February that he was struggling with stress, 
probably clinically depressed, and seeking to leave Downing Street (Campbell and Stott 2007, 
606). Responding to Gilligan became an obsession.  
 Campbell went on the attack, demanding a retraction of the original story, and a full 
apology from the BBC. He had the authority as Downing Street Director of Communications to 
mount such campaigns on his own initiative, and there is no evidence that he acted with the 
direct consent of the Prime Minister; the communication system that Blair had authorised was, 
by 2003, able to operate entirely independently of him. The BBC held its line, determined to 
fulfil its commitment to neutrality, and struggling to avoid simply repeating the government 
line in the absence of an effective political opposition (Hollis 2010, 66-67). Its Chairman Gavyn 
Davies and Director-General Greg Dyke each had Labour Party connections, and thus may have 
felt under particular pressure to resist Campbell’s demands (Powell 2010, 205). The stakes 
were high on both sides. Gilligan had hit upon a story that resonated with his audience, that 
brought together dissatisfaction with the way the war had been ‘sold’, general consternation 
with the use of ‘spin’, and the facts on the ground in Iraq, to challenge the legitimacy of an 
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operation that had only ever enjoyed a narrow margin of public support at best. With no WMD 
having been found, any accusation of official dishonesty tended to stick (Campbell and Stott 
2007, 700). Campbell struggled to shake off Gilligan’s claims until 4 July, when David Kelly 
admitted to his superiors at the Ministry of Defence that he had spoken to Gilligan, and so 
could be the journalist’s source. Kelly had served as a UN Weapons Inspector and was 
considered one of the government’s most knowledgeable biological warfare experts. He was 
apparently under consideration for a knighthood at the time of these events in recognition of 
his work in the area (Hutton 2004, 5). Crucially for the government case, Kelly said he had 
waited so long before coming forward because the comments in Gilligan’s report did went so 
far beyond what he had actually said that he assumed the journalist must have heard them 
from someone else. As Campbell wrote in his diary, with evident glee, “it would fuck Gilligan if 
that was his source” (Campbell and Stott 2007, 713).  
 With the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee having cleared Downing Street 
of improper conduct over the inclusion of material in the dossier (House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee 2003), a judgement later repeated by Lords Hutton and Butler (Hutton 
2004, Butler 2004), by July the government was grappling towards firmer ground. The decision 
was taken to announce that Gilligan’s source had come forward, that he had not been involved 
in drafting the dossier, and that he denied having made the statements attributed to him. 
Although Campbell had expressed a desire to ensure a “clear win” by totally discrediting 
Gilligan, there apparently had been no formal decision to identify the source (Campbell and 
Stott 2007, 714, 716). With Downing Street leery of being caught lying to the press, however, 
departments were instructed to confirm Dr Kelly’s name if it was put to them by journalists, 
which of course it was. There were very few possible candidates, and informed reporters 
simply called up various government press offices and worked their way through lists of names 
until they got a result. On 9 July, therefore, Kelly was ‘outed’ by the MoD. The following week, 
he was called to testify publicly at a somewhat pressurised session of the Foreign Affairs 
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Committee, where he repeated what he had told his superiors. He had spoken in general 
terms to Gilligan (without authorisation), but he had not made the statements attributed to 
Gilligan’s anonymous source. Although the BBC continued to stick by the original story, the 
wider furore might have subsided had Kelly not been found dead three days later. It appeared 
(as Lord Hutton later concluded) that he had committed suicide (Cook 2003, 336).  
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Figure 32: Front page of The Daily Mail, 19 July 2003.  
 
The Daily Mail ran the headline “proud of yourselves?” over pictures of Campbell, 
Hoon, and Blair, alleging that they had driven “a decent, shy civil servant who had been 
savagely chewed up and spat out by a malign, amoral Downing Street machine” to a 
“tormented and tragic end” (The Daily Mail 2003g, figure 32). What was already a hostile 
public debate had taken on a considerably darker tone. Kelly’s death “was an event that would 
shake Blair to his core...one of the most shocking reversals of the premiership” (Seldon, 
Snowdon and Collings 2007, 201). Campbell considered resigning immediately, though was 
talked out of it. He complained that the media should have asked what exactly an experienced 
civil servant working with the highest security clearance in a sensitive area was doing talking to 
a journalist about secret intelligence matters, rather than criticising ministers for themselves 
asking that question (Campbell and Stott 2007, 723, 727). There was little, however, that he 
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could effectively do at this stage to regain the initiative in the public debate. The human 
interest angle of Kelly’s death, combined with the recurring bogeyman ‘spin’, ensured that the 
story achieved total media dominance. Jonathan Powell recalls having “felt physically sick” 
watching the coverage. Against Powell’s instincts, Blair “felt that he had little choice but to set 
up an inquiry” (Powell 2010, 222). Lord Hutton began work on 21 July. 
 When the Hutton Report was published in January 2004, it totally and systematically 
cleared the government of each of the key charges levelled by Gilligan (Hutton 2004, 144-145, 
152, 172). Downing Street had sought to make the strongest possible case for war in 
publishing the dossier, but the document had been written and approved by the Joint 
Intelligence Committee, without interference from Downing Street. Far from being dishonest, 
it reflected accurately the best assessments available at the time. The clearest evidence 
against the veracity of Gilligan’s claims was the fact that David Kelly was not part of the JIC 
assessments staff which had drafted the dossier. Although a section he had written on the 
history of the UN inspection programme was used in the final document, he had never been in 
a position to know one way or another what influence Alastair Campbell, or anyone else, had 
exerted on its contents. With Kelly himself unable to testify, and Gilligan’s inconsistent 
evidence ruled unreliable, Hutton was unable to reach a position on what exactly the weapons 
expert had said to the reporter (Hutton 2004, 163). He did note that members of the Defence 
Intelligence Staff, to whom Kelly had unrestricted and regular access, had raised concerns 
during September 2002 about the phrasing of the ‘45-minute claim’, a point highlighted by 
Gilligan as having been ‘sexed up’. It was possible Kelly was aware of the existence of such 
concerns. At the time, however, they had been referred to the Chief and Deputy Chief of 
Defence Intelligence, both of whom, as members of the JIC, had seen the original MI6 reports 
on which the claim was based, and both of whom thought no further action necessary. Hutton 
implied, therefore, that Kelly may have told Gilligan about qualms that did exist within DIS 
about the inclusion of the ‘45 minute claim’, without himself being aware that they had been 
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considered and addressed in the proper manner (Hutton 2004, 112-126). Gilligan had then 
drawn, and broadcast, his own conclusions about the role of Downing Street. 
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Figure 33: Front page of The Independent, 29 January 2004. 
 
The Hutton Report “plunged the BBC into crisis” (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 
256). Although Gilligan was not explicitly said to have lied, the strong implication was that he 
had at the very least embellished inaccurate source material, in an ironic parallel of the 
government’s own behaviour in presenting the dossier. Like Piers Morgan before them, both 
Davies and Dyke resigned. The British public was not, however, well primed to accept an 
outcome that exonerated the widely distrusted Campbell and criticised the much-respected 
BBC. One Ipsos MORI poll found just 14% of respondents thought Campbell reliable, compared 
to the BBC’s 59% (IPSOS MORI 2003). As a result, far from the government being exonerated, 
efforts by some parts of the press to label the Report a “whitewash” (see figure 33) largely 
stuck in the public mind, something which continued to rankle with former Downing Street 
insiders long after Blair left office (Blair 2010b, 463, Powell 2010, 223, Campbell 2010a, 119).  
Although the BBC’s disgrace and a misjudged call from Michael Howard for Blair to 
resign helped to unite previously rebellious Labour MPs behind the government (Seldon, 
Snowdon and Collings 2007, 255, Powell 2010, 223), a bitter aftertaste remained in the wider 
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public debate. Powell believes “the lesson from Hutton is that, no matter how clean a bill of 
health a prime minister is given, an inquiry is not going to vindicate them in the eyes of the 
media and therefore of the people” (Powell 2010, 223). He has a point. The very existence of 
an inquiry raises suspicions which no conclusion can dispel. In this specific instance, there was 
an additional problem, namely that Hutton felt constrained by his terms of reference to focus 
narrowly on issues to do with David Kelly and the process by which the September dossier had 
been produced. He largely avoided the wider and arguably more fundamental issue of why the 
government had incorrectly judged Iraq to have WMD in the first place. Blair in due course felt 
compelled to establish a second inquiry under Lord Butler, partly responding to public 
pressure, and partly to President Bush’s having launched his own exercise in the United States. 
Again the government was exonerated of wrongdoing (Butler 2004, 76, 82, 110), although 
specific criticisms were raised about the way the dossier had brought about a conflation of 
policy advocacy and intelligence analysis (Butler 2004, 114, 127). Public doubts consequently 
remained, later leading Gordon Brown to launch a further inquiry under Sir John Chilcot, this 
time tasked with considering the entire background to and conduct of the war. Blair has 
expressed “no doubt” that after the Chilcot Inquiry “there will still be calls for more” (Blair 
2010b, 407). He has some grounds for cynicism in this regard. British Public Opinion clearly 
only values inquiries which reach the conclusions it wants and expects them to reach. When 
public actors call for an inquiry, they do so not to get at the truth, but to get confirmation for 
their existing views. No other outcome will satisfy critics.  
As with the release of the dossier itself, then, what matters from a historical 
perspective is not so much the content of the various post-invasion inquiries, but the fact that 
they happened at all. Powell’s reluctance to subject Kelly’s death to independent scrutiny 
stemmed in part from the expectation that an inquiry would be seen as a partial admission of 
guilt. As it turned out, he was right to be wary. The procession of witness statements to the 
various inquiries, and the associated media coverage, has kept the question of whether 
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ministers lied to take the country to war in 2003 central to the public debate. Given the 
volume of ‘real’ news emerging from Iraq during the difficult years of the insurgency, this 
consistency is impressive. Clearly the ‘official perfidy’ narrative had staying power, both in the 
minds of editors, and their readers. The inquiries thus represented not just evidence of public 
trust in the government having been undermined by Iraq, but also one of the means by which 
that erosion continued to take place. They also illustrate the corollary of the “elasticity of 
reality” effect. Journalists’ insinuations about ministerial dishonesty stuck because events did 
not contradict them, even when it proved difficult actually to demonstrate that the 
government had done wrong. Contra Cook, the public did not see a significant difference 
between erroneous judgements based on intelligence, which is itself necessarily partial and 
incomplete, and outright lies. What emerges from considering these phenomena is the clear 
suggestion, discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, that winning the argument before military 
action takes place is not enough to maintain support. The argument must be proven right in 
practice, even if the action itself is relatively successful, and especially if it is not.  
 
The 2005 general election 
 
 Considerable doubt remains amongst foreign policy analysts as to whether overseas 
matters are sufficiently salient to democratic electorates to affect voting behaviour. For every 
suggestion that “policymakers are held accountable by the electorate if their policies, foreign 
as well as domestic, fail” (Sobel 2001, 24) there exists an equally categorical counter-claim. 
This uncertainty is significant, for it is the prospect of future electoral punishment that is said 
to motivate politicians to take account of public views in making major decisions (Knecht and 
Weatherford 2006, 705). Public influence is not only constrained by the willingness of 
policymakers to ignore arguments emanating from non-official channels, but also by the 
possibly accurate belief that voters will not exact retribution against leaders who pursue 
foreign policies with which they disagree. The Blair government may not have thought itself 
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particularly vulnerable to electoral punishment when it decided to go to war in Iraq. After all, 
the last general election before March 2003 had been in June 2001; the next one need not be 
called until the summer of 2006. There was plenty of time for other issues to rise to 
prominence, and for progress to be made on stabilising Iraq. Evidence available as early as 
2003 suggested that most British voters were more concerned about immigration than about 
the war (Stothard 2003, 197-198). At the same time, however, there was little room for 
complacency. Blair’s ally Jose Maria Aznar lost the 2004 Spanish election at least partially on 
the back of public opposition to Spain’s involvement in the ‘coalition of the willing’ (Buzan and 
Gonzalez-Pelaez 2005, 45). Although President Bush was re-elected later that year, his 
campaign was hampered by lingering dissatisfaction with his foreign policy stance (Eichenberg 
2005, 28, Gelpi, Reifler and Feaver 2007, 151, 158, Karol and Miguel 2007, 633, Robinson 2008, 
141). By considering together the experiences of these three leaders we can begin to see why 
it was that, despite concerns over Iraq, Blair won an historic third term of office in 2005, with a 
sizeable parliamentary majority to boot.  
 Bush, Blair, and Aznar each faced the same problem with respect to the situation on 
the ground in Iraq, namely that the expected quick victory over Saddam Hussein’s forces had 
not given way to the promised rapid stabilisation and rebirth of the country as a functioning 
democracy. The descent into ‘quagmire’ destabilised official narratives about the war, opening 
up space in the public debate for even past supporters of military action to become critics. 
When Iraq came to be contested by participants in subsequent elections, it was introduced not 
only as a matter of prospective consideration, but of retrospective judgement. That the 
invasion had gone awry was seen by the British public not only as evidence that the 
implementation of the war policy had been mishandled, but that the entire enterprise had 
been a mistake. Public Opinion is fickle in this regard, which is why it is so potentially 
dangerous; “short-term support is an unreliable indicator of the eventual political ramifications 
of a policy” precisely because “many of today’s supporters are likely to become tomorrow’s 
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opponents should a policy be perceived as failing” (Baum 2004b, 191-192). In Spain the main 
opposition party, led by Jose Luis Zapatero, had objected to the use of force against Iraq from 
the beginning. It was easily able to capitalise on the war’s apparent failure. Polls taken before 
the invasion had shown just 4% of Spanish voters in favour of action without explicit UN 
support, and only 23% even with the UN fully on board (Campbell and Stott 2007, 670). 
American Democrats had a harder time, particularly given President Bush’s success in linking 
the campaign to the 11 September attacks. Senator Kerry challenged Bush over their 
respective Vietnam records, but was hamstrung when it came to the more immediate conflict 
by having himself voted in favour of invading Iraq. Britain’s Conservatives had similarly 
supported the government line. Iain Duncan Smith’s avowedly pro-American, pro-military 
foreign policy stance potentially provided some cover to the government. Certainly any 
assessment in 2003 of the likely future electoral significance of military action would have 
been coloured by the fact that the leaders of both major parties agreed on the substantive 
policy (Leblang and Chan 2003, 387, Hollis 2006, 45, Aldrich, et al. 2006, 478, Chan and Safran 
2006, 149, Kreps 2010, 199). Politicians who offer too much support to their rivals tend to be 
punished (Colaresi 2004, 556), and indeed Iain Duncan Smith was removed from the 
Conservative leadership in late 2003. Although his Party remained generally supportive of the 
international use of force, and specifically convinced that removing Saddam Hussein from 
power had been the right choice, Michael Howard’s replacement of Duncan Smith, and the 
clear opportunity for electoral gains that criticising the government over Iraq now offered, 
created space for a change of heart (Adams, et al. 2004, 590). Aznar’s problem was that, faced 
with a united opposition, he lacked a sufficient power base to survive an election. Both Bush 
and Blair faced their respective publics able to rely on a far broader coalition of support. Blair 
in particular benefitted in terms of Labour Party politics from the Conservatives’ efforts to 
discredit him. Many Labour members, and voters, who might have disagreed with the specific 
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decision, were nevertheless sufficiently supportive of the Prime Minister in general that they 
rallied behind him at the first sign of effective opposition.  
 A leaked set of internal Labour poll results dating from shortly after the 2005 election 
sheds some light on the significance of this internal ‘rally effect’. By 2005, and in stark contrast 
to the position in 2003, responses by Labour voters tended to be more positive about Iraq than 
those by Conservatives. Although overall respondents were evenly split on the question of 
whether Britain should have participated in the invasion, more than two thirds of Labour 
supporters had a positive retrospective opinion, compared to 53% opposition amongst 
Conservatives and 63% amongst Liberal Democrats. 54% of voters disapproved of Tony Blair’s 
handling of the ongoing conflict, but that figure fell to 24% amongst Labour voters compared 
to 73% for Conservatives and 75% for Liberal Democrats. Even on the contentious question of 
whether voters trusted Blair to handle Iraq in future (overall 54% did not), 73% of Labour 
voters backed the Prime Minister while 84% of Conservatives and 77% of Liberal Democrats 
distrusted him. What is unclear from these figures is whether the surveyed voters were simply 
repeating the ‘official line’ of the parties for which they had already cast their vote, or whether 
they expressed independently-held views that had influenced their voting behaviour. The poll’s 
focus on actual voters introduces the possibility of a selection bias. The suggestion that Labour 
voters agree with the Labour Party’s policies is somewhat tautological. At the same time, 
“many people use their party identification as a shortcut method for arriving at a position on 
an issue” (Mueller 1973, 116), so it may have been that people who were culturally, 
economically, or socially predisposed to vote Labour subsequently formed a positive view of 
Iraq simply because it was their party’s war. Either explanation is thus possible. What matters 
here is the fact that, just as party politics serves as an intervening variable affecting public 
influence over foreign policymaking, so too party identification intervenes between voters’ 
views of a given issue and their ultimate electoral choice (Shapiro and Jacobs 2000, 228, Sobel 
2001, 23-24, Ramsay 2004, 460, Schuster and Maier 2006, 223, Kreps 2010, 199). In Spain, this 
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effect counted against Aznar. In the US and UK it helped mitigate the impact of public 
dissatisfaction over Iraq on the re-election chances of both Bush and Blair.  
 Although the Conservative Party had supported the decision to go to war, they had 
naturally not been involved in communications exercises such as the WMD dossier or the 
failed effort to secure a second UN Security Council Resolution. Consequently, Blair was left to 
face alone the accusation that the way the invasion had been ‘sold’ had undermined its 
legitimacy. Even before the end of 2003, Iain Duncan Smith had introduced the refrain “you 
can’t believe a word he says” into his public portrayals of Blair (Kampfner 2003, 336). During 
the 2005 campaign, Conservative billboards warned “if he’s prepared to lie to take us to war, 
he’s prepared to lie to win an election” (see figure 34).  
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Figure 34: Conservative Party election poster, 2005. 
 
Naturally such attacks referred most frequently to the missing WMD; the weapons’ 
prominence in pre-invasion government rhetoric heightened their significance in post-invasion 
public debate. A further element was introduced when on 27 April 2005 Channel 4 News 
obtained a leaked copy of the Attorney General’s full legal advice to the Prime Minister. As 
Chapter 6 discussed, Lord Goldsmith had told Blair on 7 March 2003 that the case was far from 
watertight, but that on balance he thought military action was legal without a further UN 
Security Council Resolution. Parliament, the Cabinet, and so the wider public saw only a more 
condensed version of this advice in the form of a letter sent to the Chairman of the House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on 17 March. This document was far less equivocal, 
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focussing only on the reasons why action was legal, and leaving out the detailed analysis of the 
difficulties with the case. Channel 4 framed the discrepancy as further evidence of official 
perfidy, and the charge was taken up in Parliament, raising the salience of pre-war 
communication practices during the election campaign (Seldon, Snowdon and Collings 2007, 
340-341). There was some truth to the accusation that ministers had sought to influence the 
form in which the Attorney General’s advice would become public, with their motivation being 
to limit the scope for further controversy at a politically difficult time. Once again, then, 
accusations of dishonesty largely stuck. 
 
Figure 35: Voting intention polls, January 2002 – May 2005 (YouGov). 
 
Within Downing Street the degree of attention paid to Iraq during the early summer of 
2005, particularly by the media, was seen as entirely unwarranted (Powell 2010, 195, Blair 
2010b, 522). It was clearly the case, nonetheless, that the public still thought issues relating 
not just to the ongoing conduct of the war, but to the way it had been ‘sold’, significant for 
making electoral judgements over two years after the first shots had been fired. Although 
Labour had experienced a dip in the polls from mid-2003 onwards in the aftermath of David 
Kelly’s death, by late 2004 it had largely regained its lead over the Conservatives (with the 
exception of one possibly anomalous poll on 6 April 2005 which showed the parties neck-and-
neck), as figure 35 illustrates.  
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In the end, Labour won 356 of the 646 seats available in 2005, managing a respectable 
majority of 66. It lost 47 seats, and saw its majority cut from the 167-seat landslide margin 
achieved in 2001. The Conservatives gained 33 seats, and the Liberal Democrats 11, mainly at 
Labour’s expense. Speaking to voters in his Sedgefield constituency, Blair acknowledged that 
Iraq had cost the government significant electoral support. At one stage on election night he 
had taken Campbell and long-term political adviser Sally Morgan into the garden to escape the 
tension of the various vote counts going on across the country. Morgan later recalled him 
“muttering things like ‘it’s all my fault’ and ‘Iraq’” while pacing around in the cold (Seldon, 
Snowdon and Collings 2007, 343-344).  
 
Figure 36: Passive public approval of the decision to take military action in Iraq, March 2003 – 
May 2005. Data from ICM and YouGov. 
 
Explaining exactly how far Iraq actually did hit Labour’s vote share is far from 
straightforward, however. It is true that, as figure 36 shows, passive opinion on the rectitude 
of the Iraq war had dropped away markedly from early 2004, with data from May 2005 
showing 40% approval against over 50% disapproval amongst polled likely voters. It is also 
true, however, that an ICM poll conducted on 3 May 2005 for The Guardian found just 4% of 
likely voters describing Iraq as one of the most important issues influencing their voting 
decision, compared to 21% for health services, 15% for the economy, 15% for education, and 
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13% for law and order, all issues on which Labour out-performed its rivals (ICM Research 
Limited 2005b). An earlier poll for The News of the World had found 48% of likely voters 
considering Iraq at least somewhat important in determining their vote, although again this 
was a lower proportion than that selecting nearly all of the other options available. 62% of 
likely voters thought Tony Blair less honest than most politicians, and 57% that he was 
untrustworthy. 30% nevertheless expected Blair to make a better Prime Minister than his 
rivals, compared to 24% for Charles Kennedy and 21% for Michael Howard (ICM Research 
Limited 2005a). Honesty was important, then, but it was not the only or even the most 
important characteristic the British expected their Prime Minister to demonstrate. 
The best available information on the actual significance of Iraq for voting trends in 
2005 comes from the leaked Labour polling reports referred to above. Included within the 
material were two post-election analyses prepared by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research and 
by Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates. The first observed a big, late surge of voting intention 
in favour of the Liberal Democrats in certain marginal seats, accounting for as many as a 
quarter of the seats lost by Labour, and driven in large part by the controversy over Iraq 
(Greenberg and Rosner 2005). The lateness of the surge is interesting, as it cannot be 
explained alone by dissatisfaction with the ongoing conflict. It must rather be related to a 
combination of the Conservatives’ efforts to raise the ‘trust issue’ and the role played by the 
media with its focus on questioning the legal basis for war. Indeed, the second paper 
estimated that 4% of the overall vote had switched from Labour to the Liberal Democrats 
towards the end of the campaign as a direct result of views on Iraq, and specifically in the 
aftermath of the Goldsmith leak (Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, Inc 2005a). This finding 
provides further support for the claim that it was the communication rather than the 
substance of the decision to go to war that damaged the government in the long term.  
Penn, Schoen & Berland’s research goes into more detail than these simple headline 
figures indicate. A series of specific questions were asked of actual (as opposed to likely) 
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voters. By speaking soon after the event to those who had participated in the election, this 
survey was able both to drill down into the motivation underpinning real-world (as opposed to 
hypothetical) voting behaviour and, significantly, to identify the distribution of different 
positions across voters for each of the major parties. It therefore meets the criteria for validity 
discussed in Chapter 1. Looking at responses on Iraq, it is clear there was ambiguity about the 
perceived rectitude of the war. 47% of voters surveyed agreed that Britain should have been 
involved, and 47% disagreed. Considerable concern was expressed about Tony Blair’s personal 
management of the ongoing conflict, with a slim plurality of 42% thinking the situation in Iraq 
getting worse compared to 38% who thought it was getting better. On the other hand, 55% of 
respondents agreed that the people of Iraq were glad to see the fall of Saddam Hussein, 
compared to 22% who thought the Iraqis would rather have been left alone. Crucially, 50% of 
voters thought “the political campaign provided plenty of debate about the war and whether 
the country was misled or not, and we should now just get on with the business of calming and 
rebuilding Iraq”. The question is notable in itself, with its focus on “whether the country was 
misled or not”. Even in the Labour Party’s own polling, the focus was on the pre-invasion 
communication of the war at least as much as on the post-invasion management of the 
occupation, where the government actually fared somewhat better. 76% of respondents 
agreed that the Iraqis deserved British support in rebuilding their country, 70% that terrorists 
were to blame for the ongoing instability and that they should be resisted by British forces, 
69% that Britain should be proud of its role in bringing democracy to Iraq, and 64% that 
fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq reduced the likelihood of needing to fight al-Qaeda in Britain. Overall, 
67% concluded that Britain had to “stay the course”. There was agreement, too, with the 
notion that the war in Iraq had shown rogue leaders the dangers of violating international 
norms and international law (68% agreed), and that the war in Iraq had proven the resolution 
of the international community in taking enforcement action against rogue states (60% 
agreed). The most negative voter assessments came in the area of communications. 60% 
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agreed with the statement that “the issue is not whether we were right to go to Iraq or not. 
The issue is that the people and the Parliament were lied to about the reasons for going”. 53% 
still thought the invasion had been illegal, 59% that it had turned the Muslims world against 
the West, and 47% that Saddam Hussein had never been a real threat to the region and so “we 
had no real reason to go in”. In each case, the real cause of public dissatisfaction lay in the 
government’s efforts to win support for the conflict, rather than in the reality of the conflict 
itself. Voters were hardly happy about the lack of progress in Iraq, but they were for the most 
part willing to give British (and allied) forces time to work, having been convinced that 
continuing the campaign was the lesser of two evils. They were not happy about, as they saw 
it, having been lied to over the decision to go to war in the first place. 
Tony Blair’s government did, then, suffer a degree of electoral punishment as a result 
of its decision to go to war in Iraq. Unlike its Spanish counterpart, that punishment did not lead 
to its removal from office. As had been the case for Bush in the US, Blair was shielded to an 
extent by his opponents’ having supported the invasion, and so their inability to attack his 
decision on principle. Their roundabout attempts to reframe the debate by focusing on the 
question of whether the government’s pre-invasion statements, particularly about Iraqi WMD 
and the legal basis for action without a ‘second’ UNSCR, had some success because they 
chimed with many voters’ views. They also however helped rally Labour Party loyalists to the 
government’s support. Ultimately the Conservatives in 2005, like the Democrats in the US in 
2004, were simply not in a position to capitalise on the unpopularity of the Iraq campaign in 
order to throw the incumbent government out of office. However contentious the particular 
policy may have been, it could not alter the broader political landscape. 
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British Muslims 
 
 One traditional Labour-voting section of the electorate did not rally to the 
government’s cause in 2005. Labour’s support among British Muslims collapsed. Figure 37 lists 
the ten constituencies with the highest proportion of Muslim voters in the country at the 2005 
election.  
Constituency Labour 
Vote 
Change 
Incumbent MP MP’s 
War 
Vote 
Result 
Birmingham 
Sparkbrook Small Heath 
-21% Roger Godsiff For Hold from Respect 
Bethnal Green and Bow -16.5% Oona King For Loss to Respect 
Bradford West -7.9% Marsha Singh* Against Hold from Conservative 
East Ham -19.2% Stephen Timms For Hold from Respect 
Birmingham Ladywood -17% Clare Short For Hold from Lib Dem 
Blackburn -12.1% Jack Straw* For Hold from Conservative 
Poplar/Canning Town -21.1% Jim Fitzpatrick* For Hold from Conservative 
West Ham -18.7% Lyn Brown Abstain Hold from Respect 
Bradford North -7.2% Terry Rooney For Hold from Lib Dem 
Ilford South -10.7% Mike Gapes* For Hold from Conservative 
Figure 37: Labour vote trends in constituencies with highest Muslim populations, 2005 general 
election (BBC News). 
 
In each case, the Labour share of the vote had declined markedly from 2001. Several of those 
Labour MPs who escaped defeat despite suffering a dramatic drop in their share of the vote 
might have been in more danger had the anti-war Liberal Democrats, who captured many 
defecting Labour votes, not started from such weak positions in their constituencies. Included 
within this group, marked with an asterisk (*) in figure 37, is Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, one 
of the ministers at the centre of British policymaking towards Iraq. Straw had known at the 
time of the invasion that it would cause him trouble in Blackburn (Stothard 2003, 52, Straw 
2010b, 102). This knowledge had not, however, been enough to convince him to change 
course. Indeed, as Marsha Singh and Clare Short found, even taking an anti-war position was 
not enough to mitigate the loss of support felt by Labour in areas of large Muslim populations.  
Just as voters in general had expressed the position of their favoured Party on Iraq in 
post-election polling, so too Muslim voters had apparently identified Labour as a whole with 
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being pro-war, punishing its MPs regardless of their individual attitude towards the invasion. 
The effect was further exacerbated by the establishment of the Respect Party by rebel MP 
George Galloway, who had by this point been expelled from Labour over his opposition to the 
government’s actions in Iraq. Respect ran on an anti-war, pro-Muslim platform, and gave 
several incumbent Labour parliamentarians a close challenge. One, Oona King, was in fact 
beaten by Galloway himself. Thanking King for her work as a constituency MP, Galloway 
declared “it was not her defeat, it was a defeat for Tony Blair and New Labour for all of the 
betrayals” (Galloway 2005). Regardless of Galloway’s rhetoric, however, the loss of one MP 
was never likely significantly to impact upon the Prime Minister.  
It is apparent, then, that the 2005 general election was affected, though not decisively, 
by disillusionment over Iraq amongst British Muslim voters, many of whom had previously 
supported Labour, but whose party loyalties were weakened by the government’s policies 
towards the Muslim world. Christopher Hill has suggested that while “in the past, ethnic 
minorities have often felt beleaguered and powerless...discounted by those making foreign 
policy, with no fear of consequences in the letter-columns or ballot boxes, let alone the 
streets”, in 21st century Britain “this is no longer the case” (Hill 2007, 262). Labour was 
damaged by Muslim voters’ disaffection at the ballot box in 2005. Both the Stop the War 
Coalition, which orchestrated the 15 February 2003 mass protests in London, and the Respect 
Party that challenged Labour over Iraq in 2005, were organisations with high levels of Muslim 
participation at every level. The Blair government’s foreign policy decisions (and their 
consequences) had damaged its domestic political coalition. Interestingly, the effect appears 
still to be relevant. George Galloway, who had failed to win a seat at Westminster in the 2010 
general election, was returned as MP for Bradford West at a by-election in March 2012. Hailing 
the result as “the Bradford spring” in reference to the ‘Arab spring’ of 2011, he sought in his 
victory speech to link the two main themes of his campaign; a continued focus on Arab and 
Muslim causes (including Iraq, despite the withdrawal of British troops in 2009), and an ‘old 
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Labour’ economic line designed to appeal to the underprivileged. With regard to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, he was explicit. The Labour Party, the main target of his arguments, had to “stop 
supporting illegal, bloody, costly, foreign wars, because one of the reasons why they were so 
decisively defeated this evening was because the public do not believe that they have atoned 
for their role in the invasion and occupation of other people’s countries, and the drowning of 
those countries in blood” (Galloway 2012). Whether Galloway is right on the last point is 
debatable, but that he was successful in seeking office while repeatedly revisiting the 
supposedly concluded issue of Iraq suggests the voters of Bradford West (which appears in 
figure 37 as one of the constituencies with the highest Muslim populations in the UK) were at 
least not put off by it.  
One key element of the 2004 Spanish election which was not repeated in either the US 
or the UK was the dramatic series of terrorist attacks carried out on the Madrid train system 
three days before the vote. Ten remotely-operated bombs on four commuter services killed 
191 people and wounded hundreds more. Before the attacks the Aznar government had held a 
slim lead in opinion polls, although there was substantial public dissatisfaction with its Iraq 
policy. Despite attempts to frame the bombings as the product of domestic divisions by 
blaming the Basque separatist group ETA, the government was unable to respond effectively 
to evidence, which soon mounted, that the attacks were the work of al-Qaeda-inspired 
Islamists based in Spain. It is unclear to what extent the Madrid bombings directly swung the 
election in Jose Luis Zapatero’s favour, but certainly they raised the salience of the ongoing 
Spanish presence in Iraq just days before voters cast their ballots. Zapatero ordered Spanish 
forces out of Iraq shortly after coming to office. In the US, Osama Bin Laden sought to dampen 
President Bush’s re-election chances with a video statement issued in the final days of the 
campaign. Here, however, the rally effect engendered by Bin Laden’s appearance appears to 
have helped rather than hindered Bush (Burke 2011, 174).  
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Britain, too, faced terrorist activity linked to its Iraq policy, but crucially not until after 
the 2005 election, by which point it was too late for voters to be swayed. On 7 July 2005, four 
British citizens carried out suicide bombings on the London transport network, creating in the 
process what is still the most striking example of the long-term negative impact of Iraq on 
British Public Opinion (Bromund 2009, 269-270). Chapter 1 defines Public Opinion as views 
actively expressed by non-governmental actors through a deliberate effort to influence public 
debate. Although a particularly violent and extreme form of expression, the 7 July bombings fit 
within this definition. Video messages recorded prior to the attacks by two of the attackers, 
Mohamed Siddique Khan and Shezhad Tanweer, were subsequently intercut with al-Qaeda 
footage and released by jihadist groups for broadcast on al-Jazeera. Khan, who spoke chillingly 
in a broad Yorkshire accent, justified his action by telling his audience “your democratically-
elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. 
And your support of them makes you directly responsible” (Khan 2005). Tanweer was more 
explicit in linking his actions to the presence of British troops in the Middle East; “what you 
have witnessed now is only the beginning of a string of attacks that will continue and become 
stronger until you pull your forces out of Afghanistan and Iraq” (Tanweer 2005). Even before 
these images had been broadcast, the claim was being made that British involvement in Iraq 
had provoked the attacks, although Blair worked to resist the argument (Seldon, Snowdon and 
Collings 2007, 377). As he later wrote, “it’s a nightmare of an argument to deal with because, 
on one level, if you don’t fight these people, it’s possible you don’t feature so much on their 
hate list...[but] if you give even a sliver of credence to the argument, then suddenly it’s our 
fault, not theirs, which is, naturally, the very thing they want” (Blair 2010b, 570). Penn, Schoen 
& Berland were again contracted to determine the wider passive public response. Surveys 
showed 38% of those polled blaming “the hatred of certain Islamist groups for the West” for 
the attacks, compared to 30% British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 12% Britain’s 
relationship with the US. That a plurality would apparently have agreed with Blair’s view may 
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have been comforting, however if the figures for British policy towards Iraq and British policy 
towards the US are combined, it is clear that more respondents blamed the government for 
provoking the attacks than blamed terrorists for carrying them out. A subsequent question 
showed 49% seeing the attacks as a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and 43% as 
evidence that the fight against terrorism had to be continued. 68% agreed that “if we let these 
attacks force us out of Iraq, it will send the wrong message to the terrorists” and, significantly, 
the proportion of respondents who thought Britain should not have taken military action to 
remove Saddam Hussein from power fell from 47% in the aftermath of the 2005 election to 
just 42% after the bombings (Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, Inc 2005b). At the same 
time, however, a survey of young British Muslims found agreement that British policy had led 
to the attacks, and that more than 25% felt a conflict between being “British” and being a 
“Muslim” (Hill 2007, 275). The identity of the ‘British Muslim’ was coming under increasing 
pressure in the post-Iraq period as a result of the bitter political divisions that conflict had 
created.  
The decision to go to war in Iraq, then, had social as well as political consequences in 
Britain, although it must be noted that the radicalisation of young Muslim men was far from a 
new phenomenon (Husain 2007). As the situation on the ground grew more chaotic, and Iraqi 
civilian and Western military casualties rose, disaffection amongst British Muslims came to 
affect their voting behaviour, and even to drive some individuals to acts of violence. If the start 
of the war had triggered a decline in general public trust in the Blair government, and a slide in 
its electoral fortunes, the effect was particularly marked amongst this section of the British 
public. Its consequences, particularly the rise of the ‘home grown’ suicide bomber, and the 
concomitant collapse of the image of Britain as a ‘multicultural’ society, spread much further. 
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Conclusion 
 
 As damaging as the failures on the ground in Iraq were for the Blair government, it 
suffered greater reputational and electoral costs as a consequence of its own mismanaged 
‘spin’. Efforts to minimise uninformed press speculation about the prospects of military action 
in 2002 and early 2003 were widely interpreted as attempts to mislead Public Opinion, a 
perception compounded as ministers’ denials of imminent conflict grew increasingly 
disingenuous. Much of the support that eventually existed for the invasion was based on 
grudging acquiescence, with most observers agreeing that Iraq posed a potential threat to 
international security, and few willing to speak in support of Saddam Hussein’s regime. 
Unfortunately for the government, not only was the war itself costly and unsuccessful, a large 
proportion of journalists and editors approached it ready not only to be critical in their 
coverage, but actively looking for failure. So enthusiastic were they about publishing material 
damaging to ministers that on occasion they went too far, raising accusations of perfidy and 
misconduct that went beyond what could actually be proven. The basic problem for the 
government, however, was that it had taken the country to war promising to destroy WMD 
that Iraq did not actually possess. Winning individual arguments, such as that with the BBC 
over Andrew Gilligan’s Today report, did little to arrest the terminal decline in public trust 
because overall the gulf between pre-war rhetoric and post-invasion reality remained vast. The 
continued violence in Iraq ensured a constant stream of bad news about the consequences of 
military action, fuelling an endless debate over whether it had been legitimate in the first 
place. This further undermined trust in the government, while allowing political opponents 
who had supported the campaign to revisit their support. Despite having voted in favour of the 
war, the Conservative Party was able to attack the government at the 2005 election because it 
could use doubts over presentation to cast aspersions on New Labour’s honesty.  
    Conservative criticism, and the media’s continued stoking of public disquiet with the 
ongoing war in the context of rising costs and casualties, damaged the government’s electoral 
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position. It managed to retain office partly because the Conservatives were limited in terms of 
how far they could criticise on substantive grounds a decision they had voted for, and partly 
because once one major political party sought to make Iraq a partisan issue, supporters of its 
rivals naturally responded. Blair was saved in 2005, as he had been in 2003, in large part by 
Labour Party tribal loyalties. Left-wingers were no more warlike in 2005 than they had been 
two years earlier, but they chose to back Blair over Iraq rather than to capitulate to the 
Conservatives. It was only in the British Muslim community that the war remained 
unforgiveable, and here the consequences were far more devastating for ordinary people on 
the buses and tube trains of London than for the government. Only one Labour MP appears to 
have lost her seat as a direct result of the war in Iraq, although many more fell victim to the 
general decline in the Party’s support evident as it concluded its second four-year term. Fifty-
two people died in Britain’s first suicide bombings, explicitly linked by their perpetrators to the 
ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.   
 Members of Tony Blair’s inner circle continue to believe that they are unfairly 
maligned over Iraq. Blair himself refuses resolutely to apologise for taking the country to war. 
To an extent this consistency reflects habits learned in opposition and carried into 
government, underpinned by a view that journalists would report any hint of nuance as 
evidence of division or doubt. Probably too it represents a sustained belief on the part of 
former decision-makers that they did the best they could have done with the information 
available to them at the time. Public inquiries under Lords Hutton and Butler, and Sir John 
Chilcot, have revealed very little evidence of actual dishonesty in the way the invasion was 
‘sold’. The decline in public trust discussed in this chapter resulted more from perceived than 
from actual wrongdoing, being driven by dissatisfaction with ‘spin’ and the shortcomings of 
the official case for war, and exacerbated by military failings. The invasion of Iraq was 
damaging for the Blair government, but not on such a scale that it lost office. Instead its 
254 
 
reputation was blackened, its power eroded, and the coherence of its vision for multicultural 
Britain left greatly weakened. 
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Chapter 8 – Implications 
 
Although it focused originally on public opinion as a potential influence over British 
foreign policy, this study ultimately grew to encompass the wider range of actors and 
structures that together comprise the system of public debate. Partly this shift in emphasis 
follows logically from the constructivist definition of Public Opinion set out in Chapter 1. 
Constructivism implies that supposedly straightforward foreign policy concepts such as 
‘interest’, ‘legitimacy’, and ‘success’ are determined more by rhetoric than by ‘reality’. Partly, 
too, it reflects the way the Blair government developed and enacted its Iraq policy. It has 
proven “impossible, even for the toughest-minded historian, to ignore entirely what Tony 
Blair...said” during the course of the debate, not least because “on many days he [did] virtually 
nothing else but speak” (Stothard 2003, 173). Every major decision taken in Downing Street 
during this period involved some consideration of presentational matters, and for long periods 
presentation was the policy. During the early stages of the Afghan war, Alastair Campbell 
established the Coalition Information Centre, actively driving the global news agenda from 
three different time zones. When Tony Blair agreed with George Bush that their next step after 
removing the Taliban from power should be to confront Iraq, he emphasised that presenting 
the decision properly to the public would be an essential precursor to success. Britain’s WMD 
dossier clumsily conflated threat assessment and policy advocacy in seeking to convince 
sceptical Public Opinion of the need to take action against Baghdad. The entire UN process was 
designed to prove that war was a last resort, though in the end it largely had the opposite 
effect. The reversion to moral arguments in the final weeks before the invasion allowed Blair 
finally to present his case as he saw it. By then, however, the legitimacy of the entire 
enterprise had been undermined by the frequency with which the official line had changed 
(Williams 2005, 192-193).  
Chapter 7 discussed how the Blair government wound up more hindered than helped 
by its communication efforts during the build-up to war in Iraq. This Chapter explains the 
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implications of this observation for the study of British foreign policy. It looks at three broad 
areas covering the actors, structures, and processes at work, and identifies a number of 
potential considerations for future research. The first area discussed is the system by which 
the Blair government sought to manage, or ‘spin’, news coverage of its policy. Although 
dominated in the popular imagination by one notorious ‘spin doctor’, Downing Street’s PR 
approach was neither unique nor unprecedented. Governments have long sought to set the 
agenda for public debate through efforts to influence journalists, and to frame issues, 
personalities, policies, and events in a positive light. The second area is the other half of the 
news management equation, the media itself. Journalists undoubtedly come under pressure to 
repeat the ‘official line’ put out by ministers. At the same time, however, they face a range of 
competing interests and imperatives which constrain simultaneously their independence and 
the degree to which they become beholden to any one set of actors. For the most part these 
influences, which are both ideological and economic, are endemic characteristics of the way 
the modern media operates, rather than the product of individual agency in any meaningful 
way, an observation which raises questions about how plausible the concept of ‘news 
management’ actually is. The final area explored by this chapter, and its overarching theme, is 
the interaction between the imperatives and practices of policymakers and journalists in 
modern Britain. Gaining favourable coverage for their decisions has become so crucial to 
leaders that the conceptual distinction between the substance and the communication of 
foreign policy has broken down. Spin doctors contribute to decision-making. Substantive 
actions are undertaken for news management purposes. Rhetoric and reality interact in the 
assessment of policy success and policy failure, and neither alone determines how any one 
decision plays out. To understand policymaking, media coverage, and public opinion, then, it is 
necessary to identify their interrelationship. Each area is affected by the others to a greater or 
lesser degree depending on the specific circumstances. Studies that fail to account for the full 
range of interactions fail adequately to explain the impact of domestic constraints on British 
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foreign policymaking. A study of the Iraq war without political communication at its heart 
would inevitably be incomplete. 
 
News management 
 
The interrelationship between the substance and the communication of foreign policy 
operates at a practical level as a result of the functional integration of news management into 
the policymaking process that has taken place over recent decades. Media advisers no longer 
simply receive fully-formed policies and then set about presenting them to the public through 
the press. They now contribute actively to policy formation. British journalists’ dissatisfaction 
with the way the Iraq campaign was ‘spun’ may have reflected an established tension in the 
relationship between ministers and the media, but New Labour did not invent ‘spin’ (McNair 
2000, 123). Political scientists have recognised for decades the role of “the manufacture of 
consent” for the favoured policies of powerful actors by specialist professionals (Lippmann 
1922, 248). Tony Blair had been “scarred” by the hostility directed by parts of the British press 
towards his predecessors, and came to office determined to respond (Powell 2010b, 208, 192, 
Blair 2012a). Analysts often argue that democratic foreign policymakers pay little attention to 
the daily vicissitudes of public debate, and that they focus instead solely on longer-term trends 
(Baum 2004a, 606). These accounts neglect the belief common amongst leaders, however, 
repeatedly evidenced in New Labour’s conduct in office, that short-term news management is 
a prerequisite of longer-term political success (Knecht and Weatherford 2006, 710). Rather 
than engaging too closely in opinion management on their own account, British ministers 
employ specialists to handle media relations for them (Hill 2003, 276). One of Blair’s first acts 
as Labour leader had been to hire Alastair Campbell, specifically “to counter hostile media 
coverage” of the Party’s agenda after years in opposition (Moloney 2000, 127). As he later put 
it to the Leveson Inquiry, Blair believes that “in today’s media world, you need a first class 
media head. Anything else is an act of insanity” (Blair 2012a, 9). During the invasion of Iraq 
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Blair thought his chief ‘spin doctor’ so important to his policymaking circle that he preferred 
his presence at key meetings with President Bush to that of British Ambassador to the US 
Christopher Meyer. Although he was a career diplomat, Meyer had worked as a senior press 
officer in the 1980s, and so could presumably have advised Blair on the presentational side of 
the diplomatic equation. Blair wanted more than a diplomat with news management 
experience, however. He wanted a news manager, even one (like Campbell) with little 
knowledge of foreign affairs.  
This study’s first implication for the future analysis of British foreign policy, then, is 
that  policymakers want favourable news coverage for their policies, and establish powerful 
mechanisms to seek it out. Reversing the argument, we might equally conclude that the fact 
that the Blair government went to great lengths in seeking positive news coverage, introducing 
a range of innovations and placing public communications at the heart of its agenda, proves 
the significance it attached to managing Public Opinion (Cohen 1973, 181). Although many 
studies frame active news management in negative terms, describing political communication 
as “manipulation” (Page and Shapiro 1992, 283, 355, Jacobs 1992, 199, Nincic 1992, 17, 
Kaufmann 2004, 7-8), it is not necessary to make normative judgements in order to assess the 
impact of the activities themselves. References in Campbell’s diary suggest that the Blair 
government was quite cavalier about describing its own activities as “propaganda” (Campbell 
and Stott 2007, 572), at least compared to democratic leaders more generally (Cohen 1995, 
70). Propaganda is a subjective term, however. The methods by which ministers and officials 
sought to stimulate support for military action against Iraq did constitute a “deliberate attempt 
to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way” (Casey 2008, 5, emphasis in 
original). At the same time, it is not clear that they strayed across the line between legitimate 
and illegitimate activity established by the different definitions of ‘spin’ discussed in Chapter 4. 
There is apparently nothing wrong with the government presenting its case in the best light 
possible without resorting to dishonesty (McNair 2000, 127, Louw 2005, 143, Gaber 2007, 
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225). As the Blair government discovered, the credibility of official messages will suffer if the 
public no longer trusts what it is told. Lying, then, is probably counter-productive as well as 
illegitimate. 
British policymakers do not share the traumatic memory held by some of their 
American counterparts of the apparent role played by critical media coverage in the US defeat 
in Vietnam (Hallin 1986, 211, Taylor 1992, 270). That is not to say that journalists are seen as 
less significant in the UK, however. Christopher Meyer thought that in the US the leading 
foreign affairs commentators had considerable power to influence policy, but that they had 
“no equivalent in the United Kingdom” (C. Meyer 2005, 209). Discussions around the WMD 
dossier, by contrast, show leading journalists were regarded in Downing Street as both 
“trusted sources” for the development of public opinion and key contributors to Public 
Opinion (Berinsky 2007, 975). Jonathan Powell, for example, asked Campbell in one email 
about how best to answer questions raised by Donald MacIntyre of The Times (Powell 2002). 
Blair meanwhile has talked about the difficulty of keeping “the line between persuading the 
media of a policy; and allowing them privileged access in formulating it” (Blair 2012a, 5). 
Meyer may not have thought British commentators as well-placed to influence actual foreign 
policy as their peers in the US, but clearly that scepticism did not translate into policymakers’ 
behaviour. It may even be that the news management innovations introduced in the early 
summer of 2002, particularly the Prime Minister’s monthly press conference, increased the 
government’s exposure to leading journalists, both raising awareness of their concerns, and 
adding to the pressure to provide them with answers.   
News management only influences the passive public if the media influences the 
passive public. Interestingly, the Blair government’s desire to shape the way its Iraq policy 
appeared in the press appears to have developed despite limited evidence that media 
coverage has any effect on ordinary citizens’ views. Foreign policy analysts have historically 
been sceptical about the existence of a “mass market for detailed information on foreign 
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affairs” (Almond 1950, 232). As Chapter 1 discussed, ordinary citizens are thought to be far 
more concerned with matters that directly affect their daily lives than with the more abstract 
and remote issues arising in the international arena. Several studies of public opinion have 
even pointed out that, from a purely economic perspective, it is entirely rational for the 
average voter to ignore foreign policy much of the time (cf. Page and Shapiro 1992). Few 
individuals have sufficient leisure to justify the level of commitment necessary to gain viable 
first-hand knowledge of the wider world, and fewer still stand to gain or lose substantially 
from events overseas. Armed conflict changes the calculus slightly. While “in the ante-bellum 
period, nobody has to fight and nobody has to pay” (Lippmann 1922, 241), a decision to go to 
war can mean serious consequences for democratic publics. This effect has been reduced in 
the postmodern era by the shift away from ‘total war’, but it still occurs to an extent. In 
addition, more recent studies of the interplay between public opinion and foreign policy have 
noted that the lack of information most citizens hold about international affairs cannot be 
taken as evidence that they do not care about what goes on beyond their state’s borders 
(Risse-Kappen 1991, 481). Ignorance does not necessarily equate to indifference, particularly 
given that the easy availability of information in the internet age makes finding out about an 
issue that has suddenly sprung to prominence relatively straightforward. Even where they are 
dependent on news reports for information, audiences seemingly do not accept uncritically 
what they are told; they engage actively with reports, generating their own alternative 
interpretations of policies and events within the limitations of their knowledge. As a result, 
even where officials win the media over, they may still struggle to maximise public support. 
When Downing Street sought positive coverage for its positions, it accepted that winning the 
backing of journalists was an intrinsic good, but it also guessed at their ability to affect voting 
behaviour in the population at large. British leaders are not alone in undertaking news 
management activities for reasons primarily to do with fear and ignorance (Cohen 1995, 70, 
Jacobsen 2008, 339). The Blair government’s approach to Iraq reflected both the individual-
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level desire to win over key voices contributing to British Public Opinion, and this brand of 
blind faith in the trickle-down electoral benefits of such success.  
British journalists fulfilled two broader functions relevant to the understanding of this 
interaction during the Iraq debate. Firstly, they provided information about the policy that 
might otherwise have been unavailable, particularly once the centre of gravity in the crisis 
shifted from London and Washington to New York and Baghdad from late 2002 onwards. 
Information provision is a relatively straightforward media function; journalists fulfil a 
“gatekeeping role”, determining what ‘facts’ become news and so what material is available to 
citizens seeking to judge the efficacy of a policy proposal (Hill 2003, 274). There is however 
limited evidence that the passive public actually gains much knowledge from increased 
exposure to news about international affairs (Caspary 1970, 541, Page and Shapiro 1992, 283, 
Hill 2003, 264). Secondly, although journalism “may not be successful much of the time in 
telling people what to think”, it can still be “stunningly successful in telling its readers what to 
think about” (Cohen 1963, 13, emphasis in original). Media coverage is held to fulfil an agenda-
setting role for the wider public. In theory, audiences “learn not only about a given issue, but 
also how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news 
story and its position” (McCombs and Shaw 1972, 176). Because the media determines the 
sort of opinion poll data that is generated and made publicly available it is impossible to judge 
the knock-on impact of the Blair government’s efforts to set the agenda for public opinion 
more generally during the build-up to the Iraq war. Questions were simply not asked of the 
passive public on areas beyond the mainstream of public debate as it played out in the pages 
of the press. In theory, however, government success in setting the media agenda should have 
been mirrored by public opinion more generally. There is good experimental evidence 
available showing that news coverage does influence what issues audiences think are 
important (Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982, Iyengar and Kinder 1987, Iyengar 1991, Iyengar 
and Simon 1993, Cohen 1995, 123). Further analyses have suggested both that policymakers 
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pursue media management strategies primarily in order to influence the news agenda (Pfetsch 
1998, 71, Splichal 1999, 26, Esser and Spanier 2005, Silberstein 2005, Heffernan 2006, 583), 
and that in doing so they actually stand a decent chance of success (Page 2000, 88, Klarevas 
2002, 433, Soroka 2003, 27, Knecht and Weatherford 2006, 714). To a degree, then, the Blair 
government was able to influence the agenda of the British public debate over its Iraq policy, 
although it was constrained by the hostilities latent in the media market. Certain exercises, 
such as the decision to ‘go the UN route’, shifted the focus of public debate in policymakers’ 
preferred direction. Others fared less well, especially the attempt, through the ‘dossier’ 
exercise, to focus attention on the alleged threat posed by Iraq’s WMD.  
Agenda setting is only the first part of the news management process, however. 
Governments compete just as actively to secure positive framing for their positions (Gaskarth 
2006, 327, T. Solomon 2009, 276). Framing efforts are often subtle, like the repeated 
juxtaposition of terrorism and Saddam Hussein in public statements, which created the 
impression that there was a link between the two without anyone actually (dishonestly) 
asserting it. They involve the careful use of language to establish a certain interpretation of 
reality as a standard against which alternative arguments are assessed (Hilsman 1987, 229). 
British ministers and officials benefitted from the considerable leeway all governments have in 
using selective framing to seek positive coverage for their decisions (Silberstein 2005, 2-3, 
Wolfe 2008, 2). At times they came close to achieving the ultimate goal of political 
communication, namely dominance or hegemony over public debate, a condition under which 
alternative interpretations appear unrealistic or illegitimate (Jackson 2005, 19). They failed 
most notably in the course of debates over the UN weapons inspection process and the 
necessity of a ‘second’ UNSCR in early 2003. Perhaps crucially, they never managed to follow 
up successful agenda-setting efforts with effective framing. By advocating a UN route, the Blair 
government shifted the focus of the public debate over the confrontation with Iraq onto the 
issue of the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions. From September 2002 onwards, 
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arguments both for and against military action assumed the need to ensure Iraq complied with 
its disarmament obligations, differing only over the best way of doing so. The government was 
unable, however, to get a majority of Public Opinion to accept its interpretations of the proper 
role of the UN, the significance of UNMOVIC, and the nature of international law. News 
management is thus multifaceted, and can be effective on some levels while failing on others.  
Political leaders are often regarded as having the upper hand in their efforts to lead 
public discussion of their foreign policy decisions. Governments usually hold the power of 
initiative in deciding what issues are brought to the media’s attention, while their institutional 
authority enables them to exercise a degree of control over the definition of ‘national interest’ 
(Hill 1981, 59-60). They have access to the media, and they are in a position at least to derive 
influence from that access (Silberstein 2005, 2-3). Outsiders frequently feel unable to question 
what they are told by ministers. Journalists fear “stigmatisation as traitors and possible legal 
sanctions” for rejecting the official line (Carruthers 2000, 166-167), and they recognise that 
“they are in a weak position to second-guess officials who have access to the latest top-secret 
information” (Casey 2008, 12). Foreign policy may be up for debate within the public sphere, 
then, but certain aspects of the conduct of statecraft remain beyond the reach of ordinary 
observers. Interestingly, however, policymakers tend to be “far more convinced of their own 
limitations in this sphere” compared to journalists’ perceptions of them (Casey 2008, 13). 
Although most models assume the media will be heavily influenced by official positions, 
particularly during times of war, “those prosecuting wars continue to complain that news 
media are a ‘problem’, insufficiently supportive, perhaps even siding with the enemy” 
(Robinson, Goddard, et al. 2009, 534). Partly this sense of persecution stems from an 
unwillingness on the part of policymakers to accept that the public simply does not ‘buy’ the 
argument they are ‘selling’. Few accept evidence of continued hostility to their plans in public 
debate as a sign of anything other than unduly critical journalism (Stothard 2003, 3). Partly, 
too, it reflects a mistaken belief that the function of the news is to transmit information from 
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government to the governed; a belief long challenged in the media studies literature, and 
analysed in more detail in the following sections.  
Political communication requires both skill and luck if it is to be successful (Baker and 
O'Neal 2001, 682, Entman 2004, 18, 120, Louw 2005, 149). Even then, as this study has found, 
there are real limits to policymakers’ ability to overcome powerful forces operating within the 
media itself, and few would accept that they exert any real control over what gets reported 
(Casey 2008, 13). A second implication of the way Blair government communication efforts 
played out in this case is therefore that the success of news management varies for reasons to 
do with the nature of Public Opinion that are independent of the communication process 
itself.  
 
Media logic 
 
As Blair-era officials continue to complain, modern media producers have begun to 
“add their own spin to stories” in response to government news management activities 
(Powell 2010, 204). Foreign policymakers are particularly exercised by this development 
because they believe media support is essential to the effective use of force overseas. During 
the latter part of the 20th century, it became increasingly clear that “the way in which the mass 
media represent [a] conflict is part of the conflict” (Brown 2003, 87). British journalists felt 
they had been placed on the back foot by official news management efforts during first Gulf 
War. Government spokesmen had dominated the information flow while journalists struggled 
to access independent source material, resulting in coverage that many in the media 
subsequently thought insufficiently objective (Bennett 1994, 17, Jasperson and El-Kikhia 2003, 
114). The need subsequently identified for news reporters to adopt a more critical stance in 
future meant that by the time of intervention in Kosovo, in 1999, Blair government officials felt 
themselves losing influence over public debate. Information provided by Serbian government 
sources received prominent coverage alongside NATO statements, with both being subject to 
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sustained critical analysis. Emergency measures were taken, with Alastair Campbell being 
despatched to NATO headquarters to take charge of the alliance’s media-management 
operations, with the result that the perceived influence of the ‘Serb lie machine’ over the 
western press declined (Daddow 2009, 554). During the Afghan campaign, Campbell had 
sought to relive his Kosovo success, creating the Coalition Information Centre, tasked with co-
ordinating press statements and responding rapidly to rebut reports that differed from the 
official line. The result was a further rise in tensions between policymakers and journalists, 
however, with the latter striving ever harder to assert their independence, and the former 
reacting with horror as those efforts led to the use of source material of unquestionable 
independence but somewhat less marked probity. Even some news commentators 
acknowledged unreasonable behaviour on the part of their peers, with their demands for daily 
successes, constant indulgence in speculation, uncritical acceptance of Taliban claims about 
civilian casualties, pessimism, and preference for stories about divisions within the 
government or NATO ahead of substantive accounts of the issues. 
This behaviour is not, however, simply a reaction to the increasingly sophisticated 
techniques deployed by Campbell et al., although the threat to journalists’ treasured 
independence posed by ‘spin’ does naturally provoke some sort of response (Esser and Spanier 
2005, 27, Blair 2012c, 21). As Blair himself points out, trends towards less deferential news 
coverage of government activities, seen in the period covered by this study, began to develop 
before New Labour came to office (Blair 2012b, 7). They represent rather a broader tendency 
fuelled by a range of competing normative and economic pressures at work within British 
journalism, indeed within the western media sphere more generally. Journalists have long 
subscribed to a set of professional values that govern the way they approach information 
about foreign affairs. Crucial among these are commitments to independence, balance, the 
use of authoritative sources, and accuracy in reporting (Baum and Groeling 2010b, 20). They 
are increasingly constrained in terms of how far they can hold to these values, however, by 
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economic factors. Cost-cutting efforts reduce the time available to research and write stories. 
The dependence of media organisations on revenue generated by advertising forces a focus on 
maximising the audience reached by any one bulletin (Curran 2007, 28). These pressures are 
exacerbated in Britain by the rapidly shrinking size of the market for news, as audiences seek 
out information online instead of through traditional formats. Journalists consequently behave 
not as neutral observers and reporters of reality, but as “strategic, self-interested gatekeepers 
of public information regarding foreign policy events” (Baum and Groeling 2009, 437). The 
media “marketplace” thus becomes governed to a greater extent by economic imperatives 
rather than by its supposed commitment to truth, a factor which explains in part journalists’ 
failure to identify many of the weaknesses in the government case for war in Iraq, at least until 
after the invasion (Kaufmann 2004, 5, Zunes 2006, 22).  
In recognising that the news is produced not by some objective and disinterested 
process of gathering and disseminating information, but in response to commercial pressures 
and professional imperatives, we introduce a crucial element from the critical media studies 
literature into the study of foreign policy. The modern media market is potentially hugely 
profitable and immensely competitive. If there ever existed a halcyon age in which ‘facts’ were 
transmitted to audiences without their being tainted by the profit motive that drives this 
complex system, it has long since passed (Habermas 1962, 1992, 21). In order to become 
‘news’, information must now pass through what Herman and Chomsky called “news filters” 
established by the economic logic of the industrial-scale media (Herman and Chomsky 2002, 
2). These filters have at least the potential to undermine the objective value of what gets 
reported. Recognising the potential effects of ‘business’ imperatives, Walter Lippmann warned 
against complacently expecting “the newspaper to serve us truth however unprofitable the 
truth may be” (Lippmann 1922, 320-321). Rather than representing objective truth, news 
media products must to an extent reflect the interests, biases, prejudices, and preferences of 
potential customers (Bauer, Gaskell and Allum 2000, 6). This is a matter of maintaining 
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editorial lines which match audience views, of designing news formats which appeal to large 
sections of the population, and of developing news-identification practices that accord with 
popular rather than professional definitions of what information merits coverage, all while 
minimising the cost to the end consumer. On each count, the drive for audiences reduces the 
objective value of news, and adds complexity to the system by which it is produced. This 
study’s third implication, then, is that neither journalists, nor policymakers, nor audiences, 
necessarily have the last word when it comes to deciding what information will become news, 
and under what circumstances (Jakobsen 2000, 134, Entman 2004, 94). Each exerts a degree of 
influence, while their relative power is contingent on a range of outside factors.  
In common with their peers in other democratic states, few members of the British 
passive public are interested in foreign policy when it does not involve matters of life and 
death. To an extent, however, the global rise of so-called ‘soft’ news coverage, which presents 
information about foreign affairs in a light hearted or humorous manner to a mass audience, 
has increased attentiveness to international relations as an “incidental by-product” of the 
drive to make news profitable (Baum 2002, 272, Baum 2003, 3-4, Baum and Potter 2008, 51). 
In the UK this role has largely been taken by the tabloid press, particularly The Sun and The 
Mirror, both of which vastly out-sell the more traditional ‘broadsheet’ papers, underscoring 
perhaps the comparative weakness of the business case for ‘hard’ news (Magder 2003, 33, 
Baum 2006, 127). Although they discussed Iraq less frequently than the broadsheets, the two 
leading tabloids devoted considerable space and attention to the matter over the course of 
the period covered by this study. To a degree the larger audience reached by these 
publications should have democratised the process by which the British public engaged with 
foreign policy. After all, the reliance of newspapers on purchasing decisions made by millions 
of individual consumers means that “the newspaper editor has to be re-elected every day” 
(Lippmann 1922, 321). The problem, however, is that reporting can be popular without 
necessarily being sufficiently sober (Altheide 1987, 174) or accurate (Powell 2010, 205) really 
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to improve the quality of public debate (Thussu 2003, 123). Chapter 2 recounts the clash 
between media competition and information provision that resulted when The Mirror and The 
Sun argued over the significance of the fall of Kabul. Instead of considering the substantive 
impact of the Taliban’s apparent demise, Britain’s two highest-selling newspapers fought with 
each other over which was betraying their audiences in presenting it as either a major event 
(The Sun) or an insignificant moment in a failing campaign (The Mirror). This tendency of 
journalists to focus on each other rather than on the subjects of their coverage fuelled the 
constant speculation over the timing of military action against Iraq during the course of 2002 
in particular. As Robin Cook observed, newspapers were so afraid of being beaten in the race 
to be first to report the start of hostilities, they tended to pounce on anything that could be 
presented as evidence that it was coming soon (Cook 2003, 113). Clearly the expansion of the 
media audience did little, in this case, to improve the quality of the information it received. 
The particular example of media infighting cited here, meanwhile, suggests the greater 
importance placed by (tabloid) editors on ‘beating’ their rivals, ahead of promoting any one 
argument, reporting the truth, or holding the government to account. Operating in a 
competitive media market, journalists knew who their ‘real’ enemies were; other journalists. 
They may have shared common commitments to independence and to the search for ‘truth’, 
but their ideological differences (and the perceived differences of their target audiences) 
drove them into conflict with each other. The intensity of this conflict was then further fuelled 
by the economic factor; the need to boost audiences in a time of declining news consumption 
lent an edge sharpened by self-interest to individual arguments.  
By the time Tony Blair became Prime Minister in 1997 observers were already growing 
concerned about the negative consequences of journalists’ increased focus on scandal and 
trivia in the hunt for audiences (Curran and Seaton 5th Edn. 1997). Campbell’s famed focus on 
‘message discipline’ arose in large part from a (reasonably well-grounded) belief that the 
British media would seize on any hint of divisions between ministers to portray the 
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government as hopelessly mired in crisis (Cook 2003, 351, Kampfner 2003, 125, Campbell and 
Stott 2007, 756, Blair 2012b, 7). Every time a member of the Blair government so much as 
implied that disagreements existed within the Cabinet over Iraq, the media reported on the 
existence and likely political impact of those disagreements, and ignored the substantive issues 
that had allegedly caused them. In one example of this effect drawn from late 2001, Clare 
Short made some unguarded public comments about the prospect of the use of force in 
Afghanistan that prompted dozens of newspaper articles speculating about the impact of 
divisions in the Cabinet, each one of which ignored the actual question of whether military 
action was warranted or wise (Campbell and Stott 2007, 569). Alastair Campbell, then, was not 
just paranoid – and his behaviour towards the BBC over the Andrew Gilligan report 
demonstrates that he certainly was paranoid – but often justifiably so. Blair’s remark at 
Cabinet in February 2002, that the government had become “more spinned against than 
spinning” (see Chapter 3), shows that Campbell’s concerns were held more widely in Downing 
Street. What is interesting, however, in light of the way those involved in media management 
at this time continue to describe the press, is the fact that journalists’ engagement in ‘spin’ did 
little to hold the government more firmly to account. British newspapers were so busy 
accusing Blair of being a ‘poodle’ or writing about potential resignations in the Cabinet that 
they largely overlooked the less dramatic but ultimately more significant grounds on which 
they could have been engaging critically with government policy. It is interesting to speculate, 
then, on whether efforts to limit the media’s access to source material for ultimately 
unfounded ‘scandal’ stories are actually worthwhile from a strategic news management 
perspective. Arguably, a government eager to avoid close scrutiny of its substantive 
performance should actually be encouraging journalists to report rumour and innuendo ahead 
of ‘hard’ analysis. That the Blair government did not pursue this course suggests that it feared 
negative coverage more than it feared accurate coverage of its foreign policy agenda, an 
observation that actually speaks in favour of its good faith.  
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New Labour’s belief that the media was constantly circling in search of a scandal was 
compounded by fear that the sheer pace of change in the British news business threatened to 
overwhelm Whitehall’s sclerotic civil service press offices. Modern communications have 
advanced to such an extent that foreign policy no longer plays out in an isolated arena, but in 
one made immediate on television screens and newspaper pages within hours of events that 
in earlier eras might have remained distant (Hoffman 2002, Blair 2010b, 446, Blair 2012b, 11). 
Campbell continues to maintain that all he did was update a system that was no longer fit for 
purpose in the face of such developments (Hollis 2010, 58, Campbell 2010a, 4). His problem, of 
course, was that journalists’ dependence on crises, the political orientation of individual 
publications, and the technology-driven development of the media market were each 
structural characteristics of the modern media, rather than the consequences of individual 
agency. It is difficult, no matter how effective a government ‘spin’ operation may be, to out-
‘spin’ the fundamental nature of 21st-century journalism.  
British journalists tended to focus their discussion of the Iraq confrontation on its 
domestic political consequences, and on the personal role of Blair, Bush, and their ministers 
and advisers, rather than on diplomatic or geopolitical concerns. Personalisation is one of the 
more common and well-established trends in media coverage of foreign affairs (Lippmann 
1922, 13, Knecht and Weatherford 2006, 709, Baum 2006, 124). It is also perhaps the least 
damaging of the effects seen in Britain over the Iraq campaign. Christopher Meyer argues that, 
even for decision-makers themselves, “it is impossible to disentangle the personalities, the 
politics and the policies” involved in foreign affairs (C. Meyer 2005, 218-219). Tony Blair 
actually was at the heart of  policymaking, so the fact that news reports placed him there did 
not concern Downing Street unduly; indeed, by making the Prime Minister more available to 
journalists through the monthly press conferences, Campbell arguably encouraged the 
practice, albeit inadvertently. The search for domestic political divisions, however, caused real 
difficulties. When Cabinet discussed Iraq on 7 March 2002, for example, ministers expressed a 
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range of views on the right policy response while agreeing on the basic need to support the US 
in confronting Iraq. It was, in effect, a genuine debate over the relative merits of different 
options, exactly the sort of thing the Cabinet is supposed to do all the time. By the time the 
exchange was reported it had morphed into a major political crisis. Far from this being a 
consequence of individual vendettas launched by hostile journalists, it in fact reflects the 
underlying structural logic of the modern news media. Journalists have to produce a certain 
volume of news each day; there are column inches to fill. As Blair himself concedes, they “have 
to say something”, and ideally something new (Blair 2012c, 25). Information about routine 
activity, particularly in a generally low-salience area such as foreign affairs, is not considered 
interesting enough to attract audiences and so to sell advertising space. It is dismissed as 
insufficiently newsworthy, therefore, not because of the substance of the issues involved, but 
because too few people find them interesting. In order to generate sufficient ‘news’, 
therefore, journalists create their own crises, focusing reporting on information which can be 
presented as evidence of divisions, duplicity, or imminent public danger, whether or not that 
presentation reflects what is actually happening (cf. Blair 2012a, 10, 2012c, 31-32). A number 
of specific incidents discussed through the course of this study appear more explicable when 
considered in light of this observation. The effect was amplified where actual events of 
significance were playing out in Iraq. Chapter 7 notes that the constant stream of bad news 
emerging from the battlefield kept it high on news agendas, ensuring discussions over the 
legitimacy of the action continued alongside those on whether it could ever result in success. 
From the government’s perspective it made no difference why journalists refused to accept 
nuanced arguments (Blair 2010b, 403, Powell 2010b, 153). All that mattered was that they 
could not be trusted with subtlety; official communications had to make absolutely categorical 
judgements otherwise the media would ignore their substance and focus on their 
uncertainties. As Chapter 4 described, the search for certainty then caused problems of its 
own. 
272 
 
Media organisations less driven by commercial pressures might have been more 
willing to accept government statements at face value (a prospect of uncertain desirability). 
They would also likely have spent less time looking for evidence of Labour Party divisions or 
Britain’s alleged lack of influence over President Bush, and potentially more time considering 
the general ramifications of an attack on Iraq. There were long periods during the Iraq debate 
when journalists concentrated their attention almost entirely on Westminster politics, ignoring 
the wider geopolitical issues at play, and in the process missing their chance to consider 
directly the substance of what the government was proposing to do. Thus the fourth 
implication of the Iraq debate for the wider study of British foreign policy arises from the 
observation that the compulsion journalists felt, as a result of economic pressures affecting 
their employers, to seek out scandals, forced the Blair government into a constant crisis-
management stance. Competitive forces at work in the commercial media market mean that 
even the most steady administration will occasionally be portrayed as adrift, and the quality of 
information available to passive publics in considering foreign affairs will always be 
constrained. Leaders’ acceptance of the argument that short-term media support is a 
prerequisite for long-term public support forces them to engage with the baser elements of 
the news market, trying to minimise its worst excesses, or at least to shape them using ‘spin’. 
In Britain during the build up to war with Iraq this effect pertained despite the potential for the 
government to avoid being held accountable for its actions by actively encouraging the media 
to focus on trivia and invented scandals, and so by directing it away from substantive analysis.  
For professional reasons, journalists tend to prefer basing their stories on information 
gleaned from a range of authoritative sources (Hilsman 1987, 229). Just as the government 
relies upon the media to transmit its arguments to the public, so too the media relies upon the 
information the government provides to ground reporting in credible source material. The 
interaction between journalistic norms and the economic imperatives of the modern media is 
thus supplemented by the “mutual dependency” of news providers and policymakers (Thussu 
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2005, 4th Edition, 275). If policymakers want to communicate, they have no choice but to do 
so through the media, while if the media wants to write political stories then journalists must 
make some reference to official sources (Blair 2012a, 1). One major result of this is “indexing”, 
a process by which “the media calibrate news judgements...to the clout of the powerful actors 
whose remarks or actions are covered”(Entman and Page 1994, 97). Although the effect varies 
for a number of reasons, generally journalists report the views of individuals in rough 
proportion to the power of those individuals to influence the actual issues at stake (Althaus, et 
al. 1996, 412, Baum and Groeling 2008b, 1065). Since government ministers and spokesmen 
are best placed to influence decision-making, the ‘indexing’ effect ensures that the ‘official 
line’ naturally serves as a “starting point” for media coverage of British foreign policy (Gamson 
and Modigliani 1989, 7, Nacos, Shapiro and Isernia 2000, 4). Depending on the nature of the 
issues at stake, some room remains for a wider range of actors to get their voices heard 
including opposition politicians, journalists, ‘enemy’ spokespersons, and quasi-neutral figures 
such as academics and think-tanks, provided they provide views that balance what is already 
being said (Norris, Kern and Just 2003, 12-13, Entman 2004, 94, Robinson, et al. 2009, 534).  
 Although they often take little direct interest in political issues, passive publics do 
expect to see evidence that someone is offering alternatives to the official line (Almond 1950, 
70, 88, Caspary 1970, 546, Everts and Isernia 2001, 17). In most cases, this expectation will be 
met as a result of the ‘indexing’ phenomenon; government statements will be reported 
alongside retorts from opposition politicians or leading members of the active public (Nacos, 
Shapiro and Isernia 2000, 4, Magder 2003, 36, Thussu 2005, 4th Edition, 277, Casey 2008, 12). 
If the public is united on an issue, however, journalists will have nothing to gain from informing 
it of divisions within the governing elite. There is little point in organisations dependent on 
keeping their audiences’ attention working too hard to change minds. Similarly, if the elite is 
united and the public divided, journalists’ dependence on authoritative sources will leave them 
struggling to write stories that reflect a wider range of views (Kern, Levering and Levering 
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1984, 195, Page and Shapiro 1992, 283, Bennett 1994, 24). It matters little in such 
circumstances whether the absence of challenge stems from a lack of contradictory 
information, fear of appearing unpatriotic, or even genuine agreement with the substance of 
official policy (Norris, Kern and Just 2003, 296-297, Kaufmann 2004, 42, Casey 2008, 12). 
Britain’s part in the Iraq invasion was enthusiastically supported by the Conservative Party, 
which might ordinarily have criticised a Labour government’s policies. Journalists, who were 
already conditioned to highlight surprising developments such as internal party divisions (Gelpi 
2010, 93), thus balanced official statements with criticism emerging from Labour’s own 
parliamentary backbenches. When this approach proved insufficient, many went further, 
engaging in speculation and eliding the distinction between commentary and news. This 
provoked in turn an increasingly aggressive effort from Downing Street to influence coverage, 
and created a spiral of ‘spin’ that came to define the entire public debate. This effect was most 
significant during the Summer of 2002.  
It is thus not only “when credible elites defect” from the official line that “government 
efforts to manage public opinion [through the media] become increasingly problematic” 
(Powlick and Katz 1998, 29, cf. Entman 2004, 20, Casey 2008, 363). Journalists can and do 
create their own rhetorical competition to the government if the political class fails to provide 
alternative arguments for them. This effect was enhanced with regard to Iraq because some of 
those who did defect from the official line were members of Tony Blair’s Cabinet. Robin Cook 
appears to have maintained an effective behind-the-scenes briefing operation throughout the 
build-up to war. The nature and scope of his objections to military action received ample airing 
in the press, often attributable only indirectly through his ‘friends’, an approach which ensured 
he remained insulated from any serious political consequences (at least until the time of his 
resignation). Clare Short’s approach was blunter, involving spontaneous on-the-record 
interviews that undermined her credibility in the eyes of Public Opinion and so reduced her 
capacity to influence public debate. In both cases journalists were primed to respond rapidly 
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and report prominently on such senior dissent. In both cases, also, they focused their coverage 
on reporting the fact that there were disagreements, and on considering their impact, rather 
than on analysing the substantive issues at stake.  
 
Figure 38: Proportional distribution of sources cited for UK major newspaper news stories on 
Iraq, February 2002 – March 2003 (n=7,916). 
 
Although British government sources were cited more frequently by newspaper 
reports than those drawn from any other category during the period of this study, it is clear 
from the time series analysis in figure 38 that the relative importance of different types of 
source varied over time. In part this variation reflects the indexing hypothesis, with journalists 
reacting to movements in the balance of power in the public debate. It further highlights a 
possible addition to the indexing model, applicable in states other than the US, where it was 
developed. Policymakers in Washington have more influence over international affairs than 
leaders in any other state, democratic or otherwise, by virtue of their position at the helm of 
the world’s last remaining superpower. American journalists thus naturally ‘index’ their 
coverage of foreign policy to what the administration of the day is saying, drawing in 
comments from significant external forces, such as Congress, along the way. From the 
perspective of a news organisation based in London or Paris, however, Washington remains 
the centre of global power. British and French journalists will feature their own governments’ 
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
Fe
b
 0
2
M
ar
 0
2
A
p
r 
0
2
M
ay
 0
2
Ju
n
 0
2
Ju
l 0
2
A
u
g 
0
2
Se
p
 0
2
O
ct
 0
2
N
o
v 
0
2
D
ec
 0
2
Ja
n
 0
3
Fe
b
 0
3
M
ar
 0
3
Public
UK Govt
Foreign Govt
Parliament
276 
 
positions prominently, but they will usually also refer to what is being said across the Atlantic. 
The effect does not work both ways. It was unthinkable to an American official during the 
build-up to war in Iraq that the US media might pay more attention to Jacques Chirac than to 
Donald Rumsfeld; many incorrectly assumed that the converse would be true in terms of 
media coverage of events in the capitals of other democratic states. Consequently more effort 
was devoted by Bush administration officials to firing up the Republican party ‘base’ than on 
putting out messages that went over as well with public opinion in Europe as they did in the US 
(Kampfner 2003, 169, Campbell and Stott 2007, 581). 
Type Proportion n 
UK Government 29.94% 2370 
Parliament 19.68% 1558 
Foreign Government 28.39% 2247 
UN 4.84% 383 
Public 17.05% 1350 
Unnamed 0.10% 8 
Figure 39: Proportional distribution of sources cited for UK major newspaper news stories on 
Iraq, February 2002 – March 2003.  
 
In overall terms, figure 39 shows that roughly 30% of the 7,916 sources cited in the 2,335 news 
stories investigated by this study were members of the British government, or official 
spokespersons. Tony Blair alone accounted for 8.35% of all citations, members of his Cabinet a 
further 9.8%, and Downing Street officials 4.72%. A total of 28.4% of sources were members of 
foreign governments, principally officials and senior members of the Bush administration in 
the US. Just 17% of all sources cited could be categorised as “public”, including civil society 
representatives (3.31%), retired policymakers and officials (2.6%), journalists (2.44%), and 
opinion polls (2.32%). Non-governmental actors thus had only a limited ability to influence 
news reports about British policy towards Iraq during the period leading up to the invasion. 
Most of the information which became news was supplied by actors working for the British 
government, foreign governments, or sitting in one of the Houses of Parliament. Two possible 
explanations for this trend can be advanced. Firstly, it may have been that news stories about 
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foreign policy inevitably focus on the views of those actually involved in foreign policymaking, 
in line with the indexing hypothesis. Secondly, and crucially, it should be noted that journalists 
themselves represented the loudest and most consistent anti-war voices in the British public 
debate over Iraq. Civil society actors did speak up, notably through the Stop the War Coalition, 
but for the most part the debate was dominated by politicians and the press. Since quoting 
other journalists is regarded within the news industry as an admission of failure (Esser and 
D'Angelo 2003, Esser and Spanier 2005), it may be unsurprising that politicians, who were 
more likely to adopt pro-war arguments, dominated news coverage. The figures presented in 
this section do not account for the impact of media commentary, which as figure 44 (below) 
demonstrates, narrowly took an anti-war line over the course of the debate.  
 
Figure 40: Proportional distribution of sources drawn from UK government and public sources 
cited in news stories on Iraq in major UK newspapers, January 2002 – March 2003 (n=7,916) 
 
The dependence of the British media on official sources was not uniformly distributed 
across all news publications, as figure 40 shows. For example, 55% of sources cited by the pro-
war News of the World represented the British government, compared to just 22% of those 
cited by the anti-war Independent on Sunday. In order to test the significance of the apparent 
association between a newspaper’s editorial position on the war, and the sources used for its 
news coverage, a simple regression analysis was conducted using the software package STATA. 
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Regression is necessary in this case to determine whether the apparent link between a 
publication’s editorial line and its propensity to use particular types of sources for its news 
coverage actually reflects an underlying trend, or simply a spurious association apparent in the 
data but not representative of actual behaviour. Two response variables were created, labelled 
‘govsource’ and ‘pubsource’, representing the proportion of citations in each publication that 
referred to British government and to public sources respectively. The main input variable of 
interest, labelled ‘position’, described each newspaper’s stance on the war. As Chapter 1 sets 
out, this study involved the analysis of a large number of newspaper commentary articles 
published in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. Each was assessed in terms of whether it 
explicitly stated a position for or against the use of force, and coded accordingly. Pro-war 
articles were coded 1, neutral articles (including those which discussed the situation in Iraq 
without stating a position on the prospect of war) were coded 0, and anti-war articles -1.  
 
Figure 41: Average position on rectitude of war with Iraq taken by commentary articles in 
leading UK national newspapers, January 2002 – March 2003 (n-numbers in brackets).  
 
Average figures, set out in figure 41, were then developed for each publication in order to 
gauge their overall stance on the war with reference to the full spectrum of commentary they 
carried. A publication which printed only pro-war comment pieces between 1 January 2002 
and 20 March 2003 would receive a score of 1.00 on the scale established here, while a solidly 
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anti-war rival would score -1.00. Two ‘dummy’ variables, ‘sunday’ and ‘tabloid’, were created 
to introduce a measure of control to the model. Weekly newspapers were coded 1 on the 
‘sunday’ variable while their daily equivalents were coded 0. Tabloid publications were 
similarly coded 1 on the ‘tabloid’ variable while broadsheets were coded 0. Sunday papers 
tend to be larger than weekday editions, and so to carry a greater volume of more detailed 
stories. Broadsheets equally contain more detailed stories than tabloids. Either effect could 
produce spurious associations without these control variables being included. Longer stories 
contain more space and so may cite a wider range of sources simply by virtue of their greater 
length, rather than as a consequence of their publication’s editorial line. 
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P 
position 0.083817 .0321742     2.61 0.026000 
sunday 0.034117 .0321456     1.06 0.314000 
tabloid 0.090766 .0356038     2.55 0.029000 
α 0.289874 .025102    11.55 0.000000 
R² 0.6005 
 
 
 
Figure 42: Results of the regression analysis of variable ‘govsource’. 
 
The first regression analysis indicated that there was an association (significant at the 95% 
confidence level) between the position of the average commentary article published by a 
newspaper, and the citation of government sources in its news stories, controlling for 
publication type (figure 42). According to these results, on average we would expect to have 
seen the government’s share of citations in a newspaper adopting a pro-war editorial line 
rising by 8.4 and 16.8 percentage points when compared to neutral and anti-war equivalents 
respectively, holding the other variables constant. Additionally, this model shows that the 
proportion of sources cited by tabloid newspapers that represented the British government 
was on average 9 percentage points higher than in than their broadsheet equivalents, 
controlling for position and whether they were daily or weekly publications (significant at the 
95% confidence level). There was no significant association between ‘sunday’ and ‘govsource’, 
meaning that Sunday newspapers were neither more nor less dependent on government 
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sources for their information than their daily equivalents, once the other variables were 
controlled for.  
 
Coef. Std. Err. t P 
position -0.06407 .0282751 -2.27 0.047 
sunday 0.082567 .02825 2.92 0.015 
tabloid 0.009883 .031289 0.32 0.759 
α 0.14736 .02206 6.68 0 
R² 0.5901 
 
 
 
Figure 43: Results of the regression analysis of variable ‘pubsource’. 
 
The second regression analysis indicated that there was also an association (significant at the 
95% confidence level) between the position of the average commentary article published by a 
newspaper, and the proportion of citations within its news stories which derived from public 
sources, controlling for publication type (figure 43). According to these results, we would 
expect to have seen non-governmental actors’ share of citations in a newspaper adopting a 
pro-war editorial line falling by 6.4 and 12.8 percentage points when compared to  neutral and 
anti-war equivalents respectively, holding the other variables constant. Additionally, this 
model shows that the proportionate citation of public sources by Sunday newspapers was on 
average 8.3 percentage points higher than in than their daily equivalents, controlling for the 
other variables. This perhaps reflects Sunday papers’ longer article lengths, and so greater 
amount of space in which to consider a wider range of sources; data was not collected to allow 
this hypothesis to be tested on this occasion. There was no significant association between 
‘tabloid’ and ‘pubsource’, meaning that tabloid newspapers were neither more nor less 
dependent on sources representing Public Opinion for their information than their broadsheet 
equivalents.  
The levels of variation and association observed in the data generated by this study 
must have an explanation beyond the professional imperatives of journalists outlined above. 
The desire to balance competing views and the economic need to attract audiences through 
coverage of political conflict both encourage the citation of multiple sources, but neither effect 
should cause the degree of discrepancy in citation rates between publications seen here. 
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Indeed, the relatively high R² values of the two models, with both explaining around 60% of 
the observed variation in the output variables, suggests that these pressures were heavily 
counteracted by a more substantial underlying trend. British newspaper reporters apparently 
focused their coverage on sources likely to agree with their publication’s editorial line. The 
tendency of anti-war publications to emphasise opinion polls, which generated predominately 
sceptical responses throughout the build-up to war, was only the most visible example of this 
effect in practice. What this analysis has shown is that similar effects took place across the 
entire newspaper market. It suggests a fifth implication for this study, that commercial 
pressures influence what information becomes news more heavily than professional norms 
around balance and neutrality. British print journalists choose to appeal to their audiences (or 
their editors) even where doing so means deviating from an objective approach to source 
selection based on indexing coverage to actors’ power to influence events.  
The fact that British newspapers apparently paid more or less attention to official 
statements depending on whether their editorial line favoured confrontation with Iraq or not 
is intrinsically significant. Its likely impact appears all the more substantial when considered in 
light of the broadly anti-war stance taken by the British press. Figure 44 shows that there were 
just four months during the fifteen month build-up period defined by this study in which the 
average newspaper commentary article in circulation expressed support for war with Iraq; 
February, July, and November 2002, and March 2003. Even here there was only ever a narrow 
margin in favour of military action, and this was with pro-war papers consistently out-selling 
their anti-war rivals, shifting the mean position of articles in circulation towards the pro-war 
end of the scale. Complaints by Blair government officials that the media was giving them an 
unduly hard time may consequently be explained by the combined effect of most newspapers 
adopting anti-war editorial lines, and journalists ‘indexing’ news coverage according to the 
congruence of sources’ views with those of their editors rather than to the sources’ power to 
influence events.  
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Figure 44: Average position of newspaper commentary (1 = pro-war, 0 = neutral, -1 = anti-war), 
controlling for circulation, January 2002 – March 2003 (n=2,114). 
 
Understanding the impact of media logic on the public debate helps explain the 
conflicting pressures at work in the creation and consideration of foreign policy. It helps also to 
shift the focus from public opinion as the output of actors to Public Opinion as a structure 
constraining policymaking. Commercial imperatives incline news reporters towards novelty 
and scandal. They seek evidence of conflicts within political parties, and are interested in 
official positions only when they are unexpected, show signs of change, or can be presented 
(however justifiably) as evidence of crisis (Baum and Groeling 2010b, 20). Journalists’ 
professional commitment to using credible sources, generally defined in terms of the actual 
ability of those sources to affect the decisions under consideration, tends to aid governments 
in transmitting the messages they seek to transmit. This is qualified, however, by a concurrent 
tendency on the part of news reporters to cleave to the editorial line adopted by their 
employers in deciding whose views to report. Both effects exacerbate the impact of actual 
divisions amongst the governing elite. In New Labour’s case, they account for the prominence 
of anti-war Labour MPs in news coverage relating to Iraq. Rebel parliamentarians generally had 
limited direct power over foreign policy. They were outnumbered 3 to 1 even after having 
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secured the concession of a vote to authorise military action. Nevertheless their views were 
widely-reported in the press both because their rebellion and the government’s failure to back 
down were unusual and thus newsworthy in their own right, and because Labour MPs were 
the most authoritative anti-war actors available in the circumstances of Conservative Party 
acquiescence in government policy. The end result was a media environment that imposed 
itself on policymaking, but as a self-interested force seeking headlines rather than as an 
objective observer. The fact, then, that Blair government policymakers clearly feared the press, 
and indeed clearly had good reason to, does not mean that it was actually effective at holding 
them to account. As this section has shown, it was in many ways structurally incapable of 
fulfilling such a role.  
 
Communication and substance 
 
This study’s sixth broader implication is that it may not be possible meaningfully to 
distinguish between the substance and the communication of modern British foreign policy. 
This observation applies equally at the conceptual and the practical levels of analysis. 
Communication and substance are inseparable conceptually because supposedly substantive 
actions have communication consequences, while communication decisions affect matters of 
substance. Tony Blair’s three ‘conditions’ for confronting Iraq, presented to President Bush at 
Crawford in April 2002, illustrate this. Not only did Blair present recommendations about how 
best to sell the policy as essential components of the policy, he also left open the question of 
whether Britain would still support the US if the ‘conditions’ were left unmet. This ambiguity in 
turn created confusion within the British government about what exactly had been agreed, 
and particularly over the actual conditionality of the ‘conditions’. The constructivist approach 
adopted in this study implies that the rhetoric used to describe foreign policy determines to a 
significant degree the way it is understood and remembered. Concepts such as ‘legitimacy’ and 
‘success’ emerge from rhetorical interactions, just as the costs of a conflict, in financial terms 
284 
 
as well as in lives lost, are interpreted by elite actors before ordinary people even hear about 
them (Baum and Groeling 2010a, 443). In other words, it is not enough actually to win a war, 
to minimise casualties, and to achieve the goals for which the war was fought in the first place. 
Rhetoric matters. Governments must win the debate over how a conflict is represented and 
recalled if they are to shape its consideration by Public Opinion. There are opportunities for 
successful communicators to frame what it means to ‘win’ a war, what level of casualties count 
as ‘minimal’, and what goals might realistically be achieved by military action. In the 21st 
century, then, “winning is about narrative, not sheer brute force” (Michalski and Gow 2007, 
198). Military success “depends not only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins” 
(Nye 2005, Nye 2009, 162-163, Nye 2011a, 19, Nye 2011b, 18). Reality is important still, but 
“both rhetoric and reality matter” (Baum and Groeling 2010a, 445). For a war to be judged a 
success, or decried a failure, someone must first define success. Such definitions are rarely 
objective. They tend to emerge from framing contests between governments and Public 
Opinion. This is why, as Robin Cook put it, “modern warfare involves as much hand to hand 
combat in the television studio as on the battlefield” (Cook 2003, 49). It is also why it proves 
impossible to differentiate at a conceptual level between how aspects of foreign policy are 
communicated, and what they represent in concrete terms.   
From a practical perspective, meanwhile, New Labour’s development of a strong, 
centralised news management system based in Downing Street helped fuel the integration of 
communication into policymaking. Bringing ‘spin doctors’ in to advise on decisions before they 
were made ensured that policy was developed with one eye on how it might be ‘sold’, 
potentially improving the government’s position in public debate at the cost of some 
constraint on its substantive freedom to act (McNair 2000, 127). At both conceptual and 
practical levels, the integration of communication and substance has antecedents going back 
well before Blair came to power. In 1988 Christopher Meyer came to the end of a four-year 
stint as head of the Foreign Office News Department, the official centre of British political 
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communication efforts with respect to foreign policy. Taking the opportunity for a sabbatical, 
he accepted a one-year visiting research fellowship at the Weatherhead Center for 
International Affairs at Harvard University. During their tenure, all Weatherhead Fellows are 
expected to produce an extended study of an aspect of international affairs about which they 
have first-hand knowledge. Meyer chose to write about the work of News Department, and its 
role in the communication of British foreign policy to the public through the media. Two main 
conclusions of significance for this study emerge from Meyer’s manuscript. Firstly, he 
described the functional integration of press officers into the highest levels of policymaking; 
“the frequent need to act, or react, with the utmost speed in dealing with the press means 
that there is no time to go through the usual bureaucratic channels. More to the point, the 
importance that ministers attach to their relations with the press leads to their preferring a 
direct relationship with the press office” (C. Meyer 1989, 9-10). A decade before New Labour 
came to office, ministers already saw the media in the frenetic terms later described by 
Alastair Campbell, and had ceased to rely on the ‘usual’ civil service news management 
channels. For Meyer, the result of both the need to act and react quickly, and the close 
interest that ministers tended to take in press coverage, was that in the Foreign Office, “the 
head of News Department...[was] close to being an unofficial member of the Foreign 
Secretary’s private office, with similar rights of access to the minister; while the department, 
because of its responsibility to advise on the presentation and presentability of policy, [was] 
widely drawn into the discussion of the substance of policy” (C. Meyer 1989, 11, emphasis in 
original). Again the Blair government’s integration of spin doctors into policymaking should be 
seen in the context of these earlier developments. Alastair Campbell told the Chilcot Inquiry 
that he was involved in policymaking as “the part of that discussion and that operation that is 
thinking the whole time about communications issues...on something – not just on issues to do 
with foreign affairs and security, but on any of the major issues and high profile issues, you 
have to have a communications element, if you like, embedded in those policy discussions” 
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(Campbell 2010a, 7-8). By virtue of his unparalleled access and capacity to act on the Prime 
Minister’s behalf, it is indeed arguable that Campbell “had more influence over New Labour 
foreign policy than did the various ministers nominally in charge of the UK’s external affairs 
over the period 1997-2007” (Daddow 2011, 226). His close involvement in substantive 
decision-making, evidenced throughout the empirical body of this study, was both a cause and 
a consequence of its practical inseparability from communication. He was part of policymaking 
because Blair had accepted the need to shape policy according to what will ‘sell’ rather than 
waiting until decisions are made before deciding how they are to be presented. His presence 
then ensured that communication was factored into the wider policymaking calculus.  
 Meyer’s account of life in News Department may, therefore, have been somewhat 
dated by 2003, but it was not out of date. Its second main conclusion of significance for this 
study was that it is no longer “possible to distinguish in any useful way between the substance 
of policy and its presentation” (C. Meyer 1989, 38-39). Of course the presentation and the 
substance of foreign policy are, in theory, distinct. Even at a conceptual level, however, the 
distinction does not long survive contact with reality. It is inconceivable that foreign policy 
decision-making might not touch upon presentational questions, or that communication 
activities could take place without at least raising the possibility of substantive diplomatic or 
political consequences. New Labour is perhaps unfairly maligned for being “wedded to the 
idea that presentation, and hence image, were indispensable to effective policy-making and 
implementation”. Governments everywhere have accepted that news management is a central 
component of policymaking. Labour’s experiences with Iraq may “serve as a testament to the 
confusion that can result from according as much importance to the presentation of the 
government’s case as to the substance” (Hollis 2010, 30, 62). They do not prove that this 
conflation was necessarily illegitimate, particularly voluntary, or indeed unique. The 
impossibility of distinguishing between decisions made for ‘traditional’ foreign policy ends, and 
those made to better ‘sell’ those ends to sceptical domestic (and international) audiences, 
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caused more problems than it solved in the lead up to the Iraq war. This study differs from 
critics who blame Labour, Blair, and Campbell entirely for this. No one actor (or group of 
actors) is solely responsible. Policymakers remain free to define the limits of their ‘spin’ 
activities, and arguably the Blair government favoured its media advisers over foreign policy 
experts in deciding to go to war with Iraq. The integration of communication into substantive 
policymaking, however, is a consequence of the insinuation of Public Opinion into the foreign 
policymaking process through the rise of news management, itself a reaction to the challenge 
posed by pressures endemic to the developing commercial media market. It is not something 
that can be attributed solely to any one group of individuals.  
 There is nothing controversial about the claim that governments adjust their rhetoric 
in response to pressure from Public Opinion (Risse-Kappen 1991, 482, Bennett 1994, 34, 
Graham 1994, 201, Shiraev 2000, 297, Gilboa 2002, 732). Of course they do. Rhetoric is about 
persuasion. If it is not reactive, it is not effective. The Blair government tried to lead Public 
Opinion, but it also sought to respond to the challenges it raised. One immediate consequence 
of the drive on the part of officials to react more effectively to public debate has been 
increased understanding of what the public thinks. Ministers and officials displayed 
throughout the period covered by this study a “dual concern with manipulation and 
responsiveness” (Jacobs 1992, 200, 212, emphasis in original). Philip Gould’s focus group and 
poll reports, although greeted with some scepticism by Blair and Powell (Blair 2010b, 298, 
Powell 2010b, 136-137), were nevertheless a necessary complement to Campbell’s ‘spin’. A 
more general implication, this study’s seventh, emerges from the observation that since Public 
Opinion regularly affects the “nature and presentation of policy”, so “when intensely focused, 
[it] may essentially set policy” (Sobel 2001, 239). The integration of policy substance and policy 
communication, and the iteration between news management and media logic, produce when 
considered together an indirect channel of influence running between Public Opinion and 
British foreign policy. Public Opinion acts as a structural constraint affecting what kinds of 
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policy options are considered viable, limiting a government’s substantive freedom to act. It 
does this in a manner that reflects the values and imperatives of 21st century journalism. This 
effect was most clearly visible during the period of this study in the UK government’s efforts to 
obtain a ‘second’ UN Security Council Resolution. Ministers failed at a sufficiently early stage to 
frame UNSCR 1441 and the UNMOVIC inspection process in line with their own understanding. 
Many of those writing in the media who opposed the use of force in Iraq responded to the 
government having successfully met their demand for a UN resolution by demanding a second 
resolution. The purpose of their demand, after all, was to avoid entirely a war they considered 
unjustifiable (partly at least because they didn’t like members of the Bush administration). 
They had no interest in the government legitimising its actions through a UN process; they 
wanted it to change course entirely. By failing to draw a line under the matter after 1441, 
ministers blew the tactical advantage they had won over their opponents in public debate. 
Few in the British government had anticipated an inconclusive UN inspection process. Artificial 
deadlines imposed by the US military timetable, rather than by anything the UN or the Iraqis 
did, ensured that an inconclusive process was exactly what they got. Having promised to work 
through the UN, and having been vague in addressing the question of whether a ‘second’ SCR 
would be sought, Blair found himself in early 2003 ‘trapped’ by his earlier commitments into 
entering a fruitless further negotiation without US backing and with little hope of a positive 
result, however much he apparently backed himself to succeed. What was most interesting 
about the ‘second’ SCR fiasco was how actively it had been pursued despite no longer being 
thought legally necessary. Communication had not only become intertwined with substance, it 
had arguably exceeded it in significance.  
The established Foreign Policy Analysis literature has already identified this indirect 
route of public influence, without necessarily recognising its significance, in the form of the 
‘domestic audience costs’ model of international bargaining. The model frames public 
communication as a tool by which democratic leaders signal their unwillingness to 
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compromise in entering negotiations by creating expectations in the minds of their domestic 
constituents that they would subsequently face punishment for failing to fulfil (Fearon 1994, 
577, Partell 1997, 504, Heffernan 2006, 593). The relative transparency and accountability of 
democracy enhances the effect by making policymaking increasingly a public act (Leblang and 
Chan 2003, 387), particularly in the US, as this study found, but also in the UK. The credibility 
established by the invocation of the potential wrath of a domestic public is not absolute, for 
example where there is doubt about the government’s ability to carry through its proposed 
course (Putnam 1988, 439, Eichenberg 2005, 9), or where the public has limited direct power 
over, and/or little interest in an issue area (Trumbore 1998, 545, Clare 2007, 732). The 
‘domestic audience costs’ model nevertheless integrates both government and opposition 
rhetoric (Ramsay 2004, 460) into a framework that places the very ‘hard’ rational choice 
notions of actor credibility and office-seeking at the heart of a ‘soft’ constructivist account of 
policymaking (Tomz 2007, 821). When both President Bush and Prime Minister Blair explicitly 
warned Saddam Hussein that they meant to ensure he gave up his WMD, the power of their 
messages lay not only in the substance of what they said, but also in the domestic political 
implications of failing to carry their threats through (Badie 2010, 289). Indeed, Blair tacitly 
acknowledges in a passage discussed in Chapter 3 that at Crawford he and Bush consciously 
took a tougher stance against Iraq in public than the “more nuanced” approach they had 
discussed in private primarily to demonstrate to Saddam Hussein that they were serious (Blair 
2010b, 401). His annoyance at Clare Short’s clumsy anti-war briefing efforts meanwhile 
centred on the fact that they “sent exactly the wrong signal...about our seriousness of intent” 
(Campbell and Stott 2007, 569). Domestic audience costs theory, then, not only makes 
intuitive sense, it also reflects the way the British government approached Iraq.  
 It also helps explain what went wrong with that approach, and why. Establishing 
domestic expectations by making public commitments may well signal seriousness, but “the 
price of enhanced credibility is that [the policymaker’s] hands will be politically tied if the 
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adversary does not blink” (Baum 2004a, 609). On a number of occasions during the build-up to 
the Iraq war the British government was “rhetorically manoeuvred into a corner”, largely as a 
result of its own public commitments (Krebs and Jackson 2007, 42, Steuter and Wills 2008, xiv). 
The failed attempt to get UN approval for military action saw the unstoppable force of 
domestic expectations encounter the immovable object of a diplomatic impasse. It was 
exacerbated by both sides in the developing dispute having established contradictory positions 
in the minds of their respective publics. Blair signalled to Jacques Chirac by his public 
statements on Iraq that he was serious about getting UN approval for military action, but also 
that the US and UK would ignore France if it did not oblige. France thus had the choice of 
whether its impotence was made explicit through an unauthorised war or left implicit by its 
unwilling quiescence. Chirac’s response showed that he was not going to qualify his insistence 
that the UN Security Council must genuinely have the final say on the use of force. Both 
leaders had, by making their positions so explicit and so public, ensured that they could not 
back down without domestic political costs. Neither would have been satisfied from a foreign 
policy perspective with the ultimate outcome, a war taking place without clear UN support, 
and with the US and Europe divided. France, after all, still had military forces en route to the 
Gulf until the very brink of war, thus retaining the option to participate if a diplomatic truce 
had been brokered. Chirac, like many opponents of military action in Britain, was never in 
principle opposed to the use of force in Iraq; he simply argued that it was not a necessary or 
proportionate response in March 2003 given the level of threat and the length of time that had 
passed in the revised UN inspection programme. The disagreement between Blair and Chirac 
was thus one more of style than substance. Nevertheless, that neither leader was satisfied by 
the outcome of negotiations in New York reflects the real policy constraints both faced as a 
consequence of their communication efforts. As Baum put it, “all else [being] equal, a policy 
fashioned under intense public scrutiny is more likely to fail, because public scrutiny reduces 
the president’s freedom to develop an optimal foreign policy” (Baum 2004b, 188). Both Blair 
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and Chirac constrained their own freedom in signalling their positions to each other that they 
were unable subsequently to achieve a compromise. The result was a diplomatic crisis that 
neither desired nor sought.  
 Public scrutiny not only constrained the Blair government’s diplomatic options, it also 
limited the coherence and consistency of its official line on Iraq. In attempting to construct 
their statements in response to daily news headlines, New Labour policymakers not only made 
bad substantive decisions, they were also forced to proceed without the necessary 
foreknowledge of how particular concessions might play out (Bennett 1994, 14, Gilboa 2002, 
743). In the most notorious example of these effects, media demands influenced the timing, 
the content, and the impact of the WMD dossier, with negative consequences on each count 
for the invasion policy as a whole. Pressure from journalists forced the dossier’s release earlier 
than intended. The result was that sufficient time elapsed between its publication, and the 
invasion, for evidence to arrive contradicting some of its claims about Iraq’s WMD. This was an 
essential pre-condition for the later complaint that the government had lied about the threat. 
Although there is limited evidence to support the suggestion that the Blair government was 
actively dishonest, there is far better evidence that it failed to revise its public threat 
assessment of September 2002 in line with those it made subsequently in private. Blair 
announced that the dossier would be released imminently during his September press 
conference, apparently without first discussing this with anyone else in the government. In 
doing so, he seriously constrained the time available to guarantee consensus on the dossier’s 
contents between the different parts of the British government. Doubts persisted within the 
Defence Intelligence Staff about the ‘45-minute claim’, despite these having been alleviated in 
other areas by assurances from MI6. Jack Straw has lamented the Foreign Office’s limited 
contribution to the drafting process, which resulted from its people being preoccupied at the 
annual meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York, taking place at the same time. Given 
that Blair was motivated to accelerate the dossier’s release by media pressure, the implication 
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is that timing constraints indirectly imposed by journalists, themselves responding to 
commercial pressures, lay behind dissatisfaction with the dossier in the Ministry of Defence, 
and the exclusion of the experienced public communicators of the FCO from its production. 
The former helped contribute to the scandal around the Gilligan report in May 2003. The latter 
may explain the failure to spot deficiencies in the text of the dossier itself, by reducing the 
number of experienced eyes cast over it before release.  
The perception that the media would not accept nuanced arguments, meanwhile, had 
already forced ministers to make categorical statements on the nature of the Iraqi threat (Blair 
2010b, 374), which in turn constrained the ability of the dossier’s drafters to express their 
views in the finely-balanced style typical of secret JIC judgements. By the time the document 
was released, “unequivocal claims had already been made”. The JIC could not appear to 
contradict these by restating the caveats it had offered in the course of its private judgements 
(Freedman 2004, 27). The dossier had little immediate impact on the public debate because it 
contained little surprising or novel in light of earlier US and UK government claims, the 
publicly-available reports of UNSCOM, and the IISS report released just weeks earlier. Because 
it had little impact on Public Opinion, little effort was made by Downing Street to clear up 
misunderstandings in what media coverage did arise. This meant, however, that the 
government was left exposed to later criticism. Similar effects occurred with regard to the 
questions of whether or not the government intended to seek ‘regime change’ in Baghdad, of 
the role of UNMOVIC inspectors, and of the humanitarian rationale for removing Saddam 
Hussein. In each case it was primarily pressure from journalists, responding to the imperatives 
of their industry, that undermined the independence of British foreign policymakers.  
Blair may not have been “trapped” by his own rhetoric into taking the country to war, 
as some accounts have suggested (Coates and Krieger 2009, 248-249). He always had a choice, 
particularly given the decision’s unpopularity. Backing down from commitments always makes 
a leader appear weak, but this effect must surely be qualified when the commitments 
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themselves are unpopular. At the same time, it is evident that Blair could not have reversed 
course in March 2003 without suffering some damage to his credibility. He had taken a range 
of rhetorical positions from which he could not easily disentangle himself. Indeed, looking at 
the Prime Minister’s position in early 2003, we might even suggest the existence of 
‘international audience costs’ as a corollary to their domestic equivalents. He had promised to 
stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the US in responding to the 11 September attacks. This 
show of support won him considerable favour in Washington and cemented his close personal 
relationship with President Bush during the following months. Trying to capitalise on this 
access, Blair maintained a positive line in public, raising any specific concerns in private. For 
example, he publicly declared action against Iraq essential while privately urging Bush to work 
through the UN in challenging Saddam Hussein, and to seek progress on the Middle East Peace 
Process at the same time. The result was that, as early as April 2002, Blair stood to damage 
Britain’s most significant alliance, not to mention his own diplomatic credibility, should he row 
back from his commitments. Given it now seems likely that the logic of the ‘Axis of Evil’ and 
the ‘Bush doctrine’ would always have lead US forces to Baghdad, it is arguable that Britain 
was rhetorically committed to military action as much as a year before the invasion. By March 
2003 Blair was indeed boxed into a corner; either he had been wrong in his earlier arguments, 
or their logic dictated he must proceed to war. In that light his final decision was unsurprising, 
if not quite inevitable. Even setting aside the impact of his personal convictions, Blair’s self-
interest (and, in his mind, Britain’s national interest) was tied up in a decision to proceed.  
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Conclusion 
 
The Blair government was no more “spinned against” than it was “spinning” over Iraq. 
Ministers engaged in news management because they felt they had to, or else the news would 
‘manage’ them; journalists proved challenging opponents in the battle for hegemony over 
public debate. Many in the British media were professionally committed to demonstrating 
their independence, instinctively opposed to war with Iraq, and commercially compelled to 
seek out crises and scandals at every opportunity. Whenever no ‘official line’ was forthcoming 
on Iraq, they resorted to speculation. Any evidence of disagreement in Cabinet was reported 
as a sign of imminent political meltdown. Any hint of escalation in the pressure being applied 
to Baghdad meant immediate war. Source material was selected and deployed according to 
each publication’s editorial line rather than because it held any sort of objective ‘news value’. 
New Labour veterans argue that their association with ‘spin’ simply reflects the systemic 
realities of the 21st century commercial news market. In doing so, however, they gloss over the 
particular significance of political communication both for their approach to government, and 
for their place in popular memory. No other government has been so closely identified with 
news management. Probably any Prime Minister would have authorised some variant of 
Alastair Campbell’s techniques, because probably they would have faced similar pressure from 
the press. Blair nevertheless emerges from this study as a man rightly associated with an 
approach to policymaking that favoured communication over substance, and who was 
punished by the interrelationship between the two. His central role in decision making only 
served to exacerbate the effect. Jonathan Powell accepts that “at the moment the Blair 
government is more remembered for spin than for strategy”, while arguing “in truth we 
succeeded in strategy but failed in spin” (Powell 2010, 187). He implies, without conceding the 
point, that on occasion the failure of ‘spin’ damaged the strategy. Clearly, this was the case 
with regard to Iraq.  
295 
 
It was for reasons of ‘spin’ rather than substance that ministers refused to “mention 
the war” in the early part of 2002, so concerned were they to avoid a premature and 
necessarily speculative debate on whether the ‘war on terror’ should be extended to Baghdad. 
Official reticence in the UK, however, was not matched in the US, and in any event did little to 
calm concerns about the prospect of further military action. Journalists felt the government’s 
silence stemmed from its fear of facing opposition rather than a genuine lack of interest in 
Saddam Hussein. To a degree they were right, although arguably also they were cynically 
creating news where little or none existed, reporting rumours in the absence of ministerial 
statements. Regardless of how honest media disquiet actually was, during the summer of 2002 
it was fanned by debate across the Atlantic, and exacerbated further by ministers’ seasonal 
absence from the political fray during the parliamentary recess. By September the volume of 
speculation had grown so great that Blair felt compelled to respond, by bringing forward the 
release of the WMD ‘dossier’, mooted originally in March but delayed pending a decision in 
Washington about what shape the coming confrontation would take. The dossier did little to 
improve the immediate position, and ultimately damaged the government more than any 
other aspect of the invasion. Partly the long-term damage followed inevitably from the 
inaccuracy of Britain’s assessment of the threat from Iraq’s WMD programmes. Partly, too, it 
resulted from the inaccuracy of Andrew Gilligan’s Today report, and the effect it had on Public 
Opinion in an atmosphere of public distrust. In both cases, the accelerated timetable for the 
dossier’s release, forced by the press, artificially increased its significance in post-invasion 
debates.  
There were other examples of efforts to lead public debate that impacted on areas 
that might have been regarded as part of the ‘substance’ of British foreign policy. The decision 
to refer Iraq to the UN is a good case in point, but so too is the agreement between Blair and 
Bush at Crawford in April 2002. Blair pursued the “UN route” in response to public pressure, 
and because he thought UN backing might grant the expected conflict much-needed 
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legitimacy. It was, then, both a reactive and a pro-active strategy. He promised to support the 
US in taking on Saddam, but maintained that public communication was crucial to the success 
of any renewed confrontation. At every stage, the inseparability of the communication and the 
substance of Blairite foreign policy was underlined. Even at a conceptual level, the importance 
of public debate to the social construction of contested concepts like ‘legitimacy’, ‘success’, or 
even ‘threat’, made rhetoric vital to policymaking. However poisoned the atmosphere of 
public debate had been by disagreements prior to the invasion, British journalists might still 
have been won over during the course of the fighting were it not for the very real difficulties 
the invading forces faced in establishing stability after the fall of Saddam (Mueller 2005, 109). 
Crucially, they might also have been won over had the criteria for success been established 
differently. Ministers could have promised to achieve less ambitious goals, or predicted higher 
costs. They could have been more frank at an earlier stage about Britain’s inability to influence 
the US military timetable, or less reticent in discussing the ‘moral case’ for action. They could 
have avoided a damaging fiasco by not actively consulting the UN. More negative predictions, 
or a less collegial approach to international allies, might have made the prospect of war harder 
to ‘sell’, and arguably Blair could not afford any movement on either point. They would equally 
however have made it more difficult for journalists writing later to portray the invasion as 
illegitimate, or its consequences as failure. Such is the nature of warfare in the postmodern 
age. With victory and defeat no longer objective, subjective interpretation has become 
crucially important. Here the media, and media management, come centrally into play.  
The presentation of foreign policy in Blair’s Britain, then, was not only inseparable 
from its substance, it was potentially more important. Iraq was a war of words rather than one 
of conventional weapons, or even WMD. Ministers shifted focus constantly in searching for an 
argument that would break through the wall of public scepticism and legitimise, in the eyes of 
journalists and so their audiences, a war with Iraq in early 2003. In adopting a reactive and 
inconsistent approach, they undermined their own case; disingenuous opportunism became 
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the defining theme of the official contribution to public debate. Alastair Campbell complains 
that the British media focus on missing WMD, spin, and David Kelly came at the cost of proper 
coverage of the good work being done by British forces in Iraq (Campbell 2010b, 80). He fails 
to acknowledge that this focus related to, was indeed often a reaction to, government 
communication efforts which he himself drove. His presence at crucial decision-making 
sessions, at Blair’s personal behest, represented both a cause and a consequence of the 
functional integration of news management into foreign policymaking.  
British Public Opinion was neither ignored nor impotent in the face of the 
government’s determination to go to war. Policymakers had to pay attention to public debate 
if they were ever going to lead it successfully. Their conduct during the months before the 
invasion, as this study has shown, was influenced repeatedly by demands emanating from the 
public sphere. Even though this influence primarily affected policy communication, the 
integration of communication and substance ensured that Public Opinion had at least an 
indirect effect on substance at every major stage of the build-up to war. In the end, however, 
Blair was able to take military action against Iraq, in the face of public hostility, because the 
British public (including those, such as journalists and MPs, who contributed actively to public 
debate) lacked effective mechanisms to stop him once he had decided he was willing to risk 
losing his job, and because it was not really sure it wanted to; everyone agreed Saddam 
Hussein potentially posed a threat to Britain. Blair was able both to implement his preferred 
course, and to escape serious electoral punishment for disregarding opposition along the way, 
but he was not immune to the consequences of an unpopular and unsuccessful war. His 
reputation was tarnished, his political capital diminished, and his freedom to act both at home 
and overseas undermined by subsequent controversies, themselves related more to 
communication than to substance. These costs were more subtle than electoral defeat would 
have been, but they still affect Tony Blair’s place in history. Without Iraq, he might not be 
remembered for foreign policy at all. With it, no other area exerts a comparable influence on 
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his political legacy. For all his skill as a politician, and as a leader, he was unable to ‘manage’ 
the complex, chaotic, system of interaction and rhetorical exchange that comprised British 
Public Opinion. Perhaps, then, this study’s final conclusion should be to observe the near 
impossibility of a British government successfully fighting postmodern war, with its necessary 
reliance on rhetoric to shape uncertain reality, in the face of the competitive, fiercely 
independent, and technologically well-equipped 21st-century press. 
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